Fax Transmission

No. of pages incl. this one : 41

To: Tom Conroy

Fax number: [redacted]

cc: John J. Goglia, without attachments

From: Patricia Garcia

Date: Tuesday, November 25, 1997

If you do not receive all pages, please contact:

9to5/Delta Employee Network
11865 SW Tualatin Rd. #78
Tualatin, Oregon 97062
Phone /Fax Number
503-692-1687

Subject: *Delta #1288, Pensecola accident July 6, 1996*

Special Instructions: *Please attach to final report to go to the Board of Directors for their final decision on the cause of the accident.*

November 25, 1997

National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East S.W.
Washington D.C. 20594-2000
Attn: John Goglia, Tom Conroy

Re: Delta Airlines Accident, Flight #1288, July 6, 1996

Dear Sirs:

I would like to begin by introducing myself. My name is Patricia Garcia, and I am a member of the 9to5, National Organization of Working Women. I am currently the Director of a Chapter of that organization called the 9to5/Delta Employee Network. The Network was created because the phone lines to the 9to5 Hotline were being jammed by Delta Employees, so I agreed to start the Chapter and field the calls.

As the Chapter grew, and more and more calls began to come in, I realized that a large volume of calls were now coming in from Delta Mechanics, especially those who worked at Hartsfield International in Atlanta.

More and more long term, experienced A&P Mechanics were being terminated, for reasons other than misconduct, or violations of any Delta policies. 750 A&P mechanics were terminated right off of the top at the beginning of Delta's cost cutting program called "Leadership 7.5". Contrary to what Delta says about those mechanics, they were not called back. (See I-1 of attachments titled "Delta employee morale, service suffer from cuts).

I began to receive calls and letters from mechanics, whom although I know who they are, refuse to give their names for fear of reprisal, who were telling me horror stories of things that were happening at Delta about what they were being forced to do, and things they were being forced to sign off with threat of termination if they refused to comply (See page E-2 of attachments). There was even an A&P mechanic with 25 years with the company who quit, uprooted his family, and moved out of state with no promised job, because he could no longer in good conscience sign off mechanical problems that he knew had not been fixed, and possibly be the cause of another fatal accident.

Where Delta used to have only A&P or very experienced mechanics working in the hanger on the major overhauls, they changed to inexperienced, "jiffy lube" mechanics doing the work, with one or two A&P's running around frantically each shift, trying to sign off all the work that had been done.. They used to have 2 A&P line mechanics for every gate, but now have one for every eight gates, often having unlicensed leads signing off the work (See pages D-1, E-3, G-2,3 of the attachments) This of course, would be an impossible task, and even created a situation in July of 1996, where a 757 took off from Atlanta, heading for Portland, Oregon that was unable to pressurize the cabin. After returning to Atlanta and checking the airplane out, it was found that a mechanic had taken the window out of seat 29A to work on it, and forgot to put it back. It had been signed off anyway. (source: Wall Street Journal).

Around the time of the Pensecola accident, I was getting more and more calls from mechanics talking about what they were being forced to do, and asking what they could do about it. Even though I was encouraging them to report these incidents, that they could even do it anonymously, the fear was so strong, that many were hesitant to do so. (See page E-1,2. G-1 of the attachments.)

After the accident, the call volume doubled. After two people dying needlessly, the mechanics were sending me more and more information, including information about the accident. I was doing a news story with Keith Alexander, at USA today, at the time of the accident, and some mechanics even spoke to him, on conference calls with myself. Although I was ignorant to many of the details of the technical information, it became all too clear, that most mechanics, and even those employed in the engine shop, felt that this was an accident that did not have to happen. From the first reports that I got, the general consensus was that Delta's management, those responsible for making the decisions about whether an aircraft should be sent out for service, was aware the accident engine 726984, was not in proper shape to be in service, and that Delta made the decision to send it out anyway.

After gathering more and more information, and receiving more and more letters, I decided it was time to contact the N.T.S.B., to see if they would be interested in what I had. After many calls, I was put in contact with Tom Conroy, whom I believe is the Lead Investigator for that accident. I began to send Mr. Conroy some of the documentation that I was getting, and I spoke to him periodically on the phone. A couple of weeks before the N.T.S.B. hearing, I found out that I would be able to attend and informed Mr. Conroy that I would be there.

At the N.T.S.B hearings, I sat and listened to the testimony from the Delta participants, especially that of Ray Veleika, Vice-President of Maintenance. It disgusted me so badly, to sit and hear one man lie through his teeth under oath, that I could barely sit there and listen to it. At one point he was asked how many breaks his mechanics or inspectors were allowed, and he gave the standard one in the morning, lunch and one in the afternoon, but then went on to say that he never questioned anyone who went on an extra, unauthorized break. He stated that he trusted his people to know when they needed to walk away. That is just a mild contradiction to the reports that I have received. He also stated that his crew loved and trusted him, that he even had an 800 number that they could call him on, and that his was an open door policy. (See page G-1, H-1,2 of attachments).

Since the hearing, I have been working with the N.T.S.B., and requesting documents from the investigations, so that I could get better information about what had been put down, to know what the contradictions were.

I have read the Maintenance Group Chairman's Factual Report by Frank Gattolin, and from what I can tell, what he states is pretty accurate from the documents that I have obtained. I would like to inject at this time, that I in no way have any beef from anyone at the N.T.S.B., except for one person, whom I will mention later. The N.T.S.B. is an incredible organization, and I would especially like to commend Tom Conroy for his dedication, patience, assistance, and calm during situations where I was not nearly as gracious as he. As I told him, I could not do his job. I have spent many hours pouring over documents where a mother and child were killed, and

could barely stomach it. I told Mr. Conroy, that they have probably picked up more body parts and broken and shattered aircraft than I would even like to think about. They then have the almost impossible task of putting back those pieces, in hopes of solving but yet another accident. all with the desire to keep the American public flying safely. Even though I am sure that Mr. Conroy is an extremely busy man, he always took the time to try and assist me, and never grumbled or complained about the number of times I called, with what probably seemed like stupid questions. I hope that those in charge realize the value of Tom Conroy. I am sure there are others, but I did not get the opportunity to communicate with them.

Now, to get to the accident. I don't believe that it's necessary to recap the history of the engine, or the accident hub. Frank Gattolin did a fine job with that. But I do have many questions.

Delta claimed, at the time of the accident, with a press conference with Bill Berry of the Public Relations office, that they had no knowledge of any other accident similar to this, when I was being told, that there was a very similar accident that happened in Atlanta about two weeks prior to Pensecola (see page C-1, and J-2 of attachments). In fact, a reporter with the Atlanta Business Journal found through the Freedom of Information Act, that Delta had had 5 uncontained engine failures, including the one in Atlanta, prior to the accident in Pensecola, and has had 3 since, for a total of 9 uncontained engine failures between Jan. 29, 1996 and February 1, 1997 (See page J-2 of attachments). This is completely unacceptable.

Even an article dated August, 1996 from the AEM, was an N.T.S.B. recommendation concerning Delta's inspection methods with their hubs, more specifically, the hubs from the JT8D. The specific hub they were speaking of was off of an JT8D-15 from a Boeing 727-200 which experienced engine failure after takeoff. It stated in the article that the fatigue crack propagated outward almost to the blade slot at the rim and aft through most of the conical sections and partially through the shaft. The article went on to say that because the striation count exceeded the total accumulated flight cycles of the turbine hub, which indicates that factors other than takeoff and landing cycles may have been responsible for additional striations of the fracture. This suggests that a crack may have existed along the bore surface during the last overhaul. Now the question would be, if that were indeed true, why did Delta not catch it? (See page K-1 of attachments)

According to the history of the accident hub, it came to Delta new on April 27, 1990 and operated in revenue service until January 14, 1992. The engine and hub were removed from N956DA at Delta on January 14, 1992 because a mechanic's file was left in the engine after the fan blades had been dressed. The hub underwent a visual inspection after the blades were removed.

The hub assembly was installed on engine serial number 725627 on March 6, 1997. It was removed from this engine on September 24, 1995. The Delta representative said the engine and hub were removed because the engine had restrictive parts in the T-2 section. He added the hub's blades had reached Delta's soft time limit of 4000 cycles. The maintenance conducted on the hub on this visit was considered restoration maintenance, or "heavy maintenance", according to Delta's JT8D-219 Engine Maintenance Management Plan (EMMP).

