



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

GROUP	
EXHIBIT	

Agency / Organization

Title

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015

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* Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-004
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Interview of: DENNIS CARMODY

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday,
January 28, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: RICHARD DOWNS, JR.
Survival Factors Investigator

APPEARANCES:

RICHARD DOWNS, JR., Survival Factors Investigator
Chairman, Survival Factors Technical Working Group
National Transportation Safety Board

ROBERT JOE GORDON, Investigator-in-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

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Office of Transit Safety and Oversight
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WMATA

DERRON HAWKINS, Deputy Fire Chief
D.C. Fire and EMS
Homeland Security & Special Operations Division

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I N T E R V I E W

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2 MR. DOWNS: Today's date is January 28, 2015 and the
3 following is an interview being conducted in reference to NTSB
4 investigation number DCA-15-FR-004, which relates to an accident
5 involving a heavy smoke release and train evacuations that
6 occurred in and near the L'Enfant Plaza Station of the WMATA
7 Metrorail system here in Washington DC on the afternoon of January
8 12, 2015.

9 This interview is being conducted with a member of the
10 District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
11 Department as conducted by the NTSB Survival Factors Technical
12 Working Group of the investigation. My name is Richard Downs, Jr.
13 and I'm a Survival Factors Investigator with the NTSB in which I
14 also serve in the role as the Survival Factors Technical Working
15 Group Chairperson.

16 I will preside over this interview, which is being
17 recorded for the record, in which a transcript may also be
18 compiled of the recording as a permanent docketed record of the
19 interview. I'll now ask that our witness please identify
20 themselves, their employment affiliation and their job position
21 title for the record.

22 MR. CARMODY: Got it. My name is Dennis Brian Carmody.
23 I'm a firefighter with Rescue Squad 1 out of Chinatown.

24 MR. DOWNS: Very good. Thank you. I'll -- now I ask,
25 are you accompanied today by any -- by anyone in this interview?

1 MR. CARMODY: No, sir.

2 MR. DOWNS: Very well. I'll now ask that the
3 participants of this interview who will also have an opportunity
4 to present questions to the witness to please individually
5 identify themselves, their employment affiliation, and job
6 position title for the record.

7 MR. ROURKE: Good afternoon. My name is Denton Rourke.
8 I work for WMATA. I am the Operations Manager of the Office of
9 Emergency Management.

10 MS. BURTCHE: Good afternoon. I'm Kimberly Burtch from
11 the Federal Transit Administration's Office of Transit Safety and
12 Oversight.

13 MR. HAWKINS: Good afternoon. Derron T. Hawkins, Deputy
14 Fire Chief, DC Fire and EMS, Homeland Security Division.

15 MR. GORDON: Joe Gordon, National Transportation Safety
16 Board and the Investigator in Charge on the L'Enfant Plaza
17 incident. Before we get started, just a background on NTSB
18 investigations. Our purpose is enhance safety, look for process
19 improvements. We're not here to assign any blame or guilt.

20 NTSB cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or
21 immunity from legal action. As Mr. Downs spoke about the
22 transcript and the public docket. And with that, we can get
23 started with the interview. Mr. Downs.

24 INTERVIEW OF DENNIS CARMODY

25 BY MR. DOWNS:

1 Q: Thank you. And as my first question for the witness
2 would you please briefly describe for us your role or involvement
3 in this event?

4 A: Yes, sir. The day of the incident, I was driving Rescue
5 Squad 1. The technician driver retired in November. I have been
6 filling in his spot since and I've been testing for that position.

7 Q: Okay. And was it your fire department squad was the
8 first squad in to contact the train that was in the tunnel?

9 A: That's correct. As the driver, when we arrived on the
10 scene, the four individuals who are assigned to the squad aside
11 from myself were staging at the elevator, which is where the
12 rescue squad goes according to our Standard Operating Guidelines.
13 Upon reaching the elevator, they handed me my own personal set of
14 keys, which each member of the squad has their own set of Metro
15 keys for a situation like this. And my lieutenant said, something
16 doesn't sound right. We're going to head down into the tunnel. I
17 don't know how far you want me to go into that.

18 Q: Okay. That's good for now. Thank you. And could you
19 please describe for us in your own words what occurred kind of
20 step by step --

21 A: Sure.

22 Q: -- on the day of the event relative to your actions and
23 involvement at the L'Enfant Plaza Station starting when you first
24 got the call?

25 A: Yes, sir. It's a relatively long timeline, so bear with

1 me.

2 Q: Sure.

3 A: We were dispatched. We took the most direct run route.
4 As I stated before, our Standard Operating Guidelines call for the
5 rescue squad to go to the elevator. We arrived at the elevator.
6 The four members of the rescue squad aside from myself went to the
7 elevator, maintained control of it and gave me my set of keys.
8 The lieutenant notified me that something didn't sound right and
9 that they were going to head down.

10 I told him that I would retrieve the personal
11 accountability tags from Rescue Squad 1 and give them to the entry
12 control point because one had not been established yet and because
13 we were going into the elevator that is, we are the only company
14 who goes down through the elevator. So if the company goes, it's
15 my responsibility to make sure they are accounted for inside the
16 tunnel or inside the station rather.

17 I proceeded to -- I removed my personal accountability
18 tag and placed it on my belt loop because I obviously have not
19 entered the tunnel. I proceeded to the entrance at 600 Maryland
20 Avenue, maybe 200 feet from where the rescue squad was parked at
21 the elevator. There had been no company, fire department company
22 who had establish personal accountability or Level 3
23 accountability or an entry control point there.

24 I did see between six and eight police officers. I
25 cannot identify what jurisdiction they were with. They were all

1 running up the escalator. I stopped one of them and asked what
2 they had going on. They said we have smoke in the tunnel and on
3 the platform level. It should also be noted that there were some
4 accordion gates that had already been set up at the top of the
5 escalators and there were no civilians exiting the station at that
6 time.

7 So I radioed my lieutenant on Channel A-15, which is the
8 channel that we use as a talk -- a direct talk utilizing VRS. So
9 we can hear the fire round channel as well as talk to one another
10 individually without the rest of the fire round channel hearing
11 us. So I advised him, I said, lieutenant, they have smoke in the
12 tunnel. I imagine at this point he was still traveling down
13 through the other air shaft.

14 I said, I'm going to start up all of our meters for
15 atmospheric monitoring and I will bring them to you. Have one of
16 the members meet me at the bottom of the escalator. So I ran back
17 to the squad. I started up all the meters. We have an array of
18 meters that test for radiation, volatile organic compounds,
19 hydrogen sulfide, chemical warfare agents, anything for an unknown
20 environment.

