

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

MERRIMACK VALLEY RESIDENTIAL GAS *
FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS *
SEPTEMBER 13, 2018 *

* Accident No.: PLD18MR003

* * * * *

Interview of: MICHAEL MANSFIELD, Fire Chief
Andover Fire Rescue

Andover Fire Rescue
Andover, Massachusetts

Sunday,
September 16, 2018

APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

RACHAEL GUNARATNAM, Hazardous Materials Accident
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I N T E R V I E W

(1:25 p.m.)

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2
3 MR. CURRIE: Good afternoon. It's September 16th, 2018, and
4 we are in Andover, Massachusetts at 32 North Main Street at the
5 fire department in reference to NTSB case PLD18MR003.

6 I'm Shawn, S-h-a-w-n, Currie, C-u-r-r-i-e, and I'm an
7 investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board.

8 And with me is?

9 MS. GUNARATNAM: Rachael Gunaratnam, R-a-c-h-a-e-l, G-u-n-a-
10 r-a-t-n-a-m, hazmat investigator with NTSB.

11 MS. DOIRON: Sheila Doiron, S-h-e-i-l-a, D-o-i-r-o-n, from
12 Columbia Gas.

13 MS. MOTLEY: Angela Motley, with the Department of Utilities,
14 A-n-g-e-l-a, M-o-t-l-e-y.

15 MS. HALLIDAY: And Julie Halliday with USDOT Office of
16 Pipeline Safety, J-u-l-i-e, H-a-l-l-i-d-a-y.

17 MR. CURRIE: Okay. And we're interviewing the fire chief of
18 Andover, Massachusetts, Michael, common spelling, Mansfield,
19 M-a-n-s-f-i-e-l-d.

20 And I should have said this at the beginning, we started the
21 interview at 1:25 p.m.

INTERVIEW OF MICHAEL MANSFIELD

22 BY MR. CURRIE:

23 Q. How are you today, Chief?

24 A. I've been better.
25

1 Q. And rightfully so. Can you give us a snapshot of your career
2 and your experience in the fire service?

3 A. Sure. My fire service career started in 1980 when I was
4 hired as a firefighter in the city of Nashua, New Hampshire. I
5 got promoted to a lieutenant. I was promoted as a captain 4 years
6 later. I was a deputy chief, and then when I left there in 2007
7 to be the chief here, I was deputy chief of special operations in
8 the city of Nashua. On my days off I worked at the New Hampshire
9 Fire Academy for 19 years and taught and wrote training programs
10 for the state of New Hampshire and did certification testing as
11 well.

12 I started my career in Andover, Massachusetts as fire chief
13 on February 4th, 2007, and been here since. I have two
14 associate's degrees, a bachelor's degree, and a master's degree in
15 business administration. I have thousands of hours of training in
16 different firefighting tactics, techniques, leadership management
17 programs and things like that. So I've been around a while and
18 still haven't seen everything.

19 Q. Thank you. How big is -- is it a city or a town?

20 A. This is a town.

21 Q. How many people?

22 A. 33,200 approximately.

23 Q. And how big is your department?

24 A. Our department is -- we have 68 full-time career
25 firefighters.

1 Q. And you don't have call firemen?

2 A. We do not.

3 Q. Okay. And your shift -- how many firefighters do you have on
4 a shift?

5 A. We run a complement of anywhere between 15 to 17 firefighters
6 per shift, 24/7/365. We run out of three different fire stations.
7 We run three engine companies with a lieutenant and two
8 firefighters on each engine company, a ladder company. And we run
9 -- each shift is run by a different deputy chief assigned to that
10 who acts as the incident commander or shift commander, if you
11 will, that runs the overall operation day to day.

12 Q. Okay. And on the day, the 13th, do you know how many people
13 you had on regular shift when the day started?

14 A. I don't -- I'm guessing probably 16.

15 Q. Okay. And you work -- what's your shift like? Is it 24
16 hours?

17 A. They work 24 on, 24 off, 24 on, 5 off.

18 Q. Okay. Excellent. I know you are fire chief, but you are
19 outside of that complement of 16 people? You're administrative?

20 A. Yes, I am. Yes.

21 Q. And what's your shift?

22 A. My shift? How many hours do you want?

23 Q. What's your normal shift?

24 A. Typically I'm scheduled to be here 8 to 8½ hours a day.
25 Sometimes I start at 7 in the morning; sometimes I start at 8,

1 depending upon what's going on. And my shift will end, should end
2 somewhere between 4 and 4:30, but on many occasions because of
3 different things that are going on in town such as budgetary types
4 of things, I'll be here, you know, 9, 10, 12, 14 hours a day
5 sometimes. So it's vary uncommon I'm here on a weekend, but that
6 does happen as well during meetings or special events that's
7 playing in town and you're expected to -- as being part of the
8 leadership team in the community, you're expected to be here for
9 those types of events.

10 Q. Can you tell us from beginning to end on September 13th?

11 A. Yeah. It was about -- I had just left the office. I was
12 heading home, and was on Route 93 and I heard a call come in for a
13 stove fire right around 4:20. Didn't think much of it. And it
14 was -- that call came in for the Grassfields Restaurant, which is
15 located on North Main Street. And they said they had a stove fire
16 and that they were evacuating the restaurant. So peaked my
17 interest, obviously. And hadn't turned around to come back, I was
18 only probably 3 miles up the road. And I just kept driving.

19 And they said that when I got on scene they had -- they
20 definitely had a stove fire and that an employee had put it out.
21 So, okay. So I'm still driving up Route 93. And then all of a
22 sudden, within probably a couple of minutes, maybe not even that,
23 probably I'd say a minute to 90 seconds, the radio just went
24 berserk with dispatchers to different addresses and locations
25 reporting building fires. That's when I turned around and started

1 heading back here. And the calls just kept coming in and we
2 had -- our resources were overwhelmed within probably 7 minutes.

3 I'm not in town yet, I get on the radio and I instruct the
4 dispatchers to send out a code red alert to all off-duty personnel
5 to come in. I don't know what's going on. It wasn't but a few
6 seconds after that, that somebody in dispatch got on the radio and
7 said, Andover -- Lawrence and North Andover experiencing similar
8 situations. I'm like great.

