



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD  
**Investigative Hearing**

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

<b>GROUP</b>	
<b>EXHIBIT</b>	

Agency / Organization

Title

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA  
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
JANUARY 12, 2015

Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-004

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Interview of: PATRICK ADAMS

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday,  
January 20, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: DAVID BUCHER  
Railroad Accident Investigator

## APPEARANCES:

DAVID BUCHER, Railroad Accident Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

RICHARD DOWNS, Survival Factors Investigator  
Chairperson, Survival Factors Technical Working Group  
National Transportation Safety Board

SHARMILA SAMARASINGHE, Vice Chair  
Tri-State Oversight Committee

DORSEY ADAMS, Manager of Rail Safety  
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)

HERCULES BALLARD, Managing Director Rail Transportation  
WMATA

MARLENE FLEMINGS-McCANN, Assistant Business Agent  
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I N T E R V I E W

(12:55 p.m.)

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3 MR. BUCHER: This is David Bucher, Railroad Accident  
4 Investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board. This  
5 is the interview of Patrick Adams, Rail Supervisor for WMATA at  
6 L'Enfant Plaza station, in reference to the L'Enfant Plaza station  
7 incident of January 12, 2015. NTSB Accident No. DCA-15-FR-004.  
8 To my right?

9 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Good afternoon, Mr. Adams.

10 MR. ADAMS: Good afternoon.

11 MS. SAMARASINGHE: I'm Sharmila Samarasinghe. I'm with  
12 the Tri-State Oversight Committee, the TOC. And I'm the Virginia  
13 full-time member.

14 MR. ADAMS: Okay.

15 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: Good afternoon, Mr. Adams.  
16 Marlene Flemings-McCann, Assistant Business Agent for Rail  
17 Operations, Local 689.

18 MR. ADAMS: Okay.

19 MR. BALLARD: Mr. Adams, Hercules Ballard. I'm Managing  
20 Director of Rail Transportation.

21 MR. ADAMS: Okay.

22 MR. DORSEY ADAMS: Good afternoon. I'm Dorsey Adams,  
23 Washington Metro, Manager of Rail Safety.

24 MR. DOWNS: And I'm Rick Downs. I'm the Survival  
25 Factors Technical Working Group Chairperson, NTSB.

1 MR. ADAMS: Got you.

2 INTERVIEW OF PATRICK ADAMS

3 BY MR. BUCHER:

4 Q. Mr. Adams, if you could, go back to January 12th, and if  
5 you could tell us anything you remember about the incident in the  
6 station.

7 A. Okay. I could actually start from the beginning, when I  
8 was initially dispatched there. It was probably around 3:10. I  
9 was at Federal Center. A lot of times what happens is when any  
10 kind of rail incidents occur and they need assistance, or what  
11 have you, they will call supervisors from another sector. So, at  
12 the time I was dispatched there from ops No. 2, to respond to  
13 L'Enfant Plaza. Once I boarded the train headed towards L'Enfant,  
14 I went to around about 3:17, when I got up the steps I noticed  
15 that it was smoke in the station. I came up on track 2. So, I  
16 had gone towards Branch Avenue.

17 There was no trains in the station. It was very  
18 chaotic. It was a lot going on. We had a lot of customers in the  
19 station. I was the first rail supervisor there. Transit was  
20 there as well, and we was trying to work together to try to get  
21 the people out of the station. So, we were communicating with  
22 each other. But, I initially -- when I first initially got on the  
23 scene, I tried to contact ops No. 3, which is the Green Line, by,  
24 by my handset radio. And I was unable) to get through. It was --  
25 like I say, it was a lot of talking going on. They had

1 interlocking that was out at the same time that the incident was  
2 going on, at another station. I'm not sure exactly where that  
3 was. And I could hear a lot of different operators talking to the  
4 control center. But, I was unable) to get through because it was  
5 so much going on on the radio. No one could really -- I mean, I  
6 couldn't get through on my radio.

7           So, as I stood there on the platform -- we're trying to  
8 get the people out of the station. It's -- the smoke got thicker  
9 and thicker. And the Transit officers that was there -- they was  
10 telling us to get out of the station, get the people out -- help  
11 me get -- assist the people out of the station. So, I was doing  
12 just that. And at some point I went back downstairs to make sure  
13 that the lower level was clear of customers. But, it was actually  
14 an -- it was a gentleman down there in a wheelchair. But, a train  
15 actually came through and opened the doors up on that level. I, I  
16 assume -- I'm not sure, you know, what, what happened at that  
17 time. But the train doors did open on the train and we was able)  
18 to get the guy on the train. And we had all the people to stay on  
19 that train. That's on the lower level, in the front.

20           Q.    Uh-huh.

21           A.    Okay. Once we realized that the lower level was all  
22 clear, I went back upstairs to the Green Line level. And we were  
23 still assisting people out. And at that time the smoke was  
24 getting thicker and thicker, and you could barely even see each  
25 other in the station -- how bad it was.

1           So, I went outside to the top level. I believe that was  
2 9th -- 9th and D of L'Enfant Plaza. I saw a station manager,  
3 which was Ms. Gary. I did see another station manager. I don't -  
4 - I don't know the station manager's name. But he was assisting  
5 people getting out of the station. So, at some point I heard the  
6 controller say that -- the ID on the platform 510. Okay. When I  
7 heard him say that, that -- like I said, I'm still trying to get  
8 through to them. But every time I think I'm getting through, I  
9 don't get a response. So, finally he goes is there any rail  
10 transportations supervisors in L'Enfant Plaza. So, finally I, I  
11 tried to get through. This time I get through, and he can hear  
12 what I'm saying.

13           So, he asked me to go downstairs -- well, he actually --  
14 he didn't say go downstairs. Because he don't know where I'm at.

15           Q. Uh-huh.

16           A. So, he says I need that train off the platform -- track  
17 2. That's -- you know, that was the -- how he was saying it. And  
18 I, and I, and I responded as roger, I'm on my way down. So, as  
19 I'm going down the steps I run into an operator -- because they're  
20 calling 510, 510.

21           Q. Uh-huh.

22           A. And, and nobody is saying anything, right? That's when  
23 he's -- he asked for -- was there a rail transportation supervisor  
24 there. So, I'm going down the steps. And I run into the operator  
25 that was actually on the train. But I assume she just didn't --



1 couldn't hear him communicating to her. So, I said to her what  
2 are you doing up here. So, I'm thinking that she's just in the  
3 station -- just passing through. Because, you know, that, that  
4 kind of thing do happen. Operators may be on break or something.  
5 So, when I see her she says Treasure told me to get out of the  
6 station. I said is that you that's operating the train on the  
7 platform. And she said yes. So, I said okay, they want us to try  
8 to move the train off the platform.

9           So, I run ahead of her the -- down to the platform. But  
10 once I get there to the train, all I can see are the, are the  
11 outside rail -- like indicators. There was so smoke in there I  
12 couldn't see anything. I mean, it was still people in there. We  
13 trying to get those people out. You know, everybody is hollering  
14 and screaming, telling us to get out of the station. So, at some  
15 point I actually got on the train. Now, I've been a rail  
16 supervisor for 11 years. So, in my mind I'm trying to do  
17 everything I can to try to move that train to help the control  
18 center.

19           So, I did get on the train. And I keyed up -- I think  
20 the only thing that stopped me from moving that train, other than  
21 Transit coming on the train and pulling -- literally pulling me  
22 off the train -- was that someone had pulled the emergency doors  
23 on, on that car -- on that consist. So, I think that was the only  
24 thing that actually stopped me from moving off the platform.  
25 Because, you know, with all doors -- if you don't get all doors

1 closed you can't move the train. So, I actually got up out of the  
2 street to try to figure out -- I, I could see the indicator light  
3 outside. It was the lead car. Actually, it was two cars. So, it  
4 wasn't -- it was only the lead car. It was another car. The  
5 other one was off -- on the off side of the platform, and the  
6 other one was on the platform.

7           So, when I talked to the operator after the incident  
8 happened I asked her -- when she came in the station she said that  
9 she had the Transit officer guide her in the station because she  
10 couldn't really see where she was going. So, he was able to get  
11 her to -- at some point, to the chain marker to offload the train.  
12 So, I guess when people started panicking they pulled the  
13 emergency doors.

14           And, so when I got up to try to reset the emergency  
15 doors, that's when -- because, you know, with the doors being open  
16 when -- in an emergency, they're wide open. So, the officers --  
17 they got on the car, and they literally took me off the train.  
18 They said sir, you need to get off here -- we said get out of the  
19 station. And at, at some point in my mind I'm thinking like maybe  
20 he doesn't know that I'm a rail supervisor. I'm not saying  
21 because I'm a supervisor I got power over everything, but the fact  
22 that I did have on, you know, a, a big coat that day, because it  
23 was very cold. So, he thought -- he probably thought I was an  
24 operator. I don't know. But, they told us to get out of the  
25 station because it was dangerous and we couldn't move it. But, in

1 the meantime I could still hear the controller trying to get the  
2 train out of the station.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. And, and I tried to do everything I could to actually  
5 move the train. But they told me to get out of there. And he --  
6 like I said, they literally came on the train and pulled me off  
7 the train and told me to get out of the station. At that point,  
8 we, we all -- you know, we got off the train and we got out. I  
9 let them know over the radio what was going on. Because this is  
10 not the first time I've been on, you know, incidents like that,  
11 where, you know, things need to happen -- where you got to move a  
12 train or something. But, in my mind I was really trying to do  
13 what I could to move the train. And it probably would have been  
14 wrong if I had moved it, because once before -- I couldn't see in  
15 front of me, you know. But the train -- I -- it was keyed up.  
16 And I did have speed commands going in direct -- because they just  
17 needed the train to move off the platform. But I couldn't see,  
18 because it was just so much smoke in the station. So, that's  
19 actually what happened on that particular day when I was there.

20 And then from there on, me and the operator -- we got  
21 escorted around to -- what is that, Maryland Avenue side. I  
22 believe that's where the -- everything was set up there, on the  
23 Maryland Avenue side. And we went downstairs to try to move the  
24 train again.

25 Q. Right.

1           A.    Right.  So, at that time when we got back in the station  
2 most of the smoke had dissipated.  You could see a little bit.  We  
3 was going to try to move the train back towards Greenbelt, which  
4 is the opposite side -- you know, the opposite direction.  And  
5 then we -- again, trying to get through to the control center --  
6 now, mind you, I didn't mention the part about I did try to call  
7 them on my cell phone.  But, a lot of times when you've having  
8 incidents like that it's so much going on they don't really -- you  
9 know, the phones is just ringing and ringing.  At some point, they  
10 were busy -- I guess the lines were just tied up.  But, I couldn't  
11 get through to them.