21 I started all of those meters and at that point I saw no
22 one was there yet. I ran down. And I did not see any members at
23 the bottom of the escalator. There was a small amount of smoke.
24 There were officers inside at the top of the second escalator who
25 didn't seem to be experiencing any ill effects. I did have the

1 advantage of atmospheric monitoring in my hand. I was not getting
2 any immediate readings outside of the ordinary atmosphere so I
3 made it to the end of the platform where I saw Rescue Squad 1 in a
4 significant amount of smoke.

5 I was notified by firefighter Jason Woods. He said, we
6 have people trapped on the train in the tunnel and the tunnel is
7 full of smoke. I said, copy that. I was clipping the meters onto
8 the firefighters, making sure we had redundancy for atmosphere
9 monitoring. At that point, I saw Lieutenant Kuhn and I said,
10 lieutenant, I'm going to go get my gear on. What do you need me
11 to bring?

12 He said, I can't get a radio transmission out. Please
13 let operations know that we have a yellow line outbound train in
14 the tunnel and we have smoke filling the tunnel. The train is
15 still full of passengers. Copy that. So I ran back out of the
16 platform, up the escalator, ran to the rescue squad at which point
17 I saw Captain Zegowitz, the safety officer. I handed him the
18 personal accountability tags to Rescue Squad 1.

19 I said, Rescue Squad 1 is in the tunnel. Whatever entry
20 control point you go into, please notify them that the guys are
21 down there. I apologize.

22 Q: Quite all right. Take your -- take your time.

23 A: I wanted to make sure the guys were accounted for if
24 anything happened. So at this point I put on my gear and saw
25 Truck 4. The safety officer had already proceeded to whichever

1 control point. I saw Truck 4. I notified them of what was going
2 on and I gave them my PAT tag. There still had not been an entry
3 control point set up at 600 Maryland Avenue.

4 I said, I'm also going into the tunnel with Rescue Squad
5 1 and whichever entry control point you go in, notify them that
6 I'm going in as well. I also should note that when I came out of
7 the tunnel after dropping off the meters, the police officers I
8 saw standing at the top of the escalator, I did ask them, are the
9 fans on. And they said, yes. They confirmed that the fans were
10 on and I said, are then in exhaust or supply.

11 And they were unsure of that. But I was told that there
12 was ventilation occurring. So at that point, I went back down the
13 tunnel, through the mezzanine level, through the platform level,
14 got to -- almost to the entrance to the tunnel where I had last
15 seen Rescue Squad 1 and I started seeing civilians file out. And
16 they were coming directly towards me and then taking a 90 degree
17 turn to the left and running out and there were officers directing
18 them and they were sprinting.

19 I asked one of the officers what street level exit would
20 the individuals be going to. I'm sorry. I apologize. When I got
21 to the street level, I called operations on Channel A-7 and
22 notified them of what the lieutenant had asked me to tell them. I
23 also told them that they were having radio problems and that I was
24 able to make radio contact with them on A, Alpha-15, and that
25 might be an option for him. So, I apologize.

1 Fast forward back to the platform level, civilians
2 leaving. I called on Alpha-7, notified operations that we have a
3 number of civilians exiting the tunnel via the platform level and
4 the officers have notified me or advised me that that will be at
5 9th and D Street, so they needed to establish a casualty
6 collection point or a triage area. That's where everyone was
7 going. It was the most direct exit from where they were coming
8 out of the tunnel.

9 So because there were so many individuals coming out, I
10 entered the track bed because the 22-inch wide area was obviously
11 not big enough for me to safely pass and the third rail was
12 directly beneath that walkway. So I entered the track bed to
13 allow them to continue to evacuate. Upon arriving at the tunnel,
14 I was watching the individuals exit to my right coming out on that
15 22-inch walkway and there was a -- an officer trying to get into
16 the bulkhead door basically, the end of the train door.

17 Q: The very end of the -- of the rail car?

18 A: Correct. And the -- there are three options. There's
19 low, middle and high. And the high and low ones had been turned,
20 quarter turned so they were in the open position. And he said the
21 middle one is locked. Then --

22 Q: So this is -- this is who exactly who was trying to get
23 in this door?

24 A: It is an officer. I don't know his name.

25 Q: You couldn't tell whether it was transit police or the

1 metropolitan DC police?

2 A: No, sir. I don't know.

3 Q: A police officer of some sort?

4 A: Yes, sir. And I believe he was a sergeant because at
5 the end of the incident, I spoke to one of his superiors and I
6 heard him address him as sergeant something, something, something,
7 this fireman is looking for his keys and he appropriately told me
8 where he had left the keys. So I believe he was a sergeant with
9 one of the jurisdictions. I kind of imagine it was Metro but I
10 don't know for sure.

11 Q: Okay.

12 A: He was extremely helpful, whoever he was. I wanted to
13 thank him but I couldn't find him. So I told him, I said, this
14 key, the barrel key will open that middle door. So I handed him
15 my keys.

16 Q: Middle door on the side of the rail car?

17 A: I'm sorry. The middle latch.

18 Q: On the end of the rail car?

19 A: Yes, sir. That is correct.

20 Q: A barrel key will open that?

21 A: I believe so. Yes, sir.

22 Q: You believe so?

23 A: Yes, sir. That's -- the keys that I handed him and he
24 started trying those keys.

25 Q: Okay.

1 A: He was -- he was having difficulty --

2 Q: Was he -- was he successful with that key or no?

3 A: Not while I was standing there. While he was working on
4 that, I stepped up onto the walkway to make contact with my crew
5 to make sure we had crew integrity, to notify my lieutenant that I
6 am here and present, what do you need.

7 Q: Um-hum. Right.

8 A: And at that point, he said, we have a victim. And I
9 said, put her on my shoulders. So I don't know what kind of
10 success that officer had with that door. I do know when I later
11 entered the tunnel, that door was open and I found the keys
12 hanging on the middle latch. So I guess he had used those keys to
13 open it but I don't have any confirmation of that.

14 Q: Okay. And the patient that you carried out, you were up
15 in the walkway at that point --

16 A: Yes, sir.

17 Q: -- did you go in the rail car to get this patient?

18 A: No, sir. I was still standing in the walkway and the
19 railcar was just above waist level.

20 Q: Okay. And --

21 A: (Indiscernible) floor of the --

22 Q: And somebody brought this patient out to you?

23 A: Yeah. Lieutenant Kuhn said, I have a victim.

24 Q: And loaded that patient up and you shoulder carried that
25 patient out or --

1 A: Yes, sir. I carried her on the right shoulder and
2 leaned against the wall on the walkway.

3 Q: Okay.

4 A: Having navigated the track bed on the way in, I did not
5 believe that was going to be easy because there are some switches
6 there, lots of conduit, there were lots of trip hazards and I
7 didn't think that was going to be the safest option.