9 I get into town. I go right into the dispatch,
10 communications dispatch center, and the calls for fires are still
11 coming in and for other things, other emergencies. And I
12 immediately requested one of the dispatch supervisors to notify
13 MEMA, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, to send two
14 fire structural task forces from the fire mobilization people that
15 we have. And at the time that that was going on, we were going
16 through -- the dispatchers were going through trying to get other
17 fire resources in here as well from our normal 10 alarm running
18 card that we have.

19 That was a challenge because we rely upon Lawrence and North
20 Andover for early mutual aid response and they were our community,
21 and they rely upon us. So we were having a challenge trying to
22 get fire apparatus resources and personnel into the town because
23 we were all competing for the same -- because we're a very close
24 geographical area, we're all competing for the same resources.

25 So it wasn't very long into the incidents that we had

1 exhausted our 10-alarm running card and had to now rely upon those
2 outside resources that were coming from fire mobilization. We
3 knew that was -- I knew that was going to take probably an hour,
4 hour and a half for that to happen. And we just continued to get
5 inundated with calls.

6 The town manager called me and he said, what do you need me
7 to do? I said you need to muster up all department and division
8 heads and get them in here and open up this EOC now, which he did.
9 And then I've been in the building since, pretty much.

10 But we started -- it wasn't too long into it we kind of had
11 an idea that there -- it seemed as though there had been some --
12 these were gas events. It became very obvious to us that they
13 became gas events and that -- we were getting information from
14 people describing what was going on, and the descriptions from
15 many people were, they were saying that all of a sudden they were
16 using a cooking device or they were in the basement with the
17 boiler because they had heard something and there was just high
18 pressure gas coming out of these devices, whether it be a stove,
19 boiler, anything that was gas fired.

20 So they started developing messages to try to send out to the
21 community as quickly as we could to try to shut the -- you know,
22 instructing them against probably Columbia Gas' wishes, but we
23 were instructing people to shut down if they were knowledgeable
24 enough and knew how to do it, shut down the gas supply to the
25 dwelling at the meter, because we were trying to curtail as many

1 fires as we possibly could.

2 And then, you know, we were talking to different people
3 trying to get more information. The call line was still ramped
4 up. We were responding to as many of those as we possibly could.
5 I think at one point we had probably seven or eight calls in queue
6 that we could not respond to because we just didn't have the
7 resources to send. Just -- they were nonexistent. So as soon as
8 a resource came available, we sent them to another call.

9 And then the personnel started coming in from our management
10 team that the EOC opened up. I was trying to be the go-between
11 between them and dispatch. More dispatchers were coming in. At
12 the height of the event we had eight dispatchers in the dispatch
13 area. We average three usually. And they dispatch normally for
14 us, fire, but they also dispatch for the PD and EMS because we
15 also run EMS. We have two ambulances on duty 24/7/365 as well
16 with two EMTs on each.

17 So did the best we could with what we had and then we tried
18 to start planning two steps ahead because we just didn't know how
19 long this was going to last. We were getting information that we
20 were not going to lose electricity. And then within 20 minutes of
21 getting that message, we lost electricity to a good portion of
22 town, probably would say probably 30 percent. That added a whole
23 new dynamic to the whole situation that we were -- we were kind of
24 hoping that that was not going to happen. We were told it wasn't
25 going to happen, but we were still trying to plan for the worst

1 and hope for the best, and that just added a whole new dynamic
2 because now we got to worry about schools. We had to worry about
3 a whole new set of, you know, populations that we weren't really
4 having to think about at that point but now we are. And then
5 started calling in more resources try to deal with that. And
6 we're trying to make -- we had to make decisions as to whether or
7 not we wanted to cancel school.

8 A lot of 10,000-foot decisions at the management team level
9 that had to be made. And then try and provide support for, you
10 know, our folks, the mutual aid folks and the fire mobilization
11 folks that are coming in from great distances. I mean, we had
12 people, we had people in here from 50, 60 miles away and beyond.

13 So, I don't know if that's as specific as you want it but --

14 MS. GUNARATNAM: It is.

15 MR. MANSFIELD: Okay.

16 BY MR. CURRIE:

17 Q. It is. Thank you. Any problems other than you didn't have
18 enough people to begin with? Obviously, no one can prepare for
19 something that quick, but --

20 A. The problem, the biggest problems I had -- the biggest
21 problems we had in the EOC was getting good accurate information
22 in a timely fashion. And I know Sheila and have the utmost
23 respect for a lot of people at Columbia Gas because we've had very
24 good working relationships with them. And Columbia Gas has worked
25 extremely hard to make sure that those relationships, you know,

1 have continued. And, you know, it pains me to say this but, you
2 know, we were looking for good information from Columbia Gas. And
3 I was actually interviewed Thursday evening by just about every TV
4 network around here and I was asked specifically a question and
5 the question was, what do you -- can you comment about the
6 response you received from Columbia Gas? And my answer to them
7 was, yeah, I can answer that. I said, we are waiting for
8 information from them, but they are just as inundated as we are
9 and I expect that we will get information as soon as things calm
10 down on their end as well. And that's pretty much the case. They
11 were just as inundated, if not more, because they had three
12 communities they had to deal with; I had one.

13 So, you know, but as time went on, it became extremely
14 frustrating because we weren't getting good accurate information.
15 And then, you know, EOC we went -- we had a liaison. We lost the
16 liaison from Columbia Gas. And then Eversource for whatever
17 reason, that's 50,000-foot level, got brought into the mix and
18 took over the mitigation process, which just added another dynamic
19 to that for us because now we don't know is Columbia Gas answering
20 to Eversource. Are we going to deal with Eversource for liaisons,
21 you know, how is this all going work out?

22 So there was -- there were some challenges with information
23 or lack thereof, I should say. But we did the best we could. And
24 the only reason we're looking for information is so we can push it
25 out to our community, because there's 33,200 residents in town and

1 there's probably another 50-, 60,000 people that work in this town
2 that are looking for information as to whether or not they need to
3 come to work tomorrow or a myriad of things. Can I bring my kid
4 to school? Those types of things. So --

5 Q. While we are on the Columbia Gas thread, what training has
6 been provided to you folks?

7 A. Columbia Gas?

8 Q. Uh-huh.

9 A. They have provided a lot of training for us and that's how
10 the relationship has continued, one of the ways that the
11 relationship has continued. They constantly are offering
12 training. We are constantly taking them up on the training
13 opportunities that we can -- they will provide for us, whether
14 it's response training, live fire training. We have an annual
15 meeting with them where they have an opportunity to update all the
16 police and fire chiefs on safety issues, safety concerns,
17 communication challenges that we may have experienced over the
18 last year, those types of things.