12                   But once we got through again, we tried to get them to  
13 move the train.  Because we could see that they had us a lead set  
14 to go back towards Greenbelt.  Because I guess at some point  
15 everybody had communicated, and they was like look, we need to get  
16 this train out of here.  So, the operator -- me and the operator  
17 actually got back on the train then.  I normaled up the doors on  
18 the train and -- so we could actually move.  And I did what I was  
19 supposed to do at that point.  But, at that point the operator in  
20 that, in that tunnel -- they're still talking and trying to let  
21 them know about, you know, getting the people out of the train.  
22 But, by the time we got back on that train and ready to try to  
23 move it, that's when the power went down.  And they was like we're  
24 not going to be able) to move it now, because, you know, the power  
25 was down in that area right there.  Because I guess the power grid

1 is from where the train was on the platform up to that area where  
2 the train was stuck.

3 Now, that whole time I never knew where the operator  
4 was, because it was so much going on. Like I said, when I first  
5 got there the interlocking were out at some locations. The  
6 operators was blocking switches. So, it was really a lot going on  
7 at that time when that incident was going on. So, once we, once  
8 we couldn't move that train -- once we came back downstairs, that  
9 was pretty much -- we just kind of like -- just was waiting. And  
10 that was pretty much how that went that particular day.

11 Q. Were you involved -- Dave Bucher. Were you involved  
12 with the evacuation at all of either of the passengers on either  
13 train?

14 A. No, I wasn't, actually. Just to -- when that -- when I  
15 went back downstairs to try to get that train off. But it was  
16 empty --

17 Q. Uh-huh.

18 A. -- at that time. But, no, I wasn't involved with  
19 getting them off the train.

20 Q. Okay. Okay. Dave Bucher again. Thank you. I have a  
21 couple questions.

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Did you interact with the fire department at any time  
24 during your time of involvement?

25 A. No. I remember seeing the fire department, and, and we,

1 you know, spoke or whatever passing by. But I never actually  
2 talked to them -- like, you know, pulled them to the side, let  
3 them know what was going on -- because everything was kind of  
4 moving, moving kind of fast. But I never actually talked to them.

5 Q. Okay. I'm going to pass it off to Mr. Downs.

6 A. Okay.

7 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

8 BY MR. DOWNS:

9 Q. Downs, NTSB. Thanks, Mr. Adams, for joining us today.

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. You mentioned your arrival -- I'm going to regress a  
12 little bit to your sequence of events here. Arrival at L'Enfant  
13 Plaza. You arrived on the lower level platform from the --

14 A. Orange and Blue Line.

15 Q. The Orange and Blue Line.

16 A. Right.

17 Q. What was the smoke character when you got off the train  
18 at L'Enfant at that time? Do you remember?

19 A. Right. When I first got off the train it was nothing  
20 going on on that level. There was --

21 Q. No visible) smoke that you could --

22 A. No.

23 Q. -- determine?

24 A. Right. Not on that level.

25 Q. And trains were just running normally at point?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. And the reason why you came is you had heard on your  
3 radio that there was a smoke condition at L'Enfant Plaza. Is that  
4 correct?

5 A. No, actually that's not correct. Actually, what  
6 happened was they actually called -- what -- here -- okay. Like I  
7 was saying, a lot of times what they do is that they will call  
8 another supervisor from another sector. But at that time, I guess  
9 they didn't have anybody available) on the Green Line. So, they  
10 came -- they called down on, on ops 2, which is the Orange and  
11 Blue. And just so happened when they called me I was the closest.  
12 That was at Federal Center. They told me to respond there. They  
13 never told me what was, what was going on. But that -- but that's  
14 normally how it goes. Because unless you call them on the phone,  
15 you know --

16 Q. Uh-huh.

17 A. -- or sometimes it could be somebody need a personal or  
18 something. And they don't have anybody available) that's close  
19 by. So, that happens, you know, a lot where they'll dispatch you  
20 from some --

21 Q. So, the, the instruction you, you had was to, to get  
22 over to L'Enfant for an unknown problem? Is that what the essence  
23 of the call was?

24 A. They -- actually -- I'm not trying to be difficult. But  
25 they didn't say any of that actually. They just said --

1 Q. Just go to L'Enfant.

2 A. -- just respond. Right.

3 Q. Just respond to L'Enfant.

4 A. Right. Exactly.

5 Q. And that's typical when there's some sort of episode  
6 going on.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. You don't find out until you actually get to the  
9 station?

10 A. Or you call them by landline if you got time.

11 Q. Or you call them to find out the details?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Because I'm one of those guys where if they call me I  
15 respond as soon as they tell me. So I get right on the train or  
16 whatever.

17 Q. I see.

18 A. Then, when I get there, so --

19 Q. Thank you for the clarification.

20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. And, your normal procedure when you arrive at, at this  
22 station you're requested to respond to is to do what to make that  
23 determination of what the problem is?

24 A. Well, most of the time when you, when you get there to a  
25 situation you try to assess the problem just to see what's going



1 on. Now, at that time when I got up there I initially tried to  
2 call them as soon as I got up there. But because it was so much  
3 going on, the radio communication was so clogged up -- it was so  
4 much going on they never could hear me. Even though when I  
5 thought I got through, I still couldn't get a response because it  
6 was just so much going on.

7 Q. So, you were listening to your radio and you heard  
8 background discussions going on --

9 A. Right.

10 Q. -- to where it was clear to you there was something  
11 going on. From the nature of the dialogue were you able) to tell  
12 there was a fire or smoke condition at all at L'Enfant at that  
13 point?

14 A. Yes. Once I got there then -- because once I got  
15 upstairs to the upper level I could see the smoke coming from in  
16 the tunnel underneath the --

17 Q. So back on the lower level --

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. -- when you just arrived you said you couldn't get  
20 through to OCC at that point because you -- there was -- there's  
21 background discussions going on the radio and it was too much  
22 radio traffic. But just listening to some of the radio traffic  
23 did you get an idea of what the problem was at that time, or no?

24 A. Yeah. I did get an idea of what was going on. Once I  
25 got up there and I saw the smoke, and then I could hear them

1 telling the operator about blocking switches, which is at another  
2 location -- wasn't nowhere near where we were. I knew that it was  
3 something really going on --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. -- you know, once I got up there and I saw the smoke.  
6 And then they was doing all the talking.

7 Q. And was it your conclusion that there was a fire of some  
8 sort?

9 A. Well, I knew it was a -- I actually didn't know what it  
10 was, because a lot of times you get that smoke -- could be debris,  
11 could be anything. I wasn't sure. All I could see is the smoke  
12 coming in lightly, and then it just got thicker and thicker.

13 Q. And where was it coming from specifically?

14 A. Well, from where I was standing at track number 2, going  
15 towards Branch -- I was on that platform, and I could see it  
16 coming out of the tunnel.

17 Q. So, it's coming out of the tunnel --

18 A. Correct, sir.

19 Q. -- from the, the southbound tunnel track 2, upper level,  
20 of L'Enfant. Is that correct?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Right.

24 Q. And the character of the smoke, was it billowing out?  
25 Was it just wafting out?

1           A.    It was kind of like -- I guess, wafting sounds better.  
2    Because it was like -- it was almost like someone set off a smoke  
3    bomb or something.  It was just like -- it started out light and  
4    then it got thicker and thicker as it came on.  Now, we do know  
5    that one of the managers mentioned that they cut -- they asked  
6    them to cut the vents on in the station, you know, to try to clear  
7    out some of the --

8           Q.    Cut the vents, or activate --

9           A.    I'm sorry.  Activate the vents.

10          Q.    Activate the fans.

11          A.    Yes.

12          Q.    Okay.  So, you did recall hearing something that --  
13   something to the effect of activating the fans?

14          A.    Correct.

15          Q.    Was that on your radio?

16          A.    No.  That was just through -- just being in the station,  
17   or whatever, and you're talking to all the different people that,  
18   that was in the station or whatever.  And the -- like I said, the  
19   only manager that I actually came in contact with was Ms. Gary.  
20   And she, and she -- obviously, she had talked to the other  
21   managers.

22          Q.    Okay.

23          A.    And they mentioned about the vents being -- because  
24   that's always the first thing.

25          Q.    So, that's --

1 A. And then --

2 Q. -- that's where you think you got the information about  
3 the, the, the vents being activated?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Good. Okay. So, at that point when it became clear to  
8 you that we have a smoke condition -- fire or something is  
9 occurring in the tunnel rather than the station itself --

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. -- is that correct?

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. Was there a determination that was being made at that  
14 time to evacuate the station, or was that already in progress?

15 A. Actually, it was. As soon as I got there and I ran into  
16 the Transit officers that was there -- because they were there  
17 first, before I even got there.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And everybody was kind of running around just trying to  
20 determine where it was actually coming from. You know, we was  
21 talking to each other. And at some point they was -- you know, it  
22 wasn't like minutes or, or a whole lot of minutes went by. It was  
23 pretty much once it -- once they see as the smoke got worse and  
24 worse.

25 Q. Uh-huh.

1           A.    They was yeah, we need to start getting these people out  
2 of here.  And it was people on the platform.  And we was trying to  
3 get them out.  Some of them was just standing there, and a lot of  
4 them -- I think once Transit got more aggressive with them,  
5 letting them know, look, for your safety you need to get out of  
6 here -- they started moving out.  But as it started getting  
7 thicker, you know, you couldn't even -- you could barely see the  
8 people that was in the station.  So, they were like standing there  
9 right beside you.  And the only reason why it wasn't affecting me  
10 as much because -- I guess because I was on the platform and I can  
11 move back and forth or whatever.

12           Q.    Has it been your experience that patrons on the, on the  
13 platform tend to ignore a station manager rather than the uniform  
14 officer -- Transit officer, in terms of evacuating a station?  In  
15 other words, they won't heed your guidance as much as an officer?  
16 Is that a fair assessment?

17           A.    Well, I wouldn't say all of that.  But a lot of times --  
18 I know, as a supervisor I've never had that problem when you tell  
19 people.  A lot of times, people will question you because they  
20 want to know, well, why do we have to leave.  And that's what was  
21 going on.  Even though they could see the smoke, they was like  
22 well, what -- where, where are we supposed to go.  And my response  
23 was that -- just go outside for right now, you know.  We're just  
24 kind of like at the beginning of this.  So, you -- it might not be  
25 any shuttle buses out there, though, because that's the first --

1 they always ask about the shuttle buses. So, I just -- was just  
2 trying to tell them to get out of the station or whatever.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. But a lot of times the managers -- you know, they'll  
5 listen.