8 Q: Far safer to stay up on the catwalk.

9 A: In my mind at that time --

10 Q: In your professional experience?

11 A: Yes, sir. At the time.

12 Q: Very good. Okay. Good. Please continue.

13 A: So I believe firefighter Dave Williams followed me as I
14 was carrying her out. When we got to the platform level, we laid
15 her down and I was trying to reposition. I was obviously feeling
16 fatigue. I believe he checked for a pulse and he was -- when I
17 was walking her out, I asked him to check for a pulse while I was
18 carrying her.

19 Laid her down and then he and Captain Zegowitz, who was
20 the safety officer who I had given the personal accountability
21 tags to, they began to carry her arms and legs and it's a very
22 difficult thing to do with an unconscious person. They fold this
23 way and it's hard to grip and there's no rigidity. They carried
24 her for a period towards the 9th and D exit.

25 While they were carrying her, I made radio transmissions

1 to operations, squad driver to operations. We have a victim. We
2 are coming out to the 9th and D exit. We need a medic unit.
3 She's unresponsive and not breathing at this time. I believe
4 that's what I said.

5 Q: Was this an older patient?

6 A: It was hard to tell at the time, her age. But I was
7 guessing she was in her mid or late 50s.

8 Q: Okay. Now did you have any stokes baskets or anything
9 like that with you? Backboards or whatever?

10 A: I did not.

11 Q: Do you have that equipment on your truck?

12 A: We have a stokes basket, a backboard and some skeds. We
13 also are of an -- of the understanding that those are staged in
14 the Metros themselves.

15 Q: Okay.

16 A: And I did not see any when I got there.

17 Q: And whose responsibility would it be to access that
18 equipment?

19 A: Well, as the -- as any Metro situation develops,
20 generally the recon branch group turns into the rescue group.

21 Q: Okay.

22 A: It's my understanding that the recon branch group did
23 not make it into the yellow line tunnel where Rescue Squad 1 was.

24 Q: Right.

25 A: So Rescue Squad 1 at the time as far as I can tell was

1 doing the best that they could do with the resources they had
2 available which was five individuals, myself and the four who went
3 down the elevator.

4 Q: Okay.

5 A: That was all we had.

6 Q: Could anyone of yourselves in Rescue 1 could have gone
7 to the stock of rescue equipment in the Metro system and accessed
8 it and brought it out, maybe brought out some backboards or
9 whatever?

10 A: Yes, sir. That could have been a possibility, however -
11 -

12 Q: And you didn't consider that or it didn't come to mind
13 that the time or what was the thinking?

14 A: Well, so when you have a possible crush load of
15 individuals on a six or eight car train, you can have as many as
16 1,800 people on that train. So with five individuals, our
17 responsibility is triage. So it's -- the goal is to help the
18 greatest number of people with the number of resources that we
19 have.

20 Q: Okay.

21 A: So for me to go back and try to find -- could need to
22 move people when I'm seeing people self-evacuating.

23 Q: Um-hum.

24 A: It was a -- it was a decision that was made at that
25 moment and I thought that I could be most useful by using my

1 training and my physical ability to carry one individual out as
2 quickly as possible and get her out of the IDLH.

3 Q: And that there weren't obvious at that time additional
4 incapacitated individuals that would require a stokes basket or
5 whatever?

6 A: Not to my knowledge.

7 Q: Very good. Okay. Please continue.

8 A: Yes, sir. As the captain and firefighter Williams were
9 having difficulties carrying the young lady, the adult female, I
10 said, put her back on my shoulder. We made it to the bottom of
11 the escalator, top of the escalator. We came out in -- you come
12 out inside of a, kind of a mezzanine in a building. We made it
13 out to a terrace level where there are some picnic tables, went
14 down some paved steps, some concrete or stone steps and got to 9th
15 Street.

16 And I looked left and I looked right and there wasn't a
17 single ambulance or medic unit or fire engine or fire truck or
18 anyone to help. I called again on the radio and advised, we have
19 an unconscious female. We need a medic unit at 9th and D. And
20 when we got to the sidewalk level, obviously we didn't have a
21 backboard because I was carrying her on my shoulder. So I took a
22 sandwich advertising sign that was set up in a pyramid.

23 I kicked that over, laid her down on it, checked for a
24 pulse. Firefighter Williams and I began CPR. A short time later,
25 an engine company arrived with a medical bag, established an

1 airway. We continued compressions. At that time, we had the
2 captain and the engine company, Captain Zegowitz and the engine
3 company on the scene doing CPR.

4 And I said to firefighter Williams, we need to provide
5 more rescue back in the tunnel so we continued back into the
6 tunnel while they were doing CPR on her. I think there were four
7 people there when we left. When we arrive back into the tunnel, I
8 made my way back into the track bed. There were still patients
9 coming down the walkway. When I arrived back on the train, the
10 second -- well, the first time I had actually entered the train,
11 they were dragging an adult male to -- I'm sorry.

12 The door on the end of the train was now open and there
13 was an E-tech cart staged directly beneath that door.

14 Q: Okay.

15 A: There were a significant number of personnel, fire
16 department personnel in the track bed at that time. Clearly more
17 than the five members of Rescue Squad 1. They dragged this
18 individual by me and I saw them place him on the E-tech cart. I
19 then paired myself up with Lieutenant Kuhn and firefighter Jason
20 Woods and we began to do a primary search of the train from front
21 to back. So at this time --

22 Q: From front to back or back to front?

23 A: From back to front. Both. So we did a primary and a
24 secondary.

25 Q: Okay.

1 A: Our first sweep was as quickly as possible but thorough,
2 was checking under seats all the way to the rear of the train and
3 then our second sweep, our secondary search was actually, you
4 know, looking in more particular spaces. There's not really many
5 places to hide on a Metro train but our secondary search is
6 generally more thorough. It's the same type of searching that we
7 do in house fires, building fires, structural collapses, things
8 like that.

9 And at that time, the remaining passengers were
10 evacuating down the walkway and after our secondary search, I told
11 Firefighter Woods I was going to, from the front of the train
12 facing outbound, I said I was going to walk the track bed to
13 ensure that no individuals had gone the wrong way. I walked maybe
14 100 yards. The tunnel curves a bit.

