



**SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.**

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RE: CEN09IA294, Southwest Airlines Flight # 519, N371SW, MSY-HOU, Statements.

**Crew Statements**

- CA - Tom Journey

We were operating with inoperative anti-skid, rto function, and auto speedbrake deployment under MEL.

Flight 519 to HOU was flight planned to land on RWY 22 due to operational requirements. Dispatch provided landing data because the OPC was deferred as inop per MEL. The predicted crosswind was approximately 10 knots.

Flight 519 proceeded normally into HOU and began an ILS 12R approach with a circle to land clearance for RWY 22.

Circling approach lead to a stabilized Flap 40 final approach and normal landing with the left x- wind correction applied.

Landing touchdown occurred in target area, I took the thrust levers to idle, rapidly bringing the speedbrake to the full-up detent, employed reverse thrust, and manual wheel braking.

Initial deceleration seemed normal. Soon into the landing roll-out, the First Officer said a tire may have blown.

The aircraft listed sharply to the right (downwind-side) while we continued to roll-out. The aircraft came to a stop near the centerline of the runway just past the intersection of 12R.

I notified the passengers to remain seated over the PA, and gave a brief message that we were disabled on the runway. Meanwhile the First Officer notified the tower of our situation and queried if a smoke /fire condition was evident.

I called the Flight Attendants through the service interphone and asked about a smoke/fire condition near the right main gear. The Flight Attendants' initial assessment was negative. About this time we got word from the Tower that we had a fire in the right wheel well. Fire trucks were already underway.

I assessed our position relative to the wind and the probability of a safe egress out the Left (upwind) side of the aircraft. With the timely concurrence of the First Officer we elected to evacuate the aircraft. The First Officer advised the tower of our evacuation. I worked around the control pedestal to accomplish the evacuation checklist as placarded on the control column, and then, through the PA, commanded to the Flight Attendants an evacuation off the left side of the aircraft.

With the sounds of the slides blowing and the announcements being made, I had confirmation the evacuation was underway.

After running the Evacuation Checklist the First Officer exited the Flight Deck and helped coordinate the passengers who were now assembled on the grassy infield off the runway surface.

I exited the Flight Deck and performed a sweep of the cabin and lavatories, then looked back once more in the Flight deck prior to exiting the aircraft.

I joined up with the First Officer and was informed that all passengers were accounted for and injury free.

With a passenger- borrowed phone I went about making the necessary communications to the company. I informed the Fire Crew that we needed to get back in the Flight deck to pull required circuit breakers before relinquishing control of the aircraft. The First Officer and I were granted access. Upon seeing the Standby Power Switch was not on Battery position, I placed it there. I then pulled the required circuit breakers.

The First Officer and I remained in the Aircraft with the airport fire dept staff until it was released to Southwest Airlines Maintenance personnel.

- FO - Phil Swanson

I was the First Officer (non flying Pilot) on flight 519 from MSY to HOU. Immediately after touch down on runway 22 in HOU, the feel of the aircraft, which was a slightly bumpy feel, lead me to believe that we had a flat tire (or tires). The Captain questioned this also. We felt the same that this was the possibility.

The bumpy feel progressed and then it became clear that we had something wrong with the right side of the aircraft, and we felt it was probably tires and/or landing gear. The Captain stopped the aircraft on the runway. Because experience would tell me of the

possibility of a fire, I inquired of the tower that they confirm (or disconfirm) a fire on the right landing gear, which they did. I asked for the fire trucks. Tower said the fire trucks had already been called.

The Captain and I decided to evacuate the aircraft. We then ran the emergency evacuation checklist. After the checklist was complete, I was the first one out of the cockpit. The last passenger, and then the flight attendants were going down the slide.

I saw a flight attendant in the rear of the cabin and asked if everyone is out of the aircraft and out of the lav. The Captain came out of the cockpit and went behind me to sweep the aircraft to the rear. I did a visual sweep of the forward part of the aircraft and then exited the forward slide and proceeded to help direct passengers away from the aircraft. The fire crew helped secure the aircraft.

- FA/A Karen A. Hilliard

Upon touchdown it was obvious that was not a typical landing. The plane was vibrating and felt as if we were going over large rumble strips. Within seconds of coming to a stop the pilot informed us over the P/A that we had blown a tire and that we would sit and wait to be towed to the gate.

He then double chimed us and asked if we saw fire or smoke. I did not see any.

I made a modified version of the landing announcement. Not long after I could hear chatter over the interphone and picked it up. I told the pilots that I did not hear any of their conversation.

Immediately I heard over the P/A to evacuate on the left. Kristin opened the forward entry door and we proceeded to evacuate. The tone of the evac and the passengers was calm and orderly.

Once everyone was off, we jumped, and then began to gather everyone to the same area.