6 Q. Okay. You were in your supervisor's uniform at the  
7 time?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Is there a jacket involved? Tell, tell us what, what you  
10 were wearing.

11 A. Well, at that particular time I just had on, I had on my  
12 heavy coat, because it had been -- you know, that week, it was  
13 kind of cold. So I put on my bigger coat. So the coat was  
14 covered up. I had my vest on. So -- and I had my radio. I  
15 always feel like if you see a person that's got a radio -- I  
16 realize managers have radios, but I figure if people see you with  
17 a radio that means that you must be someone of importance, a  
18 little bit -- I say that. Because I would never, you know -- I'm  
19 not one of them type of guys like that. But I just feel that  
20 people see you with a radio that means that it must be somebody  
21 important.

22 Q. So, at that -- at some point you had taken your jacket  
23 off and left it in -- wherever, and had your, your safety vest on.  
24 So, it was apparent you were a, a WMATA manager of some sort.

25 A. Actually, I never took the coat off.

1 Q. You never took the coat off?

2 A. I just put the vest over the, over the coat.

3 Q. Vest over the coat?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. The reason I brought that up is that you had indicated  
8 before that the, the Transit officer -- it sounded like he didn't  
9 recognize you when you were on the train.

10 A. Right.

11 Q. And it sounds like you didn't have your vest on at that  
12 time.

13 A. Oh, no, I did. I had it on. But I think what happens a  
14 lot of times is that -- I mean, we all -- our uniforms all look  
15 the same except for, you know, the shirts or whatever. But I  
16 think a lot of times -- those particular officers that were there  
17 that day, I don't -- I have never seen -- I've never seen them  
18 before since I've been around here. I know it's -- we get a lot  
19 of new people coming in. I've never seen those guys before.

20 Q. I see.

21 A. So, they probably didn't know me. A lot of the officers  
22 I do know, you know, by working in different areas of the system.  
23 But I didn't --

24 Q. They would normally know you on sight, but this  
25 particular officer didn't recognize you?

1 A. Right. I don't think they knew who I was.

2 Q. I see.

3 A. Right. Because they kept calling me operator. And I  
4 said I'm the supervisor. Right. But, you know, whatever they was  
5 telling me to do I was just following their instructions. I  
6 wasn't trying to give them a hard time.

7 Q. I see. When you have an emergency of this magnitude,  
8 where it would be advantageous for a supervisor to actually stay  
9 with the train as long as possible) --

10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. -- would it be up to you to indicate to the officer that  
12 you needed to stay with the train, or would you simply heed the  
13 guidance of the officer on the order to evacuate?

14 A. Well, in, in, in that case most of the time -- and I --  
15 let me, let me say this correctly. In -- most of the time what  
16 happens is when they ask you -- you know, because when they're on  
17 the scene they're normally the on-scene commanders, right. And  
18 they probably felt that it was unsafe for everybody to be there.  
19 But even though at some point -- I don't know, like I said, if  
20 they ever knew I was the actual supervisor. They kept calling me  
21 the operator or whatever. But I told them I was the supervisor.  
22 But the fact that -- letting them know that I had to stay with the  
23 train, they still felt that it was unsafe.

24 Q. I see.

25 A. But if it -- I'm just assuming -- if it was like another



1 day -- like something other than smoke and things like that -- you  
2 know, they might have been -- say okay, somebody needs to stay  
3 with the train. But in that case, I think they was more concerned  
4 about the safety, not realizing that, you know, maybe moving that  
5 train might have made a difference. I don't know.

6 Q. The first time you were at the train, the purpose of  
7 potentially keying it up --

8 A. Uh-huh.

9 Q. -- what was the visibility in the station at the time?  
10 Was it relatively light to where had you been able) to key up you  
11 might have been able) to do a reverse move, in terms of being at  
12 the opposite end of the train and be able) to see your way out of  
13 the station, do you think?

14 A. Yeah. When I, when, when I, when I went down to the  
15 train the visibility was bad. All I could see was the red door  
16 indicator lights on the train. And the area where the train was  
17 keyed up was going towards Branch. I had speed readouts, but I  
18 couldn't see the signal.

19 Q. Okay. So, you wouldn't have felt comfortable) moving  
20 the train anyways at that time. Would that be a correct -- fair  
21 assessment?

22 A. Yeah. That would be a fair assessment to say that. It  
23 would be a fair -- right.

24 Q. Even if OCC said at your discretion proceed to move back  
25 -- reverse move - you, you still wouldn't have felt comfortable)?

1           A.    Well, if we could have -- yeah, the reverse move I think  
2 would have been a little safer because most of the smoke was  
3 towards that front of that train area.

4           Q.    Well, that's what I'm saying.

5           A.    Right.

6           Q.    Toward the rear of the train, what was the smoke  
7 condition back there? Was it clear enough you might have been  
8 able) to see your way onto the, the, the interchange there -- to  
9 cross over?

10          A.    Well, you know what, I can't really answer that. I'm  
11 going to tell you why. Because I wasn't -- I never even like  
12 looked back that way.

13          Q.    You never got that far?

14          A.    Right.

15          Q.    I see.

16          A.    So, I don't want to answer that and --

17          Q.    Yeah. I wanted to kind of touch on that little  
18 hypothetical --

19          A.    Right. Okay.

20          Q.    -- in that it had come up in discussion before.

21          A.    Got you.

22          Q.    Okay. Now, when you got back to the, to the train with  
23 the operator the second go-around, and the smoke had cleared and  
24 you and the operator were in the process of clearing the doors and  
25 everything --

1 A. Right.

2 Q. -- I guess she was working in one direction, you were  
3 working the other direction.

4 A. Right. Well, actually, what I told her to do is just to  
5 go back towards the Greenbelt area. Because we could see flashing  
6 lunar going back towards Greenbelt. And I told her just hold up.  
7 I said just go ahead and key up, because we wanted to establish  
8 some communication because we're only working with one handset  
9 here. So I went back there and normaied up the doors. Normaied  
10 up meaning that I reset the emergency --

11 Q. Reset the doors. Right.

12 A. -- doors. So we can move.

13 Q. And your thinking, your strategy at the time is that OCC  
14 may be --

15 A. Right.

16 Q. -- sending you on to Greenbelt --

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. -- through the interchange, the lunar on the Greenbelt,  
19 to get your train cleared from the platform.

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Okay. Were you aware of -- at that time, that there was  
22 another train down the track?

23 A. Yeah. At that time I did, I did know. By then I knew.  
24 But before then -- because it was so much chatter going on, I had  
25 no idea where that train was.

1 Q. Okay. So --

2 A. Because you just listening.

3 Q. -- let's, let's try to put a, a best guess on the time  
4 when you might have learned that occurred? Was that before or  
5 after the first time you had gone to the, the train to try to  
6 clear it?

7 A. It was the -- it had to be, probably, the, the second  
8 time when we got on the Greenbelt. And that's when I realized  
9 that -- when they called, when they called for a supervisor -- let  
10 me start over again. When they called for the supervisor to move  
11 that train off the platform -- at that time, okay, then I could  
12 say that I knew something was going on up in that tunnel right  
13 there.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. That the -- you know, try to get that train out of  
16 there.

17 Q. I see.

18 A. Because they kept on kind of like -- kind of putting a  
19 lot of emphasis on moving that train.

20 Q. But, they didn't give you a radio call or phone call,  
21 whatever, to say we have a train down on the tunnel somewhere, we  
22 need to evacuate that train and get it back to the platform? You  
23 didn't get any, any of that guidance from OCC did you?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Directly?

1 A. No, not directly. I did not.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Because I think what happened at the time was was that  
4 when I initially got there and I tried to call them, just to let  
5 them know what was going on there -- because a lot of times that's  
6 how we normally do, just to let them know okay, I'm here, this is  
7 what's going on.

8 Q. Uh-huh.

9 A. And I couldn't get it -- I couldn't get through to them,  
10 right.

11 Q. You just couldn't get through because of all the radio.

12 A. Right. Right.

13 Q. The chatter. Okay. Let's move on to the next question  
14 and give everybody a fair opportunity here.

15 BY MR. DORSEY ADAMS:

16 Q. All right, Mr. Adams. How you doing today?

17 A. I'm fine, Mr. Adams.

18 Q. I've got a great name here.

19 A. Yes. You do.

20 Q. It is --

21 A. Most people think we're related. But go ahead. I'm  
22 sorry.

23 Q. Okay. At any point, did you change ops on your radio  
24 from 2 to 3?

25 A. I did not.

1 Q. You stayed on ops 2?

2 A. Ops -- I'm sorry. I did change once I got upstairs to  
3 L'Enfant. I changed to ops 3 then.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. When I first got on the scene, yes.

6 Q. All right. You mentioned that you ran into the operator  
7 on the steps and then you traveled down to the train.

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Right? Did she stay with you the whole time?

10 A. She did.

11 Q. She did?

12 A. Because I think she was, she was, she was kind of  
13 scared, herself, because of the fact that -- how she -- you know,  
14 she was told to get out of the station or whatever. Because  
15 that's when I had explained to her that they was calling you, they  
16 want you to move the train off the platform or whatever. So, she  
17 was, she was, she was kind of like upset about it.

18 Q. I don't know if I heard you correctly, but I thought you  
19 mentioned at one time that you, you only had one handset.

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. She didn't have a radio with her?

22 A. Oh, yeah. She -- you know what, she did have a radio.  
23 She had a radio as well.

24 Q. Okay. So, you --

25 A. But I was, I was -- right. So we had two radios.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Yes. You could say that, yes.

3 Q. When, when somebody opens an emergency door do you still  
4 get the speed commands?

5 A. Yeah. You will still get speed commands on the train,  
6 yes, if the doors are -- if you have a -- if you are sitting there  
7 or whatever and the train is -- the only time you probably lose  
8 readouts is, you know, like if you have a track server problem,  
9 yes.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. You should still have readouts, because you're just  
12 sitting there on the platform right there. But that doesn't  
13 affect the readouts with the doors or whatever. Because that's  
14 almost like the doors are in bypass.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Right.

17 Q. All right.

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. Tell me a little bit about your training. How, how long  
20 is your training? Well, how long have you been with Metro?