19 Q. Okay.

20 (Radio interruption.)

21 A. Sorry about that.

22 Q. That's opportune because my next question is about the radio.
23 Any radio issues? We talked to a couple -- obviously, we talked
24 to the other two chiefs and they quickly found that radio time was
25 -- they couldn't get it. It was just everybody was talking.

1 A. Yeah. They were talking over each other. The biggest
2 problem I have with our radio system here is that we only have one
3 tactical channel. Only one tactical channel. I have requested
4 from the FCC at least another tactical channel, and there is just
5 no channel space available in our frequency spectrum that they can
6 give us. It's ironic that -- I just spoke to the fire chief in
7 Londonderry, New Hampshire, who may allow us through a letter of
8 concurrence utilize one of the frequencies that they utilize and
9 share that. He's far enough away so that if we use that frequency
10 they're on, it hopefully will not interfere with their radio
11 communications. I just had a face-to-face with him back in August
12 with relationship to that. We just haven't been able to meet up
13 to discuss that, and hopefully to get a second tactical channel.
14 But having only one tactical channel to operate off of just
15 decreases the level of everybody's safety dramatically.

16 We are in the process of building out a radio system, radio
17 assisted communication system for the school. I have requested 11
18 frequencies and they're getting all 11 frequencies that they
19 requested, because it's a different block that's totally
20 different. It's frustrating.

21 So, radio communications was extremely chaotic because of
22 that one channel.

23 Q. Okay. Do you have any canned emergency action plans or
24 incident action plans for a natural gas --

25 A. A management working group that meets on a monthly basis to

1 discuss any issues that may exist on the emergency management
2 side. And we train on different scenarios that could happen. We
3 work together with the hospitals. We work together with the
4 health department for decontamination/isolation if we need to do
5 that, those types of things. And, you know, we train together as
6 a management team quite often on incident management, incident
7 command. We've had Texas A&M come in, and we've had a training
8 program tomorrow, scheduled for tomorrow; it got canceled. So
9 we're constantly doing things like that.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. We have a plan. Like you said, like you asked, we do have a
12 plan.

13 Q. Okay. Did you run the plan?

14 A. We ran the plan to the best of our ability. I don't think
15 you can really ever plan for something this big. Like I said, you
16 plan for the worst and hope for the best, and this was above and
17 beyond anything that I've ever seen in my 38, 39-year career.

18 Q. How many calls did you end up getting?

19 A. I really can't tell you that. I can't answer that right this
20 second because I'd have to go back and actually peel off -- we are
21 still getting event-related calls as we speak. They're out there
22 right now.

23 Q. Okay. Maybe could you ballpark it for Thursday? From the
24 time that you were driving up 93 to the time that --

25 A. Probably 200, 250.

1 Q. And obviously a lot of those calls were not fire related? I
2 mean they were fire related, but not actual working type --

3 A. They were event related.

4 Q. Right. Of those, how many you think were actual fires?

5 A. Right around 37.

6 Q. Thirty-seven.

7 A. Thirty-eight. And some of those -- so just to clarify. So
8 not 37 -- 37 or 38 different addresses. Some of those addresses
9 we had to actually go back a second time to deal with the same
10 issue or a similar issue.

11 Q. Okay. Did you have any full-blown structural fires that were
12 burned to the cellar?

13 A. Yes. Burned through the cellar, extension into the first
14 floor, those types of things. Yes, we did.

15 Q. How many?

16 A. A handful, five.

17 Q. And any houses explode?

18 A. No. We were very fortunate in that respect.

19 Q. In EOC did you folks do an incident action plan, IAP?

20 A. In writing, no. I'm not the emergency management director,
21 so -- we did not.

22 Q. Did they catch up and do one for the next operational period?

23 A. No, they did not.

24 Q. Okay. Do you know why?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Okay. And my final question is how common are gas leaks in
2 the town?

3 A. Here? They are not that common. I know that there has been
4 a lot of work going on this year with respect to replacement,
5 replacing gas lines. We are updating the infrastructure. We had
6 -- in one neighborhood we had some issues this summer where the
7 contractor kept hitting things that were not marked or they didn't
8 know exist. Actually it wasn't on their maps. So I forget the
9 term that they use, but there is one developer in town who planned
10 a development and he had the gas company back 4 years ago, put in
11 -- he didn't build on every lot, but he had them install a --

12 MS. DOIRON: Stub.

13 MR. MANSFIELD: A what?

14 MS. DOIRON: A stub.

15 MR. MANSFIELD: Yeah, a stub. Exactly. Had them put a stub
16 in, in the event they want to develop that particular lot. They
17 were finding a lot of stubs that they were not aware of, and they
18 hit three or four of them within a 7-day period. So that -- I
19 can't remember us ever having that issue. I was running into Dana
20 Argo almost every day because the contractor was hitting the stubs
21 and creating some high pressure problems.

22 But as far as leaks are concerned, we go through -- you know,
23 it's cyclical. We'll go through a, you know, a time frame where
24 we won't have any, you know, for months and we'll all of a sudden
25 we'll have, you know, one, two, three in a particular area. And

1 that's part of business. In our business it's just the
2 infrastructure ages and they involve leaks. Columbia Gas has done
3 a good job with trying to change out and update their
4 infrastructure in town. I can say that, and they've been very
5 responsive in the past.

6 MR. CURRIE: Excellent. Thank you. That's all the questions
7 I have. I'm going to jump out to make a call real quick and I'll
8 go over to Rachael.

9 BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

10 Q. So, this was good. So around -- I just want to go back to
11 your timeline when you first heard. 4:20 p.m., you got the --
12 that's when the chaos basically started happening. Within minutes
13 and so forth you got multiple calls about fires and so forth.
14 Could you -- I know it would be hard to remember but when exactly.
15 But when, at what point -- you said very early on you knew it was
16 related to gas and then you started calling in mutual aid. When
17 did you realize that you didn't have enough resources that you
18 knew to go outside of Lawrence and North Andover?