On page 6 of Frank Gattolin's report, he states that the inspectors who conducted the FPI and Visual inspections were interviewed. The FPI inspector said that he worked the afternoon shift of October 27, 1995 and acknowledged that he had done many FPI's, including an FPI on the subject hub. However, on a Time Control Data Card, a service inspection was signed off by an A. Wyb---- (remaining letters illegible) on November 9, 1995. Were these two separate inspections?

The FPI inspector interviewed also stated that he undergoes FPI recurrent training every 9 to 12 months, and that he had been doing FPI inspections for 18 months. By my count he could have possibly gone through 2 recurrent trainings, more than likely one, but no proof that he had gone through any. Eighteen months seems like an awfully short time for an FPI inspector. Before Leadership 7.5, the average senority of an inspector was 20 years. At the time of the accident, the average senority of an inspector was 7 years.

During the Hearing on this accident, it seems that I recall expert testimony on the proper way to conduct a hub restoration process. If I am not mistaken, he said that after all of the emersion into the various vats, the hub must then be air dried in a clean, cool area, and that it should not be touched in any way by human hands, because the oil from human skin could cause problems with the inspection. Frank Gattolin's report states that on their visit, "no specific drying of the hub was observed after it was removed from the last vat in the cleaning process. His report also states that after the final rinsing procedure, the technician doing the rinsing procedure physically moves the hub from a vertical position to a reclined position. The hub is then placed into a drying oven.

After the hub is removed from the drying oven, developer dust is applied. It is sprayed on the exterior and interior visible surfaces, and although the developer is applied to both sides and the edge of the hub base, it is not directly applied to the tierod bolt or SR holes. Whatever gets into the holes and adheres to their surfaces is, essentially peripheral.

Delta's FPI process standard states the parts must be inspected within 2 hours of its developer application. Defects identified by the FPI process which are more than 1 hour old, should be interpreted as suspect. In the event the 2 hour time frame is not adhered to, the hub is returned for cleaning, dye, emersion, drying and developer process. There was no formal logging procedure observed that would show the inspector when the part was ready. The inspectors said they generally have a "group knowledge" of how long the part has been ready for inspection. This statement was made by the same person who acknowledges that this is a stressful job, and inspectors often walk away when fatigued. With no formal logging, how can the traveling public be asked to believe on blind faith that this group of inspectors has a "group knowledge" of when a part needs to be inspected. I don't accept it, and I don't think anyone else would.

The hub inspection process was observed on two separate occasions. In Mr. Gattolin's report, he states that the inspectors switch back and forth between two separate types of lighting. The UV flood light appeared not to illuminate the hub's tierod bolt and S holes. It appeared as though the hole's interiors did not have developer applied to it. I will not waste the committee's time with quoting the -219 hub FPI process as observed by the maintenance group, but to say that the

feeling I got from Mr. Gattolin's final observations were that the process was ineffective, and I feel, impossible to effectively find cracks within the tierod bolt holes, or in any hard to see areas.

Finally, I would like to get into some general questions and comments. A hub is taken off of it's original engine in January of 1992 because a mechanic left his file in the engine. The blades are removed, but it only goes through a Light Maintenance Visual Inspection. However, on September 24, 1995 the hub comes out of the second engine because there are restricted parts in the T-2 section, and a soft time of 4000 cycles on the blades, but this time, the hub supposedly goes though a complete heavy maintenance. According to Frank Gattolin's report, this happened on October 27, 1995, however, I would question the Time Control Card saying the inspection was done on November 9, 1995.

Now by 1995, this company had virtually sold off every part that they owned. However, a part as important and vital to Delta's large MD-88 fleet, sits in a bin from September 24, 1995, when the hub was not even the reason the engine came off the plane, until either October 27 or November 9, 1995 to go through a complete wash and fluorescent boroscope inspection, and then goes back into the bin until December 29, 1995 when it is taken out to be put on engine 726984.

The next thing that seemed rather odd to me, was that when engine 726984 came in to be removed, on December 21, 1995, for "smoke in the cabin", I never could find any real reason why, after hours and hours of work done on that engine, suddenly the decision is made to take the old hub out on December 28, 1995, and the accident hub put in on December 29, 1995 with a new set of blades. I called Tom Conroy to see if he could shed some light on this, however, Mr. Conroy was not in. Wanting to get this report out as soon as possible, I asked if there were anyone else I might ask. I was given to Mr. Conroy's supervisor, Tom Haueter. I presented this question to Mr. Haueter, who is the person that I referred to earlier in this report as the one person at the N.T.S.B., that I felt was just putting me off, and I felt very uncomfortable talking to him. I asked him the question of why the decision was made to take the old hub off, after all of the work that had been done, and to put on the new hub. His answer to me was that according to an unnamed Delta representative, it was done out of convenience. When I questioned "convenience", I felt as though I was begin brushed off, or perhaps that I was just not bright enough to understand.

I have attached a number of newspaper articles concerning Delta's past maintenance problems, but this is by no means the total number of articles that I have. I attached a witness report who was driving on a road behind the runway, when the accident aircraft was waiting for take-off clearance. Both the witness and his son noticed a definite "droop" of the left engine. It was obvious enough to the two of them, that they stopped the car to watch the take-off. I have attached a number of written and typed notes made by mechanics about the conditions under which they work, and I have came to this conclusion. Make no mistake. This is not the conclusion of any group, organization, or anyone else but myself.

Until the day that I leave this earth, I will know from the bottom of my heart, that those in charge at Delta knew all along that the accident hub was not a good hub. It would not have set in a bin for the period of time that it did, if it were a good hub. For some unknown reason, that I

was unable to find, a decision was made to change the old hub and put on the accident hub. I believe that they knew the accident hub was marginal at best, but because they were in the busiest season of the year, and because they needed every aircraft that they could get into service, they made a cost effective decision. They put on the hub, and took the chance that it would be ok. Six months later, two people were dead from an uncontained engine failure.

This is not Volvo's fault. This is not McDonnell- Douglas' fault. They may have had a hand in putting out a hub that had the potential for a crack to develop. But any part has the potential for failure. Look at your car. If you don't properly do maintenance on it, and then it breaks down, do you blame the car manufacturer?

Just by going through the maintenance papers, Delta has an absolute impossible tracking system. There are no dates on the JIC cards. There is no mention in the aircraft component tracking system of the accident hub being one of the parts put on the accident engine. It is a joke, even to the novice eye.

I would ask the N.T.S.B. to put this report and attachments into their final report, for consideration of their final decision, and at the very least, I would like to have some of my questions answered, so that I may feel safe boarding a Delta Aircraft.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Patricia Garcia

[redacted]

MAINTENANCE ITEMS

N.T.S.B. ACTIONS RECCOMMENDED:

1- SUBPEONA TYPED AND RECORDED TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL RADIO MESSAGES BETWEEN "FLIGHT CONTROL" AND PILOTS. YOU WILL SEE AND HEAR THE MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND THE DANGEROUS ACTIONS TAKEN IN SOME CASES. i.e. ON WED/THU. MARCH 19/20 AN MD-80 TOOK OFF FROM MELBOURNE; EXPERIENCED GEAR PROBLEMS; WAS TOLD TO FLY TO ATL WITH THE GEAR DOWN AT A LOWER AIRSPEED AND ALTITUDE; AND UPON ARRIVAL AT MACON, THE PILOT REALIZED HE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL, SO HE HAD TO DECLARE AN EMERGENCY AND LANDED WITH LESS THAN 3000# OF FUEL IN THE TANKS. HE SHOULD HAVE GONE TO ORLANDO, THE CLOSEST SUITABLE AIRPORT, BUT DELTA WANTED TO SAVE MONEY BY COMING TO ATLANTA, AND NEARLY CAUSING A TRAGEDY! THIS HAPPENS DAILY!!!

2- CHECK THE MAINTENANCE COSTS THAT DELTA HAS SPENT ON BOTH MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING OVER THE PAST FIVE (5) YEARS COMPARED TO THE COST THE PREVIOUS FIVE (5) YEARS AND YOU WILL SEE THAT LITERALLY NOTHING IS BEING SPENT NOW VS PREVIOUSLY. EVEN THE TRAINING RECORDS ARE BEING FALSIFIED FOR SOME MECHANICS TO SAVE MONEY!