21 A. Eighteen years.

22 Q. And that job entailed what? You started as a train  
23 operator?

24 A. Correct. Uh-huh. I did.

25 Q. You started as a train operator?

1           A.    I'm sorry.  I'm sorry.  I started as a bus operator.  I  
2 do apologize.

3           Q.    Okay.

4           A.    And I worked my way up through the ranks, train  
5 stations.

6           Q.    And you were a bus operator for how long?

7           A.    Three years.

8           Q.    And then you did what?

9           A.    Once I left bus I went to trains in '99.

10          Q.    And then what?

11          A.    Once I left trains I went to stations for like about 3  
12 months.  I want to say probably around 2000 -- 2002, around about  
13 that time.  And then once I had done the station for 3 months I  
14 went back to trains again, because I just liked trains better.

15          Q.    Okay.  Each time you change positions -- change jobs,  
16 like from trains to stations to trains, is there some retraining  
17 that you go through?

18          A.    Yeah.  Most of the time when you, when you -- any time  
19 you do either/or, it's always a training class that you got to go  
20 through.  If you going to go to stations, you get -- I know at  
21 that time when I was doing it -- it's probably longer now.  But,  
22 yes, you do get some kind of training when you switch positions  
23 like that.

24          Q.    Does that training include emergency evacuations?

25          A.    Correct.  It does.



1 Q. It does?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. On what -- smoke? Fire? Water? Hurricanes? What?

4 A. Yeah, you get like --

5 Q. A little bit of everything?

6 A. Yeah, kind of like crowded platforms. You know, you  
7 know when you get the crowded platforms, smoke in the tunnel,  
8 person falling from the -- I mean, fall on the tracks. That kind  
9 of stuff. It's a few more of them that, that we normally get  
10 trained on.

11 Q. Do supervisors go through the same refresher training  
12 as, as train operators?

13 A. Yes, we do, every -- supposed to be every 2 years here.

14 Q. You said supposed to be.

15 A. Yes. But only reason why I say supposed to be because  
16 sometimes where -- you know, when your time come up, you know --  
17 it might be a little late or whatever. But normally, you do get  
18 the certifications that you're supposed to.

19 Q. So, you, you said in and around that --

20 A. Right.

21 Q. -- it has to be --

22 A. Exactly. That sound -- yeah, I like the way that  
23 sounds. That sounds better.

24 Q. You also mentioned that you've been involved in big  
25 events before.

1           A.    Yes.  I wouldn't say like -- you know, I've been  
2 involved with some -- with a few things.  Because you know how  
3 sometimes when you get a lot of stuff that happens, normally  
4 you're not there at work that day.  But, that's not the first time  
5 that, you know, something like that -- where you get calls for the  
6 smoke in the station or somebody done fell on the track or  
7 somebody got hit by a train -- things like that.

8           Q.    Anything of this magnitude before?

9           A.    For me, no.  I could say this was the first for me.

10          Q.    First?

11          A.    Correct.

12          Q.    Did you get issued a respirator?

13          A.    I did.  I have been issued a respirator.  But it's been,  
14 it's been a while since I've actually had one.  I know they do  
15 expire after a certain amount of years.  But at one point I was  
16 issued a respirator.

17          Q.    So, are you required to have it?

18          A.    Yes.  I would say so.

19          Q.    Well, in your own opinion is it something that people  
20 carry -- train operators and supervisors?

21          A.    No.  In my opinion, no.

22          Q.    Okay.  All right.  That's all the questions I have for  
23 you.

24          A.    Okay.

25                BY MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN:

1 Q. Marlene Flemings-McCann, Local 689 representative.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. Mr. Adams, you said that you were required to -- you  
4 think maybe you're required to carry a respirator.

5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. But if they haven't issued one in such a long time and  
7 either -- even though you went to certification and all that other  
8 stuff --

9 A. Uh-huh.

10 Q. -- was that ever brought up to you again after the years  
11 that you first got one? Has anyone brought that up to you again,  
12 as to do you have it, is it updated, whatever?

13 A. No. I actually -- I do not have one. But, I mean, I --  
14 you know, since I've been here I have been issued one. But, no,  
15 it has not come up. It sure hasn't.

16 Q. How long have you been a supervisor?

17 A. Eleven years.

18 Q. You said when you went back down that first time --

19 A. Okay. Uh-huh.

20 Q. -- to move the train and your goal was to get it off the  
21 platform.

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. But, first of all -- it was a couple things that stopped  
24 you. One was you had to normalize the doors.

25 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. The second was you really couldn't see.

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. So, with that being said, what do you think you could  
4 have done at that point?

5 A. The only, the only thing I think I could have done --  
6 because, you know, once I got on the train and I -- when I got --  
7 first got on there and I keyed up and I said -- I looked straight  
8 ahead. I could see the train had the speed commands. I was like  
9 oh, my God, I can't even see in front of me. I was really like  
10 thinking in my mind like, wow, this is quite dangerous. If I do  
11 move it that direction, it's kind of scary. Because I don't know  
12 what's in front of me. It was so many people out there. So, I --  
13 in my opinion, I think if I just could have reversed ends or  
14 something at the time. But that's what I'm thinking in my mind,  
15 that the communication thing between everybody -- it just wasn't  
16 there on the same level. But, yeah, reversing ends -- that was  
17 my, that was my next option.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And I think by them -- I don't mean to cut you off,  
20 Ms. Flemings --

21 Q. That's okay.

22 A. -- but by Transit coming on the train and pulling me off  
23 there like that, I think that, that had a lot to do with me  
24 probably not moving that train. Because in my mind I want to do  
25 everything I can to try to move it, because that's always been in

1 my -- the way that I think.

2 Q. Do you think that Transit knew that there was a train in  
3 the tunnel when you was on it?

4 A. The only reason why I'm not sure if they knew or not  
5 because of the fact that everybody is on a different frequency.  
6 Like, we were on 3. I don't know what channel they were on. And,  
7 and, and I'm thinking later on -- you know, the -- after, after  
8 everything go down and you listening and you say, like, wow, I  
9 wonder if everybody is on the same frequency -- the same channels  
10 or whatever. So, I'm thinking that they probably did not know.  
11 I'm just -- I don't know.

12 Q. Another thing. I think you said the second time when  
13 you came back down, the other thing that hindered you was third  
14 rail power was down?

15 A. Correct. By the time we -- by the time the officers got  
16 me -- and they operated together. They walked us around to the  
17 Maryland Avenue side. We came down the station, and I saw another  
18 Transit officer -- a more higher rank officer -- he said we're  
19 going to try to move that train back the other way. So, we went  
20 down there. And that's when I told her just go up to the lead  
21 cab. I'm going to try to -- I'm going to normal this stuff up  
22 real quick.

23 Q. Uh-huh.

24 A. So when they ready to talk to us we can go.

25 Q. Right.

1           A.    And that's basically how that, how that happened right  
2 there.

3           Q.    How much time do you think had passed from the first  
4 time you was on the train to the second time?

5           A.    I would probably say at least between 20 minutes and a  
6 half an hour before we actually got back on that other side there.  
7 I'm just kind of guesstimating, because I wasn't really keeping  
8 track of the time.

9           Q.    Uh-huh.

10          A.    Because I do remember we went upstairs.  When I got --  
11 when I came back down, we went back outside.  As soon as we went  
12 outside -- the guy walked us out -- we walked over there to the  
13 other side.  Because we had to walk from 9th and D over to  
14 Maryland Avenue.  So, I'd just say -- I would say probably about  
15 20 minutes.

16          Q.    Next question.  Do you have any idea who, who knocked  
17 third, third rail power off?

18          A.    I don't.  Because once I realized, you know, at that  
19 time about the train being in that tunnel and I already kept  
20 saying that the -- you know, about getting back to the platform or  
21 whatever -- I have no idea who probably had done it.  Because I'm  
22 thinking that -- he said that people had started evacuating.  It's  
23 not telling who might have shut it down.  Because there was a lot  
24 of people there.

25          Q.    Uh-huh.

1 A. I'm not even sure.

2 Q. My last question to you is, being a supervisor and, and  
3 normally dealing with Central direct through your radio, do you --  
4 the communication was, you said, a lot of chatter.

5 A. Yeah. Uh-huh.

6 Q. On a normal situation or a normal emergency, Central  
7 normally shut down the airway to the emergency.

8 A. Right.

9 Q. But I haven't heard anyone -- so, I'm -- I guess I'm  
10 asking you --

11 A. Right.

12 Q. -- because of your position. I haven't heard anyone say  
13 Central shut down the airways to everybody else and focused on  
14 that train in the tunnel and who was at L'Enfant, which was you.

15 A. Right.

16 Q. Or whoever -- whatever employee that could move that  
17 train.

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. Did at any time that come across the radio?

20 A. No. I never, I never heard that part. And you're  
21 absolutely right. Normally -- in normal situations, they be like  
22 we need everybody to just stand by because we've got an emergency  
23 going on. I do not remember hearing that. Now, mind you that I'm  
24 doing other things. But, at that -- I don't remember -- recall  
25 hearing them say that at all about the -- cutting down the

1 chatter. And then that particular location, L'Enfant, is like --  
2 the reception there -- that's just one of few -- many stations  
3 with bad radio communication. Now that we don't have the analog  
4 radios available).

5 Q. All right. Okay. No more questions. Thank you very  
6 much, sir.

7 A. Okay. You're welcome.

8 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

9 Q. Sharmila Samarasinghe, Tri-State Oversight Committee.

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. Mr. Adams, a few questions about incidents such as this.

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. Because you mentioned that you have been in emergency  
14 situations within Metro Rail. Just trying to understand the  
15 interaction between rail transportation and Metro Transit PD --

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. -- in the incidents. When incidents like this happen,  
18 at, at this kind of -- at this scale --

19 A. Uh-huh.

20 Q. -- is it your experience that you have a rail  
21 transportation supervisor or somebody being a liaison with the on-  
22 scene commander?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. That's, that's normally how it normally goes.



1 Q. Okay.

2 A. But I was -- as I was saying earlier, in my mind -- I'm  
3 just saying through experience -- it just seemed like those guys  
4 that was there that day --

5 Q. Uh-huh.

6 A. -- might have been -- you know, they might not -- they  
7 might have been inexperienced.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I don't know. I'd never seen the guys before. But I  
10 realize it's a big system.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. But normally, yeah. Because, I mean, most of the time  
13 Central -- they're talking to us --

14 Q. Uh-huh.

15 A. -- because they want to keep updated about what's going  
16 on.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. They want to talk to us. And they do have the guys  
19 that's in charge of whatever. Yeah, normally, that's normally how  
20 it, how it goes.

21 Q. Okay. So, on, on this day -- on the date that the  
22 incident took place, to your understanding there was no person  
23 from rail transportation -- maybe a supervisor -- who could be  
24 identified as the liaison between rail transportation and the on-  
25 scene commander -- like a forward liaison?