15 Q: Um-hum.

16 A: And I was obviously shouting, hello, anybody need help?
17 Anybody need help? And shined my flashlight as far as I could
18 see. I didn't see anything and I did not want to separate myself
19 that far from Firefighter Woods. So I turned and came back. I
20 said, I didn't find anybody in the tunnel from here to about 150
21 yards in that direction. We really --

22 Q: That would be -- that would be south of the train?
23 Towards the river?

24 MR. GORDON: Going away from L'Enfant.

25 MR. CARMODY: Going away from L'Enfant. Yes, sir.

1 MR. GORDON: Okay.

2 MR. CARMODY: It was hard to --

3 MR. GORDON: Right.

4 MR. CARMODY: -- know north, south, east and west inside
5 the -- inside the tunnel. I apologize.

6 MR. GORDON: Sure.

7 MR. CARMODY: But, yes, going away from L'Enfant Plaza.

8 BY MR. DOWNS:

9 Q: Okay. Please continue.

10 A: Then we made contact back with Lieutenant Kuhn, advised
11 him what we had done, and that was basically it as far as our
12 operations were concerned. We maintained our crew integrity and
13 left the railcar after everyone was off and safe.

14 Q: The train -- the train was cleared at that point?

15 A: Yes, sir.

16 Q: Okay. Did you have your SCBA gear with you when you
17 first went down into the Metro station?

18 A: With the meters?

19 Q: SCBA gear.

20 A: I understand.

21 Q: Your air bottles, yes.

22 A: I went down into the -- I went to the station twice.

23 Q: Right.

24 A: The first time I ran the meters down --

25 Q: Right. Okay.

1 A: -- without any gear on because I wanted to get those to
2 the crew as quickly as possible. When I actually entered the
3 track bed as the civilians were exiting, yes, I was wearing full
4 gear.

5 Q: Full turnout gear --

6 A: Yes, sir.

7 Q: -- and SCBA. We --

8 A: I was not on air but, yes, I had mine.

9 Q I was going to say, were you on air or did you have the
10 mask not in use at that time?

11 A: I never went on air.

12 Q: Never went on air.

13 A: No, sir.

14 Q: But you did have the bottle on your back --

15 A: Absolutely.

16 Q: -- and available instantly if needed.

17 A: Absolutely. And I had that on my person until we had
18 returned the second time after dropping off the woman we were
19 giving CPR to. Then I did leave my bottle at the platform level.
20 The smoke was basically dissipating and this was more of a --

21 Q: I was going to say, it sounds like the smoke was clear
22 enough at that point you didn't really need the air at all.

23 A: When I initially entered? So as a firefighter in DC,
24 you tend to see many years of action in a short period of time.
25 And I've been on the job 11 years in December and there are many,

1 many, many different types of smoke. And it's hard to describe
2 that to someone who hasn't been exposed to many, many different
3 types of smoke. This was -- this was not a -- this was not a
4 thick smoke in terms of respiratory issues.

5 It's hard to describe. I -- at no point did I cough or
6 hack. At no point did I feel like I was breathing anything toxic.
7 That probably sounds a little bit ridiculous because many times we
8 don't know if we're breathing something toxic and even if we don't
9 think we are, we could, in fact, be breathing things that are
10 harmful to us. But I believe that my job is to save people.

11 And if I can go as far as possible with my bearings as
12 in tune as possible then I am going to continue until I need my
13 SCBA. We do have the advantage of atmospheric monitoring on the
14 rescue squads. So I'm going to be alerted if any of those things
15 are present that I discussed earlier, anything that I'm not able
16 to taste or smell, is going to show up on one of those meters.
17 And I will immediately deploy my SCBA.

18 One thing that we discussed afterwards was the
19 importance of keeping the individuals on the train calm. And had
20 all of us continued to wear our breathing apparatus, it would have
21 been very difficult to ensure their safety while we are breathing
22 all of this good air.

23 Q: So there was kind of a calming effect by not actually
24 using the air while you were in the rail cars, calming the other
25 passengers?

1 A: There is no doubt in my mind. It was -- it was strange
2 how cordial everyone was inside that rail car. It was
3 unbelievable the display of human spirit. There was no pushing
4 and shoving. There was no panic. There was no pandemonium.
5 There was -- there were people moving aside and saying, let her
6 through.

7 There were, from what I hear -- I didn't see it
8 firsthand, but there were -- there were passengers helping move
9 patients forward, saying, you know, she's not breathing or he's
10 unconscious or whatever. And it was eerily quiet. There was no
11 yelling. There was very little talking. And I don't attribute
12 all of that to us not being on air. But I do think it helped. I
13 think it was a factor.

14 Q: Very good.

15 A: Maybe not the key factor but I think it had something to
16 do with it.

17 Q: Very good. Thank you. The patient you hand carried out
18 of the tunnel, ultimately out to the sidewalk to find no
19 ambulances nearby and you left that patient with other
20 firefighters who were doing CPR and so on --

21 A: Yes, sir.

22 Q: -- do you happen to know -- we had one fatality in the
23 event. Do you happen to know if this was the fatality?

24 A: Yes, sir. It was.

25 Q: Ultimately.

1 A: Yes.

2 Q: It was the same person?

3 A: That's correct.

4 Q: Okay. The removal off this person, do we have a
5 timestamp on that by chance? Do we know when that occurred or do
6 we have radio transmissions we can look at to identify when that
7 might have occurred?

8 A: I identified myself as the squad wagon driver in the
9 transmissions, the question of whether or not they were received
10 or whether they made it out of the tunnel, I do not know.

11 Q: Don't know.

12 A: But if you were able to look at the radio transmissions
13 or listen to the radio transmissions, the timestamps would be -- I
14 did describe that we are exiting the tunnel --

15 Q: Hand-carrying somebody?

16 A: -- with an unconscious victim and we will be going to
17 this location.

18 Q: Good. That's good information to help us identify that
19 --

20 A: Yes, sir.

21 Q: -- narrow that time point down. All right. Thank you,
22 firefighter. I'm going to now pass on the questioning to my
23 colleague to the right.

24 BY MR. ROURKE:

25 Q: Well, thank you. Denton Rourke again from Metro. Just

1 a couple points of clarification. When you took the monitors down
2 and you -- and the lieutenant told you what the plan was and you
3 went back out to get your gear and you called that in on the
4 radio, do you remember anyone acknowledging that?

5 A: Yes.

6 Q: And who --

7 A: Yes, in fact, I said, something along the lines of squad
8 driver to operations to make contact with Squad 1. They do have
9 smoke at the platform level and in the tunnel. They are advising
10 that they have an outbound yellow line train with passengers on
11 it. I believe I told him that they were having difficulty making
12 -- difficulty with the radio transmissions, making it out of the
13 tunnel and I said that I have contact with them on A-15 and I
14 didn't know if that would be an option for him.