3- SUBPEONA DELTA'S MAINTENANCE COORDINATORS AND THEIR RECORDS REGARDING BROKEN AIRCRAFT OVER THE LAST SEVEN (7) YEARS. MAINLY THE MD-90'S AND THE L-1011'S! THEY ARE ACCIDENTS WAITING TO HAPPEN!! NO MECHANIC WILL GO TO THE LOCAL F.A.A. BECAUSE THEY ALL KNOW THAT THEY (THE F.A.A.) ARE IN DELTA'S POCKET!!

4- THE STATION OF HOUSTON, TEXAS, HAS USED "OLD TIRES" IN THE CONTAINERS THAT ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO BE EVEN USED FOR LUGGAGE BECAUSE THEY HAVE HOLES IN THEM AND ARE BROKEN FOR "WEIGHT AND BALANCE LOADING" INSTEAD OF SAND BAGS. WHAT FUEL FOR A FIRE IF IT GOT STARTED LIKE IN VALUJET?!?!

THE F.A.A. IS GOING TO DO NOTHING UNTIL THERE IS A MAJOR ACCIDENT AND THEN THEY WILL JUST COVER UP. LOOK AT PICH AIRLINES IN MIAMI; DELTA IN ATLANTA; AND WHO KNOWS HOW MANY MORE BECAUSE OF THEIR INEPTNESS AND LACK OF ACTION FOR WHATEVER REASONS!!

A-1

MAINTENANCE ITEMS

TWO YEARS AGO A CONTRACT RAMP AGENT (WITH LITTLE TRAINING) WAS SUCKED THROUGH AN ENGINE IN ATLANTA. ALL DELTA DID WAS "HOSE DOWN THE RAMP, AND CALL HIS MOTHER 72 HOURS LATER THAT HE HAD DIED. HE WAS 19 YEARS OLD!

LAST NIGHT (MARCH 27, 1997) ANOTHER CONTRACT RAMP AGENT WAS RUN OVER AND KILLED AT JOHN F. KENNEDY AIRPORT IN NEW YORK , BY A PARIS BOUND JET. ANOTHER ILL-TRAINED CONTRACT EMPLOYEE?

YESTERDAY, MARCH 27, 1997, AN 18 FOOT FLAP SECTION FELL OFF OF A DELTA 757/767 IN DALLAS, TEXAS, WHILE LANDING! MORE GOOD MAINTENANCE!! IT IS GOING TO HAPPEN BIG TIME, SOON!! MECHANICS LIKE MYSELF WILL NOT ALLOW FAMILY, NEIGHBORS OR FRIENDS TO RIDE DELTA'S L-1011'S!

THE TURN OVER IN MECHANICS MAY NOT BE MUCH IN THE LAST THREE OR FOUR YEARS, BUT WHAT ABOUT THE SENIOR 750+ MECHANICS THAT WERE TERMINATED IN THE LAST THREE TO FOUR YEARS. YOU CANNOT REPLACE THESE MEN WITH 20+ YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH SOMEONE FROM "JIFFY LUBE"! SEVEN YEARS EXPERIENCE TO INSPECT JET ENGINES WHEN IT USED TO BE OVER 20. WHAT A JOKE!

IT USED TO TAKE ~~TWO WEEKS~~ 8 weeks TO ~~INSPECT~~ overhaul AN L-1011 WITH FULLY QUALIFIED ATP, 20+ YEAR MECHANICS. NOW IT IS DONE IN ~~ONE~~ four WEEK, WITH HALF AS MANY MECHANICS: IN HALF THE TIME; AND MANY OF THEM WITHOUT AN ATP! 200% drop

THERE USED TO BE ONE MECHANIC FOR EACH GATE IN LINE MAINTENANCE. NOW ONE MECHANIC WAS TO COVER 10 OR MORE GATES AND SIGN OFF WORK (SUPPOSEDLY DONE) BY NON ATP MECHANICS! HE WAS NO WAY OF KNOWING IF THE WORK WAS INDEED DONE OR DONE CORRECTLY!

THE ACCIDENTS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN SOON IF SOMETHING IS NOT DONE!!!!!!!

THESE ITEMS ARE JUST THE TIP OF THE ICE BERG!

Name with held due to fear of reprisal and termination

A-2

B757/767 Crashed Starters!

In the past year, over 25 B757 starters, P/N 790290-2, had to be scrapped due to failure as a result of crash engagements. The cost of a new starter is over $30,500. In addition, Delta lost over $400,000 due to flight delays as a result of crashed starters. No small change!

To eliminate the crash engagement mode of failure on the B757 main engine starter, Hamilton Standard has developed a Synchronous Engagement Clutch (SEC) to replace the existing ratchet and pawl clutch of the main engine starter. E.O. 6-68749-3 modifies all B757 starters to include the SEC.

Currently, the old starter is stocked with the B757 shaft installed and the B767 output shaft attached for commonality (P/N 790290-2 is effective on B757 and B767 aircraft). Here's where it might get confusing: After the E.O., the current P/N 790290-2 stock for the B757 and B767 starters will be split and assigned new part numbers. When you request P/N 790290-2, you will have to state on which aircraft type the part will be used. On the B757, if a modified starter (P/N 784750A4) is available, it will be provided. If it is not available, the old P/N will be provided from the B757 dedicated split stock. For the B767, the computer will provide P/N 775550A3 if available. If it is not available, P/N 790290-2 will be pulled from the B767 dedicated stock.

Please make a note of the change!

L1011

The L1011 is not a Short-timer!

In December, the Technical Operations Reliability department held a Reliability Briefing for many of the departments that are responsible for the L1011 fleet. In his opening remarks, Harold McDonald, Vice President A/C and Hangar Maintenance, reminded the attendees that, "The L1011 is the queen of our fleet and will remain so for a few more years. Unfortunately, when we start talking about retiring a plane, we can see dispatch and technical reliability decrease. Don't get the attitude that the L1011 is a short term airplane and disappoint the passengers."

During the briefing, attended by representatives from Hangar and Line Maintenance, Fleet Management, In-flight and Flight Operations, the L1011 Fleet Team members and Fleet Analysts were introduced, past successful initiatives were highlighted (many of which resulted from the L1011 International Task Force conference held two years ago), current problems were discussed and future initiatives were introduced. Yes, you read that right—future initiatives. "This aircraft is going to be around for a while. It generates a tremendous amount of revenue dollars, so we will continue to recommend and implement system improvements to ensure reliability as long as it is in our fleet," says Ed Dunlap, Manager Technical Operations Reliability. "As with every plane in our fleet, we must keep up the reliability!"

The briefing went well. Dunlap's department, along with George Hallen, L1011 Fleet Manager, and the L1011 Fleet Team, will follow-up with many of the issues raised by the attendees. Flight Operations pledged their support by promising to brief the pilots regularly about the L1011 effort, while In-flight and Maintenance promised to sponsor "differences" classes for their employees as the L-1011-500's are brought into the domestic fleet to replace other models.

MAINTENANCE ITEMS

See Page J-2

AN ATL-PHL BOUND MD-88 ABORTED TAKEOFF BECAUSE OF A FAILED ENGINE THAT CAME APART TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE PENSACOLA ACCIDENT. THEY WERE BROUGHT INTO CONCOURSE "E" (THE INTERNATIONAL CONCOURSE) BECAUSE IT WAS IN THE MORNING, AND THERE WERE FEW PASSENGERS THAT COULD SEE THE DAMAGE AS WOULD BE THE CASE IF THEY BROUGHT IT BACK TO CONCOURSE "A", "B", OR "C"! THE PASSENGERS WERE UNLOADED, AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS "IMMEDIATELY" TOWED TO THE HANGER. THIS WAS TWO WEEKS FEFORE THE PENSACOLA ACCIDENT!!
JT-8 ENGINE

DAVE FONTENOT (770) 942-2629 JUST RETURNED FROM MSY WHERE A B-727 JT-8 ENGINE (#2) HAD AN UNCONTAINED EXPLOSION! JAN-FEB 97.

