



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

GROUP	
EXHIBIT	

Agency / Organization

Title

TOC CAP Spreadsheet

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
08-001	Eisenhower Ave./DuPont Circle: TW4	Promptly implement appropriate technology that will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching trains and will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks.	WMATA will evaluate available technology and new approaches for automatically alerting wayside workers of approaching trains and will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks.	OAA	CENI	Robinson	12/31/2016

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 8/20/2013 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 1/24/2014 -- TOC waiting on WMATA to provide GM-approved CAP due date extension

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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08-005	DGMO Internal Safety Audit: A 8-4	Develop and fully implement a WMATA Hearing Conservation Program that is compliant with OSHA requirements.	WMATA will develop and fully implement a WMATA Hearing Conservation Program that is compliant with OSHA requirements.	OAA	SAFE	Krukowski	<u>12/31/2014</u>
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 1/23/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/19/13 -- WMATA presented a GM-approved extension of this CAP due date to 12/31/14.

Hazard Rating

10-050	Ft. Totten NTSB report 8/10/10: A R-10-20	Remove all 1000-series railcars as soon as possible and replace them with cars that have crashworthiness collision protection at least comparable to the 6000series railcars.	WMATA will remove all 1000-series railcars as soon as possible and replace them with cars that have crashworthiness collision protection at least comparable to the 6000series railcars.	OAA	DGMO	Troup	2/15/2017
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 4/3/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps:

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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10-051	Ft. Totten NTSB report 8/10/10: R-10-21	Ensure that the lead married-pair car set of each train is equipped with an operating onboard event recorder.	WMATA will ensure that the lead married-pair car set of each train is equipped with an operating onboard event recorder.	OAA	CENV	Reynolds	6/30/2015
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/26/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 1/16/2014 -- SAFE provided GM-approved extension to 6/30/2015

Hazard Rating

10-052	Ft. Totten NTSB report 8/10/10: R-10-22	Develop and implement a program to monitor the performance of onboard event recorders and ensure they are functioning properly.	WMATA will develop and implement a program to monitor the performance of onboard event recorders and ensure they are functioning properly.	OAA	CENV	Reynolds	6/30/2016
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 4/13/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 3/19/2015 -- GM-approved extension received; new estimated completion date 6/30/2016

Hazard Rating

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10-176	2010 Triennial Review report: Deficiency 14E-1	Many Communications Technicians have not received classroom training on the 490 MHz radio system.	11/23/10--WMATA Status Summarized: The COMM Radio Instructor has identified that the original vendor training was presented in approximately 14 modules, each generally 1 to 2 days in length. The COMM Radio Instructor has been supplied with the vendor materials, and is currently examining and editing the materials, with the goal of achieving a finalized course, with a determined length. - The COMM Radio Instructor has identified the absence of training materials related to the underground portion of the system, and will have to create these. - Estimated completed date of all curriculum related to the CRCS (490 Mhz System) is February 2011.	OAA	TTDC	Petersen	10/31/2015
TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review							
Last Update Provided:		7/28/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		7/28/2014 -- Approved extension request received. New estimated completion date: Oct. 31, 2015					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

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10-218	2010 Triennial Review report: Deficiency 17-1	WMATA does not yet have a compliant CM program or a plan for its achievement.	11/23/10--CENV response: The foundation of CM for railcars is based on OPA 200-6, Engineering Modification Instruction. CENV will work with CENI to develop a configuration management implementation plan with an overall timeframe and intermediate milestones that fully achieves the purpose of P/I 4.10/2. The schedule of development is in the milestones section - total est. eschedule is 14 months. CENI will reorganize with a sub organization specific to Configuration Management. CM team will develop standards and protocols for CAD drawings, filing, and software revisions, both vital and non-vital. This will be completed by January 2012.	Retired	CENV, CENI	Troup	<u>6/30/2013</u>

TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review

Last Update Provided: 12/31/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/31/2014 -- CAP retired. TOC to address this issue through similar CAPs issued in 2013 Triennial Review of System Safety Elements.

Hazard Rating

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10-219	2010 Triennial Review report: [?] Area of Concern [?] 17-1	CM initiatives of other WMATA departments need to be addressed as part of an overall WMATA CM Plan.	11/23/10--CENV response: The foundation of CM for railcars is based on OPA 200-6, Engineering Modification Instruction. CENV will work with CENI to develop a configuration management implementation plan with an overall timeframe and intermediate milestones that fully achieves the purpose of P/I 4.10/2. The schedule of development is in the milestones section - total est. eschedule is 14 months. CENI will reorganize with a sub organization specific to Configuration Management. CM team will develop standards and protocols for CAD drawings, filing, and software revisions, both vital and non-vital. This will be completed by January 2012.	Retired	CENV	Troup	<u>6/30/2013</u>
TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review							
Last Update Provided:		12/31/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		12/31/2014 -- CAP retired. TOC to address this issue through similar CAPs issued in 2013 Triennial Review of System Safety Elements.					
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10-262	RTRA ISA report: 12/29/10 - 120	RTRA does not significantly participate in safety certification, end-user input or life-cycle planning.	12/29/10--Ensure full participation of RTRA in all procurements from planning to disposal for all equipment and other purchases. Ensure that safety certification is performed for all safety-critical procurements, and that RTRA and Safety participate.	Retired	CENI	Viner	<u>3/31/2013</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided:

11/20/2014

Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps:

11/24/2014 -- TOC retired CAP. TOC to pursue issue of ensuring full SCRC involvement via a different avenue, perhaps TOC-WMATA Monthly SSC meeting.

Hazard Rating

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10-303	2010 D&A Internal Audit: 10	No data analysis reports for testing of WMATA employees are currently being performed on drug and alcohol testing.	Drug and alcohol testing results with redacted personal/medical identifying information are to be forwarded to the Safety Department for review and analysis. The Safety Department shall make a formal request in writing to ensure the data is transmitted for analysis. See 11(a).	OAA	Medical	Cooper-Lucas	<u>4/30/2013</u>
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- Technical writer is incorporating recommendations for SAFE analysis of D&A results into SOP.					
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Hazard Rating	<input type="text"/>						

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10-304	2010 D&A Internal Audit: 11 (a)	Data is not currently shared with other departments for analysis and review.	Drug and alcohol testing results with redacted personal/medical identifying information are to be forwarded to the Safety Department for review and hazard analysis, and transmittal to other departments for review as appropriate based on that analysis. An SOP is needed to ensure the implementation of hazard analysis for D&A results.	OAA	Medical	Cooper-Lucas	<u>4/30/2013</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- Technical writer is incorporating recommendations for SAFE to transmit analysis of D&A results to departments.

Hazard Rating

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11-122A	ISSA of IT, Final Report March 27, 2011, CAP IT1	A full risk assessment has not been performed for IT	Retain the services of a qualified IT firm to perform a full risk assessment for WMATA's IT systems	OAA	IT	Kramer, Iwugo	<u>12/31/2012</u>
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- ISSA team, IT, and SAFE to meet in early May to discuss outstanding IT CAPs

Hazard Rating

11-123	ISSA of IT, Final Report March 27, 2011, CAP IT3	MTPD e-mail access is not compartmentalized	Ensure that MTPD e-mail servers are compartmentalized to handle national security intelligence per the CNSS standard	Transferred	IT	Kramer	<u>12/31/2012</u>
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 12/15/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/15/2014 -- IT stated that it does not handle commercial e-mails only and that MTPD's e-mail system is the same as that of the rest of the Authority. MTPD can communicate with other law enforcement agencies, i.e. DHS, FBI, etc. MTPD does communicate on a separate, encrypted MPLS network from their mobile devices only. TOC will transfer this CAP back to the Security CAP Log and follow up with MTPD for tracking and resolution. Transferred to TOC security CAP log.