15 Q: And did that A-15 work for you from the street to --
16 into the station?

17 A: It did because when I got to the top of the escalator
18 the first time, when I was looking for a entry control point
19 officer, when the officers were coming out and they said there's
20 smoke in the -- on the platform and in the tunnel, I called him on
21 A-15. That was the channel that I was on initially. And I said
22 there's smoke on the platform and in the tunnel. I'm going to get
23 meters for you. Send one of your crew members to the bottom of
24 the escalator. And he acknowledged that.

25 Q: Okay.

1 A: And that was Lieutenant Kuhn with Rescue Squad 1.

2 Q: All righty. And then --

3 A: Now I was standing at the top of the escalator or near
4 the top of the escalator --

5 Q: Okay.

6 A: -- when I made that transmission. That's a direct talk
7 channel so --

8 Q: And would command be on monitor for that or not?

9 A: No, sir.

10 Q: Okay. And here again I think you might have said this,
11 your -- when you were carrying the woman out and you made that
12 request, you don't -- what -- do you recall if that was
13 acknowledged or not?

14 A: I believe it was. But I cannot say with 100 percent
15 certainty. But as I've tried as much as possible to recall the
16 events, I do believe it was acknowledged.

17 Q: Okay. That's all I got right now.

18 MR. DOWNS: All right. Ms. Burtch?

19 BY MS. BURTCH:

20 Q: You spoke about the meters -- the meters you went and
21 turned on the meters --

22 A: That's correct.

23 Q: -- so you could go down and test the air.

24 A: Correct.

25 Q: Are there any other procedures that you are -- or

1 guidance that you follow when you are aware of a smoke event?

2 A: In regards to the meters or --

3 Q: Well, in regards --

4 A: -- outside of --

5 Q: Were the meters one of the things that you use when you
6 have a smoke event to test the -- so --

7 A: We do -- we do not use them in house fires, building
8 fires --

9 Q: Um-hum.

10 A: -- apartments, things like that. When we have smoke
11 inside a Metro tunnel, --

12 Q: Um-hum.

13 A: -- it is not written in our SOGs that we bring
14 atmospheric monitoring. However, the city in which we work --

15 Q: Um-hum.

16 A: -- and the air in which we work in that city, in the
17 back of our minds, we are always going to consider a possibility
18 of a terrorist event.

19 BY MR. DOWNS:

20 Q: So that's an informal best practice? Would that be a
21 good characterization?

22 A: Yes, sir. It is not written but I would say, yes, it's
23 an informal best practice.

24 Q: That's well known amongst the fire fighting --

25 A: No, sir.

1 Q: -- personnel to do that?

2 A: No, sir.

3 Q: Or that's just your best practice?

4 A: That is our best practice, the members of Rescue Squad
5 1. We tend to go a little bit outside the box in our thinking and
6 we tend to what if things to death. And because we are a
7 specialized unit with specialized training, we generally have
8 exposure to more possibilities of things going wrong. So with
9 five individuals thinking forwardly for a situation like this,
10 could it have been a consideration prior to going in? Absolutely.

11 Next time, there's no doubt in my mind. I'm happy that
12 we had that atmospheric monitoring as soon as we did. It couldn't
13 have been a matter of a few minutes. But we always critique
14 ourselves at the end of any event and we have all decided that
15 from this point forward we will, regardless of what the SOGs say,
16 we will bring all of our atmospheric monitoring equipment with us.

17 Q: And that's your prerogative upon your own determination
18 given the event?

19 A: Yes, sir. We have certain meters that are intrinsically
20 safe. So we will bring them into an unknown environment and that
21 -- it will not cause any extra harm. We have some that are not
22 and we will -- we will not take a flame ionization device into an
23 unknown environment because it could be an explosive environment.
24 However, there is no negative, in my personal opinion, to bringing
25 meters into this unknown environment even without orders. So it's

1 not deviating. It's just an extra precaution.

2 BY MS. BURTCH:

3 Q: Thank you. Thank you.

4 A: Yes, ma'am.

5 Q: Also, so you knew there was smoke but did anyone
6 consider the fire factor when you went, your squad went down into
7 the tunnel? And if they had, or if their -- I guess I'm saying,
8 you don't -- you didn't know. Did you?

9 A: No, ma'am.

10 Q: Did you plan for that? Did you have something to
11 extinguish the fire if you had come across one?

12 A: So -- and then --

13 Q: But not in your -- I meant -- yeah. Please.

14 A: Yes, ma'am. So in the District of Columbia Fire
15 Department, there are engine companies, truck companies and
16 rescues.

17 Q: Okay.

18 A: So we are on a rescue squad.

19 Q: Right. Okay.

20 A: We are very much used to operating without hand lines.
21 We go -- two of us go above every fire and search for victims
22 without a hand line. And we are accustomed to that. We are a
23 specialized group that has specialized training and we have the
24 ability to recognize events where we are able to move forward and
25 recognize the possibility of need for extinguishment and we can

1 backup if we know we are incapable of moving forward.

2 The engine companies, and there are two of them in the
3 recon branch, their job is suppression. So they are carrying a
4 minimum of 400 feet of hose. So two firefighters from the back of
5 each those recon groups are each carrying 100 foot sections of
6 hose. So their job would be suppression. We move forward
7 regardless of our own safety.

8 Q: Um-hum.

9 A: If we had been presented with a free burning environment
10 or an active fire --

11 Q: Um-hum.

12 A: -- we would have as quickly as possible relayed that
13 information to the engine companies who carry the devices utilized
14 for extinguishing, be it extinguishers or inch and a half hose
15 lines

16 Q: Okay.

17 A: And they coordinate that with the efforts of the engine
18 companies above who establish the water supplies at the
19 appropriate standpipe connections.

20 MR. DOWNS: On your second trip down there, when you
21 made it to the train, was there any heat?

22 MR. CARMODY: No, sir. Zero heat.

23 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

24 MR. CARMODY: Yes, sir.

25 MS. BURTCH: Thank you.

1 MR. CARMODY: Yes, ma'am.

2 MR. DOWNS: Chief, do you have any questions now or do
3 you want to defer?

4 MR. HAWKINS: I'll defer. I'll come back.

5 BY JOE GORDON:

6 Q: Joe Gordon, NTSB. When were you made aware that the
7 power to the third rail was down or were you made aware of that?