DELTA STAFFING SERVICES (D.S.S.) IS HIRING RETIRED MECHANICS TO INSPECT PARTS, ENGINGES, ETC., AND PAYING THEM 80% OF THEIR BASE PAY WHILE THEY ARE DRAWING RETIREMENT. THE I.R.S. SAID THIS IS ILLEGAL, BUT DELTA CONTINUES THE PRACTICE BECAUSE THEY CAN GET THEM TO RE-TAG PARTS AND SIGN OFF INSPECTIONS "LOOSELY"!

DELTA AIR LINES IS "OUT SOURCING" OUR MAINTENANCE AND GROUND OPERATIONS AS FAST AS THEY CAN. DELAYS ARE CONSTANT DUE TO UNQUALIFIED MECHANICS ON THE GATES WITH ONE A& P TO SUPERVISE AND SIGN OFF "WORK" THAT HAS BEEN DONE, BUT HE HAS NO TIME TO INSPECT. GROUND PERSONNEL ARE NOT TRAINED PROPERLY AND ARE KILLED BECAUSE OF IT (ATL-'95 AND JFK-'97). FUELING MISTAKES ARE DAILY, AND THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE MISTAKES ARE CAUSING NUMEROUS TAIL SKID STRIKES ON TAKE OFF IN ALL AIRCRAFT!! IT IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN!!

A B-727 HAD A FAULTY LEADING EDGE LITE COMING OUT OF KALISPELL, MONT. (FCA) IT HAD TO BE FERRIED TO SLC FOR REPAIRS WHICH MADE THE FLIGHT A MAINTENANCE FERRY FLIGHT WHICH CANNOT CARRY ANYONE BUT CREW! CAPT.'S SHAND GAUSE AND TERRY CUSICK FROM FLIGHT OPERATIONS TRIED TO FORCE THE FLIGHT CONTROLLERS TO LET A COMMUNTING PILOT RIDE ON THE JUMPSEAT IN COMPLETE VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS (FAR'S) IT WAS NOT ALLOWED!

B-737 LEADING EDGE HONEYCOMB GONE; WING SIMPLY BUFFED; SPRAY PAINTED; AND PUT BACK IN SERVICE. HONEYCOMB NOT REPLACED.

CAPTAIN MILT McKNIGHT; B-767 IN FORT LAUDERDALE. LANDED NOSE WHEEL FIRST AFTER LOSING AN ENGINE ON TAKEOFF. NEVER WENT TO MIAMI WHICH IS JUST FIVE MINUTES AWAY AND HAS LONGER RUNWAYS. OVER $20M IN DAMAGE. FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR IN JUMP SEAT SAID IT WAS NOT A HARD LANDING. BENT THE AIR FRAME. CAPT. McKNIGHT WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE IN THE LEFT SEAT AS HE HAD NOT HAD HIS THREE TAKE-OFFS AND LANDINGS WITHING THE LAST 90 DAYS BUT HAD IT "PENCILED" IN PRIOR TO THE TRIP BY A FLIGHT OPERATIONS SPECIALIST (MR. GEORGE DUNCAN WAS ORDERED TO DO SO) CAPTAIN McKNIGHT WAS SIMPLY GIVEN A PERIOD IN THE SIMULATOR; NO F.A.A. REPORT OF THE INCIDENT; AND NO COMPANY ACTION SINCE HE IS PART OF THE FOURTH FLOOR MANAGEMENT. NO SAFETY RECORDS ARE KEPT ON THE FOURTH FLOOR PERSONNEL THAT ARE IN MANAGEMENT!

NOTES/REMARQUES/NOTAS

NV 2 TO EXTEND OVER HAUL FROM 5 YEARS TO 7 YEARS

AFT CARGO BIN

WHEN AIRCRAFT GETS OUT ON TIME, THE FOREMAN GETS BONUS

TOTAL 10 DAYS TO COMPLETE OVERHAUL

B727 SHIP # 589
BAY 3
STRINGER 29 Rt.
STATION 9 50 E

COVERED UP WITH SEALER, THIS NEEDED TO BE CHANGED OUT — THIS WAS ROTTED (SEVERELY)

- A LEAD SIGNED IT OFF
TIM JONES

- THE FOREMAN - DAVE SMITH BOUGHT IT OFF

D-1

To whom it may concern,

I was asked to write about the conditions that surround us at work, as far as safety, compliance, work rules, violations, harrassment, intimedation, and whatever else that could affect the repair of an aircraft part, that eventually goes on an aircraft that hundreds of people use to get from point A to B, safely.

The first, and I think the most important of all, are the work conditions. They have gone from worse to ephemely bad in my opinion. I have worked in the airline industry for 25 years. Delta is the second carrier I have worked for, and it is the scariest, and most backward, unprogressive place I have ever worked. I realize on paper, and to the public they can show you differently, but please don't be misled. The ones who don't say anything are usually the ones who don't do anything. The ~~concerns~~ concern people who speak out, are usually considered rebels and are usually given time off, discipline, put on restriction, or terminated. So now the people who care and do most of the work are intimidated, and will usually sign things off now, that they wouldn't in the past. The ones who don't care, don't say anything, and don't do anything, really have the fear put in them, and the end result is control by ultimate fear! The work rules at Delta, work best for the employer to do anything he or she wants to the employees.

The employees have no protection whatsoever. I have seen people suspended, terminated and disciplined many times without cause, I have seen the company in violation of the Railway Labor Act, paragraph 3, many, many times. The company has flexed their muscle, to see what they can get away with intimidating the work force, to do whatever Delta wants of them. I believe the 9 TO 5 LABOR GROUP, can show you many report on how Delta wronged it's people. What we need are laws to protect the employees, and not a law that gives the employer, the ~~work~~ right to work rule. Because corporations such as Delta will abuse their people, as well as the law.

However I realize, I spoke a great deal about how the employees are abused, for reason. In the shops, we don't always have what we need for test equipment, and very little support from Tech Pubs for the technical manuals required for the job. So what happens now is that, if we get a piece of equipment in, that needs repair, and are unable to do a ~~thorough~~ complete test, but the part is needed for the aircraft now, then our manager puts pressure on us to sign it off and send it out, or else. We don't have many options, and it is kind of crazy, because our manager gives us no option, and if the plane has a serious problem with the part we just signed off, then FAA comes down on us, not our manager. Our manager would deny everything. A few things that should bother the public and government are the following; we have

E-1

one mechanic A&P type for every 8 gates, where before we had two A&P mechanics per gate, they have been replaced by mechanic helpers, and junior mechanics who aren't always licensed or paid enough to care about anything. Delta has eliminated a good many inspectors. Why? Don't they concern for safety anymore? All contract services we have working the planes, and around the planes, are they security around? My understanding, are that they aren't trained in driving around aircraft, and there are many accidents, also these same people who are suppose to clean the plane, are cleaning the plane out, such as the flight attendant's bag, the liquor compartment, what not? The instruments in the cockpit?

In closing, I hope I was able to show that when compliance, safety, and concern for passengers are in question, that Delta doesn't care, because they now have a management force that can get away with just about anything, thru harassment, intimidation, & threats to get the plane signed off, sent out, and make their money. One final thought, I have seen quite a few mechanics, get promoted to supervision, or upper, middle management, who did nothing including not repairing the units they were ~~repo~~ paid to repair. ~~Dela~~ Instead, they did crossword puzzles, colored in their coloring books, play trips, play chess, and now there are the same people who sign off the final inspection on repaired parts.

Scary isn't it

Thank you for your time

[illegible]

I refuse to sign this letter for fear of losing my job. Yaless the government can guarantee me protection, and that I will get no reprisals or termination, will I sign my name.

P.S. Mr Jim Diffley (Tech Ops Admin.) once said, "Here at Delta, you have no rights, only privileges, and quite frankly, you haven't earned any. So you get your ass back to work, you understand me Boy!

(1)

Here is a couple of Things That the Contract people have done. This is not only in ATL but outstations.

1) Contract people were miss loading 727's so often ~~and~~ That These Alc were dragging the Tail skid on flo. IT come TO a point were any Suspected Tail skid strike, the Alc would have to make an Air turn back for an Inspection

2) The Contract fuelers were miss fueling Alc. we had several Alc with eng. that flamed out on rollout. and several more were there wasn't enough fuel to make a missed

(C-1)

(2)

Approach.