19 A. Probably 25 minutes.

20 Q. Within the hour?

21 A. Well, we started calling mutual aid in almost immediately.

22 Q. Right.

23 A. But the mutual aid that we always had planned for was not
24 available --

25 Q. Right.

1 A. -- because it's coming from the two communities that are also
2 having problems. So we had to keep going further out and further
3 out. That process started probably within I want to say 10, 12
4 minutes after the event started. I'm referring to, you know, the
5 event. And then we kept calling mutual aid and then we got --
6 obviously we implemented the fire mobilization plan. That
7 happened probably, I want to say -- that request from me went out
8 to MEMA I want to say probably 25 or 30 minutes after.

9 Q. Okay. And when you decided to initiate EOC that was the same
10 time?

11 A. Just right around the same time. I knew we were going to
12 have a lot of resources coming in. I knew this was now going to
13 be a long-term event and we needed to get that EOC opened up and
14 operational. That was a decision I made. The EMD didn't make
15 that decision. I made that decision.

16 Q. Emergency manager, EMD?

17 A. Yeah. The police chief.

18 Q. Oh, I see. So once that got started, okay, and they set
19 up -- where did they set up?

20 A. We just set up right downstairs.

21 Q. Downstairs, okay.

22 A. 32 North Main Street. Right here in the public safety
23 building in Andover.

24 Q. Yeah. And who was part of the EOC, what agency?

25 A. We got the town manager, the deputy town manager. We've got

1 the police chief; myself, the fire chief. We've got the second in
2 command of the police department. We've got the third command of
3 the police department. We have a MEMA liaison. Board of Health.

4 Q. Board of Health?

5 A. Yep. We had health inspectors for food. We had the DPW
6 director. We had the building inspector, the electrical
7 inspector. I'm just picturing where everybody's sitting. We had
8 our public relations representative for the -- that does public
9 relations for all the departments in town. We had the
10 recreational director initially. We had our planning director
11 initially. We had our IT director. Liaisons from -- on and off
12 from the utilities: Columbia Gas, finally Eversource, and
13 National Grid.

14 Q. National Grid.

15 A. Yesterday we had -- we didn't get a National Grid rep,
16 liaison until yesterday in the EOC. I think I already said MEMA.

17 Q. Yeah. So all local guys?

18 A. All local people with the exception of the MEMA rep,
19 representing the state, so we could get the state assets requested
20 when we needed them.

21 Q. Okay. And when -- you said they shut off the power at
22 around, what time?

23 A. I want to say probably around 8 o'clock, 7:30, 8 o'clock.

24 Q. So when did the phone calls start dying down? I mean, you
25 know, because initially the first hour it was like --

1 A. I want to say probably not until 10 o'clock that night.

2 Q. And what I mean by dying down, it's like the fires versus
3 odor calls.

4 A. Well, that -- yeah, we're probably looking probably around
5 8:30, 7:30.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. 7:30.

8 Q. Okay. So in that -- during that process, what information
9 was your CMA liaison providing you? What information were they
10 providing you between 4 to 7:30?

11 A. Not a lot.

12 Q. Not a lot, okay.

13 A. No.

14 Q. What did you know CMA was doing?

15 A. We didn't know.

16 Q. Okay. Have you ever done any drills with CMA?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you remember by any chance the last one you did with them?

19 A. I believe it was 2 years ago.

20 Q. And how did that go?

21 A. Well.

22 Q. Do you remember what involved?

23 A. It involved a reported leak in a very remote area of town
24 where we exercised our response plan to those types of leaks. I
25 was there with a number of Columbia Gas folks just looking at --

1 as an observer and an evaluator basically to see how my response
2 was going to end up and, you know, watch the response from
3 Columbia Gas technicians and management and things like that. As
4 a result of that, that drill that we were involved in, I made some
5 adjustments to our standard operating guidelines and made sure
6 that we went through some things afterward with our personnel to
7 make sure that we're all on the same page with regards to
8 appropriate wearing of personal protective equipment.

9 Q. Yeah. So when did you get relieved on September 13th or --

10 MR. CURRIE: Has he been?

11 BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

12 Q. Yeah, have you been relieved?

13 A. I got relieved at 4:30 on Friday morning and was back here at
14 7 a.m., that day.

15 Q. Yeah. So when you came back here at 7 a.m., what were your
16 duties then?

17 A. The same duties that I had --

18 Q. Twelve hours before?

19 A. -- 2½ hours before when I left.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I was pretty much -- for a lot of the event I was pretty much
22 running the EOC, not having the role of the EMD.

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. I know how to run, you know, an EOC because I've been in that
25 situation before, much better trained in that situation. I've got

1 bachelor's degree in emergency management. And I found myself
2 running the EOC because the command post was located someplace
3 different. They were running that command post for the three
4 communities that were involved, and we decided to stand up -- I
5 decided to stand up our own EOC so we could get our own stuff
6 working together. And I've been pushing and pushing and pushing
7 for us to do stuff like this for quite some time. And, you know,
8 they did it, trial by fire; no pun intended.

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. So I found myself doing that because there were things that
11 the police chief -- the EMD and the town manager needed to do.
12 They needed to continue that liaison link between the command post
13 in Lawrence and our own local EOC. So I basically assumed those
14 duties.

15 Q. So who is your emergency manager?

16 A. He's the police chief, Patrick Keefe.

17 Q. So he was the one liaison?

18 A. He was liaison between -- along with the town manager,
19 between the commandpost and here.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Because they felt that they would probably get some better
22 information from that location that we weren't getting locally.

23 Q. Okay. So you mentioned that you have been trying to push
24 something forward for a while. What exactly --

25 A. Tabletop exercises, those kinds of things.

1 Q. Right. On a more wide, bigger scale?

2 A. Yeah, on a townwide scale. Getting everybody that needs to
3 be involved in emergency management response involved in tabletop
4 exercises, and learning their roles and responsibilities within
5 the incident command system if something were to happen.

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. And I have been organizing and training to make that happen.
8 So, you know, we have people that have -- that certainly would
9 have roles and responsibilities but are not up to snuff with
10 writing an IAP; they're not up to snuff with situation reports,
11 and up to snuff with how to deal with 12-hour operational periods.

12 You know, part of my background includes being a rescue
13 specialist, rescue specialist technician with the FEMA USR team
14 out of Task Force 1. So I've got a lot of experience with all
15 these types of things that way, and they just don't have --
16 they've not been exposed to that stuff.