8 A: I don't recall.

9 Q: Okay.

10 A: It's possible that I did not have confirmation that the
11 third rail was down. It's possible.

12 Q: So you guys treat it live all the time and --

13 A: Oh, absolutely.

14 Q: -- you're kind of first one in.

15 A: Even if we have confirmation that the third rail is
16 down, we treat it as if it was live.

17 Q: Okay.

18 A: 100 percent of the time.

19 Q: Okay.

20 A: I did identify where the third rail was. I maintained a
21 distance from it and always being aware of where it was and in
22 addition to that the switches because they operate on a different
23 electrical system from the third rail. So even if the third rail
24 is down, the switches can operate.

25 Q: Right.

1 A: And there were a series of switches we had to pass in
2 the track bed so we were also aware of those.

3 Q: Okay. Okay. And air flow in the tunnel --

4 A: Yes, sir.

5 Q: -- did you notice any air movement and, you know, if you
6 did, feel any of the air movement, if, you know, we can talk about
7 the direction if you noticed any air movement or if it was just
8 kind of stale in there and quiet?

9 A: The smoke was definitely coming from the tunnel into the
10 platform area but it was not pushing. You did not feel active air
11 flow.

12 Q: Okay.

13 A: So you could tell the direction of the source but it
14 wasn't -- inside the station, I did not feel any active airflow,
15 no.

16 Q: Okay. When you made it to the rear of the train, did
17 you feel any -- once you're in a -- in that tube, did you feel any
18 airflow in there?

19 A: After I exited the train and walked south?

20 Q: Right.

21 A: Yes. And that was completely clear --

22 Q: Okay.

23 A: -- at that point.

24 Q: And which way was the air flowing? You're facing south
25 walking away from the train, was the air blowing into your face or

1 air at your back?

2 A: I can't say with 100 percent certainty.

3 Q: Okay. Okay. I have no further question.

4 BY MR. DOWNS:

5 Q: Thank you, Firefighter Carmody. Let's divert a little
6 bit and address your personal work history. You mentioned you
7 were on the -- been with the fire department for 11 years.

8 A: Yes, sir.

9 Q: Firefighter the entire time?

10 A: Yes, sir.

11 Q: And do you have any specialized training as part of your
12 11 year career with the fire department?

13 A: Yes, sir. We have a pretty extensive selection process
14 to come to a rescue squad. You don't have to have a minimum
15 amount of training. However you do get extra points for
16 particular types of training. You also do have to have a minimum
17 of 5 years to come onto the rescue squad. As a member of the
18 rescue squad, I now currently hold eight certifications to
19 technician level, which is between 40 and 80 hours a week per
20 discipline.

21 So swift water, trench collapse, building collapse,
22 hazmat, confined space, high angle rescue, vehicle and machinery
23 extrication, things like that. So lots and lots and lots of
24 training. I've also been sent to the upper flats out in Nevada
25 for radiological training. I've gone through extensive water

1 rescue training above and beyond the technician level to advanced
2 boat ops and things like that.

3 Personal skills classes in addition to technician level
4 for ropes, upwards of 80 hour classes for those as well. I work
5 with a group of highly trained individuals.

6 Q: Very good. Metro training drill activities, have you
7 attended any of those recently?

8 A: In 2009, I believe, the members of Rescue Squad 1 and a
9 joint jurisdiction drill operated an electric E-tech type cart
10 under the Potomac River with some fire department personnel in
11 Alexandria there was a --

12 Q: Is this Alexandria or Rosslyn?

13 A: I'm sorry. It was in Rosslyn. Yes, sir. It was in
14 Virginia.

15 MR. ROURKE: Was that (indiscernible) exercise?

16 MR. CARMODY: That was basically an all night drill. It
17 started sometime around midnight and we had a train full of
18 passengers. We came from the DC side. They came from the
19 Virginia side and we worked on evacuating those individuals. I
20 have been to a countless number of emergency calls in the Metro
21 regarding individuals struck by trains, smoke in the tunnel,
22 things like that.

23 The rescue squads are the ones who go under the train
24 and pull the people out who have been struck by the train. I am
25 in the process of trying to fill the position of technician for

1 the individual who retired in November. I've gone through 98
2 percent of that process and I think I'm very fortunate to have
3 studied very hard Metro operations leading up to this incident. I
4 do think that was very helpful.

5 I also think that that is probably not the norm for most
6 individuals on the fire department because it is not visited as
7 often as we would probably like it to be. We do have so many
8 disciplines that we're looking at. Metro is one of them. But
9 there are so -- only so many hours in the day. We can drill all
10 day long and we're not going to hit every type of scenario that
11 we're going to see, even in Metro and in any amount of time.

12 BY MR. DOWNS:

13 Q: So 2009 was your last recollection of a major training
14 simulation drill in Metro. Nothing since then? To your best
15 recall.

16 A: That's correct, regarding a actual drill set up --

17 Q: Okay. In your training process, did Metro provide
18 guidance as to the emergency evacuation doors on the given
19 railcars?

20 A: I don't recall any particular training regarding the
21 emergency evacuation doors on Metro --

22 Q: In your SOGs, SOPs and other documentation, guidance
23 documentation received from WMATA, are the evacuation doors
24 covered in the documentation in terms of how to operate them,
25 which ones they are and so on?

1 A: Yes, sir. They are.

2 Q: And you're -- and you're familiar with that?

3 A: I'm relatively familiar with it but there are so many
4 different rail cars, manufacturers and series that it's really
5 difficult. One of the things that -- for an example, one of the
6 things that we need to operate when we go under a train to rescue
7 someone is the filter capacitor discharge switch. Well, you can't
8 find an answer for where it's always going to be. And it's very
9 similar with the exit doors. It depends on, to my understanding,
10 it depends on the make, year, model, series of each particular
11 train.

12 Q: Okay. We've heard reports in the media that the fire
13 department had approached the rail car and had trouble opening the
14 evacuation doors. We had also received reports to the effect that
15 firefighters were approaching the wrong doors, meaning not all of
16 the doors on the rail, the given rail car are emergency evacuation
17 doors. Can you add any information on that in terms of your
18 experience in this event?

19 Did you see any firefighters go to the doors other than
20 the one police officer that tried to get a door open? The end
21 bulkhead end door? Did you see any firefighters try to go to any
22 of the other doors to open them at all or that was after -- before
23 you arrived and you had gone up topside and came back down?

24 A: That is correct. So the first open door I encountered
25 was the very first door on the walkway side.

1 Q: On the catwalk side?

2 A: Yes, sir.

3 Q: The very first door you come to on the side of the car?

4 A: Yes, sir. And that was the only door I had any
5 interaction with aside from the one that the officer was
6 attempting to open.