Ship 964 Had an Illegal MCO on board. (nose spray deflector missing) It flew for several days this way and made landings on wet and or rainy runways march of 97

Ship 918 A mechanic (Contract mechanic) fired a nose Jive with high press. nitrogen and blew part of his leg off. This happened in Tys 9-19-96

Ship 185 Aileron Cable Broke This problem was known by Boeing 6-28 or 6-30-96

F-8

(3)

Ship 562 Leading edge flap or slat damaged. don't remember which.
but A/C left out of florida for ATL without a mechanic looking AT it. maintenance coordination center made the determination it would be all right. 6-26-96
The pilot may have Stff disclosed on this.

Ship 790 6-1-96
A/C had stiff Ailerons not a problem.
but Capt stated this was his First flight (Rev) as Capt on this type A/C and This was the F/O's first revenue flight on this type A/C

F-3

(1)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN,

THIS IS TO INFORM WHO EVER MIGHT BE CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS. THIS IS NOT A THREAT, BUT I HEARD HOW RAY VALEIKA TOLD THE COMMITTEE HOW WELL HE IS LIKED. THAT IS A LIE. HE IS FEARED, HE IS NOT FAIR. HE IS A WISE GUY, HE, AS WELL AS MANY OTHER PEOPLE IN UPPER MANAGETMENT'S OPEN DOOR POLICY IS BULLSHIT ! I CAN JUSTIFY THAT LAST STATEMENT, BECAUSE WHY ELSE, WOULD THE UNION CAMPAIGN BE GOING SO WELL, IF THEY WERE SUCH HAPPY CAMPERS! ALSO DELTA IS AFRAID OF THE TEAMSTERS, AND NOT THE TWU. ONLY PRO-TEAMSTER PEOPLE ARE REPRIMANDED, NO ONE FROM TWU. TYPES OF REPRIMAND ARE SUSPENSIONS, WRITTEN WARNINGS, TERMINATIONS, AND ON AND ON.

NEXT, WILL BE A LIST OF ITEMS THAT ARE BEING CONTRACTED OUT. THE WORK IS SHODDY, OFTEN TIMES NEEDS REWORK. WHEN WE QUESTION MANAGEMENT ABOUT THIS, THEY TELL US NOT TO CAUSE PROBLEMS, JUST TO CORRECT IT, AND PUT IT IN STOCK. WE HAVE FOUND OUT THAT SOME OF THESE COMPANIES MAJOR OWNERS , ARE OUR OWN UPPER MGT.. SO NO WONDER THEY DON'T WANT US TO QUESTION ANYONE. THE MECHANICS ARE CONCERN BECAUSE OFTEN TIMES WE ARE TOLD TO SIGN OFF THEIR WORK, WE ARE NOT ASK, BECAUSE IF WE WERE, WE WOULD REFUSE. LET US MOVE ON TO THE LIST;

1. FIRST, YOU MIGHT WANT TO TALK TO DUTCH SEGERS. HE IS THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF WORK CONTRACTED IN AND OUT OF DELTA. HE WOULD PROBABLY TELL YOU A FEW CHOICE COMMENTS ABOUT MR VALEIKA'S POLICIES, IF YOU CAUGHT HIM IN THE RIGHT MOOD. ALSO HE KNOWS WHO OWNS WHAT. HE IS NOT A MECHANIC SO HE COULDN'T HONESTLY TELL YOU IF THE WORK DONE OUT SIDE OF DELTA IS GOOD OR BAD.

G-1

(2)

2. IN MIAMI FLORIDA, COMPANY NAME GREENWICH CO. HAS DONE SOME WORK ON 727 CSD UNITS. THEY CLAIM THE WORK IS WARRANTED, BUT WHEN IT CAME RIGHT DOWN TO IT, THEY WOULDN'T HONOR THEIR WORK. INSTEAD, WHAT WAS FOUND OUT WAS THAT THEY BREAKING OUR UNITS DOWN AND STEALING ANY NEW PARTS THAT WERE IN THEM. COST CHARGED WAS 23,000/UNIT, AND THEY DIDN'T WORK. WE HAD TO REWORK THEM, WHICH WE COULD HAVE DONE THE WORK OURSELVES IN THE FIRST PLACE. COMPANY ONCE AGAIN GIVES MECHANICS A REASON TO BE UPSET!

3. UNC, A COMPANY IN PHOENIX, WORK ON SOME OF OUR 727 CSD UNITS. SAME STORY AS IN #2 ABOVE.

4. AIR ASSOCIATES ANOTHER SHODDY OUTFIT IN HAPEVILLE, GA. THAT DELTA OUTSOURCE WORK TO. QUESTION IS WHY, WHEN WE HAVE MANPOWER, AND CAPABILITY. THESE SMALL COMPANIES DO NOT SEND THEIR TO SCHOOL, OR ARE THEY KEEPING UP WITH THE CHANGES. THE ONLY THING THEY ARE GOOD FOR, IS THAT THEY ARE CHEAP, AND DEFINETLY PUT PEOPLE'S LIFE IN DANGER.

5. SOUTHERN PRIDE TRUCKING CO. ARE SEEN ON DELTA PROPERTY MORE AND MORE THESE DAYS DELIVERING REWORK ENGINE PARTS, FROM SOME COMPANY IN SAN DIEGO. SHODDY WORK ONCE AGAIN!

6.IN AVIONICS SHOP OFTEN CANNILBALIZE COMPONENTS OFF SCRAP PARTS, TO MAKE A UNIT WORK.

7. MANY LEADS AT DELTA ARE NOT LICENSED, AND YET, SIGN OFF INSPECTION BLOCK.

G-2

8. JUST LIKE AT THE TERMINAL THE LINE MECHANICS ARE SO SHORT HANDED THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO GO TO SCHOOL TO BE RECERTIFIED. NO PROBLEM THOUGH, LEADS GO INTO COMPUTER, AND SIGN THEM OFF, AS HAVING COMPLETED THE SCHOOL.

9. RETIRED V.P. SUGGS OF STORES WAS A MAJOR OWNER OF GOAIR, A REAL, REAL BAD COMPANY. THEY WERE UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING MECHANICAL. THEY BORROWED OUR TEST EQUIPMENT, ARE TRAINING AND TOOK OUR WORK, AND COULDN'T EVEN REPAIR A BURNT LIGHT BULB. BUT, MR SUGGS MADE A LOT OF MONEY, AT THE COST OF EVERYONE'S SAFETY. MECHANICS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO QUESTION.

10. SUPERVISORS BREAKING INTO PERSONAL LOCKERS TO CONFISCATE UNION MATERIAL. DELTA BREAKING COURT ORDERS, AS TO WHAT THE MECHANICS ARE ALLOWED TO WEAR OR DISPLAY ON PERSONAL PROPERTY IN REGARDS TO UNION MATERIAL. IN OTHER WORDS DELTA ON A DAILY BASIS IN VIOLATION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT. DELTA HARASSING PRO UNION PEOPLE BY TRANSFERING PEOPLE TO JOBS AGAINST THE MECHANICS WILL. IN OTHER WORDS, PUT IN AN UNDEREMPLOYMENT SITUATION, HOPING THE MECHANIC WILL QUIT.

IN CLOSING THRE IS MORE BUT I'M TIRED OF TYPING. I WILL TRY TO UPDATE THIS EVERY COUPLE OF WEEKS.

[redacted] MECH IN ATL

G-3

To the Delta Peeper,

I am sending some information along that I hope will prove useful to you. The first is a guideline for the pilots that instructs them on how to handle accidents or incidents. It is interesting how much support the pilots get from the union. By contrast mechanics have no one to contact and are offered no assistance by the company. Without representation we are left to twist in the wind.