17 Q. Right. So the tabletop exercise, you're thinking, is just
18 townwide or with the other --

19 A. Well, we'd have to -- I mean, we need to do something
20 townwide for us. We got to walk before -- crawl before we can
21 walk and then walk before we can run. So we've been -- I've been
22 actively trying to nudge the EMD without stepping on toes to make
23 that happen, and it's been a little bit difficult.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. So you need to be quite creative in how you write that on

1 your report because that's going to come back and bite me --

2 Q. Oh, yeah. We're -- anyway.

3 BY MR. CURRIE:

4 Q. Do you think that after a real-world exposure to an actual
5 EOC that was having to be up an actually function through multiple
6 periods will help your cause, or do you think --

7 A. You want me to lie?

8 Q. No, because that's the only way you can get in trouble with
9 us is lying.

10 A. No.

11 Q. If you don't -- we can talk about it later. It's --

12 A. No.

13 MR. CURRIE: Okay.

14 MS. GUNARATNAM: Okay. So, we can go around the room.

15 MR. MANSFIELD: It's where the rubber meets the road and it
16 needs to happen and I know what needs to happen and it's not going
17 to help the cause. I would love to think that it would. I'm an
18 optimist but I'm a realist too. And the same point, I mean we've
19 got people in roles and responsibilities that should have already
20 learned a long time ago how to fill out ICS forms. I have the ICS
21 forms in my position downstairs. They don't want to have anything
22 to do with them. We could have this thing all well documented.
23 We could have everything running and rolling and doing the whole
24 thing. I've got the forms downstairs.

25 MS. GUNARATNAM: Okay. So do you want to go next?

1 MS. DOIRON: Yeah.

2 MS. GUNARATNAM: Sheila.

3 BY MS. DOIRON:

4 Q. And not talking about that, but just -- you're talking about
5 just in general, a drill, not just drill with the gas company for
6 what you're talking.

7 A. Right. Right.

8 Q. A more comprehensive robust drill --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- and then, pie in the sky, multi-jurisdictional?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. We have been working towards that goal actively over the last
14 3 years, 2 or 3 years.

15 Q. Okay. Just a general question about not only this incident
16 but just in general, if you go to a place and they call -- the
17 resident calls 911 first. So you guys go first.

18 A. Yep.

19 Q. You don't call us until you get there. Is that how you do it
20 here in Andover?

21 A. It depends on what we -- depends on the information we
22 receive from the caller.

23 Q. What they say, yeah.

24 A. Many times we will wait to call Columbia until we're on scene
25 and actually find out what conditions exist there. If we're

1 getting what we feel is good information from the caller, we will
2 request Columbia Gas response right away, even before we get
3 there.

4 Q. Yeah. You know --

5 A. That's the typical, I think --

6 Q. -- blowing gas; I just saw a contractor hit a line.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. I mean, clearly that --

9 A. Or a contractor that hit the line is calling saying we hit
10 the line.

11 Q. Yeah. So that's kind of a different level. But a homeowner
12 or resident just calls and says, oh, I smell gas in the house or I
13 smell it outside or something like that, you would typically go
14 first?

15 A. Yeah, we'd go and meter.

16 Q. And then -- yeah.

17 A. And then, you know, if there is an actual problem, we will
18 request Columbia Gas.

19 Q. Okay. And then do you also, because this is just -- just in
20 general, some of the other chiefs are sharing the same thing. If
21 you see something that's in the house would you shut off the gas
22 meter, if you think I better just shut this off?

23 A. Yeah, more often than not, I would.

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. Yeah, that's -- I mean, that's how we're trained.

1 Q. Right. Okay. No, that's fine.

2 A. To mitigate the situation.

3 Q. Do you -- and in this case, I know time was of the essence
4 because, you know, comprehensive investigations weren't being
5 enabled. You didn't -- did you turn off some gas meters or turn
6 curb cocks?

7 A. I know for a fact that we had personnel turning off gas
8 meters.

9 Q. Right.

10 A. As far as curb cocks are concerned, I would have to -- I
11 don't know the answer to that, but knowing that we do not have the
12 ability to do that because we don't have the tools, I would have
13 to say no, they did not.

14 MS. DOIRON: Okay. That's it.

15 MS. GUNARATNAM: Angel?

16 MS. MOTLEY: You guys asked a lot of my questions.

17 MS. DOIRON: Oh sorry.

18 MS. MOTLEY: No. So I have to ask --

19 MR. CURRIE: It's like we've heard them before.

20 MS. HALLIDAY: It depends on where you sit.

21 MS. MOTLEY: I know. I can see -- jockey for that position.

22 BY MS. MOTLEY:

23 Q. One of my concerns and I think you kind of spoke about it, is
24 the communication you have with Columbia Gas.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And more of that communication prior to something like this
2 happening. One of the things that they're required to have and do
3 have is a liaison. So can you tell me who that person was prior
4 to the incident, not after the incident. Obviously you can give
5 me that one too, but who was your contact regarding emergency
6 related kind of --

7 A. I would call -- I could call Dana Argo at any time if I have
8 any issues involving Columbia Gas.

9 Q. Did you have someone assigned to you?

10 A. Assigned?

11 Q. Yes. Someone who was your liaison person who you could call
12 if you had any questions or any --

13 A. Yeah, we had -- well, certainly Maureen is downstairs and
14 she's been here for quite some time. It's changed out a couple of
15 times.

16 Q. Is that a Columbia Gas person?

17 A. Yes. Yep.

18 Q. Maureen?

19 A. I can't remember her last name.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Callahan.

21 BY MS. MOTLEY:

22 Q. Callahan. Okay. So for the training and drills that you
23 spoke about, who would set those up from Columbia Gas?

24 A. It used to be -- I can't think of -- sleep deprivation --

25 Q. Andrea?

1 A. No. Andrea would help set up the drill that we had, but the
2 gentleman that works out of Lawrence that did all the training.

3 MR. CURRIE: Bart.

4 MR. MANSFIELD: Bart. Thank you. He just retired.

5 MS. DOIRON: Bart Maderios.

6 MR. MANSFIELD: Bart Maderios; he was the man.

7 MS. MOTLEY: What is Andrea's last name?

8 MS. DOIRON: Luppi, L-u-p-p-i.

9 MS. MOTLEY: Is she still around?

10 MS. DOIRON: No. She just retired.

11 MS. MOTLEY: She just retired. So we have a couple new
12 people who will be communicating with the chief since there is --
13 because I think both of those individuals have retired.