Passengers were taking pictures, making phone calls, and asking about luggage and connections. I asked people if they were ok and if they had phone access.

We stayed with the group until transportation back to the terminal arrived.

Two women reported small 'rug' burns on their arms and one elderly woman told me her knee was beginning to swell. Medical assistance was made available to them as quickly as possible.

- FA/B Constantino Ferrer

Routine final descent and landing. As soon as main landing gear touched runway, I heard a loud "bang" followed by rattling noises and shaking. Four overhead compartments opened (two aft and two forward) and aircraft tilted a bit toward the right (still shaking) coming to a complete stop.

Immediately, the captain informed customers over PA system that we had a tire failure (blowout) and requested PAX to remain calm.

At that point I got up to close the two aft opened overhead compartments, check on customers and peek through right OWWE windows to check for fire. At that time, I saw just a little smoke... Capt. called crew over interphone so I went back to aft and as soon as I answered he asked me if I had seen fire... I answered no but at that moment a lady seated in (or close to) OWWE area was flapping her arms to get my attention and I rushed there. She and a male PAX told me they have seen fire and as soon as I peeked this time, I did see a flickering red glow accompanied with smoke; I rushed again to A/C aft to inform capt but he was already chiming us again.

As soon as I grabbed the interphone I heard: -Initiate evacuation on aircraft left. I wasn't sure whether my A or C F/A's were listening so I repeated the command over the PA system.

Immediately I opened AFT left door, the slide deployed and I made sure door locked; then I assumed evac. position and started commanding evac. yelling: -OUT! Leave everything! Come this way, cross your arms, jump!... I repeated commands until last customer jumped. Then I went through cabin checking that everybody was out and asking out loud: Is everybody out?

The capt was doing the same forward so we "met" by row 10. He asked me if anybody was in the restroom and I said no. I went back aft and jumped down the slide... A fireman was already waiting for me at the other end of the slide.

I walked away from tarmac, directing customers toward grass area and reminding them to move away from AC and not to smoke. By then, firefighters were extinguishing tire fire and EMT's arrived.

We (entire crew) checked on PAX and only were told about two injuries: A lady with a small arm "friction burn" from slide and an elderly lady with a swollen knee. We informed EMT's. 25-30 minutes later a Southwest ground representative arrived to inform PAX about baggage, connections and other items, shortly followed by 4 shuttles. PAX were bused to terminal (gate 24?) and we rode there with OPS representative.

- F/A/C Kristin Kiehne Armstrong

On May 12, 2009 Flight 519 landed in Houston. It was a very bumpy landing, much bumpier than usual. The Aircraft came to a complete stop. At that point, Captian Tom Journey came on the PA and informed us that we had blown a tire on landing and would be shortly getting towed to the gate.

It was at this point that F/A Constantino in the back of the A/C as well as a few of the PAX noticed smoke and the tower in Houston also advised the Pilots that there was a fire. An Evacuation was ordered off the left side of the A/C.

At this point, I assessed the conditions and opened the Forward Entry door and deployed the slide. We commanded the Evacuation and then quickly exited the aircraft ourselves. Everyone was evacuated quickly and safely.

### **Dispatcher Statement**

- Patrick Spaulding

I dispatched Flt 519 MSY-HOU. It had MEL 32-2 and associated MELs 27-7 and 32-7 deferred. The release was planned for RWY 22 due to RWY 12R (the active runway) ATOG being below the TOW.

I called HOU tower and informed them Flt 519 would need to land on RWY 22 due to equipment issues. They said it would be OK.

I put on the release this statement, "RWY 22 REQUIRED IN HOU DUE TO MEL LANDING WT RESTRICTIONS. HAVE COORD WITH HOU TOWER FOR CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 22. PLS GIVE THEM A HEADS UP ASAP." The CA called prior to push and stated he saw the comments and liked the 35 min of contingency fuel due to TSTMs around MSY. We also deferred the OPC - MEL 46-2.

Inflight the crew sent ACARS asking for landing data. I ran the info in Swift for RWY 22 with latest HOU metar info - winds 15011, temp 28, altim 29.91 and cut and paste the data into an ACARS msg and sent it.

The crew then asked why not rwy 12R. I sent ACARS saying, "RWY 12R WAS ATOG RESTRICTED DUE TO UR MEL". I ran the numbers for RWY 12R in Swift and got all bracketed numbers. I sent the crew another ACARS stating, " IM GETTING ALL BRACKETED NUMBERS FOR RWY 12R." The landing data for RWY 22 was: WINDS: 4H/10X MIN(2): 1592 MED(3): 1612 MAX(M): 1612.