Hazard Rating

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11-125	IT Internal Audit: 3/27/11 Report - IT2	SCADA systems are not properly identified as SCADA, and are compartmentalized SCADA systems: 1. TIES SCADA a. ELES (This system must be maintained and monitored separately to conform tyo federal law) b. AIM, including Automatic Train Control, in train contol rooms, ROCS: and power management and distribution c. Advanced energy d. ADT alarm and security camera system 2. PLNT SCADA system-control energy management (Lighting at stations and facilities) 3. PIDS (currently protected fully through MITS).	Ensure proper identification of all SCADA systems and consolidation of their security through MITS. The audit team recommends this be accomplished through the following steps: 1. Development of thorough and detailed interdepartmental procedures for coordination of efforts for SCADA. 2. Documentation of all SCADA activities on an open log (can be accessed both by users and MITS) with the exception of protected operational activities only for ELES - all user activities should be logged for review of MITS 3. Ongoing and open discussion of security issues on the SCADA systems for users and MITS.	OAA	IT	Borek	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		2/4/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/4/14 -- TOC received WMATA extension letter signed by GM with new due date of 12/31/14.					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

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11-129	IT Internal Audit: 3/27/11 Reort - IT7	IT does not currently comply with the WMATA Safety and Security Certification program.	Although IT has robust program in place for the life cycle of its equipment and software, there is not required coordination with Safety and MTPD to meet WMATA's SSPP requirements. IT should also ensure that ISSE standards are actively employed in the acquisition process.	OAA	IT	Borek	<u>3/31/2013</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- ISSA team, IT, and SAFE to meet in early May to discuss outstanding IT CAPs

Hazard Rating							
12-005	WMATA System and Safety Program 6-20-2014	No life-cycle planning is done for the department supported by CENI.	Develop and implement full life-cycle planning for infrastructure elements supported by CENI.	OAA	CENI	Viner	<u>3/31/2015</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 8/4/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 8/4/2014 -- Findings re-issued with 6/25/2014 ISSA report of CENI

Hazard Rating 3D

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12-006	WMATA System and Safety Program 6-20-2015	Not all departments have sufficient engineering support from CENI.	Ensure that all TSSM/PWR, ATC, & COMM engineering requests are documented and addressed in a timely manner. In addition, ensure that all inquiries, communiques and requests from stakeholder departments regarding acceptance, reliability and maintainability, including during the SSC process, are addressed in a timely manner.	OAA	CENI	Viner	<u>3/31/2015</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- TOC agreed to close CAP

Hazard Rating

3D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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12-007	WMATA System and Safety Program 6-20-2016	Safety and security methodologies are not included in departmental documentation. (CENI)	Ensure that safety & security criticality methodologies are properly documented in departmental methodologies. Include decision methodology for FMEA/FMECA.	OAA	CENI	Viner	<u>3/31/2015</u>
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- WMATA to convene internally to discuss how to address CAP

Hazard Rating

12-009	WMATA System and Safety Program 6-20-2018	No training policy/procedures.(CENI)	Ensure that departmental training requirements, including agency requirements are documented & have a responsible position for verification.	OAA	CENI	Viner	<u>3/31/2015</u>
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- WMATA to demonstrate how WMATA determines which personnel what training.

Hazard Rating

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12-018	ISSA of Customer Service: 6-20-2013	Director of CSCM does not have formal methodologies for the position	develop and implement documented methodologies for the director Position	OAA	CVSC	Tyler	<u>12/31/2013</u>
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- CSVC submitted binder with CVSC director position procedures. TOC to review and provide disposition.					
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Hazard Rating		<input type="text"/>					

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12-021	2011 ISSA of Revenue, CAP#T3Rev6. Also 2013 ISSA of TRES, CAP REV9	CFO Revenue has not met all document control and configuration management requirements for its operation	2011 ISSA CAP: Develop and implement document control and configuration management requirements. 2013 ISSA CAP: Develop and implement documented document control for policies and procedures. These can be integrated into existing documents and policies as desired or be stand-alone procedures. They should include review & update procedures, with specified intervals to be no less frequent than annually. Also ensure that review of all documents by SAFE and MTPD for compliance with the SSPP and SEPP are included, and that an SOP on SOPs is in place for internal documentation.	OAA	TRES	Srinath	<u>11/15/2013</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 8/21/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 10/24/2014 -- MTPD stated that this CAP does not have a nexus to security; TOC to re-request closure documentation from ISSA Team

Hazard Rating

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12-033 Yellow	2011 ISSA of Rail Operations 6-20	Ensure that all interdepartmental and interagency communications protocols are documented	May be developed and included as part of documentation for RS1	OAA	ROSC	Xie	<u>12/31/2013</u>
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled
 Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- TOC agreed to close CAP.

Hazard Rating

12-052	2011 ISSA of Training	Certain technical training courses need revision or development	Ensure that courses/modules/instruction in car cleaning, PMs-work orders (where needed), truck rebuild, splicing, rerailling, wheels (press-true-bore), calibration, welding and fabrication are developed and approved.	OAA	TTDC	Petersen	8/31/2015
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 7/14/2014 Next Update Scheduled
 Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 7/10/2014 -- GM-approved extension submitted. New estimated completion date is 8/31/2015.

Hazard Rating

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12-070	Incident #437, 05/29/12 Shady Grove -- Employee Struck	Parabolic mirrors shall be installed in areas of limited visibility within the car wash.	WMATA shall install the mirrors.	Retired	TIES	Troup	7/31/2013
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 9/18/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 10/24/2014 -- TOC retired this CAP on the grounds of WMATA's determination that implementation of parabolic mirrors would present an even greater hazard. See also CAP 12-071.

Hazard Rating

12-071	Incident #437, 05/29/12 Shady Grove -- Employee Struck	WMATA shall install a Train Movement Indication system in all car wash facilities.	The Communications Engineering group will use existing portal warning system for this application, beginning with the Shady Grove facility.	OAA	TIES	Troup	12/31/2016
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- Pending scheduling of meeting between TOC, SAFE, CENI, and CMNT

Hazard Rating

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13-015	Incident # #502, 4/6/13 Brentwood Yard derailment	Dry rail can contribute to wheel climb.	MMATA shall install wheel flange friction modifiers on most of the remaining fleets, similar to the 5000 series installation	OAA	CENV	Reynolds	6/30/2016
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		6/19/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/3/2014 -- GM approved extension through 6/30/2016					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

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13-017	2012 ISSA Report of PLNT F1	Maintenance Policy not established for a number of safety-critical areas	<p>Establish formal documented policies for the safety-critical maintenance areas below:</p> <p>a. Inspection reports received outside of MOC or field inspection reports. Failure to ensure entry of all deficiencies into Maximo means that work cannot be tracked and proper failure trend analysis required for safety data acquisition and analysis as required by 49CFR659 cannot be achieved.</p> <p>b. Failure trend analysis is not performed for PLNT maintenance. Failure to do so does not meet criteria for 49CFR659.</p> <p>c. Prioritization of critical repairs. Per the Mil Std 882, required of WMATA by the TOC PSP, proper hazard identification and analysis must be performed and hazard addressed by their criticality. Prioritization of critical repairs is a critical part of this area of compliance. Also documented should be the criteria for any "PM Pass" that PLNT deems acceptable, meaning any time a PM inspection is not performed within the time frame allotted by department/OEM guidelines or standards.</p> <p>d. Fabrication, including machinists and sheet metal fabrication. Lack of</p>	OAA	PLNT	Grooman	<u>12/31/2014</u>

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			<p>procedures, standards and policy for fabrication can lead to premature failure and other safety-critical hazards.</p> <p>e. Deferred maintenance and work-around criteria</p> <p>f. Management methodologies for PLNT</p> <p>g. Configuration Management and document control of all PLNT internal documentation, including change control, annual review and SAFE/MTPD review for compliance with the SSPP and SEPP</p> <p>h. Internal Controls, including reviews for documentation compliance, OEM compliance/changes, and all policy, procedures for supervision and QA, and as pertains to industrial safety assurance per 29CFR.</p> <p>i. Safety Critical parts and processes: it is recommended that PLNT use the Dulles extension certification process as its documentation.</p> <p>j. Site Specific Work Plan coordination as required for construction sites as applicable to PLNT</p> <p>k Shelf-life & warehousing (materials management)</p>				
		Internal Safety/Security Audit					
Last Update Provided:		9/30/2013	Next Update Scheduled				

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Most Recent Update / Next Steps:

Hazard Rating

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13-018	2012 ISSA of PLNT F2	There are required safety-critical inspections that are not properly documented	Provide full formal accurate written documentation for: a. Internal SOPs and other procedures, including OAPs, are not regularly updated, and some are 10 years old. All safety-critical documentation should be properly updated to reflect current configuration, technology and practices, and then reviewed at least once annually to assure accuracy. Document control procedures should require version control (date/version/revision) to reflect annual reviews. b. Roll-up door inspections, station security barriers: procedures and checklists are required for safety-critical inspections of these assets c. Generators owned and maintained by PLNT d. Fire cabinets: no regular inspections of these items are recorded; field verifications for proper storage of flammables and combustibles at several PLNT locations throughout the system revealed a number of violations.	OAA	PLNT	Grooman	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		9/20/2013	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:							