14 BY MS. MOTLEY:

15 Q. So you spoke about a drill that occurred about 2 years ago?

16 A. Yeah, I think it was 2 years ago.

17 Q. So who was invited to that or who participated in that drill
18 other than yourself? I'm just trying to figure out who --

19 A. There were a number of people from Columbia Gas that were
20 there at all levels of their hierarchy, from the meter -- it
21 started off I believe with a meter reader that came across the gas
22 leak, and then supervisory personnel and then other response
23 personnel that came in as it was, you know, identified. We
24 basically had a script and they kept bumping the response up
25 through and up into their management team. And they got involved

1 and the safety people were involved.

2 Q. And from your side?

3 A. Just our fire response personnel, deputy chief. We had an
4 engine company respond.

5 MS. GUNARATNAM: This is probably all listed in the after
6 action report.

7 MR. MANSFIELD: What's that?

8 MS. GUNARATNAM: Did you have an after action report?

9 MR. MANSFIELD: Yes. There was an after action report.

10 MS. GUNARATNAM: So this is probably listed, your
11 personnel --

12 MR. MANSFIELD: Yeah, it's all in there. Columbia Gas, who
13 they had.

14 BY MS. MOTLEY:

15 Q. Okay. I think you already mentioned -- when you realized
16 that it was a gas-related incident, and how did you contact
17 Columbia Gas? Was it through a number, dispatch?

18 A. Yeah. Through dispatch.

19 Q. Got you. Regular dispatch number?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And how soon after that phone call did you actually have any
22 communication with someone at --

23 A. It was quite a while. I want to say 4 hours, 4½ hours.

24 Q. And so after you did hear from CMA, did you have individuals
25 go out with the gas company to shut off meters? Did you

1 participate in that?

2 A. Yes. We -- as teams became -- as techs became available, we
3 sent out -- that process initially started where techs were
4 available, we staged them up on Main Street and we sent each tech
5 out with a police officer and a fire -- somebody from fire. Most
6 of the police officers that were sent out with the techs were from
7 Boston Police Department because the -- on the police side, they
8 had activated their emergency response system as well, through
9 NEMLEC.

10 Q. Do you have any idea what time?

11 A. That was about midnight.

12 Q. Midnight?

13 A. Thursday night, right around midnight.

14 MS. GUNARATNAM: They were sent out to the neighborhoods?

15 MR. MANSFIELD: Yeah, they each had an area that they were
16 assigned to on paper, streets, and they were going to those
17 streets, street to street, door to door checking things. There
18 was also at least one locksmith that was with them.

19 BY MS. MOTLEY:

20 Q. So, say, after the incident I believe you mentioned there
21 were several different CMA liaisons.

22 A. I'm sorry?

23 Q. After the incident you mentioned there were several different
24 liaisons from CMA. So who is your liaison now? Who do you
25 contact if you have any questions about --

1 A. Right now?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. I would go down and I would talk to Maury.

4 Q. Maury. I'm just curious. About the stubs, what location did
5 you -- were those stubs located? If he can remember.

6 A. It was an area off of our Tewksbury Street, a development up
7 there. I don't recall the street. I can get that.

8 Q. And Columbia Gas's response to those hit lines?

9 A. It was good. It was good. It's nice to have a local office
10 right down the street. Their response -- you know, I'll say that
11 their response is usually within 20 to 30 minutes, which is --
12 that's what we --

13 Q. That's wonderful.

14 A. Yes, it is. We don't have many issues with their response.
15 We call, we get a good response.

16 MS. MOTLEY: That's it for me.

17 BY MS. HALLIDAY:

18 Q. Have you had any overpressurizations before?

19 A. Not that I'm aware of.

20 Q. You mentioned that you sent out a communication --

21 A. Can I back up on that? I'm not certain because we really
22 haven't got, really, you know, a good answer whether or not this
23 was overpressurization or not. We're assuming that it was, but we
24 really have not heard specifically from anybody from Columbia Gas
25 saying that was an overpressurization issue.

1 MS. GUNARATNAM: Sheila, if you want to?

2 MS. DOIRON: For the record, it was an overpressurization.

3 MR. MANSFIELD: Well, it becomes very apparent that that was
4 the situation, but I know there are other things going on or that
5 will come out of this, I'm sure, and, you know, people don't like
6 to talk when there's the threat of litigation, so -- and
7 rightfully so.

8 BY MS. HALLIDAY:

9 Q. Yeah. I don't -- I mean, I don't think that's anything we
10 can't divulge here at this point.

11 A. I'm just telling you that it's, you know, it becomes a
12 situation point, so --

13 Q. The talked about your communication to the public that you
14 sent out. How did you --

15 A. Social media.

16 Q. So, is it a --

17 A. We had somebody assigned to sending, messaging out the whole
18 entire time that we've been open, to keep up our citizens involved
19 and keep them informed as best we can and to answer their
20 questions. They were responding back Twitter, Facebook. They had
21 a lot of questions for us, and that individual that was running
22 that was able to get back to them. He basically liaised with
23 whomever he thought was best to answer that question or he would
24 talk to one of us and then he'd get back to that individual that
25 was asking that question with the best possible answer we could

1 give them.

2 Q. Do you have any feel of numbers? Do you guys have a counter
3 or anything on --

4 A. Yeah. I can get that information for you.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. It's a lot. Nonstop, since probably an hour into the
7 incident.

8 Q. But it seems like it's an effective communication tool?

9 A. Extremely effective.

10 MS. GUNARATNAM: When was that set up? The social media --

11 MR. MANSFIELD: About an hour after the events began.

12 BY MS. HALLIDAY:

13 Q. Do you guys -- so does anybody in your department check
14 Facebook or Twitter during to get updates or do you have any other
15 type internet that you --

16 A. Sergeant Edgily (ph.), Chuck Edgily was assigned to that task
17 and sending updates out constantly. We were -- we also utilized
18 our website, the town website to push information out as well, and
19 we had somebody assigned to that task. And that was Patrick
20 Waller. He's our information analyst. And then we have also a
21 liaison who is our public relations firm dealing with the media
22 specifically. So we have a lot of ways afforded to us to get that
23 information out.

24 Q. Do you leverage any of those resources internally for the
25 fire department when you're out in the field? You talked a little

1 bit about the chaos of communication.