7 Q: Okay. All right. So you're telling me that you're not
8 familiar with exactly which doors on the Metro cars are emergency
9 evacuation doors?

10 A: That is correct. I'm not 100 percent certain on which
11 doors on Metro cars are emergency exit doors.

12 Q: Not to put you on the spot but shouldn't that be
13 something that you should be relatively -- have a relatively good
14 familiarity with in terms of instantly going to a rail car to
15 identify which door is the one or more than one that you would
16 have to open and how to get it open?

17 A: Yes, sir. I think that should be highlighted, that we
18 should train on that.

19 Q: You should train on that. And you've not had any
20 training on that you said.

21 A: I've -- no, sir. I've not.

22 Q: And you've been with the fire department 11 years?

23 A: That's correct.

24 Q: Okay. Would it be helpful -- let me go right to my --
25 actually, let's pass along the questioning. Any questions on my

1 right? Do we have further?

2 MR. HAWKINS: Yeah. I have a --

3 MR. DOWNS: Go ahead, Chief.

4 MR. HAWKINS: -- couple questions. You mentioned --

5 MR. DOWNS: That's Chief Hawkins down there.

6 BY MR. HAWKINS:

7 Q: I'm sorry. Derron Hawkins, DC Fire and EMS. You
8 mentioned that once your lieutenant realized he had communication
9 problems you switched over to the line of site of 0-Alpha-15.

10 A: No, sir. We were on that -- we go to that channel --

11 Q: Okay.

12 A: -- two of us go to that when we arrive on the scene.

13 Q: Okay.

14 A: Always.

15 Q: Was there any other radio traffic on 0-Alpha-15 other
16 than Rescue Squad 1? Was there any other unit recon group, was
17 there any other transmission, anybody else --

18 A: On Alpha-15?

19 Q: Yeah? Did you hear -- other than yourself and Squad 1?

20 A: I don't recall there being any. So we activated VRS
21 when we arrive on the scene. And the talk about channel only work
22 with the fire round channel when VRS is on.

23 Q: Um-hum.

24 A: So I should have been able to hear the fire round
25 channel. When I made contact with them in the tunnel, when I came

1 back out, I did switch to Alpha-7 to make the transmission to the
2 chief to ensure that he heard directly from me at the street
3 level, this is what rescue squad has -- Rescue Squad 1 has and
4 which train it is.

5 Q: So in terms of communication, there seems to be have
6 primary, secondary and tertiary. What -- can you explain to me if
7 there's a problem with communication, what are the procedures or
8 what is the next thing we do to enhance or try to continue or have
9 continuity communications?

10 A: On a rescue squad or in an incident command structured
11 event?

12 Q: In an incident command structure, whether the rescue
13 squad, whether it's a Metro incident or a structure fire or high
14 rise?

15 A: Well, I think there are two different issues. The
16 rescue squad driver operates on a talk about -- a direct talk so
17 he has communication with the officer because the rescue squad
18 driver is generally the only person on the fire drive who is
19 unaccounted for. He is not teamed up with anybody. So that is
20 the channel that the driver operates on. In a normal incident
21 command structured event, we use the appropriate tac channel.

22 So if it's, in this case, I believe it was at Alpha-7.
23 If for any reason radios are honking out, someone recommends VRS
24 and units would switch to Alpha-8. In this particular event and
25 we operated on Alpha-8.

1 Q: Okay. So after that is anything --

2 A: Well, with the new radios, and this is something that I
3 don't believe too many people understand at this point, if you are
4 on a VRS channel and you hold down -- if you key up your talk
5 button and no transmission goes out, it honks out, if you continue
6 to hold that button, you will be able to transmit on the talk
7 about channel. So if you're on A-7 or A-8 in this case because
8 you're on VRS, that message will automatically go to A-15.

9 So if you were in a building where you are calling a
10 mayday and you're on VRS, and you're on A-8 and you can't get out,
11 the only people who are going to pick up your transmission are the
12 members of the rescue squad who are on that talk about channel.
13 So that highlights why it's so important for us to be on the talk
14 about channel and have the ability to listen to the fire round
15 channel.

16 So the four individuals who went into the tunnel, two of
17 them are on the fire round channel, one from Team A and one from
18 Team B, two of them are on the talk about channel, one from Team
19 A and one from Team B. So all five of us have the ability to
20 communicate with one another.

21 Q: I think that's it.

22 MR. DOWNS: Anything further, Chief?

23 MR. HAWKINS: No. That's all I got.

24 MR. DOWNS: Do you have a question?

25 MR. ROURKE: Yeah, Chief, just something -- I mean,

1 excuse me, fireman. I just thought of something here.

2 MR. DOWNS: That's --

3 BY MR. ROURKE:

4 Q: Denton Rourke, Metro. So I think you said it took you
5 all 3 or 4 minutes to respond down there or what you told me from
6 the box to arrive on scene?

7 A: I don't believe I gave you an exact time.

8 Q: Oh, okay.

9 A: But it's not a super long distance.

10 Q: Right.

11 A: I can give you the run route we took.

12 Q: No. That's fine.

13 A: But it was -- it was within a matter of 3 or 4 minutes.

14 Q: It's an easy run for you all.

15 A: Yes, sir.

16 Q: And they you standby at the elevator.

17 A: Correct.

18 Q: And how long do you think they did that before the
19 lieutenant made his decision to go in?

20 A: Long enough for them to gather a Metro bag, WSAD, all
21 the appropriate Halligan bars. I'm trying to think what else they
22 brought down in there. With all their gear on and time to get the
23 squad driver keys to me, it was a couple of minutes.

24 Q: Okay.

25 A: But not a very long time.

1 Q: Right. And then how about for you to grab the meters,
2 do what you need to do with them, run down, you know, run up to
3 (indiscernible), go down to the end of the platform and meet up
4 with them, how long do you think that took? Ballpark?

5 A: Somewhere of 4, maybe 5 minutes.

6 Q: Four to 5 minutes?

7 A: Yes, sir.

8 Q: Okay. And then --

9 A: But --

10 Q: -- back to the -- I'm sorry.

11 A: I was -- I was moving pretty quickly.

12 Q: I understand.

13 A: I wasn't sprinting. I didn't want to create panic. But
14 I was --

15 Q: Right.

16 A: -- I was moving with a purpose.

17 Q: And then back to the street?

18 A: That would be total cycle. So --

19 Q: Oh, total cycle. All right.

20 A: So, yes, sir.

21 Q: And then --

22 A: So from meters to company and back to the street to get
23 my gear.

24 Q: I got you. And that's when you made the transmission to
25 the command channel?

1 A: Yes, sir.

2 Q: Did --

3 A: And I'm going on recall.

4 Q: Oh, I understand. Sure. Absolutely.

5 A: I don't have exact numbers.

6 Q: Sure. Absolutely.

7 A: I apologize.

8 Q: Did the lieutenant ever articulate to you all what made
9 him make his decision?

10 A: I do not know. He didn't tell me. He's got 27 years of
11 experience on this job. He has been to a lot of emergencies and
12 that's one of the reasons I believe he's in charge of a high speed
13 company like Rescue Squad 1 and when he says, we're doing this, we
14 say, yes, sir.