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Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-027	2012 ISSA of ELES EL1	Maintenance Policy not established for a number of safety-critical areas	<p>Establish formal documented policies for the safety-critical maintenance areas below:</p> <p>a. EOC procedure for MAXIMO is not current.</p> <p>b. Field inspection reports procedure. Failure to ensure entry of all deficiencies and non compliances into Maximo means that work cannot be tracked and proper failure trend analysis required for safety data acquisition and analysis as required by 49CFR659 cannot be achieved.</p> <p>c. Failure trend analysis process was not readily available. Failure trend analysis is required to identify hazards to meet criteria for 49CFR659.</p> <p>d. Prioritization of critical repairs. Per the Mil Std 882, required of WMATA by the TOC PSP, proper hazard identification and analysis must be performed and hazards addressed by their criticality. Prioritization of critical repairs is a critical part of this area of compliance.</p> <p>e. Configuration Management and document control of all ELES internal documentation, including change control, annual review and SAFE/MTPD review for compliance with the SSPP and SEPP</p> <p>f. Internal Controls, including</p>	OAA	PLNT	Murray	<u>12/31/2014</u>

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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reviews for documentation compliance, OEM compliance/changes, updating work instructions when OEM revise manuals.

g. Safety Critical parts and processes: it is recommended that ELES use the Dulles extension certification CIL as its documentation.

h. Shelf-life & warehousing (materials management, spill containment SOP 212-21 incomplete)

i. Incident investigation procedure did not include data entry for SMS or tracking of open investigations.

j. Document processes for inter-departmental communication and coordination.

k.No SOP or documented procedure for ELES emergency operations subsequent to elevator/escalator malfunction.

l. No documented Life cycle program plan.

m.ELES participation in Safety Certification.

n. Safety goals and accountability.

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 9/20/2013 Next Update Scheduled

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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Most Recent Update / Next Steps:

<u>Hazard Rating</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-029	2012 ISSA of ELES EL3	Security:MERT training for ELES not documented.	a.Staff must obtain MERT training. b. Develop a inventory control SOP.	Retired	ELES	Murray	<u>12/31/2013</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 11/20/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 11/20/2014 -- TOC retired CAP. TOC to address gap of JST training for front-line employees through 2014 Emergency Management triennial.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-030	2012 ISSA of ELES EL4	No official departmental QA/QC/QI policies in place.	Develop and implement QA/QC/QI policies and processes. Implement a corrective action program based upon QAAW reports.	OAA	ELES	Murray	
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		9/20/2013	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:							
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-037	2013 ISSA of IT Cycle 2 IT 11	IT does not comply with the WMATA SSPP requirements for Configuration Management and Document Control	<p>a. IT must properly document the full configuration of its system, and make appropriate changes in a timely manner when the configuration of its networks, compartments, hardware, firmware and all other aspects of the system change. This process must be governed by Standard operating procedures.</p> <p>b. IT must have SOPs in place for appropriate document control for all internal documents as well as P/Is for which IT has primary responsibility. These SOPs must ensure development, annual review, authorization, maintenance and access of all IT documentation is appropriately managed.</p> <p>c. All documentation must be reviewed by safety/MTPD for compliance with the SSPP and SEPP. Changes to documentation must be provided to SAFE/MTPD per IT SOPs.</p> <p>d. Ensure that compatibility and reliability studies are required in the acquisition process and are properly documented when completed.</p>	OAA	IT	Borek	<u>12/31/2014</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided:

4/16/2015

Next Update Scheduled

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- ISSA team, IT, and SAFE to meet in early May to discuss outstanding IT CAPs

Hazard Rating

13-038	2013 ISSA of IT Cycle 2 IT 12	IT does not properly document its internal controls procedures	a. Ensure that internal audits and scans of the IT system and external connectivity validation are performed per existing documentation, are fully documented and have an appropriate methodology in place to guide the processes. b. Ensure that the checklist used in the daily inspection of the DRS has instructions/SOPs, including for maintenance of the inspection checklists for verification.	OAA	IT	Murray	<u>12/31/2014</u>
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 12/15/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps:

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-039	2013 ISSA of IT Cycle 2 IT 13	The IT vendor review process is not documented. In particular, Security requirements of the SEPP are not currently ensured in the IT department.	a. Ensure that IT has a documented methodology for review of vendors for quality and security purposes. b. Ensure that positions of trust are identified in the department so that both vendors and employees who hold these positions are appropriately monitored for security purposes.	OAA	IT	Borek	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		12/15/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- ISSA team, IT, and SAFE to meet in early May to discuss outstanding IT CAPs					
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Hazard Rating		3C					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-043	TOC Special Study on Rule Compliance: Finding of Non-Compliance #1	Records show that most Train Operators are not receiving the monthly minimum number of Blackberry (compliance) checks	RTRA shall work with Information Technology personnel to link the PeopleSoft software with Blackberry checks. This will help to ensure Train Operators are appropriately assigned to a Supervisor when they are reassigned to other sections within RTRA.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>10/31/2014</u>

Other

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- RTRA to submit standards/expectations for Supervisors' Blackberry checks.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-044	TOC Special Study on Rule Compliance: Finding of Non-Compliance #2	WMATA does not appear to be conducting analysis or validation of the rule compliance program effectively as described in its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).	RTRA shall evaluate the effectiveness of the rule compliance program through weekly staff meetings as stated in Section 4.9 of the Rule Compliance Check Procedure SOP in order to analyze trends and determine problem areas of compliance that may need reinforcement.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>10/31/2014</u>
Other							
Last Update Provided:			Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		9/27/13 -- renumbered; formerly TOC CAP 13-019					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-051	10/15/13 ISSA of TRES report: REV9	Configuration Management/Document Control for policies and procedures are not in place for TRES as required within SSPP section 12.3.3.	Develop and implement documented document control procedures. These can be integrated into existing documents and policies as desired or be stand-alone procedures. They should include review & update procedures, with specified intervals to be no less frequent than annually. Also ensure that review of all documents by SAFE and MTPD for compliance with the SSPP and SEPP are included, and that an SOP on SOPs in place for internal documentation.	OAA	TRES	Srinath	<u>9/30/2014</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 12/18/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/18/2014 -- Pending meeting between C. Moses/ISSA Team, D. McCoy/SAFE, and J. Shih/TOC contractor to clarify status

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-052	10/15/13 ISSA of TRES Report: REV22	Training programs and documentation are not fully in place.	a. Appropriate revenue collection staff shall receive RWP and SMS training. B. The training matrix requires all positions to be listed with all training requirements, including SMS training requirements. C. On-the-job training must be fully documented	OAA	TRES	Srinath	<u>9/30/2014</u>
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:			Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		12/2/2014 -- Finding description in database corrected.					
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Hazard Rating		3C					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-053	10/15/13 ISSA of TRES Report: REV23	Not all safety-critical tasks and activities are appropriately documented in SOPs	Document SOPs for: a.) All interactions with IT, including system failures b.) Maintenance Engineer does not cover all of the tasks and activities required for the position c.) Document the field relief process for revenue collection items d.) Job safety analyses are not currently performed for the maintenance engineering staff e.) Document appropriate interactions with MOC (facilities, comm, etc.)	OAA	TRES	Srinath	<u>12/30/2014</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided:

Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps:

12/2/2014 -- Finding description in database corrected.

Hazard Rating

2C

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-055	8/6/2013 Hazard Investigation and Analysis Report: Passenger Complaints Involving Train Intercoms: Mitigation #2		CENV & CMNT shall develop an audit procedure to conduct sample testing of the intercom system for entire trainline. This will involve testing full consists.	OAA	CENV	Reynolds	<u>1/31/2014</u>
Other							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- QAAW to submit signed procedure.					
Hazard Rating		<input type="text"/>					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-057	8/6/2013 Hazard Investigation and Analysis Report: Passenger Complaints Involving Train Intercoms: Mitigation #4		CENV shall continue to investigate and mitigate the 2K, 3K and 5K noise issue associated with the Digital Radio Upgrade. ETP for these fleets was circulated for approval on June 25, 2013.	OAA	CENV	Reynolds	6/30/2015

Other

Last Update Provided: 2/18/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/18/2015 -- GM-approved extension received; new due date 6/30/2015.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-059	8/6/2013 Hazard Investigation and Analysis Report: Passenger Complaints Involving Train Intercoms: Mitigation #6		Until the 4K testing and analysis is completed, it is recommended that the 4K cars not be run in consists with 6K cars. A separate ETPjEMI will be issued for the modifications necessary to correct the 4K PCS to 6K CCP compatibility.	OAA	CENV	Reynolds	<u>1/31/2015</u>
Other							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- TOC agreed to close CAP					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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13-087	2013 Triennial Review - Procurement: Finding of Non-Compliance 2	The PRMT or SAFE department does not evaluate and/or inspect contractor equipment for use on the Metrorail System.	WMATA will develop a procedure to evaluate and/or inspect contractor equipment for use on the rail system to assist in the prevention of accidents.	OAA	SAFE	Brown	<u>12/31/2014</u>
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TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review