2 A. Um-hum.

3 Q. Do you text? Do you have other communication channels that
4 you guys utilize other than the channel to try and coordinate
5 or --

6 A. Other than radio communications?

7 Q. Right.

8 A. The police department has the ability through their CAD to
9 communicate cruiser to cruiser or dispatch. We do not have that
10 same level of capability, although there is -- each piece of fire
11 apparatus and command vehicle is its own hotspot and we have the
12 ability to download things through that, the use of that. We have
13 GIS mapping. We have a lot of different things that we can
14 utilize in the computer to get information or request information.
15 So texting is a means, phones.

16 Q. Were you guys doing texting during this? Not while driving,
17 I know.

18 A. Yes. Yeah, some but not a whole lot.

19 Q. Is it because that you guys haven't used it before in an
20 emergency or you feel like that's not something that would help
21 the situation? Have you made a conscious decision to use it or
22 not to use it?

23 A. I think most of us don't. If we were using it, it was to
24 basically get people into the EOC if they had a question. This
25 phone has been nonstop, not only with stuff professionally but

1 personally. You know, it's the same phone. I don't have two
2 separate phones. So, I mean, it becomes a -- it's not an
3 effective tool in many situations, this being one of them. Now
4 that things have slowed down, I would certainly use it. I'm
5 getting questions about can people open -- from the deputy chief
6 and stuff like that.

7 Q. But in the heat of the moment --

8 A. Because they don't know where I am. He doesn't know where I
9 am. Everybody in the room downstairs knows where I am, because I
10 told them I was coming up here to speak with you folks, but the
11 deputy chief doesn't know where I am. So he texted me to find out
12 specific answers to questions. But I don't find it of a benefit.

13 Q. But you have GIS on your cars though, so you -- on your
14 vehicles, so you know where people are based on --

15 A. We do not have that report.

16 Q. You don't? Oh.

17 A. The police does, we don't. It's a union issue.

18 Q. Okay. During this event is there anything on the Columbia
19 Gas website or some personal website that you guys communicate or
20 check for updates from?

21 A. We can certainly get on their website and check to see if
22 there's information being posted. I'm not sure that that took
23 place. But once liaison comes in here, we go -- they're on their
24 website or on their communications portal getting the information
25 that they should have in the event we have questions for them.

1 MS. HALLIDAY: Those are all my questions. Thank you.

2 MS. GUNARATNAM: I just have a few follow-up questions
3 despite your very comprehensive discussion.

4 BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

5 Q. The evacuations, did you -- did people evacuate on their own
6 or was it --

7 A. Yeah, people evacuated on their own.

8 Q. Do you know the zones of where people in your town evacuated?

9 A. Everywhere.

10 Q. Everywhere. So who would know the exact streets and areas,
11 or you're just saying the whole --

12 A. That we evacuated?

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. We didn't go into any comprehensive evacuation process like
15 the city of Lawrence did.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. We didn't do it because we were so aggressive in pushing out
18 information to our residents through these social media and media
19 outlets. We -- to be extremely specific, personally I feel we
20 were extremely lucky. We were much luckier than the city of
21 Lawrence. I don't know what to attribute that to other than the
22 fact we were further away from ground-zero, so to speak, from
23 where the incident was initiated.

24 So we didn't have the house explosions. We didn't have the,
25 you know, buildings that were fully engulfed in fire that the city

1 of Lawrence had and what occurred in North Andover. So in that
2 respect, damage-wise we were extremely lucky. Yeah, we had a lot
3 of incidents. Yeah, we had a lot of fires. Yeah, we had -- but
4 we were able to contain things in a relatively short period of
5 time unlike those other two communities.

6 Q. So if residents wanted to evacuate or something, did you
7 direct them to go anywhere?

8 A. Yeah, we set up a walk-in center at the senior center and the
9 youth center, which are adjoining complexes. They are right next
10 door to each other. We called the Red Cross in. The Red Cross
11 established the welcoming center for us. We refrained most times
12 from calling it, referring to it as a shelter because that just
13 triggers too many requirements. So --

14 Q. But that's what it was, basically a shelter for people to go
15 to?

16 A. It was a welcoming center.

17 Q. A welcoming center. Okay.

18 A. They provided food and refreshments and medical care if they
19 needed it. And at one point we had some elderly people at the
20 senior center the following day that required their medication,
21 and we sent out a firefighter and a police officer to each one of
22 their homes and got their medication and returned and gave that to
23 them so they can have their medication.

24 Q. Did you have any firefighter injuries?

25 A. Yeah, we had two.

1 Q. Do you know the nature of those injuries?

2 A. They are non-life-threatening, very minor.

3 Q. Okay. Do you know how many people came to the senior center?

4 A. On the first night we had 17 or 18 at the senior center and
5 we had approximately 65 at the youth center.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. A total of 85 is what was reported to me.

8 Q. On Thursday?

9 A. On Thursday night into Friday. On Friday night we had the
10 same 17 or 18 at the senior center and we had 5 at the youth
11 center. So the decision was made yesterday to demobilize the
12 youth center piece of that and just retain what we had -- what
13 assets we had at the senior center.

14 Q. What's the address for the senior center?

15 A. It's 20 Whittier Court, W-h-i-t-t-i-e-r.

16 Q. Whittier?

17 A. Whittier.

18 Q. Okay. So there was -- you felt there was no need to urge
19 residents to evacuate because the damage --

20 A. We told them to evacuate their homes. If they knew how to
21 shut the gas off at the meter, do so as quickly as they could and
22 evacuate their home.

23 Q. Okay. And did you get any calls from the residents regarding
24 how to do this, how to turn off the gas?

25 A. Did we give any what?

1 Q. Direction on how to --

2 A. No. We just made it -- we made a blanket statement if they
3 knew how.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Many people know how to do that. I don't know where they
6 learned this skill from, but they know how to do it. But many
7 people know how to do it.

8 Q. Yeah. And just one last question. What was the most severe
9 damage you saw on Thursday?

10 A. That I saw? I didn't see any damage on Thursday other than
11 smoke coming up from --

12 Q. The restaurant?

13 A. -- you know, the buildings that were on fire. I was off in
14 the distance. And the buildings that were on fire in Lawrence as
15 I was coming back to the office, it looked like -- you've probably
16 seen the quote -- it looked like Armageddon. It really did.
17 There was people -- it was, like, surreal. It was like out of a
18 movie. We had firefighters in the middle of Main Street. Main
19 Street is usually -- this is a busy street. It's usually busy.
20 Cars were just all over the place. We had fire apparatus in the
21 street.