15 Q: Okay. Thank you.

16 MR. DOWNS: Anything further?

17 MR. ROURKE: No.

18 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Gordon?

19 BY MR. GORDON:

20 Q: Joe Gordon, NTSB. The catwalk was being used as the
21 primary egress for the evacuation.

22 A: Yes, sir.

23 Q: How would -- give us a little idea of the lighting on
24 that catwalk. Was that -- was that an issue with the evacuation?

25 A: Yes, sir. Almost none.

1 Q: Oh, okay.

2 A: Almost none.

3 Q: And what was done to mitigate that? Did the fire
4 department personnel shine their personal lights on? I mean,
5 their --

6 A: At that point --

7 Q: -- emergency lights?

8 A: -- I believe fire department personnel were operating
9 inside the train doing as rapid of a triage as they could with as
10 many individuals as they had.

11 Q: Okay.

12 A: I did not see fire fighters lighting walkways.

13 Q: Okay. So --

14 A: On the walkway, you have a wall to your left and a drop
15 to your right. I do recall hearing people say, keep your hand on
16 the wall. Keep contact with the wall. There are also bump outs.
17 There's conduit. There's junction boxes.

18 MR. DOWNS: Junction boxes.

19 BY MR. GORDON:

20 Q: Junction boxes. Right.

21 A: -- ETS switches, blue light stations, all that stuff
22 that intrude sometimes as much as 5 or 6 inches into that walkway.
23 But, no, there was -- there was little lighting and with the four
24 individuals that were there when I got there and myself, we were
25 going to where we thought we were needed the most.

1 Q: So you're trying to get people shuffled, moving that
2 direction and, yeah, I understand the junction boxes had height --
3 hip height, knee height --

4 A: Yes, sir.

5 Q: -- I mean, it's all the way down.

6 A: Yes, sir.

7 Q: So it's an -- a little bit of an obstacle course. Okay.
8 I have nothing further.

9 MR. DOWNS: Very good. Any further questions on the
10 right here?

11 MR. GORDON: No.

12 BY MR. DOWNS:

13 Q: Okay. I'm going to -- why don't we -- before we
14 adjourn, I typically like to wrap up with one final question.

15 A: Yes, sir.

16 Q: I like to give our witnesses the opportunity to express
17 what we call retrospective thoughts, kind of in hindsight, knowing
18 what you know now, would you do anything differently in this
19 particular event and like you like to share with the professional
20 firefighting community with your experience so far as things that
21 might help in the future events such as this scenario? Anything
22 come to mind?

23 A: Yes, sir. We talked about it upon arriving back at our
24 station as soon as the event was over. We like to talk about
25 things when they're fresh.

1 Q: Um-hum.

2 A: And the things that we came up with were meters will be
3 turned on in route to any Metro incident. This is our company.
4 This is not something that we're being ordered to do. This is
5 something we had come up with.

6 Q: And this is not part of your SOP. This is just a --

7 A: No, sir.

8 Q: -- a new best practice that's developed as result of the
9 event?

10 A: This was the five individuals there saying what can we
11 do better next time.

12 Q: Good. And did you document these thoughts in your after
13 action?

14 A: I did not fill out an after action report.

15 Q: I mean, you were sharing -- you were sharing these
16 thoughts amongst yourselves as brainstorming.

17 A: Yes, sir.

18 Q: Did anybody take any good notes that you could pass up
19 the chain in command or?

20 A: As far as I know as an individual in the trenches, the
21 lieutenant would handle whatever type documentation that as
22 necessary.

23 Q: So you were counting on him taking some good notes to
24 pass on to the chain of command?

25 A: That's correct. And the individuals on the ground, we

1 discuss these things amongst ourselves so I did talk about these
2 things with individuals on other shifts after the fact.

3 Q: So we should get with Lieutenant Kuhn in terms of seeing
4 what kind of notes he might have put together?

5 A: Yes, sir.

6 Q: Okay. Very good. I'm sorry. I interrupted you.

7 A: That's fine.

8 Q: Go -- continue with your thought points.

9 A: In addition to having meters on the initial response, we
10 also decided that we were going to place some mega movers, which
11 are -- they're basically like tarps with handles, in the bottom of
12 our Metro bag just to always have them if we need to move
13 unconscious individuals. In addition to that, we -- the squad
14 driver will bring extra SCBA bottles when they go into the tunnel
15 as well as a couple of sked stretchers and we actually modified
16 one of our sked stretchers after this.

17 We have bolted two seatbelt clasps at the torso level
18 and at the leg level for rapid extrication so we don't have to
19 worry about reeving the strap through the cinch harness.

20 Q: Yep.

21 A: And we have shared that with all the other shifts. It
22 is now currently on the back of Rescue Squad 1. It's a quick, put
23 them in, clip the two belts and we can go. In addition to an
24 incident like this, we would use it for any individual who was
25 struck by a Metro train we had to retrieve them from underneath

1 the train. It's much faster than having to reeve the straps. It
2 should also be noted that in my opinion, carrying the victim out
3 the way I did was the absolute most efficient way to do it.

4 Q: Most efficient given what you had at the time --

5 A: In my mind.

6 Q: -- and the timing of the event.

7 A Yes, sir. If we had had an individual wrapped up in a
8 sked, it would have taken time to put her in the sked,
9 appropriately strap her in and secure her, and then we would have
10 had two individuals trying to carry her down a 22-inch walkway
11 over top of a third rail, with j-boxes and conduit getting in our
12 way. And one of those individuals would have most likely been
13 walking backwards. So I am satisfied with how we removed that
14 victim from the train --

15 Q: Got it.

16 A: -- given the circumstances --

17 Q: Okay.

18 A: -- and the resources.

19 Q: Very good. Anything else?

20 A: No, sir.

21 Q: All right. If there are no further questions on either
22 side, that concludes our interview. Thank you very --

23 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

24

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015
Interview of Dennis Carmody

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: Washington, DC

DATE: January 28, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Heidi E. Gardner
Transcriber