Last Update Provided: 5/29/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/29/2014 -- Updated with responsible party and due date

Hazard Rating

13-088	2013 Triennial Review - Procurement: Finding of Non-Compliance 3	Not all hazardous materials had corresponding hard-copy MSDS on file in the local facility audited.	WMATA will ensure that all employees in storerooms have direct electronic access to the complete catalog of MSDS information.	OAA	SAFE	Brown	<u>12/31/2014</u>
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TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review

Last Update Provided: 5/29/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/29/2014 -- Updated with responsible party and due date

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
13-089	2013 Triennial Review - Procurement: Finding of Non-Compliance 4	Section 21.2 of the SSPP contains an outdated reference.	WMATA will revise Section 21.2 in the next revision of the SSPP to accurately reflect the most up-to-date references and procedures.	OAA	SAFE	Brown	<u>12/31/2014</u>
TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review							
Last Update Provided:		5/29/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		5/29/2014 -- Updated with responsible party and due date					

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-002	Incident 518, 6/6/2013, train struck construction fence at Ft. Totten, Mitigation to Prevent Re-Occurrence 1	The probable cause of the incident was an insufficiently secured section of Chain Link fence used to secure the construction area.	Contractor was given instruction to use temporary substantial means such as concrete block, sand buckets, and other materials to tie back and secure fences and other materials that may be susceptible to movement from heavy winds, to prevent injury to persons and damage to property.	OAA	SAFE	Brown	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:			Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:							
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Hazard Rating	4E						

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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14-005	Incident 536, 9/6/2013, tie crane derailment near Rhode Island Ave., Mitigation to Prevent Re-Occurrence 2	TC07 went over a section of track that had a suspended joint.	The incident area was built up with ballast, tamped and two track bolts were inserted in addition to other areas in the system as part of routine maintenance.	OAA	TRST	Kelly	<u>12/31/2014</u>
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- TOC advised WMATA that WMATA should demonstrate that the ballast buildup & system inspection for similar conditions took place shortly after the incident.

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-006	Incident 536, 9/6/2013, tie crane derailment near Rhode Island Ave., Mitigation to Prevent Re-Occurrence 3	TC07 went over a section of track that had a suspended joint.	TRST has evaluated other track areas throughout the system through routine inspections or capital projects and built up ballast areas when necessary.	OAA	TRST	Kelly	<u>12/31/2014</u>

Hazard Rating

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- TOC advised WMATA that WMATA should demonstrate that the ballast buildup & system inspection for similar conditions took place shortly after the incident.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-011	Incident 554, 12/19/2013, train obstructed by railing gate in Shady Grove car wash, CAP 1	SAFE concludes that Y/O failed to properly walk around his train to identify any obstruction such as the unsecured railing and as a result, his train came in contact with the unsecured railing.	RTRA and CMNT Supervisors discuss this incident with staff and issue a system wide communique to staff with an emphasis on ground walk around and ensuring hand railings are secured before moving trains 12/20/2013.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- Yard Operators are required to perform a walkaround prior to moving a train into the car wash per SOP 12. TOC agreed to close CAP.					

Hazard Rating

4C

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-012	Incident 554, 12/19/2013, train obstructed by railing gate in Shady Grove car wash, CAP 2	SAFE concludes that Y/O failed to properly walk around his train to identify any obstruction such as the unsecured railing and as a result, his train came in contact with the unsecured railing.	IRPG replace existing hand rails in A99 Shop 12/23/2013.	OAA	IRPG	Viner	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:			Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:							
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Hazard Rating	4C						

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-013	Incident 554, 12/19/2013, train obstructed by railing gate in Shady Grove car wash, CAP 3	SAFE concludes that Y/O failed to properly walk around his train to identify any obstruction such as the unsecured railing and as a result, his train came in contact with the unsecured railing.	CENI/IRPG/CMN/PLNT and SAFE-Design and install a railing system that reduces the number of openings and eliminates the ability of the rails to swing into the direction of the dynamic envelope of a rail car, in all shop locations and rail facilities to replace the current sectional type of railing system currently installed. Meetings held and design being prepared by CENI to install a solid railing system with specific gated openings that will be unable to swing into the dynamic envelope of a rail car.	OAA	CENI	Viner	<u>12/31/2014</u>

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided:

Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps:

Hazard Rating

3D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-014	Incident 554, 12/19/2013, train obstructed by railing gate in Shady Grove car wash, CAP 4	SAFE concludes that Y/O failed to properly walk around his train to identify any obstruction such as the unsecured railing and as a result, his train came in contact with the unsecured railing.	Discuss this incident in a group setting with all yard personnel to include Rail Supervisors, Interlocking Operators and Train Operators, as it relates to communication, ground inspections prior to moving vehicles and performing required brake test before moving vehicles. Safety Stand down held at Shady Grove 12/20/13.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		Next Update Scheduled					
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- TOC requested evidence of verbal communique being given, e.g. sign-in sheets					
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Hazard Rating	3D						

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-016	Incident 552, Train #101 red signal overrun at Dupont Circle, CAP 1	Based on T/O's own account of incident during interview with SAFE, ROCC Playback information, NICE audio playback and Oracle data, SAFE concludes that T/O overran signal A03-08.	RTRA issue a communiqué via newsletter with an emphasis on employee Situational Awareness when operating within Interlocking limits. Lessons Learned 2014-001, dated 1/27/2014, was issued addressing Inattentiveness Contributing to Red Signal Overrun Incidents.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>12/31/2014</u>

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/21/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- RTRA to submit Lessons Learned document for situational awareness.

Hazard Rating

4D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-017	Incident 552, Train #101 red signal overrun at Dupont Circle, CAP 2	Based on T/O's own account of incident during interview with SAFE, ROCC Playback information, NICE audio playback and Oracle data, SAFE concludes that T/O overran signal A03-08.	RTRA provide retraining for T/O with an emphasis on Red Signal Overruns and operating without speed commands. Training was instituted on November 27, 2013.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		12/18/2014 -- RTRA submitted CBT signal recognition, re-instruction/discipline sheet					
		7/17/2014 -- SAFE submitted updated CAP responsible person and estimated completion dates; CAP remains open.					
		Need supporting documentation from WMATA. Incident report states this CAP was implemented on 11/27/2013.					
Hazard Rating		3D					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-018	Incident 552, Train #101 red signal overrun at Dupont Circle, CAP 3	Based on T/O's own account of incident during interview with SAFE, ROCC Playback information, NICE audio playback and Oracle data, SAFE concludes that T/O overran signal A03-08.	RTRA evaluate Medical Department intervention for employee by recommending Employee Assistance Program (EAP) support. RTRA Management has offered voluntary EAP counseling to incident employee. Document was signed and dated on November 27, 2013.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		12/18/2014 -- RTRA submitted re-instruction/discipline sheet					
		7/17/2014 -- SAFE submitted updated CAP responsible person and estimated completion dates; CAP remains open.					
		Need supporting documentation from WMATA. Incident report states this CAP was implemented on 11/27/2013.					

Hazard Rating

4D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-019	ISSA of TTDC, Final Report 8/5/2014, CAP TR1b	Training policy and procedure are not fully documented.	<p>Ensure that all training policies and procedures are fully documented and approved, to include: SOPs, EOPs, lesson plans/cirricula, pass/fail criteria, training requirements by department, recurring/refresher/recert training, training matrix by position and document control-change control-configuration management of training programs and documentation, and ensure that SAFE & MTPD review all training documentation for compliance with safety & security requirements.</p> <p>TTDC needs to document refresher requirements, all OJT provided through TTDC, trainer evaluation process & procedures, student feedback review and incorporation. SOP/Instruction to support the A/I procedure, and management methodologies.</p>	OAA	TTDC	Petersen	10/31/2015
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:			Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		8/6/2014 -- CAP submitted					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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Hazard Rating 3D

14-020	ISSA of TTDC, Final Report 8/5/2014, CAP TR11	Certain technical training courses need revision or development	Ensure that courses/modules/instruction in PMs-work orders, calibration, welding, OJT car cleaning, OJT wheel press, ladders, OJT truck rebuild, OJT rerailing and OJT fabrication. (Finding revised to reflect that outstanding items are OJT courses, and will be documented as such, and that WMATA policy is to require external training/certification for welding).	Retired	TTDC	Petersen	8/31/2015
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/2/2014 -- CAP retired; duplicate of 12-052. Finding TR11 re-issued.