About 1945CST, I got a call from HOU OPS saying an aircraft landed and had a wheel fire. They then confirmed it was Flt 519. I made an ICOM ALL CALL and then called the SOD. The CA called soon and said landed on centerline, deployed speed brake, then thrust reversers. Then FO said they blew a tire.

CA said at first there was no indication of fire. Once alerted to fire, stopped a/c, evacuated on the runway. CA stated the evacuation went great and all 51 pax and 5 crew were OK.

### **Other SWA Aircrew Statements**

- CA Luke Lombard, SWA Flight 45

I am writing this IR in response to a request by my assistant chief pilot. My captain and I held on the ground in Houston for about 45 minutes for a passenger coming in on a delayed flight from FLL.

We pushed back at 1938 central. We were instructed to taxi out to and hold short of runway 12r. We were then cleared into position and hold runway 12r and told that we were waiting on company traffic to land on runway 22.

We were in position and saw the traffic (flight 519) on final and then land. Upon landing, a large plume of smoke emanated from the right truck of the aircraft, gathering our attention.

The aircraft's right gear went from smoking to sparks and fire. We watched the aircraft slow down and stop just having crossed our runway from left to right and stopping just past 12r on 22.

At this point we could see fire coming from the right wheel area. Relatively small fire, but kept our attention. We were told to taxi off of runway 12r onto runway 17. I repeated the instructions from hobby tower "SWA 45 taxi off of runway 12r onto 17, and our company aircraft has a fire coming from the right gear", or something to that effect.

At this point we received no indication from flight 519 if they had understood our transmission, and were not sure if they were aware that they did in fact have a fire in the right wheel area. (I am going try to make an effort to get the phraseology correct, but I'm sure it will not be exact. Pull the tapes from the event for the exact wordage.) We then taxied off of runway 12r onto 17.

The tower then instructed a gulfstream on short final for runway 12r to go around. At this point my captain asked if they wanted us to taxi clear of runway 17. I queried tower, "tower, SWA 45, would you like us to taxi clear of runway 17?", tower's response, "SWA 45, turn right off of runway 17 and taxi to 12r via taxiway g, hold short of runway 12r", and I repeated the instruction. We did as instructed and taxied to runway 12r via taxiway g, and held short of the runway as instructed.

Our aircraft was pointed in a northeasterly direction and my captain lost all sight with the aircraft in distress on runway 22. I was able to look over my shoulder through the third right window and had a clear line of sight with the aircraft and the fire in the right wheel area. The tower informed SWA 519 that they had called for the fire trucks as we were taxiing clear of the runways. I was watching SWA 519, and was becoming concerned that they had not evacuated the aircraft due to the fire, and there were no fire and rescue trucks in sight.

At this time SWA 519 radioed hobby tower, "tower, do you see any smoke coming from our gear?", and there was no response on tower frequency for about fifteen seconds. (I believe that hobby tower could not see the wheel fire of SWA 519 because the relative position of the aircraft and its right motor hid the fire from their vantage point, and were possibly distracted from other duties). I keyed, "hobby tower, this is SWA 45, please be advised that our company aircraft on runway 22 still has a fire at their right gear", and the tower responded, "SWA 519, did you copy your company?", and SWA 519 responded, "yes, we did, and we are going to evacuate the aircraft."

At this point they began the evacuation of their aircraft. My captain still could not see the aircraft in distress but agreed with my radio calls.

Hobby tower then asked us to accept runway 17 for departure, if able, and we were able, so we accepted the runway and departed Houston. From what we witnessed, SWA 519, was not aware they had a fire initially, and did not evacuate faster because of this, and coupled with the fact that hobby tower could not actually see the fire, it took some time to relay that information to the crew.

- CA Mike FitzGerald, SWA Flt 2622

We had pushed off gate 51 at 1941 Local and had just begun our taxi to runway 22 via "Z". As we approached "H1" on "Z" we were oriented looking directly at the touchdown zone of runway 22. We watched Flt 519 touchdown and it appeared to be a normal touch at the proper distance from the end of the runway.

I continued to watch the rollout because there seemed to be a larger than normal puff of white tire smoke on initial touch down. There was no smoke for 100-200 feet after the initial touch down and then a large continuous plume of brown/black smoke of the right tire(s) shortly followed by the blown tire and the fire and sparks on the right wheel(s).

The aircraft came to a stop at about mid field and the right tires continued to burn. We stopped our taxi short of "C" and let Ground Control work things out.

Several calls were made on various frequencies to let the crew know that the tires were on fire.

Initial response and evacuation seemed to us to take forever, but when watched later turned out to be quite good! Once the fire rescue was on scene and the evacuation underway, Ground Control began to work aircraft out to the remaining open runway, runway 17, and we departed about 15 minutes after the incident.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which has been obscured by a thick black horizontal bar.

Court Goodroe