The second sheet is by far the more interesting. It is a memo from Harold McDonald and Ray Valieka to Bobby Hollis. I don't know how the memo got into circulation but the second shift dept. 242 was pretty upset by it and demanded a meeting with Bobby Hollis. He had a meeting right there on the spot and proceeded to tell us all that when Ray Valieka states that management (we) is doing too much and the mechanics (our people) aren't doing enough, Ray didn't mean it. Then he told us, "I wouldn't lie to you guys. I've always told you the truth." He was very worried that this memo would get around and asked that we all throw them away as we left the room. I think that we caught Delta telling the truth for once. This is an accurate depiction of management's attitude. We are doing too much and our people aren't doing enough. Bobby Hollis told us that Ray sent this message from his home because he was on vacation at the time. I think it's great that Ray, with one and a half years seniority, gets so much vacation. Mine was cut. Ray wants to make "people" accountable I think he should start at the top. He admitted in the latest Delta Digest, that the current system of maintenance was failing but Ray will not take responsibility for the failure of the plan that *he* implemented. Instead he blames it on a learning curve. In other words "our people" aren't good enough to make it work. So much for accountability. Ray says that management is doing too much. Well that is precisely the problem, too many idiots with ties running around with brilliant ideas that don't work, and not enough people fixing airplanes.

I hope that you will run this memo in the next Peeper in it's entirety so that people can get an actual picture of our standing.

There is a veiled threat in the last part of Ray's memo. I believe it refers to contract maintenance but I'm not sure.

I think that what you are doing is very worthwhile and I applaud your efforts. I have sent in a card for every union and continue to encourage others to do the same. You have many supporters and your publication is widely read. Keep up the good work.

H-1

Delta's employee morale, service suffer from cuts

By Keith L. Alexander
USA TODAY

ATLANTA — Olympic athletes Michael Johnson and Dominique Dawes aren't the only ones in this town trying to prove to the world that they're the best in their fields.

As the official airline for the Olympics, Delta Air Lines will be scrutinized by millions of people in the most important time in the airline's history.

This fall, Delta plans to unveil its boldest project to date, a low-cost airline to compete in Florida against other low-cost airlines such as Southwest. But the success of both ventures will depend heavily on the attitude of Delta's employees. And there's the rub.



By Clyde A. McLean, USA TODAY

Many employees and frequent fliers say Delta's customer service and employee morale have flagged since Delta began its "Leadership 7.5" cost-cutting program in 1994. Delta was then losing money, and low-cost airlines such as Southwest and ValuJet had invaded 80% of its routes. Delta aimed to whack expenses by $2 billion a year, reducing its cost to fly a seat 1 mile from 9.3 cents to Southwest's level of 7.5 cents.

Delta has cut $1.6 billion and reduced its employee count by 10,035 to 60,000. Costs are at 8.3 cents a mile. Delta said Friday that operating income for its fiscal fourth quarter, excluding a $273 million restructuring charge, rose 27% to $569 million. Its stock fell 2⅛ to $72¾ Friday because Delta said it will not reach its 7.5 cents-a-mile goal this fiscal year. Still, the stock is up almost 60% from two years ago.

But so are complaints. In 1990, the Transportation Department got fewer complaints about Delta than any big airline. It ranks fifth among the 10 biggest airlines this year.

Employees say the cutbacks have strained operations. Because Delta reduced the number of flight attendants on planes to federally required minimums, flight attendants say it's more difficult to attend to passengers on full flights. Employees say planes aren't as clean as they used to be because that work is now done by contractors. Flight attendant Deborah Thompson routinely lugs her own pillow and blanket from home on flights. "I don't dare put my head on one of our pillows," she says.

The Food and Drug Administration warned Delta in April about "unsanitary conditions" at its Cincinnati operations. Aircraft coffee pots and lids were stored in dirty sinks used for cleaning mops. Unwrapped cups were found stored next to an aircraft toilet cleaning brush and cans of cleanser. Delta says it has worked with FDA officials to correct the problems.

Travelers say they've noticed a decline. Frequent flier Jeff Clark of Sanford, Fla., switched to American and United after seeing worn and filthy carpets and mildewed bathroom fixtures on Delta planes. Rundown interiors made him wonder about safety practices. "If you get into someone's car and it's filthy inside, it makes you wonder about what's happening on the outside," he says. "What else isn't together?"

Delta has furloughed 750 mechanics since beginning Leadership 7.5. It has rehired 60, but 25 chose not to return when asked to. Mechanic Ray LaPlante, who has campaigned for a union, says the cuts have left the mechanics angry and untrusting of Delta management.

Delta CEO Ronald Allen admits service and morale suffered during its restructuring. He says Delta is now committed to a broader strategy that includes giving customers "Delta-style service" and building a sense of unity among employees.

"There were some areas we slipped in, I'm not going to deny that," Allen says. "We're working hard to correct that."

July 22, 1996
USA TODAY

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ATLANTA BUSINESS CHRONICLE

Behind the News
Check out Editor David Rebinger's new weekly column
Page 44A

FAA probes Delta maintenance

By Cheryl Crabb STAFF WRITER

A "high rate" of engine failures on Delta Air Lines Inc. jets prompted the Federal Aviation Administration earlier this year to launch an investigation into the Atlanta carrier's engine maintenance program.

The FAA began its investigation after 10 uncontained engine failures occurred on Delta planes in less than four years. In such failures, parts of the engine break loose and can act like shrapnel.

In 1996, two passengers were killed when flying engine debris pierced the cabin of a Delta McDonnell Douglas 88 taking off from Pensacola, Fla. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has not issued a final report on the incident.

Delta said it is cooperating with the FAA in its investigation of uncontained engine failures, which occur when parts of the engine escape the casing. But the carrier alleges that the fault lies with the engine's manufacturer, Pratt & Whitney. All of the failures have occurred with Pratt & Whitney engines.

"These failures were new not only to Delta, but the industry as well," said Delta spokesperson Kim King. "Delta can find no correlation between these isolated events that would identify any additional proactive measure that we could identify in-house to reduce these failures."

In the case of the Pensacola accident, an NTSB official said at a March hearing that Delta

➤ *See* **DELTA,** *Page* 42A



ALLISON SHERRETS

Engine blame: Delta is cooperating with the FAA, but it blames Pratt & Whitney for frequent failures.

Stockbrokers' new world

Bull market changes way top producers



Promina launches HMO, aiming for 100,000 members

By Harriett Hiland STAFF WRITER

ATLANTA BUSINESS CHRONICLE August 22-28

Delta

Continued from Page 1A

maintenance should have detected a crack in a fan hub suspected of causing the failure. The engine pieces were subsequently recalled by the FAA.

The FAA's investigation of the engine failures is ongoing, the FAA confirmed. East Hartford, Conn.-based Pratt & Whitney did not return phone calls by press time.

Atlanta Business Chronicle obtained documents from the FAA concerning the safety and maintenance performance of Delta between June 1996 and June 1997 through the federal Freedom of Information Act.

Memos tell the story

The Atlanta-based airline has experienced 10 uncontained engine failures since 1994, according to an FAA memo to Ray Valcika, Delta's senior vice president of technical operations, dated Feb. 25, 1997. Of these failures, one occurred in 1994, none in 1995, six in 1996 and three in 1997, the memo stated.

A March 12, 1997, memo described the "high rate of engine failures."

Of these engine failures investigated by the FAA, eight occurred in Pratt & Whitney (P&W) JT8D series engines, according to the Feb. 25 memo. Delta has 120 MD-88 aircraft in its 553-plane fleet, which all use the Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines, King said. The engines also have been used in several Boeing 727 aircraft.

The other two uncontained engine failures occurred in the Pratt & Whitney 2037 series. Delta has used this engine in its Boeing 757 aircraft.

One of these incidents occurred on Jan. 27, 1997, when a Pratt & Whitney JT8D engine blew shortly after takeoff from New Orleans International Airport. More than 100 passengers on the Tampa, Fla.-bound flight were forced to return to the airport. Delta station manager Benny Braud confirmed passenger reports to the Associated Press that there was a hole in the aircraft the size of two basketballs.

In the February memo, Barry R. Basse, the FAA's principal maintenance inspector for Delta, described these engine failures as a "trend that appears to be escalating and is unacceptable." He requested that Delta develop a "comprehensive action plan ... designed to significantly improve the P&W JT8D uncontained failure rate."

An uncontained engine failure occurs when some part of the engine, due to an internal failure, protrudes through or exits the engine case. The outer case of the engine should retain most of the pieces and the parts that would come loose in an internal failure. When the case does not, it's like "throwing shrapnel," said an FAA official, who requested anonymity.

Delta said it is working to address the FAA's concerns, King said. "Safety is our No. 1 priority. Whenever they have questions, we respond in a timely manner; and in the situations that warrant corrective action, we put them in place.