Hazard Rating 2D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-021	WMATA Response to FTA Safety Advisory 14-2		RTRA will develop and implement an operating rule that prohibits equipment from being stored in any tail track where an incoming train could enter that track over a switch in the normal position which allows that route to be traversed at a higher speed.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>12/31/2014</u>

Other

Last Update Provided:

Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps:

8/12/2014 -- CAP submitted. TOC to forward closure documentation to FTA upon CAP closure.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-022	ISSA of SCES, Final Report 6/30/2013, CAP MS1	Material Storage Facility (MSF) policy manual was not compliant to WMATA SSPP Section 5.3, "SAFE included in document review"; Section 17, "Configuration Management"; and Section 21, "Procurement"	Establish formal documented policies for safety-critical inventory management methodologies below: a.) Configuration management and document control of all MSF internal documentation, including change control, annual review, and SAFE/MTPD review for compliance with the SSPP and SEPP b.) Internal Controls, including reviews for documentation compliance, updated MSDS processes for MSF warehouse and for supervision and QA, and as pertains to industrial safety assurance per 29CFR.	OAA	SCES	Bitar, Rodolfo	<u>12/31/2014</u>
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		9/3/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		9/2/2014 -- CAP submitted.					
Hazard Rating		3C					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-025	Incident 515, 5/18/2013, red tag violation at Greenbelt Yard, Mitigation #3	RTRA develop a procedure to ensure that Interlocking operators are aware of any work being done, the effect on the yard and any restrictions that will be put in place. This information should be consistent for each shift during turnovers. RTRA management to complete no later than 5/31/13 When work is being done in a rail yard a RSAB (Rail Service Adjustment Bulletin) will be issued for the rail yard. This will show the work to be done, the effect on the yard operations, and any restrictions put in place	RTRA develop a procedure to ensure that Interlocking operators are aware of any work being done, the effect on the yard and any restrictions that will be put in place. This information should be consistent for each shift during turnovers. RTRA management to complete no later than 5/31/13 When work is being done in a rail yard a RSAB (Rail Service Adjustment Bulletin) will be issued for the rail yard. This will show the work to be done, the effect on the yard operations, and any restrictions put in place	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>2/28/2015</u>

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 9/11/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- RTRA to submit revised Interlocking Operator Training Manual

Hazard Rating

3D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-027	Incident 517, 6/2/2013, red signal violation at Van Dorn St, Mitigation #1	On June 5, 2013 Rail Transportation Director met with Train Operators that had been involved in Red Signal Overruns within the last two years and discussed relevant policy an procedures. Train operators were reminded that they may be distracted at times which can cause unsafe acts which can result in accidents/ incidents.	On June 5, 2013 Rail Transportation Director Byron England met with Train Operators that had been involved in Red Signal Overruns within the last two years and discussed relevant policy an procedures. Train operators were reminded that they may be distracted at times which can cause unsafe acts which can result in accidents/ incidents.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>2/28/2015</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		9/11/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		8/28/2014 -- Responsible party and estimated completion date received.					
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Hazard Rating		4E					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-029	Incident 520, 6/14/2013, train contacted metal staircase at Rhode Island Ave, Mitigation #1	A system wide inspection was executed to identify the location of all steel stair structures. Completed 6/21/13 - CENI	A system wide inspection was executed to identify the location of all steel stair structures. Completed 6/21/13 - CENI	OAA	CENI	Viner	<u>2/28/2015</u>

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 9/11/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 8/28/2014 -- Responsible party and estimated completion date received.

Hazard Rating

4E

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-038	2014 ISSA of HRTM, CAP TR1a	Training policy and procedure are not fully documented.	Ensure that all training policies and procedures are fully documented and approved, to include: SOPs, EOPs, Lesson plans/curricula, pass/fail criteria, training requirements by department, recurring/refresher/recert training, training matrix by position and document control-change controlconfiguration management of training programs and documentation, and ensure that SAFE & MTPD review all training documentation for compliance with safety & security requirements.	OAA	HR	Peters, M.	<u>12/30/2014</u>
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- Documentation lacks program details and training requirements (i.e. training matrix). ISSA Team will submit training matrix with cross-referenes to appropriate SOPs.					
Hazard Rating		3D					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-040	Incident 553, 12/6/2013, elevator/escalator wood panel contacted train, Bethesda, CAP #1	The root cause of this incident was the failure to take the proper precautions to prevent material movement due to the vacuum effect of train travel.	Ensure that all contract workers are Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) trained and provided guidelines which place safety requirements on fence, partition, guard and barricade installation.	OAA	ELES	Murray	<u>2/28/2015</u>

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- SAFE to discuss with contractor; SAFE to submit contractor's SSWP

Hazard Rating

3C

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-041	Incident 559, 1/11/2014, train operator opened doors off platform, Ft. Totten, Mitigation #1		Improve communications between ROCC, Operators, and Operations during troubleshooting. Rail Operations Control Center distributed Lessons Learned on January 16, 2014 reiterating the use of Door Control Circuit Breakers, knowing the exact position of the train before authorizing an Off Load, and SOP #40 (Door Operations).	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>2/28/2015</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- TOC agreed to close CAP.					
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Hazard Rating	3E						

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-042	Incident 575, 4/9/2014, gas leak in S&I building at Alexandria Yard, CAP #1		SAFE will survey all of the rail yards to determine a similar hazard of exposure to unprotected gas line exist.	OAA	SAFE	Brown	<u>2/28/2015</u>
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		9/11/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		8/28/2014 -- Responsible party and estimated completion date received.					

Hazard Rating

4E

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-044	2014 TOC Triennial Review of RWP: Finding of NC 2	CMNT Road Mechanics do not adhere to parts of the WMATA RWP program.	WMATA will reinstruct all Road Mechanics and their Supervisors to complete Job Safety Briefings at the beginning of each shift. CMNT I issued a RWP Safety Bulletin April 11, 2014 emphasizing this issue found during the February 2014 TOC review. WMATA's position is that the Job Safety Briefings along with their training provides the Road Mechanics with the knowledge and awareness of situations on the Roadway including disable trains, etc. See attached Safety Bulletin.	OAA	CMNT	Cannon	<u>2/28/2015</u>
TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review							
Last Update Provided:		11/20/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- ROCC clarified that Rules 4.8 and 4.15 are in the RWP Manual and not the MSRPH. TOC to review and provide disposition.					
Hazard Rating		3C					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-045	2014 TOC Triennial Review of RWP: Finding of NC 3	There appears to be a low rate of Train Operator compliance with rules regarding acknowledgement of personnel in the ROW.	See enclosed WMATA Permanent Order T-14-06 addressing RWP Hand Signaling Changes for Mobile Work Gangs for NC 3. To address this finding, the Rail Transportation QA/AC group will also add RWP compliance audits to their annual audit schedule. In conjunction with the quarterly RWP compliance audits already scheduled by rail lines, the RTRA QA/QC group will add an additional four RWP compliance audits to the annual audit schedule. The RTRA QA/QC group RWP compliance audits consist of scheduled compliance observations from the roadway by RTRA QA/QC group personnel, as well as, interviews of random Train Operators on Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) Operating Rules 3.87, 3.1.76, and Safety Rule 4.183	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>2/28/2015</u>

TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review

Last Update Provided: 9/11/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 8/28/2014 -- Responsible party and estimated completion date received.