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. No, not, not that I can recall.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Not at that time. Because like I said, it was so much  
6 going on.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. I'm in and out of the station. So, no.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. Do you recall there being another rail transportation  
12 supervisor, Supervisor Abney --

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 Q. -- from --

15 A. From my division --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- the --

18 Q. Was he -- do you happen to know whether he was the  
19 forward liaison for ARTA at the on-scene command?

20 A. No. If I'm not mistaken, I believe Abney came after I  
21 got there.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And they did have someone on the train, or what have  
24 you. A supervisor that was on the train that went in with them to  
25 rescue those people out of there.

1 Q. Okay. All right.

2 A. But, I don't think it was him.

3 Q. All right. So, again, reaching back to in past  
4 instances --

5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. -- when you've had these incidents, what has your  
7 experience been in terms of interacting with Metro Transit PD and,  
8 and how we all resolve the situation and restore service? What --

9 A. Yes. Normally, normally we have like a, a command  
10 center there normally.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Where they -- where you have like a rail supervisor  
13 there, then, you know -- there. And then you have the Transit  
14 Police is there, and they're talking back and forth.

15 Q. Uh-huh.

16 A. And we're -- and it's normally better communicating than  
17 that day. I don't know what happened that day. But normally,  
18 it's always -- when I've ever been on the scene with them --

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. -- normally we communicate pretty good.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Because we got to determine -- like, okay, can we bring  
23 the power back up and things like that. But, I always say in my  
24 mind -- I realize that everybody can't be on the same frequency.

25 Q. Sure.

1           A.    But that's always to me, I think, that should be a good  
2 idea.

3           Q.    Okay.

4           A.    Maybe -- you know, so that way everybody can hear what's  
5 going on together.

6           Q.    Okay.

7           A.    And not like you and I -- we two separate entities.

8           Q.    Okay.

9           A.    They talking to me, and then you getting information  
10 from somebody else.

11          Q.    Yes. Yes. So, the -- just picking up on, on the last  
12 thing that you mentioned about being on the same frequency --

13          A.    Right.

14          Q.    -- as far as radio communications.

15          A.    Right.

16          Q.    In the past when you've been involved in these  
17 incidents, has it been your experience that either ROCC or Transit  
18 decides that everybody is going to talk on the same channel so  
19 that rail transportation and PD --

20          A.    Uh-huh.

21          Q.    -- know what each, each group is deciding to do next?

22          A.    Right. Now, normally --

23          Q.    Is the --

24          A.    I'm sorry. Now, it -- normally what they would probably  
25 do is -- now, in the past I've had them guys -- like if you get a

1 person that done jumped in front of a train they'll tell you to go  
2 to ops 6.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. They will.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. But I'm still on ops 2, because I'm the guy that's  
7 there. They want to talk to me because they wanted me to keep  
8 them updated to what's going on.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. So they probably would -- will -- would do that. I've  
11 seen them do that, where --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- they go to a different ops and they talk. So that  
14 way everybody -- all of the first responders be on the same ops.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. And then I'm always on 2 or wherever I'm at, talking to  
17 them.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And they -- I can keep them updated what's going on with  
20 the train moving and things like that.

21 Q. Got it.

22 A. Because they going to -- they always want to talk to a  
23 supervisor.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Because even though they are the on-scene commanders at

1 the time, they still want to talk to us because they want to know  
2 what's going on --

3 Q. Exactly. Okay.

4 A. -- about moving trains and things like that.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 A. You're welcome.

7 BY MR. BUCHER:

8 Q. Dave Bucher.

9 A. Okay.

10 Q. Did you observe passengers evacuate the train in the  
11 tunnel?

12 A. I did not. I didn't see the people coming out of the  
13 tunnel until after the power was down. And then they start  
14 bringing the, the people off the train -- walking them through.

15 Q. Okay. At that time, were you in the station or up top?

16 A. I was in the station then.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. When it -- and I --

19 Q. So you --

20 A. Go ahead.

21 Q. -- you did observe the firefighters bringing people out  
22 of the tunnel, or people coming out of the tunnel?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And I was just like -- at that time, I was just a

1 standby. I was just watching. Because they had us just stand  
2 back, so they can make like a line or what have you so they can  
3 walk out.

4 Q. Okay. You didn't observe anything unusual? I mean, it  
5 was unusual.

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. The whole thing was unusual. But the, the system seemed  
8 to be working as it's supposed to?

9 A. Yes. At that time, to me -- I mean, most of the people  
10 were walking out. I only saw them carrying one person over their  
11 shoulders. That was the only person that I saw them carrying.  
12 Everybody else -- I know -- I understand it was a -- maybe one or  
13 two wheelchairs. I'm not even sure which direction they took  
14 them, because they were using both platforms.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. But I was only on that one side where most of the people  
17 was coming out.

18 Q. Okay. Okay. That's all I have for now.

19 A. All right.

20 BY MR. DOWNS:

21 Q. Downs, NTSB. Mr. Adams, I'm going to jump around a  
22 little bit here. Let's, let's go back to the question over here  
23 regarding the incident command process.

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. In your training program for when you took your rail

1 supervisor position was the incident command process addressed in  
2 that training?

3 A. The incident command -- you mean like -- can you explain  
4 that to me, in --

5 Q. Incident command. That's where the Fire Department sets  
6 up and establishes an incident command up topside, where you have  
7 the Fire Chief --

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. -- you have the PD and so on. You're familiar with that  
10 process at all, or no?

11 A. Okay. No, here's -- now, when I first became a  
12 supervisor we probably didn't have that in place. I'm just -- and  
13 so --

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. -- as the years went by and, yes, they -- when we had  
16 our retraining about that, it was mentioned that how they -- how  
17 you got the people on the topside, the -- what is the word that we  
18 always call it -- you know, the area where everybody is at, where  
19 the main people are -- the people you need to talk to and things  
20 like that. I forgot the word that we call it, right, but I done  
21 kind of got a brain clot on that one.

22 Q. Is that an incident command post?

23 A. Yes. The incident command post. Right.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Exactly.



1 Q. Okay. So, correct me if I'm wrong. My understanding is  
2 that they didn't necessarily -- when you first had your training  
3 years ago, when you first took your position --

4 A. Uh-huh.

5 Q. -- they didn't have the incident command, from -- but in  
6 retraining over the years, periodically training, they did provide  
7 that familiarization. Is that correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. So, do you feel you have a good understanding of it  
12 right now -- how the incident command process works?

13 A. I do.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Because like I was one of the -- one of these guys, I'm  
16 not sure who asked the -- I think Mr. Adams, about that -- you  
17 know, even though I've been to a lot of scenes or whatever, some  
18 of the things that -- when you get there, sometimes you might, you  
19 might be the second or third person there. So, you won't always  
20 be the person that they're talking to.

21 Q. Uh-huh.

22 A. So, you're just there, you know, as support -- things  
23 like that.

24 Q. Okay. All right. So, far as Rail management's  
25 involvement with incident command processes, had you been given

1 any guidance in terms of what you were supposed to do specifically  
2 when there's a major event going on relative to, to communicating  
3 with incident command? Did you have any of that coverage with  
4 your training?

5 A. I did. And, and, and mostly my, my job is to just -- to  
6 keep them updated, because they're on the topside. And to keep  
7 them updated what's going on on the lower level. I mean -- I can  
8 say lower level, but to keep them --

9 Q. On the at the platform level.

10 A. -- what's going on on the platform levels. And then  
11 talk to OCC as well.

12 Q. So, would it be correct to say that your first step of  
13 your process would be to go down and work the platform? Or would  
14 it be the first step to go up and communicate first with incident  
15 command to let them know who you were and that you were on scene  
16 and that you would be going down further to the platform to do  
17 your assessment?

18 A. Right. The -- to check with them first, to let them  
19 know I'm there.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. Because most of the time when Central call you the first  
22 thing they going to ask you is that -- where is the command post  
23 located, have you located that, or whatever.

24 Q. Uh-huh.

25 A. And most of the time, you know, when I was the first

1 person there that's what they always tell you.

2 Q. In this particular incident, did you do that?

3 A. I did not.

4 Q. You did not?

5 A. I did not.

6 Q. Is there mitigating factors here why you didn't do that?

7 A. Well, I think what happened was because it was so much  
8 going on at the time and I was just so concerned about getting the  
9 people out of the station. That was probably the only thing that,  
10 at that time -- because I think what happened sometimes when you  
11 get so caught up in what you're doing -- I was thinking safety  
12 first, just trying to get the people out. And I, and I did not.

13 Q. You were thinking life safety first?

14 A. Yes. Trying to get those people out of the station.

15 Q. And was it your intent once you did that first step  
16 process to go back and get the incident command up at the command  
17 post and to let them know who you were and where you were and what  
18 you were doing?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. Did you ultimately do that?

21 A. I did not.

22 Q. Did not do that?

23 A. Uh-uh.

24 Q. Were there other mitigating factors there?

25 A. Well, I think what happened is that -- I think at some

1 point I just -- I guess -- like I said before, I just got so  
2 involved with what I was doing.

3 Q. I see.

4 A. And the fact that once the people started evacuating  
5 from the train, and then I was kind of like -- how can I put it?  
6 I was that person that was kind of like in the background.  
7 Because now we got something real major going on, and they're not  
8 even talking to me. You know, they're not talking to anybody but  
9 the people, trying to get them off the train. So --

10 Q. Well, was it your expectation that they would seek you  
11 out?

12 A. Yes. Eventually. They did call me but they didn't call  
13 me for a while. Because they was handling that or whatever, after  
14 that, after that had happened. But, yeah, that's probably the  
15 only thing I could say that I didn't do at that time.

16 Q. Well, we'll go back to that and give you --

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. -- an opportunity to expand upon that a little bit.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. Jumping around a little bit. Your service radio -- is  
21 it the standard radio that all the station managers will, will  
22 have, or is that a special radio?

23 A. Well, mine is supposed to be a little stronger than  
24 theirs, I think. I think mine is like a 3000 series.

25 Q. Okay.

1           A.    And theirs is like a 1500.  So, it's supposed to be a  
2 little stronger.  But, from my experience with dealing with those  
3 radios, I mean, you're going to still get some bad spots where you  
4 get the beeping sound.  Because you can't get through.

5           Q.    Pardon me.  You're, you're anticipating my next question.

6           A.    Right

7           Q.    There are challenges, I guess, with the use of these  
8 radios -- these digital radios down in the tunnels and on the  
9 platforms?

