



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

GROUP	
EXHIBIT	

Agency / Organization

Title

Derailment of Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority Train No. 410 at Smithsonian Interlocking January 13, 1982 RAR-82-6

Conclusion 23: Before the accident and during the emergency, the stresses within the OCC were aggravated by confusion as to who was actually in charge of the OCC.

Conclusion 27: The personnel in OCC lack a working knowledge of the rules and procedures, the physical characteristics of the rail system, and the fundamentals of rail transit operation. This is due to WMATA's failure to provide them adequate training.

Conclusion 34: Extended and unnecessary delays in starting evacuation of the train resulted from the OCC's failure to properly authorize, direct, and coordinate an evacuation through Metrorail supervisors and employees on the scene.

Conclusion 37: District of Columbia Fire Department radio frequencies are not compatible with WMATA's radio repeater system in the subway. This delayed communication between rescue forces in the subway and aboveground command posts.

Recommendation to the DC Mayor:

Improve the emergency procedures to be activated in the event of a Metrorail emergency which establishes effective and ongoing liaison between the District of Columbia Fire Department's onsite command post and its Communications Center, the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Metropolitan Police, and hospitals(R-82-79)(C-AA).

Collision of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Train T-111 with Standing Train at Shady Grove Passenger Station, Gaithersburg, Maryland, January 6, 1996 RAR-96/04

Conclusion 12: As demonstrated by this accident, the training given to Operations control Center controllers by WMATA prior to the accident was inadequate to prepare them to safely manage and control the highly automated Metrorail system.

To Montgomery County Fire & Rescue Commission:

Review your Metrorail SOPs regarding the requirement that the on-scene commander immediately take charge of the accident scene and establish a direct communications link with the Metrorail OCC. (R-96-48)(C-AA).

Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station Washington, D.C. June 22, 2009 (RAR 10-02)

Conclusion 5: Considering the challenges of the recovery operations, the emergency response was well coordinated and effectively managed.

Collision Between Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains at the Woodley Park-Zoo/Adams Morgan Station in Washington, D.C. November 3, 2004 (RAR

Conclusion 3: The emergency response to the accident was well coordinated and effectively managed.

Derailment of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Train near the Mr. Vernon Square Station Washington, D.C. January 7, 2007 (RAR-07-03)

Member Kathryn O'Leary Higgins Concurring Statement:

We were fortunate that only 23 of the passengers on board the train that afternoon were transported to the hospital with non-life threatening injuries. I appreciate the staff's review and assurances that WMATA has emergency evacuation procedures in place and that those procedures were followed on the afternoon and evening of the accident. Yet, it was more than an hour from the time of the derailment until the evacuation of the two rear cars was completed, and more than 20 minutes from the time the evacuation started until it was completed. These incidents test our responses in real time, and provide valuable insight for future events. I believe we could have done more to learn what was done and why it was done. We learn important lessons from our investigations and I think we missed a chance to learn much more about emergency response from this incident.