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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Hazard Rating 3C

14-046	2014 TOC Triennial Review of RWP: Finding of NC 4	Maintenance departments are not routinely conducting checks of RWP rule compliance.	WMATA QAAW office will add RWP compliance audits to its schedule. At least one RWP compliance audit per month must be completed for TRST, SMNT and CMNT. QAAW has developed an audit checklist for each department, and has scheduled and completed audits for the departments listed above. QAAW will submit reports for CAP Compliance.	OAA	QAAW	DiNatale	<u>2/28/2015</u>
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TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- QAAW to submit audit schedule



Hazard Rating 4A

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-049	2014 TOC Triennial Review of RWP: Finding of CWR 2	There does not appear to be a consistent procedure in place for Controllers and Operators to effectively keep track of two crews using Train Approach Warning in the same area.	Rail Transportation ROCC recommends order changing SOP 28 Appendix B requiring dedicated stick men for each separate RWIC/gang. In doing so there will always be a stickman as long as a unit remains.	OAA	ROCC	Dziduch	<u>10/24/2014</u>
TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- TOC agreed to close CAP.					
Hazard Rating		4D					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-050	2014 TOC Triennial Review of RWP: Finding of CWR 4	There is no written policy or procedure documenting how the Operations Management Services (Training) Department tracks, monitors, and communicates employees' need for RWP qualification and recertification.	<p>WMATA OPMS office updated the RWP Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) April 24, 2014 to reflect:</p> <p>RWPT Supervisor will distribute training matrices weekly to all Operations General Superintendents/ Directors communicating the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Listing of employees who are delinquent in completing the Refresher training. •Listing of employees who are delinquent in completing the Requalification training. •Listing of employees who require completion of Refresher training in the next six (6) months. •Listing of employees who require completion of Requalification training in the 	OAA	OPMS	Stoffregen	<u>2/28/2015</u>

TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review

Last Update Provided: 11/20/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 4/16/2015 -- OPMS to re-submit RWPT SOP executed with signature.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-053	2014 TOC Triennial Review of RWP: Finding of CWR 6	WMATA has no documentation on the membership, structure, or duties of the RWP Committee.	WMATA RWP Committee added the "Introduction, Issuance, Revision and Update Procedure for Roadway Workers Protection" at the back of the RWP Manual revised June 2014. It follows WMATA's P/I 1.15 Rule Book Management which establishes procedures for development, revision, maintenance, management and enforcement of Rule Books. The RWP Manual is a rule book. RWP Manual (Rev 2) June 2014 was printed June 20, 2014.	OAA	OPMS	Stoffregen	<u>2/28/2015</u>
TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review							
Last Update Provided:		4/16/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		4/16/2015 -- WMATA to make terminology referencing RWP Committee and RWP Manual Committee consistent for next revision of RWP Manual. TOC agreed to close CAP.					
Hazard Rating		4E					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-057	2014 TOC Triennial Review of RWP: Finding of CWR 12	The current RWP rules are not clear regarding whether or how track workers should face and acknowledge trains on an adjacent track.	WMATA' s RWP committee evaluated the current language in the RWP Manual and MSRPH and performed a hazard analysis to the efficacy of requiring the roadway workers to face (turn their backs to their watchman/lookout, direction of traffic or work activity) as it relates to mobile crews (i.e. Track Inspections). The RWP committee also evaluated whether the distance between tracks is relevant to this requirement. WMATA will provide this analysis to TOC and modified the RWPM 's and MSRPH manuals and RWP training to reflect proposed change to the current requirement. (See attached Order #T-14-06)	OAA	RWP Committee	Bunting	<u>2/28/2015</u>

TOC Triennial Safety & Security Review

Last Update Provided: 9/11/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 7/31/2014 -- WMATA response to RWP Triennial Review report states that this CAP has been completed as of 6/20/2014. WMATA referenced Permanent Order T-14-06, which TOC did not receive. TOC to request supporting documentation for review.

Hazard Rating

3E

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-058	ISSA of SCES, Final Report June 30, 2013, CAP MS4	Security vulnerabilities observed as per SEPP Element 5 and as recommended in 49CFR15 and 49CFR1520	Make the necessary correction to mitigate theft at MSF 400. a.) Improve outdoor lighting; b.) Install intrusion detection c.) Install CCTV monitoring d.) Secure crawl space e.) Upgrade perimeter fencing f.) Request frequent vegetation removal from perimeter fencing	OAA	CENI, PLNT	Grooman, Viner	6/30/2015
Internal Safety/Security Audit							
Last Update Provided:		9/3/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		9/3/2014 -- CAP issued.					
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Hazard Rating		3C					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-059	ISSA of SCES, Final Report June 30, 2013, CAP MS5	OMSF did not have all MSDS documents as required per MSRPH section 1 & 4 and the SSPP section 18.1 The staff did not demonstrate adequate knowledge and understanding of the use of MSDS.	a.) Ensure staff fully understand and implement MSDS tasks. B.) Develop a methodology to maintain current MSDS of all hazardous material.	OAA	SCES	Bitar, Rodolfo	<u>12/31/2014</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 4/16/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 3/4/2015 -- SAFE submitted report on inventory inspection of OMSF and employee demonstration of SDS knowledge.

Hazard Rating 2D

14-060	ISSA of RTRA, Final Report March 14, 2013, CAP R31	Personnel do not have all safety training.	Ensure that required personnel obtain bloodborne pathogens (BBP) training.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>3/31/2015</u>
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Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 9/3/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 9/3/2014 -- CAP issued.

Hazard Rating 2B

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-061	ISSA of RTRA, Final Report March 14, 2013, CAP R32	Lack of a train the trainer program.	Develop and implement a train the trainer program and procedure.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	<u>3/31/2015</u>

Internal Safety/Security Audit

Last Update Provided: 9/3/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 9/3/2014 -- CAP issued.

Hazard Rating							
3C							
14-063	Incident 548, Nov. 2, 2013, Car Wash Obstruction Incident, Recommendation 2	Car cleaner failed to secure railing gate, resulting in railing becoming dislodged as train proceeded to be re-positioned on the car wash track.	IRPG engineers are designing new hand railings in the car wash area, the blow pit, and inspection areas of C99, D99, and K99 S&I buildings. These new railings will be installed by contract when the final design is complete.	OAA	CENI	Viner	6/30/2015

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 12/10/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/10/2014 -- CAP due dates and responsible departments submitted.

Hazard Rating 3D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-064	Incident 556, Jan. 8, 2014, Red Signal Overrun, Shady Grove, CAP	Operator moved train without speed commands.	RTRA to discuss incident with Shady Grove Train Operators and develop lessons-learned document with a focus on Terminal Communications. Lessons Learned 2014-001, dated January 27, 2014, entitled "Communications Failures Leads to Red Signal Violation," created and distributed to RTRA staff.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	6/30/2015

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 12/10/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/10/2014 -- CAP due dates and responsible departments submitted.

Hazard Rating

4E

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-068	Incident 585, May 28, 2014, Red Signal Overrun, Anacostia, CAP 1	Train operator failed to verify lunar signal and speed commands prior to moving train.	RTRA to issue Lessons Learned document with an emphasis on Operating without speed commands. RTRA issued Lessons Learned document, dated June 26, 2014.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	6/30/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		12/10/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		12/10/2014 -- CAP due dates and responsible departments submitted.					
Hazard Rating <input type="text" value="4C"/>							

14-069	Incident 593, June 30, 2014, Red Signal Overrun and trailed switch, Greenbelt, CAP 3	Train operator was not familiar with Greenbelt push-button route selection and inattention paid to speed commands. Train operator moved train without verifying speed commands and lunar signal aspect.	RTRA to retrain all Train Operators on Manual Route Selection Operations.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	6/30/2015
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Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		12/10/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		12/10/2014 -- CAP due dates and responsible departments submitted.					

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-070	Incident 594, July 4, 2014, train collision with WMATA non-revenue vehicle at grade crossing, West Falls Church Yard, CAP 1	SMNT Power Dept employee operating non-revenue vehicle failed to yield right-of-way to rail vehicle	SAFE will develop and distribute a Safety Bulletin referencing the above July 4th incident with an emphasis on proper operation through roadway crossings and defining that rail vehicles have the right of way at yard roadway crossings. Note: Safety Bulletin 14-08 was developed and issued on August 1, 2014. In addition, Safety Bulletin 14-08 is available on the WMATA SAFE intranet site for review by all.	OAA	SAFE	Brown	6/30/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		12/10/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		12/10/2014 -- CAP due dates and responsible departments submitted.					
Hazard Rating		4E					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-071	Incident 594, July 4, 2014, train collision with WMATA non-revenue vehicle at grade crossing, West Falls Church Yard, CAP 2	SMNT Power Dept employee operating non-revenue vehicle failed to yield right-of-way to rail vehicle	SMNT to develop a Lessons Learned document and distribute to staff.	OAA	SMNT	Newman	6/30/2015

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 12/10/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/10/2014 -- CAP due dates and responsible departments submitted.

Hazard Rating

4E

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-072	Incident 594, July 4, 2014, train collision with WMATA non-revenue vehicle at grade crossing, West Falls Church Yard, CAP 3	SMNT Power Dept employee operating non-revenue vehicle failed to yield right-of-way to rail vehicle	SAFE to revise its portion of New Employee Orientation (NEO) training to include content from Safety Bulletin 14-08 with an emphasis on trains having right of way over non-revenue and personal vehicles at roadway crossings. Note: October 5, 2014 --SAFE has made edits to powerpoint presentation to include safe operation at roadway crossings in yards.	OAA			6/30/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		12/10/2014	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		12/10/2014 -- CAP due dates and responsible departments submitted.					
Hazard Rating		4B					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
14-073	Incident 595, July 4, 2014, red signal violation, Shady Grove Yard, CAP 2	Train operator was on wrong track and failed to verify switch alignment before moving train	RTRA Supervision will discuss the incident with Shady Grove Train Operators and develop lessons learned documents focusing on MSRP or 3.76, Cardinal Rules 1.46, 1.79, 3.1, interlocking Procedures and Train Consist Verification Process no later than August 18, 2014.	OAA			6/30/2015

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 12/10/2014 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 12/10/2014 -- CAP due dates and responsible departments submitted.