10          A.    Correct.

11          Q.    Can you elaborate a little bit for us?

12          A.    Well, my job during the day is that I travel through  
13 different stations and what have you.  And you get certain  
14 stations and -- you know, the ones that I know that have bad radio  
15 communications, sometimes you just got to stand in certain areas  
16 of the platform.  Like I give you an example.  Like Landover,  
17 that's a real bad spot there.  Downstairs where the kiosk is.  
18 When you go up to the top level, it's a little better.  You're on  
19 a platform.

20          Q.    Uh-huh.

21          A.    But you would figure since Landover is an outside  
22 station it should be better throughout.  But I -- we get that a  
23 lot.  I mean --

24          Q.    So, universally, there are dead spots --

25          A.    Yeah.

1 Q. -- and you get to know where they are pretty much by  
2 your experience --

3 A. Right. Just by --

4 Q. -- and regular --

5 A. Right. Because I work these areas every day.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. And then if I'm there I just call them and say look, I'm  
10 at Landover. I might -- going to be here long. If you need me,  
11 that's where I'll be.

12 Q. And you've alerted your radio technology folks as to  
13 these issues?

14 A. Yes. They know. I mean, we --

15 Q. Many times you've alerted and they've sent people out to  
16 see if they can fix it. Or --

17 A. Yes. That's just like if something go down in the  
18 system or whatever. They'll send the guys out to check the spots.  
19 But I just think that it's just -- the communication is just  
20 really bad.

21 Q. And you, you just feel fundamentally it's with the, with  
22 the digital radios that there's not enough -- maybe not enough  
23 repeaters in the tunnels or --

24 A. Well, I mean, I'm not really -- I don't know because I'm  
25 not really -- that's not my level of expertise. But, I mean, I

1 know that since I've been using the digital radios -- I loved the  
2 analogs better, because at least you can use them pretty much a  
3 lot of places. But I know we don't have those no more.

4 Q. You didn't have that -- those problems with the analog  
5 that you have now with the digital?

6 A. Yes. But like -- say, for example, if you got an area  
7 where it's a -- where the digital don't work the analog might  
8 work.

9 Q. Uh-huh.

10 A. So, I kind of got spoiled with the analog, because I was  
11 using both -- we were using two radios to try to communicate.

12 Q. Okay. And if you can't use your radio for whatever  
13 reason, do you have a backup company-issued cell phone?

14 A. I do.

15 Q. Is it a BlackBerry or an iPhone or is it just a  
16 conventional flip phone?

17 A. Oh, a BlackBerry.

18 Q. It's a BlackBerry.

19 A. Uh-huh.

20 Q. So, you could get a message on your BlackBerry, in terms  
21 of -- from OCC, potentially?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Do they send you messages on your BlackBerry?

24 A. They do. Mostly rail incidents.

25 Q. Rail incidents?

1           A.    Uh-huh.

2           Q.    Did you happen to get any messages regarding this event,  
3 in terms of what was happening?

4           A.    Not at that time, because when they first dispatched me  
5 that was -- that's funny you ask that, because that was the first  
6 thing I did -- look at my phone, just to see was anything going  
7 on. But most of the time when they call you like that you never  
8 know. Because I used to work out at Brentwood. They would call  
9 you down to the Orange and Blue, somebody need a personal. They  
10 want you to check a train out, because we do do that as well, you  
11 know.

12          Q.    Uh-huh.

13          A.    Check trains out for mechanical problems. So, it could  
14 have been anything and at that time I was just hoping that it was  
15 something real simple.

16          Q.    Now, would it --

17          A.    To be honest with you.

18          Q.    -- would it have been helpful to get a quick message  
19 saying to the effect -- for example, we have a train the 302 in  
20 the tunnel unable) to evacuate -- that kind of a message? Would  
21 that have helped clear in your mind your, your, your strategy in  
22 terms of what you'd be able) to manage the station?

23          A.    That's possible). But I think -- I'm just assuming at  
24 the time when, when I got, when I got called -- I don't even think  
25 that train was actually in that tunnel at the time. I don't know,



1     though.

2           Q.     When you first got called, you don't think the train was  
3     in the station -- in the tunnel at the time?

4           A.     I don't think so, because I got there about 3:17.  I  
5     don't know what time that train was in the tunnel.  But I don't  
6     think when I, when I got there initially -- the first time I  
7     arrived there.

8           Q.     Okay.  Okay.  Jumping around a little bit.  Did you have  
9     any medical distress as a result of the smoke in the tunnel?

10          A.     No.  Not at the time when they were -- you talking about  
11     the people coming out of the tunnel, you mean?  Or --

12          Q.     Right.

13          A.     No.

14          Q.     You yourself, did you need any medical treatment or  
15     anything --

16          A.     Oh, no.

17          Q.     -- like that?  No medical distress?

18          A.     Uh-uh.  Uh-uh.

19          Q.     Okay.  Let's see.  You -- as a supervisor, you could  
20     readily move a train yourself.  Correct?

21          A.     Correct.

22          Q.     And we had testimony to the effect earlier -- some train  
23     or some station managers could move trains, meaning they had a  
24     train operator background.  Some did not.

25          A.     Okay.

1 Q. Regarding the emergency movement of trains, is that only  
2 the role of a, of a rail supervisor or could a station manager  
3 move a train upon authority?

4 A. You know what, that's a very good question. It's a good  
5 question. Now, in, in my mind it's like this. If you are a train  
6 operator you're a train operator. If you're a station manager  
7 you're a station manager. I do understand what you're saying  
8 about previous experience. But, I don't think that, that it would  
9 be allowed for a person to move the train because of if they're a  
10 station manager that's what they're certified in. And they -- it  
11 might have been a while since they've been certified. It could be  
12 somebody that could be new, that's real fresh. So, I don't, I  
13 don't, I don't know. I don't think that they would have had them  
14 move that train like that, for -- because of the fact that's a  
15 station -- even though they previously a train operator.

16 Q. But it's not part of their job description as a station  
17 manager to be qualified to be able) to move a train in an  
18 emergency? Is that a fair observation?

19 A. Yes. That's a fair observation. Yes.

20 Q. Correct observation?

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. Okay. Good. In your training capacity -- or, when --  
23 in your training processes, you have a manual that, that you  
24 utilize, correct? To learn all the procedures and such to be  
25 followed.

1           A.    Correct.

2           Q.    Okay.  And during emergencies with the station  
3 operators, we ask them the question to the effect -- trade  
4 procedures to be followed -- and they all indicated to the effect  
5 yes, they had appropriate documentation, manuals or whatever.

6           A.    Uh-huh.

7           Q.    And when they were asked to the effect -- actually  
8 executing the steps of the evacuation process, did they go by  
9 recollection from their training or did they go by a procedural  
10 checklist, just to make sure they didn't inadvertently miss  
11 something, because things were so hectic --

12          A.    Uh-huh.

13          Q.    -- okay.  So, the question to you would be to the  
14 effect, do you think a procedural checklist -- a bullet point  
15 checklist, so far as critical emergency operations that concern,  
16 in this case, evacuation -- would that have been helpful to you  
17 and/or the station managers to go through the processes of making  
18 sure that all of the steps were done?  Meaning check the  
19 escalators, check the elevators, check the rooms, blah, blah,  
20 blah, blah.  The idea is that so much input is coming all the, all  
21 the time.

22          A.    Right.

23          Q.    You've got so many things to do.  Sometimes you have a  
24 little list on your sleeve, so to speak --

25          A.    Right.  I understand.

1 Q. -- I got that done, that done -- oh, I don't want to  
2 forget that --

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. -- blah, blah, blah. Would that be something that would  
5 be helpful, do you reckon, in your experience as a, as a  
6 supervisor? I'm not saying that, that the folks didn't do  
7 anything wrong.

8 A. Right.

9 Q. I'm just saying to help them execute their job and your  
10 job.

11 A. I think so. I mean, it, it -- I mean, I've always been  
12 the type person I'm open for solutions about trying to make things  
13 better. I mean, that would probably be helpful. But I realize in  
14 an emergency situation, you know, you're trying to follow the  
15 rules and regulations but a lot of times you're probably not --  
16 you don't that manual out, because so much going on.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. You know, that you're not really -- but probably at some  
19 point you're like, okay, did I do that, do that, do this.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. But, I, I understand what you're saying. Yes.

22 Q. You, you certainly don't have the time to consult a  
23 manual.

24 A. Right.

25 Q. But the idea is that --

1 A. Right.

2 Q. -- the --

3 A. Right. A checklist.

4 Q. -- a checklist. For example, many investigations that  
5 I've worked train crew members, universally, like to have a  
6 checklist. Pilots have checklists all the time, of course.

7 A. Right. Right.

8 Q. The idea is that it's not that you're going to forget  
9 something deliberately, but there's a lot of stimulus going on  
10 there.

11 A. Right.

12 Q. And anything you can make your job easier --

13 A. Absolutely.

14 Q. -- is better.

15 A. I like that. Uh-huh.

16 Q. Yes. Great. Okay. Okay. Got all that done. Got all  
17 that done. We had testimony to the effect the, the 510 train  
18 operator pulled her train into the station. Got to some point,  
19 maybe halfway down the platform -- I'm paraphrasing here.

20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. The smoke was really thick.

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. She felt hesitant to proceed with the train. Stopped  
24 the train. She then saw a Transit officer there with a flashlight  
25 who she requested and he provided guidance with the flashlight,

1 him going down the platform to see if she could get her train down  
2 as far as possible) --

3 A. To get all the cars on the platform.

4 Q. -- per that -- per the instruction. They're supposed to  
5 pull the train normally up to the eight car spot. Is that  
6 correct?

7 A. Correct. That is correct.

8 Q. She stopped the train in that the Transit officer -- we  
9 later measured -- the train -- it was a little bit over a hundred  
10 feet from the end of the platform -- the eight car spot.

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. That's as far as they could go. We're trying to locate  
13 the identity of that Transit officer. Do you have any idea who  
14 that might be, this officer with a flashlight? Did you happen to  
15 encounter an officer with a flashlight? Or was that entirely  
16 unrelated to your presence?

17 A. Right. It was definitely unrelated to my presence.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And if the operator was able) to see it, their -- see,  
20 their nametags -- and even if you ask them, they -- their nametags  
21 is -- it's hard to kind of see their nametags. Because a lot of  
22 times -- dealing with a lot of those, I kept trying to see their  
23 nametags but they were moving. And then just talking to them.  
24 So, I didn't see that encounter, though. But --

25 Q. You didn't see?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. But she did mention it to me, though, that she got  
4 guided in by a Transit officer.

5 Q. Okay. Yes. We touched on the respirator mask before.  
6 Questions that came around.

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. You indicated you had been issued one years ago.

