

**DOCKET No.: SA-521**  
**EXHIBIT No. 2R**

**NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**Interview Summary, Terrence M. Hill,**  
**First Officer, Emery Worldwide Airlines**

**(3 pages)**

---

Interview: Terrence M. Hill, First Officer, Emery Worldwide Airlines  
Represented By: John Dean, ALPA  
Date: February 22, 2000  
Time: 1410  
Location: Sheraton Hotel, Rancho Cordova, California  
Present: Operational Factors/Human Performance Group

---

During the interview, Mr. Hill stated the following:

Mr. Hill stated that he is employed by Emery Worldwide Airlines as a DC-8 first officer. His date of hire is September 1995. He has about 10 years experience flying DC-8s. His total flight time is about 14,000 hours, including about 5,000 hours in DC-8s.

He was the first officer on the accident airplane when it flew from DAY to RNO, and then from RNO to MHR. He stated that they were originally scheduled to go directly to MHR where "George" was going to get on the airplane; instead the airplane was routed directly to RNO. The accident captain and the flight engineer got on the airplane at RNO. The accident captain flew the airplane from RNO to MHR.

He stated that the accident captain was the jumpseat rider on the flight from DAY. He first saw him at the hub at DAY. Mr. Hill stated that he really did not know the accident captain because Mr. Hill was usually flying a daytime schedule. He said they had no "real words at all;" Mr. Hill just knew that they had a jumpseat rider on board.

He said the scheduled departure time was 0948 UTC. Mechanics were working on the airplane's windshield and the airplane was not ready for departure. They were told that it would be another two hours. He did not recall any conversation with the accident captain. Hill thought it would be longer so he went to the bunkroom until someone came and woke him up. They again went to the airplane and the mechanics asked why they were there because the airplane was not ready. They went back inside the building.

He said they eventually flew the airplane to RNO. He did not get out of his seat during the flight. The accident captain was lying across some seats during the flight. Mr. Hill said that he did not really have a conversation with anybody during the flight.

On the flight from RNO to MHR the accident captain was the flying pilot. Mr. Hill stated that it was the first time he had flown with either the accident captain or the accident flight engineer; consequently, everything they did was operational and

they did not have any social conversation. He watched the accident captain closely and thought that he was a really good pilot. He made a nice rotation and was on the proper speeds for the departure; he climbed "right out on localizer." After turning towards Sacramento, the accident captain hand-flew the airplane up to 14,000 feet altitude. Mr. Hill said he was impressed. He did not recall if the captain used the autopilot during the flight. They were only at 14,000 "for a bit." The accident captain made a normal descent, and a nice landing and taxi-in. He did not have a conversation with the captain about anything. Mr. Hill talked to "George" for a couple minutes about 1845. The company had set up a cab to take him back to Reno and the cab arrived about 1900 as the airplane was being loaded.

From what he saw that day, he had two impressions about the accident captain: one, he was a good pilot, and two, he was real quiet. The captain never mentioned "anything about anything." He thought that the captain seemed to be alert, and not nodding off.

He stated that the airplane flew well and there were no problems with it. He said there were no loading problems in RNO; everything was uneventful, normal.

When asked about unusual attitude training and training for aft CG problems, he stated that he had done low-level windshear, stalls, and that type of thing. He said he only goes in the simulator once a year. He heard they do a thing about running the weight back, simulating an aft cg, or cargo shift. He is not sure if they do it system-wide or if it is just one person's report. He said he personally has not experienced that in the simulator. He said he has had unusual attitude training at Emery.

The planned duty day started at 0948 UTC, with a scheduled departure of 1048 UTC. On the 15<sup>th</sup> he flew MHR-DAY and was at DAY for 24 hours. They got into DAY that day about 1700 UTC. He said the company provided a hotel room. He said he was not walking around or doing anything during the delay; he went to sleep.

When asked if he had ever experienced taking off with an aft CG, he said that sometimes you have to "tweak it a little" to take pressure off the stick; you trim the pressure off. He said he has had a CG of 30 percent. He has never been out of limits but it has been close. He said 30 percent would be a "crummy load;" it would be abnormal to have it way aft like that. This was a problem that was not as obvious on the taxi-out but more obvious on the takeoff roll. He said that one of the things you would observe is a strut extension greater than normal, but once in the airplane there is no way to tell, sitting on the ground. He believes that the stick-shaker can be set off with an aft CG while the airplane is on the ground. He said the flight engineer usually checks the strut.

He said that when the accident captain took off out of RNO, it was a normal rotation without trim changes, and a normal climb profile. The captain made no mention of any problems at all.

He stated that the accident captain never mentioned being tired; there was no conversation. The accident captain was sleeping on the way out to RNO, and during the day, Mr. Hill was in the bunkroom.

He was not sure about how much the accident captain slept during the flight from DAY but he estimated it to be a couple of hours. He was not sure if the accident captain had eaten anything. He first saw the accident captain in DAY about one hour before the originally scheduled departure time.

On the ground at RNO, the accident captain sat at the table in the office as Mr. Hill called the company about who was going to be first officer on the flight to MHR. Mr. Hill said that he was not tired at RNO because he had slept during most of the delay in DAY. He said they decided that he would serve as first officer on the flight to MHR.

He said at RNO the accident captain was looking over the flight papers and was very quiet.

He said the first officer is responsible for filling out the load manifest and doing the CG calculations. He said the first backup for the computer is to pack a set of batteries; next call the company; and the last thing is to go to the book and do it manually. He said a calculator stays on the airplane.

He said the go around at RNO occurred because they flew the ILS Runway 16R approach to minimums and "there was nothing there," so they went around on the published missed approach. They entered the published hold and then ATC started vectoring them. They decided to make the second approach, a back course, because the minimums were lower. They landed uneventfully and he said it was a good landing. He said the go-around took about 10 minutes.

He stated that he has never heard any "weird" noises during takeoff when flying the DC-8.

He described the accident flight engineer on the flight to MHR as a "normal flight engineer who seemed okay." Mr. Hill said that the accident flight engineer called out traffic for them while coming into MHR, and helped with "speed bugs."

He said that an elevator check is done on takeoff at 80 knots. A physical check is accomplished; the nose strut extends and you get a "clunk" sound.