Hazard Rating

4E

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-001	Incident 535, September 4, 2013, red signal overrun, Van Dorn St, Mitigation to prevent re-occurrence 4	Equipment Operator and Flagman failed to follow safety stop procedures on approach to red signal; violation of MSRPH Rule 3.37	Track has amended training procedures to only allow AA Equipment Operator to train student Operators	OAA			
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		2/17/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-002	Incident 537, September 9, 2013, red signal overrun, Van Dorn St, Mitigation to prevent re-occurrence 4	The 3rd rail cover boot was found to be higher than the cover board and leaning in towards the track. The 3rd rail power cable boot was not in the correct position, which would have been lower than the step on NSD-01.	TRST will work with Power personnel to identify and correct, if any, areas where power cable connections are infringing on the dynamic envelope of trains or track equipment. To date, a re-occurrence of this type of incident has not ensued.	OAA			

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/17/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-003	Incident 572, April 3, 2014, NoMa-Gallaudet, wrong-side door opening, CAP 1	Water intruded into door control junction box; water caused electrical current, which triggered uncommanded door opening. Drainage hole in junction box not sufficiently large to permit proper drainage.	CENV to submit a Service Bulletin which addresses periodic inspections for car body water intrusion detection and draining (5K Service Bulletin, SB113 was completed on June 9, 2014)	OAA			
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		2/17/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
<hr/>							
Hazard Rating	<input type="text"/>						

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-004	Incident 572, April 3, 2014, NoMa-Gallaudet, wrong-side door opening, CAP 2	Water intruded into door control junction box; water caused electrical current, which triggered uncommanded door opening. Drainage hole in junction box not sufficiently large to permit proper drainage.	CENV to revise Preventative Maintenance Inspection (PMI) to reflect integration of car body water accumulation preventative inspection into task no. 40 of the 5000 Series PMI.	OAA			

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/17/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-005	Incident 572, April 3, 2014, NoMa-Gallaudet, wrong-side door opening, CAP 3	Water intruded into door control junction box; water caused electrical current, which triggered uncommanded door opening. Drainage hole in junction box not sufficiently large to permit proper drainage.	CENV to evaluate a sealant for use to prevent water intrusion within the car body that will affect the door operation components - (Sikaflex221 sealant was approved on October 29, 2013)	OAA			
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		2/17/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-006	Incident 577, April 21, 2014, Van Ness, Rollaway flat car, Mitigation to Prevent Re-occurrence 1	Flatcar taken from Shady Grove Yard without required number of chocks; hand brake not fully tightened; correct number of chocks not made available on flatcar; chocks not placed tight against wheels	Discuss this incident with all TRST personnel involved with securing work equipment. (A Safety Standown meeting, in which SAFE personnel attended on May 15, 2014 at the Pensy Drive in which this incident was discussed.)	OAA			

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/17/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database. TOC has supporting materials from A/I file; TOC to review and provide disposition.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-007	Incident 577, April 21, 2014, Van Ness, Rollaway flat car, Mitigation to Prevent Re-occurrence 2	Flatcar taken from Shady Grove Yard without required number of chocks; hand brake not fully tightened; correct number of chocks not made available on flatcar; chocks not placed tight against wheels	Discuss incident notification protocols with TRST Management. (This was discussed with TRST Management after incident by SAFE Personnel.)	OAA			
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		2/17/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database. TOC has supporting materials from A/I file; TOC to review and provide disposition.					
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Hazard Rating		<input type="text"/>					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-008	Incident 577, April 21, 2014, Van Ness, Rollaway flat car, Mitigation to Prevent Re-occurrence 3	Flatcar taken from Shady Grove Yard without required number of chocks; hand brake not fully tightened; correct number of chocks not made available on flatcar; chocks not placed tight against wheels	Review the incident and procedures to inspect a flatcar, chock a flatcar, and the procedures for coupling/uncoupling to a Primemover during upcoming safety meetings. (WMATA 3000, Lessons Learned Communication developed and issued to staff on May 19, 2014 which places emphasis on proper procedure for coupling and uncoupling.)	OAA			

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/17/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database. TOC has supporting materials from A/I file; TOC to review and provide disposition.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-009	Incident 577, April 21, 2014, Van Ness, Rollaway flat car, Mitigation to Prevent Re-occurrence 4	Flatcar taken from Shady Grove Yard without required number of chocks; hand brake not fully tightened; correct number of chocks not made available on flatcar; chocks not placed tight against wheels	Develop Lessons learned document and disseminate throughout TRST. (WMATA 3000, TRST-05-019 developed on May 19, 2014 and issued to personnel.)	OAA			
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		2/17/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database. TOC has supporting materials from A/I file; TOC to review and provide disposition.					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-010	Incident 580a, May 3, 2014, Takoma, PB ran over WSAD, CAP 1	RWIC failed to place WSAD in position visible to entire work crew.	Discuss incident at Safety Tool Box Meeting as a system wide TRST effort with an emphasis on proper WSAD placement per Roadway Worker Protection Manual, Rule 1.54 and performing a ground walk around per MSRP Section 3 – Operating Rule 3.127 which states in part “Equipment operators removing Class II vehicles from storage or preparing Class II cars for movement shall perform an interior and exterior inspection (walk-around), and perform a Standing and Rolling Brake Test prior to initiating general operation of the consist.” - (The incident was discussed at Tool box meetings as a system wide TRST effort. Completion Date 6/8/14)	OAA			

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/17/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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15-011	Incident 588, June 3, 2014, Huntington, wrong-side door opening, CAP 1	Train Operator error due to inattention; failure to comply with SOP 40, Door Operations/Station Service Procedures.	Green line terminal supervision advised to continually remind operators going into service of the requirement to comply with SOP 40 Door Operations/Station Servicing Procedures-Completed on 6/3/14 by SAFE 21	OAA			
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		2/17/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

15-012	Incident 588, June 3, 2014, Huntington, wrong-side door opening, CAP 4	Train Operator error due to inattention; failure to comply with SOP 40, Door Operations/Station Service Procedures.	RTRA will review the incident and design slides for the Electronic messaging Screens to show "Lessons learned"-to be completed by Greenbelt RTRA Supt.	OAA			
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		2/17/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
Hazard Rating <input type="text"/>							

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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15-013	Incident 569, March 24, 2014, Alexandria Yard, train collision with shop door, CAP 1	Neither the Y/O nor the E/M was at fault and SOP #12 was properly followed. PLNT indicated that the shop door malfunctioned because it sagged by a couple of inches over an unknown period of time. The deduced cause of the incident was the lack of a positive form of indication to verify that the overhead shop roll up door was completely open.	Develop a form of positive indication on door opening frame that ensures verification that the overhead shop roll up door is completely open. PLNT installed temporary striped tape on the frame of door 3E (SAFE verified on 5/12/2014) that effectively mitigated further occurrences, by using specified measurements from CMNT. As of 9/11/2014 all C99 shop doors have been replaced (Yard 1 Upgrade) and warning indication paint has been completed on all shop door frames.	OAA			
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/17/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database. TOC received copy of revised SOP 12 on 2/2/2015.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-014	Incident 569, March 24, 2014, Alexandria Yard, train collision with shop door, CAP 2	Neither the Y/O nor the E/M was at fault and SOP #12 was properly followed. PLNT indicated that the shop door malfunctioned because it sagged by a couple of inches over an unknown period of time. The deduced cause of the incident was the lack of a positive form of indication to verify that the overhead shop roll up door was completely open.	CMNT revise SOP #12 to reflect CMNT/RTRA/TRST personnel ensuring that overhead shop doors are in the "fully open" position when clearing markings on the support columns associated with shop doors prior to vehicle operation in and out of shop.	OAA			