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. And were qualified in it and trained in it and all that  
11 sort of thing.

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. But you don't -- not quite sure where it's at now?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. And you're required to carry it, to your best knowledge?

16 A. Yes. I mean --

17 Q. Did I get that right?

18 A. Right. You're right. Yes. We're supposed to.

19 Q. Did you have it in this particular case?

20 A. I did not.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Where is it now? Any idea?

24 A. I do not -- I mean, it's possible) it might be --

25 because I do carry a utility bag. It's possible) -- just along

1 with the rest of the stuff that I carry. But I'm, I'm not sure  
2 where it is.

3 Q. Do you think having your respirator mask during this  
4 particular event might have been helpful in terms of dealing with  
5 some of the smoke at some of the times?

6 A. Absolutely.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Uh-huh.

9 Q. Okay. Let's move on to the next. We'll get back.

10 MR. DORSEY ADAMS: Dorsey Adams. No questions at this  
11 time.

12 MR. ADAMS: Okay.

13 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: Marlene Flemings-McCann.

14 MR. ADAMS: Okay.

15 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: 689.

16 BY MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN:

17 Q. You certified to make sure that you're up to par every 2  
18 years.

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. Is having a respirator -- I can't get my words out now.  
21 Is having the respirator mask on your questions? Or was it one of  
22 your questions, as far as your certification? Because I know you  
23 said --

24 A. Oh, yes.

25 Q. -- you're supposed to have it.



1 A. It's not part of the certification.

2 Q. The only reason I asked because you said you're supposed  
3 to carry it.

4 A. Right.

5 Q. And I know most of the things you're supposed to do you  
6 get questions on.

7 A. Right.

8 Q. You know. So, I just wanted to know --

9 A. Exactly.

10 Q. -- was that one of the questions. Or has it ever been a  
11 part of, of it?

12 A. No, not that I can recall. That part of the test,  
13 you're saying. Right?

14 Q. Right.

15 A. Right. No. It hasn't.

16 Q. Has your supervisor ever asked you about it?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Okay. That's all that I want to ask.

19 A. Uh-huh.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Sharmila Samarasinghe, as the Tri-  
22 State Oversight Committee.

23 MR. ADAMS: Yes.

24 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

25 Q. Mr. Adams.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. A quick question. You were talking about training.

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. And in particular we were asking about the training that  
5 you get on the SOP for emergency events.

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. Command and control of emergency events. You said when  
8 you first joined the, the authority didn't really have an SOP on  
9 that, and it was more recently that they came out with the SOP  
10 about how you are supposed to conduct yourself in your capacity  
11 during emergencies. Right?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. Is that something that you get refresher training --  
14 when you get your refresher every 2 to 3 years? Do you recall?

15 A. Most of the time when the refresher is done it's mostly,  
16 you know, you get the -- you get the right of way and things like  
17 that.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Like I said, ever since Metro -- you know, the people  
20 come in and, and --

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. -- overseeing in the Tri-State Committee, those kind of  
23 things --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- things have been better when it comes to getting the

1 training done for certain things.

2 Q. Okay. Okay.

3 A. So, every 2 years -- you're right. I mean, it's  
4 supposed to -- it's, it's a -- you get certified and then on the  
5 procedures and that kind of stuff, you're not really getting  
6 certified on the procedure but when new SOP things come out --

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. -- you know, they're brought to your attention.

9 Q. Yes. Okay.

10 A. And, you know, you have to sign for it and then talk to  
11 the people about it.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Aside from emergencies, when you interact with Metro  
15 Transit Police are there opportunities, not in the -- in  
16 situations where it's high stress, like an actual event, are there  
17 other opportunities for rail transportation supervisors such as  
18 you to interact with Metro Transit Police where you're sitting in  
19 a much more comfortable) environment --

20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. -- kind of talking through things, rather than trying to  
22 introduce yourselves and resolve an emergency situation at the  
23 same time? Do you, do you have other opportunities to interact  
24 with Metro Transit police?

25 A. You mean on emergencies, you're saying?

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Not on emergencies.

4 A. Okay. But --

5 Q. Well -- on the topic of emergencies --

6 A. Okay. But --

7 Q. -- but not during an emergency situation.

8 A. Got you.

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. Okay. Mostly, when I'm in the stations and I'm going to

11 visit the managers, you might --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- if you have officers there, we're interacting in that

14 way.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. That's how a lot of times I get to know some of the

17 guys.

18 Q. Sure.

19 A. But that's normally how -- is how we normally meet each

20 other.

21 Q. Okay. Okay.

22 A. Right. Or on the train or something, and I speak to

23 them or things like that. But that's normally the normal -- the

24 only way it normally happens.

25 Q. All right.

1 A. Interacting with those guys.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. All right.

4 Q. Have there been any opportunities for -- you've heard of  
5 full-scale drills that Metro conducts that, right?

6 A. Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

7 Q. Have you had an opportunity to either observe a Metro  
8 Rail full-scale drill or participate in a Metro Rail full-scale  
9 drill that might have taken place in the last few years?

10 A. No. I have not.

11 Q. Okay. Okay.

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. Okay. Thank you.

14 A. Sure. You're welcome.

15 MR. BUCHER: Dave Bucher again.

16 BY MR. BUCHER:

17 Q. I have one question.

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. And it is going to go back to the Fire Department, and  
20 it -- I previously asked -- you said you had -- you didn't talk to  
21 anybody in the Fire Department. Do you have a feel for when the  
22 Fire Department arrived? I know you said you arrived at about  
23 3 --

24 A. 17, I said.

25 Q. -- 17 or 18.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you have a feel for when the Fire Department arrived,  
3 even though you didn't talk to them?

4 A. No, that's a good question. I have -- when I started  
5 evacuating the people -- when I first, when -- the first time I  
6 went upstairs -- I don't recall what time that was when I first  
7 started sending people outside -- I did see some, some Fires --  
8 Fire people out. But it might have been more like EMS. But I  
9 really can't recall when I first started seeing those guys. But I  
10 do remember seeing them, but, like I said, I did not interact with  
11 them. But I can't really recall --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- when I actually seen -- I saw them in the station.

14 Q. Okay. That's all I have, thank you.

15 A. Okay.

16 MR. DOWN: Downs, NTSB.

17 BY MR. DOWNS:

18 Q. Mr. Adams, what's your operating territory normally?  
19 You -- if you -- the lines, or --

20 A. Yes. Actually, I work on the Orange and Blue. My  
21 sector is between New Carrollton and Federal Triangle.

22 Q. Orange and Blue, New Carrollton to Federal Triangle?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Okay. And you've had that particular assignment for a  
25 while now, or --

1           A.   Probably about 3 or 4 months.  Because they just -- we  
2 just got reassigned.  I was working out of Brentwood before.

3           Q.   Out of Brentwood previously.

4           A.   Correct.

5           Q.   And how long were you on the Brentwood --

6           A.   Probably about 8 years.

7           Q.   Eight years?

8           A.   Well, no, I've been a supervisor 11 -- let me get that  
9 straight.  I was probably at Brentwood 6.  Because I've, I've  
10 moved around at least three times since I've been a supervisor.  
11 So, I would say 6 years I was at Brentwood.

12          Q.   About 6 years?

13          A.   Uh-huh.

14          Q.   And you're relatively new on the Orange and Blue at this  
15 point?

16          A.   Well, only reason why I wouldn't say new because when I  
17 first started in utility -- that's what they called it before you  
18 become a supervisor --

19          Q.   Uh-huh.

20          A.   -- I was working out of New Carrollton.  So, I basically  
21 just went back home where I started.

22          Q.   Okay.

23          A.   Yes.

24          Q.   And the Orange and Blue is the lower level at L'Enfant,  
25 and the -- of course, the upper level is the Yellow and Green.

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. And even though technically it's not your territory, you  
3 still have enough familiarization -- enough supervisory skills --  
4 to be able) to gauge your expertise on an event on that particular  
5 operations. Right?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And you were the only rail supervisor, to your  
8 knowledge, that arrived on scene at the, at the onset of the  
9 event, pretty much. Do you recall?

10 A. Correct. That was -- I was the only person there. Even  
11 though I didn't see anybody else, but as far as I know I was the  
12 only person there.

13 Q. As far as you knew --

14 A. Right.

15 Q. -- you're the only one.

16 A. Right.

17 Q. And when did that change? In other words, when did  
18 another rail supervisor arrive on the scene? Roughly. I'm not  
19 looking to split hairs on the time or anything.

20 A. Right. By the time I, by the time I went back  
21 downstairs to try to move the train back towards Greenbelt I ran  
22 into Supervisor Abney. I ran into him.

23 Q. Abney?

24 A. Abney. Correct.

25 Q. Okay.



1           A.    I ran into him.  And he, he told me that there was  
2 another supervisor -- I don't know how he got in that tunnel with  
3 those guys, but he was in there to help them with the evacuation  
4 situation.  But they came afterwards.  I assume they got keyed off  
5 the train on the lower level and they came up.  But they was on  
6 the opposite side.  That's probably why I didn't see them.  But  
7 eventually, we saw each other.  But by the time I came back down  
8 the second time -- to try to move the train -- that's when I ran  
9 into Abney.

10          Q.    I see.  Okay.

11          A.    And he's out of my division as well.

12          Q.    Okay.

13          A.    Right.

14          Q.    I like to pose the -- typically, the last question to  
15 the witness, what we call retrospective thoughts.

16          A.    Okay.

17          Q.    Now that you've had a little time to kind of gather your  
18 thoughts --

19          A.    Uh-huh.

20          Q.    -- not that you did anything wrong -- is there anything  
21 that you can think of that you might have done differently or  
22 processes that you might do differently in the future?  In other  
23 words, suggestions to your management --

24          A.    Uh-huh.

25          Q.    -- that management could engage here, to help reduce

1 some of the confusion or reduce the risk or whatever -- in other  
2 words, any, any helpful thoughts that you might want to be able)  
3 to offer? Things that you would have done differently in  
4 retrospect, or, or things of that sort. This would be your  
5 opportunity to kind of --

6 A. Right.

7 Q. -- come forth and offer any thoughts on that on those  
8 points.

9 A. Is this -- does this pertain to the train movement as  
10 well?

11 Q. Everything and anything.

12 A. Anything.

13 Q. This is carte blanche your opportunity --

14 A. Right.

15 Q. -- to come on forth and be the --

16 A. Well, here's --

17 Q. -- hero of the event.

18 A. Here's the thing. I really wish that I could have got  
19 through to them when I first got there. Because maybe I could  
20 have been letting them know not to bring no more trains in. My  
21 opinion, I think that them trains that came through there when I  
22 went upstairs --

23 Q. That's the Blue Line trains on the lower level?

24 A. No, upstairs. The, the --

25 Q. On the, on the, on the Green and Yellow.

1 A. Right. Right.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. The train that got caught in the tunnel, and the one  
4 that was on the platform. That's just my opinion.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I probably would have -- ain't no probably. I'm saying  
7 that's just my opinion. I'm not there. But, I mean, like you  
8 said afterwards, right --

9 Q. But what -- knowing what you knew at the time --

10 A. Right.

11 Q. -- that's your thinking?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. You would have said suspend all trains coming into  
14 L'Enfant.