"There are instances where it just really amounted to a misunderstanding of procedures, and we resolved the issues, or addressed their concerns," she said.

At issue in the Pensacola case is whether Delta could have detected cracks in the fan hub of the engine.

Before the Pensacola incident, Delta had used a visual technique called "fluorescent penetrant inspection" for finding flaws. In response to the engine failure, the airline began using a se method, an "eddy current test," w uses an electrical field to detect cra

FAA officials have advised both m ods be used in inspections. Agency cials said the JT8D engine has a good history.

However, the FAA, Delta and Pra Whitney could not explain why D has experienced these uncontai engine failures, according to a se FAA official who asked that his n not be used.

"In the cases we're looking at ... the not a trend in any of these, and that's w has Pratt & Whitney baffled. Delta Lines [baffled]," the FAA official sai

No failures since February

Delta has not had an uncontai engine failure since the FAA raised concerns about them in the Feb. 25 me This has eased the agency's concerns, FAA official said.

"We were concerned about the tre the FAA official said. "I'm a lot m comfortable with where I am today t where I was."

The FAA has not issued additio reports concerning the uncontai engine failures at Delta, he said. "T have provided a great deal of informa and work to this point; however, almos of these programs are ongoing," he sa

Engine maintenance isn't the only a

Uncontained engine failures on Delta flights 1996-'97

New York City, Jan. 29, 1996	Boeing 727 equipped with a Pratt & Whitney JT8D en
Memphis, Tenn., Jan. 30, 1996	Boeing 727 equipped with a Pratt & Whitney JT8D en
Raleigh, N.C., April 23, 1996	McDonnell Douglas 88 equipped with a Pratt & Whitn JT8D engine
Atlanta, June 13, 1996	McDonnell Douglas 88 equipped with a Pratt & Whitn JT8D engine
Salt Lake City, June 27, 1996	Boeing 757 equipped with a Pratt & Whitney 2037 eng
Pensacola, Fla., July 6, 1996	McDonnell Douglas 88 equipped with a Pratt & Whitn JT8D engine
New Orleans Jan. 27, 1997	Boeing 727 equipped with a Pratt & Whitney JT8D eng
Atlanta, Jan. 31, 1997	Boeing 757 equipped with a Pratt & Whitney 2037 eng
Dallas, Feb. 1, 1997	Boeing 727 equipped with a Pratt & Whitney 2037 eng

SOURCE: Federal Aviation Administra

SEE Page C-1

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The FAA has not issued additiona reports concerning the uncontaine engine failures at Delta, he said. "They have provided a great deal of information and work to this point; however, almost al of these programs are ongoing," he said.

Engine maintenance isn't the only are that the agency is watching.

"It is the entirety of the maintenanc plan and its health that we're concerne about," the FAA official said.

FAA officials said on Aug. 20 that they believe Delta has a "good maintenanc program" as a whole, but that there ar "areas in it that need work."

Safety and maintenance issues ar among the significant challenges facing Delta's new CEO and President Leo F Mullin, an outsider to both the company and the airline industry.

He has been charged by the Delta board including non-executive Chairman Gerald Grinstein, with improving customer service while simultaneously holding down costs. After years of cost-cutting under former Delta CEO and Chairman Ronald W. Allen, Mullin faces the challenge of lifting employee morale.

Although pilots and some dispatchers are Delta's only unionized employees, efforts to organize other worker groups are under way.

According to Grinstein, Mullin's "familiarity with regulatory agencies, which is an important part of life in the airline industry and in particular, an emphasis on safety," were among the key criteria for his selection. ❑

J-3

[NTSB Safety Recommendations]

Engine Failure Due To Fractured Turbine Disk

A Delta Air Lines' Boeing 727-232, equipped with Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15 engines experienced an engine failure after takeoff, so the flight was rejected. Maintenance discovered the number one engine's rear turbine hub— or fourth stage, low-pressure turbine disk—was fractured from the bore of the disk portion to the blade slot. The blades had been ejected from the turbine hub, which made a large hole on the top part of the engine cowling and produced small dents on the left side of the vertical stabilizer.

NTSB's metallurgical examination of the fractured turbine hub, P/N 629494, revealed that a fatigue crack started at the bore of the disk portion in an area containing inclusions with lots of cerium and lanthanum. The main inclusion on the fracture was 0.3 inches long with a maximum width of 0.07 inch. However, this inclusion intersected the bore surface only at an area measuring 0.001 inch. Narrow grooves caused by fatigue stretched in all directions from the primary groove.

Three smaller inclusions also were found on the fracture near the primary inclusion.

The fatigue crack propagated outward almost to the blade slot at the rim and aft through most of the conical sections and partially through the shaft.

The turbine hub is part of the T2 engine module. The hubs are not required to be inspected for cracks at any specific interval, but they are supposed to be examined any time the T2 turbine module is disassembled for any reason. The Pratt & Whitney maintenance manual states that a disassembled turbine hub should be inspected by the fluorescent penetrant method prior to visual and dimensional inspection. Delta reported that the T2 module involved in the incident had last been disassembled 5,897 cycles prior to the accident, which was about 3.4 years prior. At that time, the turbine hub was inspected visually and by a nondestructive method, which was not specified in the maintenance manual.

Because the striation count exceeded the total accumulated flight cycles of the turbine hub, which indicates that factors other than takeoff and landing cycles may have been responsible for additional striations on the fracture, this suggests that a crack may have existed along the bore surface during the last overhaul.

This made NTSB question whether fluorescent penetrant inspection is appropriate for detecting cracks. The Safety Board believes the turbine hubs processed with cerium and or lanthanum should be regularly inspected at intervals less than 5,900 flight cycles—with emphasis being placed on the bore area. ■

K-1

ATL The Airport Newspaper

HARTSFIELD ATLANTA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

ATL, THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1997 PAC

Feds focus on crack in Delta engine

Hearing on fatalities

The left engine hub ruptured in a Delta MD-88 that aborted take-off at Pensacola Regional Airport July 6. Debris from the explosion killed passengers Anita Saxton, 39, of Scottville, Mich., and her 12-year-old son, Nolan.

By Shade Elam
Staff writer

Federal investigators during a National Transportation Safety Board hearing last week focused on inspection methods that may have caused an engine crack to go undetected.

The three-day public hearing in Atlanta focused on a Delta MD-88 that aborted take-off at Pensacola Regional Airport July 6 when its left engine hub ruptured. Debris flew into the passenger cabin, killing Anita Saxton, 39, of Scottville, Mich., and her 12-year-old son, Nolan.

The accident on Flight 1288 occurred as the plane rolled down the runway for takeoff. Investigators blamed the explosion on a crack that went undetected for years in the engine hub.

Since then, the NTSB has been trying to determine what may have caused the crack to go undetected.

Robert Guyotte, branch manger of the engine certification of the FAA explained the federal agencies intentions to tighten inspections of special parts.

"We will be supplementing inspection in areas of concern," said Guyotte, the last witness to take the stand.

Raymond Valeika, senior vice president of Technical Operations for Delta, testified before Guyotte to defend Delta's inspection methods.

"The initial defect is a very important concept here," Valeika said. Valeika pointed to the initial manufacturing of the hub.

An NTSB report noted that Delta had inspected the hub several months before the accident, claiming that the airline should have detected the crack.

dent, Atlanta-based Delta created a new engine test and had it approved by Pratt & Whitney. The FAA proposed that the test be added as an additional tool in October.

Witnesses for the engine maker, Volvo Aero Corporation, and its designer, Pratt & Whitney, had already taken the stand.

Pratt & Whitney had recommended fluorescent penetrant inspections, involving inspecting the part under special light. Evidence and testimony revealed that the visible testing was not reliable.

Delta has since adopted several recommendations on the inspections that the FAA has made since the explosion, Valeika said. The airline has also put several of its own standards in place, he added.

"We immediately began fan blade inspections on the whole fleet," Valeika said. In addition, the airline began using reduced thrust take-offs.

Valeika said all variables must be considered when trying to find where the detection process went wrong. He questioned whether methods in place could really detect the reason for the engine explosion.

"What I'm really concerned about is, hypothetically, can we do everything right and find the crack?," Valeika said.

The FAA enacted a rule on March 5 that will now require initial and current inspections on the holes drilled into engine hubs. Another role on a subset of those engines has been proposed but not enacted, according to FAA spokeswoman Kathleen Bergen.