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/17/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database. TOC received copy of revised SOP 12 on 2/2/2015.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-015	Incident 570, March 26, 2014, Shady Grove Yard, PM-PM collision, CAP 1	Clearance point/fouling signage failed to indicate proper storage location for PM 39. Non-qualified employee acting as flagman, a violation of MSRPH Rule 3.96.	TRST Personnel to inspect Clearance Point signage in all yards where On Track Equipment is stored. An assessment was made on April 7, 2014 by TRST Management where areas were identified which needed sign installation or correction. Corresponding crossties were painted to identify no clearance point. See embedded memo above.	OAA			
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		2/17/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database. Supporting documentation embedded in final incident report.					
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Hazard Rating		<input type="text"/>					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-016	Incident 570, March 26, 2014, Shady Grove Yard, PM-PM collision, CAP 2	Clearance point/fouling signage failed to indicate proper storage location for PM 39. Non-qualified employee acting as flagman, a violation of MSRPH Rule 3.96.	Ensure that all Clearance Point signage in yard are visible and located upright and in proper location preventing track equipment fouling events. This CAP was satisfied as mentioned above. See Attachment #1.	OAA			

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 2/17/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 2/17/2015 -- CAP added to database. Supporting documentation embedded in final incident report.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-017	NTSB Safety Recommendation to WMATA, Feb. 11, 2015, R-15-8	Assess your subway tunnel ventilation system to verify the state of good repair and compliance with industry best practices and standards, such as those outlined in the National Fire Protection Associations NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems.(Urgent)	WMATA will assess the tunnel ventilation system to verify the state of good repair and compliance with industry best practices and standards, such as those outlined the National Fire Protection Associations NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems.	OAA	DGMO	Troup	12/31/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		5/10/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
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Hazard Rating		1D					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-018	NTSB Safety Recommendation to WMATA, Feb. 11, 2015, R-15-9	Develop and implement detailed written tunnel ventilation procedures for operations control center staff that take into account the probable source location of smoke and fire, the location of the train, the best evacuation route, and unique infrastructure features; these procedures should be based on the most effective strategy for fan direction and activation to limit passengers exposure to smoke. (Urgent)	WMATA will develop and implement detailed written tunnel ventilation procedures for operations control center staff that take into account the probable source location of smoke and fire, the location of the train, the best evacuation route, and unique infrastructure features; these procedures should be based on the most effective strategy for fan direction and activation to limit passengers exposure to smoke.	OAA	DGMO	Troup	12/31/2015

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

1D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-019	NTSB Safety Recommendation to WMATA, Feb. 11, 2015, R-15-10	As part of the implementation of the procedures developed in response to Safety Recommendation R-15-009, incorporate the use of the procedures into your ongoing training and exercise programs and ensure that operations control center staff and emergency responders have ample opportunities to learn and practice activating ventilation fans. (Urgent)	WMATA will incorporate the use of the procedures into your ongoing training and exercise programs and ensure that operations control center staff and emergency responders have ample opportunities to learn and practice activating ventilation fans.	OAA	DGMO	Troup	12/31/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		5/10/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
Hazard Rating		1D					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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15-020	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 1	Write SOP for train operator to cut environmental system (EV) immediately upon stopping for smoke incident.	RTRA will Write SOP for train operator to cut environmental system (EV) immediately upon stopping for smoke incident.	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	5/30/2015
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled
 Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

15-021	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 2	Write SOP for incident management in ROCC to provide specifics for site discipline in the ROCC to avoid crosstalk and unnecessary interactions.	RTRA will Write SOP for incident management in ROCC to provide specifics for site discipline in the ROCC to avoid cross-talk and unnecessary interactions	OAA	RTRA	Ballard	5/30/2015
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled
 Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-022	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 3	Set schedule for next three years for emergency quarterly drills to be conducted wayside. Sequence station, then a tunnel section, then an elevated section (note tunnel and elevated sections shall be between stations) . Please sequence each quarter in a separate jurisdiction. Coordinate type of drill and logistics with MTPD.	The Office of Emergency Management will set schedule for next three years for emergency quarterly drills to be conducted wayside. Sequence station, then a tunnel section, then an elevated section (note tunnel and elevated sections shall be between stations)	OAA	OEM	Bodmer	5/30/2015

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

1D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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15-023	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 4	Design and implement exterior signage for exterior doors to clearly delineate access in event of emergency.	CENV will Design and implement exterior signage for exterior doors to clearly delineate access in event of emergency.	OAA	CENV	Reynolds	5/30/2015
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled
 Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

15-024	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 5	Provide engineering and operations report on all third rail jumper cables in tunnel sections for condition and installation	CENI will provide engineering and operations report on all third rail jumper cables in tunnel sections for condition and installation	OAA	CENV	Viner	5/30/2015
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled
 Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-025	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 6	Recommendation on installation of low smoke/low halogen on high voltage third rail jumper cables.	CENI will provide recommendation on installation of low smoke/low halogen on high voltage third rail jumper cables	OAA	CENV	Viner	5/30/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		5/10/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
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Hazard Rating		2D					

15-026	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 7	Install mechanical protection on third rail jumper cables that may be exposed to wear from vibration against other materials.	CENI will develop EMI and install mechanical protection on third rail jumper cables that may be exposed to wear from vibration against other materials	OAA	CENV	Viner	5/30/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		5/10/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
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Hazard Rating		2D					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
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15-027	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 8	Review of ground fault detectors on third rail circuit breakers.	CENI will complete a review of ground fault detectors on third rail circuit breakers.	OAA	CENV	Viner	5/30/2015
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled
 Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

15-028	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 9	Operational analysis of running trains at 45 MPH in the core with limited acceleration.	WMATA will conduct a operational analysis of running trains at 45 MPH in the core with limited acceleration	OAA	DGMO	Troup	5/30/2015
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Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled
 Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-029	DGMO Jan. 20, 2015 Early Actions Memo to TIES, RTRA, Item 10	Provide report on installing zoned smoke detectors using ETS boxes for location and transmitting of information, also investigate use of wireless smoke detectors.	CENI will provide report on installing zoned smoke detectors using ETS boxes for location and transmitting of information, also investigate use of wireless smoke detectors	OAA	CENI	Eppler	5/30/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		5/10/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
Hazard Rating		3C					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-030	DGMO Apr. 17, 2015 Additional Early Actions Memo to GM, Item 1	Replacing and repairing tunnel lighting. We will begin an annual maintenance program to replace every light and light fixture cover in the tunnels, to include rehabbing covers where appropriate to recycle materials. The campaign will begin in May and will take approximately four years to complete all 88,044 light fixtures in the entire system, using two six-person crews.	WMATA will begin an annual maintenance program to replace every light and light fixture cover in the tunnels, to include rehabbing covers where appropriate to recycle materials. The campaign will begin in May and will take approximately four years to complete all 88,044 light fixtures in the entire system, using two six-person crews.	OAA	DGMO	Troup	5/30/2015

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

1D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-031	DGMO Apr. 17, 2015 Additional Early Actions Memo to GM, Item 2	Establish a dedicated maintenance crew to clean tunnel walkways of any debris or retired equipment left behind in the underground portions of the system that may obstruct nondesignated passageways for rail personnel or first responders.	WMATA will establish a dedicated maintenance crew to clean tunnel walkways of any debris or retired equipment left behind in the underground portions of the system that may obstruct nondesignated passageways for rail personnel or first responders.	OAA	DGMO	Troup	5/30/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		5/10/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
Hazard Rating		2E					

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-032	DGMO Apr. 17, 2015 Additional Early Actions Memo to GM, Item 3	Review protocols for responding to alarms in the rail operations control center. The goal is to reduce superfluous alarms and segregate critical from non-critical alarms. Final implementation of new protocols will be subject to receiving the APTA peer review report next month to ensure alignment with their recommendations.	WMATA will review protocols for responding to alarms in the rail operations control center. Final implementation of new protocols will be subject to receiving the APTA peer review report to ensure alignment with their recommendations.	OAA	DGMO	Troup	5/30/2015

Accident/Incident Investigation

Last Update Provided: 5/10/2015 Next Update Scheduled

Most Recent Update / Next Steps: 5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.

Hazard Rating

1D

<u>TOC ID</u>	<u>CAP Source Report</u>	<u>Finding / Recommendation</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Responsible Department</u>	<u>Responsible Person</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
15-033	DGMO Apr. 17, 2015 Additional Early Actions Memo to GM, Item 4	Implement a quality audit of the ventilation system testing. This shall include development of the document PLNT 1000 which will specifically outline periodic critical safety testing apart from regular preventive maintenance activities. This insures self-regulatory compliance to maintenance and testing practices which address "life safety" issues.	WMATA will Implement a quality audit of the ventilation system testing. This shall include development of the document PLNT 1000 which will specifically outline periodic critical safety testing apart from regular preventive maintenance activities. This insures self-regulatory compliance to maintenance and testing practices which address "life safety" issues.	OAA	DGMO	Troup	5/30/2015
Accident/Incident Investigation							
Last Update Provided:		5/10/2015	Next Update Scheduled				
Most Recent Update / Next Steps:		5/10/2015 -- CAP added to database.					
Hazard Rating		1D					