15 A. Right.

16 Q. That would have been, in effect --

17 A. Right.

18 Q. -- your guidance? Okay.

19 A. And like I said before, I, I don't know how far those  
20 guys -- were the trains were. Because it was so much talk on the  
21 radio. I don't even know where those trains were.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I didn't even know they had come in until I went  
24 upstairs and came back down.

25 Q. But at 3:17 you went directly up to the platform.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. There was no train on the platform.

3 A. No train on the platform.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Just me and transit trying to figure out where the smoke  
6 was coming from.

7 Q. And, and you were, you were trying to communicate with  
8 OCC at that time.

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. And there was just so much radio communications --

11 A. Right.

12 Q. -- going on you just couldn't get through.

13 A. Couldn't get through.

14 Q. Did you try on your cell line to get through?

15 A. I did. And that's why I was -- I mentioned earlier that  
16 I did try on my BlackBerry. But it was just --

17 Q. Without success.

18 A. Right. The phone would ring for a long time and then it  
19 would get busy --

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. -- after some point. But I don't really like calling  
22 them when they got an emergency. Because I know how it is down  
23 there. You know, it's so chaotic.

24 Q. Is there a top manager of the OCC you could have  
25 potentially called to say, look, I can't get through to the

1 desk --

2 A. Right.

3 Q. -- here is critical firsthand information from you, the  
4 top supervisor at the time --

5 A. Right.

6 Q. -- on the station platform?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. Is -- could that have been an option, do you think?

9 A. Yes. That was -- now, the top guy normally would be  
10 the, the assistant superintendent that's on duty.

11 Q. Uh-huh.

12 A. They have a number they can call, but most of the time  
13 they're up there with them. I'm not saying -- now, I did not call  
14 his number. I called the regular number.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. But, normally they're up there with them.

17 Q. In retrospect --

18 A. Right.

19 Q. -- do you think maybe you could have made that call to  
20 the OCC supervisor to --

21 A. Yes. I could have, probably with no -- you know, I  
22 don't know what may have happened. But I did not make the call to  
23 him.

24 Q. You were just so --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- diverged --

2 A. Right.

3 Q. -- in different directions at the time --

4 A. Exactly.

5 Q. -- it didn't come to you?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. I see.

8 A. That's exactly what was going on.

9 Q. Okay. But let's --

10 A. So --

11 Q. Anything else?

12 A. Yes. Also, the fact that -- certain things that kind of  
13 bug me a lot is that -- the fact that, as a supervisor, sometimes  
14 you feel like you want to be involved more with what's going on.  
15 I realize they have the command post and the different people in  
16 charge. But a lot of times -- back in the day, I always say,  
17 because when I first became a supervisor when we was the first  
18 person on the scene we would be in charge. So, a lot of times I  
19 would like for us to be involved with what's going on on them  
20 platforms. I realize when we get there we're like second fiddle.  
21 Because when, when the police get there they're in charge. I, I  
22 understand and respect that.

23 Q. Uh-huh.

24 A. But a lot of times I would like to see us being able) to  
25 be more involved with what's going on with the other entities,

1 like the Fire Department and those guys. And I realize up there  
2 at their command post a lot of that stuff is going on. But we're  
3 not on the same page, together.

4 Q. To, to where you could potentially have, have, have  
5 overridden OCC and, and said to the effect if you had been able)  
6 to get through to them, look, I'm telling you you need to do this.

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. Meaning suspend all train arrivals.

9 A. Right.

10 Q. Make a determination if there were any trapped trains in  
11 the tunnel.

12 A. Right.

13 Q. Okay. And take appropriate action in concert with the  
14 Fire Department. Is that what you're thinking here?

15 A. Right. That's what I was -- absolutely.

16 Q. Perfect. Okay.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. Anything else?

19 A. Just the -- you know, the part I was saying about us  
20 working together. And then the, the communication thing. We've  
21 got to get better communication in the stations. Now, the  
22 evacuation process -- I thought we did the best we could do at  
23 that particular day, because we had the people -- I mean, we did  
24 good with getting the people out of the station. In that aspect  
25 of it, I don't think -- I think we did pretty good with that. I'm

1 not trying to take no praise about what we did -- I realize it was  
2 not a good situation, but --

3 Q. For, for the folks that you could control --

4 A. Right. Right.

5 Q. -- that were right on the platform -- not speaking about  
6 the folks --

7 A. Right.

8 Q. -- in the train yet, which hadn't come off.

9 A. Right. And I'm going to tell you, every day I think  
10 about it -- you know, now that I know -- I get clear picture of  
11 what happened, about only if I could have moved that train. I  
12 think about that all the time. I'm not -- you know, I just think  
13 about it, you know. The fact that I wish I could have --

14 Q. Might have been a whole different scenario --

15 A. Right.

16 Q. -- unfolded?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And I know it's not no blame on my part. But, I mean, I  
20 did everything I could to just try to move it, you know what I  
21 mean. So -- I can't think of anything else that I might have done  
22 differently. But it's just that I thought that -- like I said,  
23 just to have those two things right there -- the trains coming in  
24 and the communication with all the other departments or whatever.  
25 Because a lot of times when we're there, like I said, we're, we're



1 not a voice. Central still talk to us, because we're their eyes  
2 and ears. When you got a lot of different people there, they want  
3 to know, okay, what's going on -- can I get an update, every so  
4 often.

5 Q. Right.

6 A. So, they do need us there so we can talk to them.

7 Q. But you had mentioned earlier about -- when I brought up  
8 the topic about the incident command process --

9 A. Uh-huh.

10 Q. -- and whether or not you contacted them when you  
11 arrived and so on.

12 A. Right.

13 Q. In -- and I said we can revisit that later on.

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. Is that something you might have engaged a little  
16 differently too, in terms of --

17 A. Oh, yes. Absolutely.

18 Q. -- having it in your mind, oh, quick, I got to get up  
19 first --

20 A. Right.

21 Q. -- get with incident command, tell them who I am --

22 A. Right.

23 Q. -- where I am, what I'm doing -- that kind of thing?

24 A. Right.

25 Q. Is that something in retrospect you, you would have

1 handled a little differently?

2 A. Exactly.

3 Q. As well?

4 A. I would have.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. So, there's basically three things.

8 A. Right. Uh-huh.

9 Q. Okay. All right. Anything else you can think of on  
10 that regard?

11 A. Not right off the top of my head. No. I can't think of  
12 anything.

13 Q. Okay. That's good. That's good. Very good. That  
14 concludes my questions.

15 MR. DORSEY ADAMS: Dorsey Adams. No more questions.

16 MR. ADAMS: Okay.

17 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: Marlene Flemings. No more  
18 questions.

19 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

20 Q. Mr. Adams --

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. -- Sharmila Samarasinghe, the Tri-State Oversight  
23 Committee. Just one question.

24 A. Sure.

25 Q. You said that when you first arrived at some point in

1 those first initial minutes you paired up with the Metro Transit  
2 Police officer who was there. The -- he -- you met him.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. And you all were both focused on getting people out of  
5 there.

6 A. Right. Right.

7 Q. At that point in time, did he ask you for whatever you  
8 were hearing from OCC -- kind of using you as a resource --

9 A. Right.

10 Q. -- to get a handle on what was going on on the  
11 transportation side? Did he try to use you in any manner to get  
12 more information from you?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. I think, I think mostly -- the, the, the most concern by  
16 everybody, I believe, at the time was just to get people out of  
17 there.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Because he started -- you know, he was just telling me  
20 man, we need to get these people out of here.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Everybody need to get out of here. And he was probably  
23 meaning me as well, but I was still there.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Because I'm trying to listen to what's going on. But

1 yes, we was trying to just get the -- he was basically just trying  
2 to get the people out of there.

3 Q. All right.

4 A. We never really had made really much conversation about  
5 who I was and who he was, things like that.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Right.

8 Q. All right. Thank you.

9 A. You're welcome.

10 MR. BUCHER: Dave Bucher.

11 BY MR. BUCHER:

12 Q. One question, and it follows up a little bit on what Mr.  
13 Downs was pursuing --

14 A. Uh-huh.

15 Q. -- about your connection with the incident command  
16 headquarters upstairs and downstairs. Do you feel there was a  
17 disconnect between what was happening downstairs on the platform  
18 and what was happening upstairs at the incident command  
19 headquarters?

20 A. When you said disconnect, meaning --

21 Q. Well, I mean, what -- it sounds like for -- I mean, your  
22 answer the first time is there was a communications issue.

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. I just want you to elaborate on that. It sounded like  
25 it was -- you know, you had a -- had some feelings for that.

1           A.    About the command center being up there, you mean?  I  
2   said I never actually talked to those guys.

3           Q.    Right.  And it sounded -- when --

4           MR. DOWNS:  If I may interject, Dave.

5           MR. BUCHER:  Uh-huh.

6           MR. DOWNS:  He never got with incident command.  So, how  
7   can he make a comparison?

8           MR. ADAMS:  Uh-huh.

9           MR. BUCHER:  Right.  Okay.  Well, that answers the  
10   question.

11          MR. ADAMS:  Yes.

12          MR. BUCHER:  It just sounded like you were -- you had  
13   communicated or heard communication.

14          MR. ADAMS:  No, I -- right.

15          MR. BUCHER:  Okay.  All right.  That -- well, that's,  
16   that's fine.

17          MR. ADAMS:  Okay.  Thank you for clearing that up.

18          MR. BUCHER:  I don't have any other questions.

19          MR. DOWNS:  I'm good.

20          MR. DORSEY ADAMS:  No more questions.

21          MS. SAMARASINGHE:  No more questions.

22          MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN:  No more questions.  Thank you.

23          MR. BUCHER:  And that concludes the interview of Mr.  
24   Adams.

25                 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA  
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
JANUARY 12, 2015  
Interview of Patrick Adams

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: January 20, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.

Jane W. Gilliam  
Transcriber