22 I was flying down the road. I had state cops coming down 28
23 from Lawrence into town. Guy gets out; I go, do you know what's
24 going on? He goes, I don't know. We don't know for sure, but all
25 I can think of is we have an overpressurization, you know, problem

1 similar to what happened in Danvers several years ago. I'm like
2 okay. So it was just -- seriously, it looked like it was a scene
3 out of a movie.

4 And then once I got information from him, made sure my guys
5 that were down at that fire were okay, I flew up here and that's
6 when I started dealing with all that stuff. But I felt compelled
7 to stop where my people were working to make sure they were fine.

8 Q. Right. So the majority of damages that occurred were from
9 structural fires?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. All right.

12 A. Like I said, we had no reports of explosions in homes.

13 Q. Right. Okay.

14 A. Or structural damage from anything like that.

15 MS. GUNARATNAM: Anyone else?

16 MR. CURRIE: Is there anything we missed?

17 BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

18 Q. Anything you want to tell us?

19 A. Anything I want to tell you? No.

20 Q. Don't worry, we don't quote you.

21 A. No, no. No, I don't think so. I think you were pretty
22 comprehensive in the questions you asked. I'm sorry I don't have
23 a lot of specifics. There's just so much stuff going on. I think
24 I mentioned to you yesterday, you know, my recommendation is --
25 and I talked to the police chief about it today, about going back

1 and listening to the audio tapes and having that transcribed.
2 That is really, I think the only way we are going to have a true
3 accurate account of what happened.

4 MR. CURRIE: And I'll offer it to you again. If you give us
5 a CD or whatever --

6 MR. MANSFIELD: I am going to give it to you because I'm
7 going to take you up on that offer. I think that was a wonderful
8 offer.

9 MR. CURRIE: We'll have it back to you within 14 days-ish.

10 MS. GUNARATNAM: Once we submit it, yeah.

11 MR. MANSFIELD: That's a wonderful offer and I really
12 appreciate it. Because I really think if there's anything that's
13 going to help us out in that question that you had, do you think
14 this event is going to change things, I think that will. When
15 people really sit down and they start listening to all the stuff
16 that was going on, it's going to really sink in that we have got
17 to get something moving, you know. It's going to be compelling.

18 MS. GUNARATNAM: So, we're going to actually submit a list of
19 documents, and I understand that Sheila from state -- Mass state
20 police --

21 MR. CURRIE: Mass state police/fire, I suppose.

22 BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

23 Q. Is she working with you guys to collect certain documents
24 because we don't want to be redundant?

25 A. I have not spoken to Sheila specifically. I know that for --

1 what we have found out, and this kind of bizarre -- what we are
2 finding out is that people had fires in their home and that fire
3 may have only involved the boiler. The fire went out on its own
4 or they put it out, shut the gas off, and they left the building
5 and never called us. So we're running into, you know, that type
6 of situation. I think it's -- we're dealing with five or six, and
7 don't hold me to that, five or six incidents where that happened.

8 And what I'm doing is trying to be proactive. And I notified
9 the FIU from the state to go in there and do an investigation so
10 that we have a record of that. I've also made sure that we have a
11 date stamp and an incident for those types of incidents as well,
12 because those people are going to need insurance coverage on that
13 stuff and the only way the insurance company is going to cover
14 that is if we actually have a fire report on that.

15 We did -- the night of the event, we did have the police
16 department go around and take photographs of the residences, the
17 occupancies that we actually had fires in. They didn't actually
18 get inside most of them, but they took photographs of the outside
19 to record that, in the event that something might've happened.
20 Because basically, again, we really didn't know what was going on
21 and, who knows, it could be considered a crime scene.

22 Q. Who did that work?

23 A. We did.

24 Q. Oh, you did. Okay. Your local fire arson?

25 A. Police department.

1 Q. Police department. Okay.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And that was Thursday night?

4 A. Yep. Yes. We are not good at doing some things, but we are
5 really good at doing others, and I think that was a very good
6 suggestion that somebody had.

7 Q. So could we -- we'll add that to the list of things we could
8 -- and they completed that work or it's still ongoing?

9 A. I think it's done. I think it's completed.

10 Q. Would we go through you for that request?

11 A. You can, yes.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Sure. Just to streamline everything.

14 MS. GUNARATNAM: Yeah. Okay.

15 MS. HALLIDAY: Rachael, I'm sorry, could I ask just one more
16 question, just because it came up in one of the other interviews.

17 MS. GUNARATNAM: Sure.

18 BY MS. HALLIDAY:

19 Q. You mentioned that you did have some rekindles. Do you feel
20 like -- can you explain why you felt like that?

21 A. I have no idea. I have no idea. I can't even --

22 Q. When you went to the fires, did you handle them the same way
23 you typically would handle a fire or, due to the number of events
24 that were going on, did you deviate from what is normal when
25 you --

1 A. I can't speak for the fire personnel that were on scene. But
2 I would think that they felt comfortable enough that the fire was
3 extinguished at that point. They're not going to leave a
4 situation where they didn't think it was mitigated a hundred
5 percent. That's not how they're trained and that's not human
6 nature. That just doesn't happen. So I can't tell you what
7 happened because I was not there. I don't know.

8 Q. Sure.

9 BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

10 Q. Is there anybody from your -- that did go out that you think
11 we should talk to or is this --

12 MR. CURRIE: That could give us more information.

13 BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

14 Q. Yeah, more than what you have given us.

15 A. The guy that you might want to talk to is another progressive
16 proactive guy that I think would probably be able to give you some
17 decent information is Lieutenant Brian Wright.

18 Q. And he?

19 A. I'm not -- I think he's here today. So if you want to talk
20 to him, that would be fine.

21 Q. But he went out and responded?

22 A. Yeah, that's why I'm offering his name.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yes.

25 MS. GUNARATNAM: Okay.

1 MR. CURRIE: Excellent. I think that's it. We appreciate
2 your time, and we're going to close the interview at 2:38.

3 (Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: MERRIMACK VALLEY RESIDENTIAL GAS
 FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS
 SEPTEMBER 13, 2018
 Interview of Michael Mansfield

ACCIDENT NO.: PLD18MR003

PLACE: Andover, Massachusetts

DATE: September 16, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Letha J. Wheeler
Transcriber