There are about 2,624 engines with the engine design worldwide, 1,279 in the United States, said Bergen. Nearly 40 percent of inspections on those engines have already been completed, she said. She expects the remaining inspections will be completed by September.

The hearing on Flight 1288 took place at the Atlanta Hilton and Towers Hotel on 255 Courtland Street in downtown Atlanta.

NTSB Board member John Goglia presided over the board of inquiry of senior NTSB officials. A technical panel of Safety Board



Photo by Wayne Pat

John Goglia (r) asks a question last week during the NTSB he ings in Atlanta. At left is Vern Ellingstad.

a former airplane mechanic, also led the high profile safety board hearing in Miami last fall on ValuJet flight 592.

Representatives at the hearing include the Federal Aviation Administration; Delta Air Lines and its top maintenance officials; Pratt & Whitney, Air Line Pilots Association, McDonnell Douglas Corp. and Volvo Aero Corp., which made the hub.

Chairman John Goglia said the investigation will remain open. The board may reopen the hearing to make any new information put record.

The record of the investigati including the transcript and exhit of the hearing will be entered into record and will become part of Safety Board's public docket these accidents. They will be ava able for inspection at the boar Washington Office.

The NTSB is an independent f eral agency employed by Congr to determine the probable cause transporation accidents and to ma recommendations to improve safe

Plane kills baggage handle

From staff and wire reports

A Delta Air Lines baggage handler was killed last Thursday night when he was struck by an airplane at Kennedy International Airport in New York, the Port Authority said.

Nicholas Romano apparently was hit by the Delta L-1011 jet bound for Nice, France, as a vehicle was pushing it from the gate about 6:20 p.m., said a Delta

"The employee died when he fell beneath the wheels of the aircraft being pushed from the gate," she said.

He was pronounced dead at the scene.

Passengers on the jet, Flight 82 were transferred to another plane. The accident is under investigatio by the airline and other inspectors

The victim had been with the airline three and a half years, according to Delta spokesman Bill Berry. This is the first time an accident like this has happened, he

Delta tops list in paying fines on maintenance

By Cynthia Mitchell
STAFF WRITER

Atlanta-based Delta Air Lines paid more than $2 million to the Federal Aviation Administration for maintenance violation fines from 1986 through mid-1994 — more than any other major airline.

The ranking is part of an article in the upcoming issue of Conde Nast Traveler magazine. It charges the airline industry with operating "tens of thousands" of flights in airplanes with maintenance problems that made them "unairworthy." Moreover, the article charges, FAA regulations that require airlines to correct the defects before flying the planes "are often ineffective."

The airlines "are only caught after the fact — sometimes after hundreds and hundreds of flights have gone by with the unairworthy conditions," said Gary Stoller, the article's author and the magazine's investigative editor.

While still a "cause for concern," Stoller noted Delta's No. 1 ranking for maintenance violation fines doesn't mean it is the least safe airline. Other variables also factor into overall safety.

Todd Clay, a spokesman for the airline, did not dispute the ranking but said the company was "very disappointed" with the story. He pointed out Delta would have fared better if the ranking had been on number of fines.

That would have ranked United Airlines first, with 31 fines, and put Delta in a three-way tie for ninth, with 10 fines. Fines, however, are often for multiple violations.

The article highlighted several alarming Delta violations. Four contributed to Delta's 1992 fine of $2.5 million — the second largest ever levied by the FAA. (After Delta agreed to comply with the FAA order, $1 million of the fine was suspended.)

Two of the incidents Stoller said he unearthed from Freedom of Information requests. The FAA verdict on one of those incidents, according to the article, said Delta "was not only careless but reckless so as to endanger the lives and property of others." The other violation cited Delta for operating a Boeing 737 jet on 253 flights with an unrepaired fuselage crack.

Clay said Delta could not confirm or rebut those two violations. Regarding the violations that contributed to the 1992 fine, Clay said the company was upset the reporter did not quote these remarks from the FAA report: " . . . at no time throughout our inspections were aircraft found to be operating in an unsafe condition."

Airline maintenance violations

Number of fines and dollar amount paid to the Federal Aviation Administration for maintenance violations:

Airline	Amount fined	Number of fines
Delta	$2,061,000	10
Hawaiian	$1,172,500	10
United	$1,065,000	31
Northwest	$929,250	27
USAir	$924,500	23
TWA	$507,000	20
Air Wisconsin	$363,800	14
American	$319,200	29
Continental	$222,638	17
Horizon	$184,450	10
Tower	$123,900	14
Alaska	$90,700	12
Southwest	$55,750	5
America West	$41,200	8
Aloha	$27,000	3
American Trans Air	$23,400	9
Midwest Express	$20,000	3

*Compiled from FAA statistics from Jan. 1, 1986, through June 10, 1994. Data are for cases officially closed by the FAA; other cases are pending. Number of fines does not indicate the number of violations because one fine often covers numerous violations.
Source: Conde Nast Traveler

M-1

teady — for now

Trends in interest

When the Federal Reserve wants to raise interest rates, it usually does so by boosting the federal funds rate, the interest rate banks charge for overnight loans needed by other banks to meet reserve requirements. The last time the Fed trimmed the fed funds rate was Jan. 31.

The fed funds rate has a direct effect on the prime rate, a benchmark banks use to price other loan rates. But there are other factors that can affect loan and deposit rates, such as competition and other market forces.

Here are the trends and rates for fixed-rate credit cards, home equity lines of credit, auto loans, 30-year fixed-rate mortgages and one-year certificates of deposit.



JAMES SMALLWOOD / Staff

steady, noninflationary growth rate for the economy of about 2 percent to 2.5 percent a year.

Consumer credit a damper

That hasn't happened in recent months, however. The economy struggled to grow at a 0.5 percent annual rate in last year's final quarter, then expanded at a 2.2 percent rate in the first quarter, government figures show. Growth sprinted ahead at a 3.0 percent to 4.0 percent annual rate in the second quarter that ended on Sunday, according to Astrid Adolfson, an economist at MCM MoneyWatch in New York.

Wednesday's Fed decision to hold rates steady suggests Fed policymakers don't expect the second-quarter bonanza to last because higher interest rates and ballooning levels of household debt should dampen consumer spending, corporate profits and housing construction in the months ahead.

Borrowing costs may be the key to proving whether that assessment is correct. The yield on the benchmark 30-year Treasury bond has declined from a recent high of 7.19 percent June 12 to 6.95 percent Wednesday. Still, the yield is almost a full percentage point higher than it was in early February. And the average 30-year mortgage rate nationally was about 8.14 percent in the past week, up from 6.94 percent five months ago.

Market also controls rates

Wall Street already "has done a large part of the Fed's job" by push-

Delta fined $650,000 in safety laps

By Rodney Ho
STAFF WRITER

The Federal Aviation Administrati Wednesday fined Delta Air Lines $650,(failing to inspect a crucial aircraft part in a fashion.

Delta said that, on a single Boeing 757, dentally delayed inspection of a newly in thrust reverser, which is used to help stop craft after landing.

In March 1994, following an Austrian accident in which a thrust reverser deploy ing flight, the FAA required all 757s to be fied by 1999 with a third locking feature vent that from happening again.

Delta said it modified the thrust reverser 86 757s several years early. Required inspe were also increased from every 4,000 op hours to every 1,000. A repetitive inspecti due in October 1995 but wasn't performe 476 scheduled flights later, in January, af FAA flagged the problem.

Jack Barker, a former FAA spokesman, s $650,000 fine was reasonable given the nun flights involved. "And it's enough money anyone's attention — even Delta's," Barker

Delta spokesman Bill Berry said, "We co [the fine] a high amount, but given the c environment, we'll accept it and move forwa

The FAA, a target of criticism since the M crash of ValuJet Flight 592, has punished s carriers recently for various infractions:

- Savannah-based AvAtlantic was grounde 13 for several days because of flight att training problems.
- On June 21, the FAA decertified 30 pilots Newark, N.J.-based Kiwi International Air in a dispute over pilot training that has yet resolved.
- On June 27, Miami-based charter carrier International Airways was fined $2.6 milli safety violations.

Delta called the problem an isolated insta misplaced paperwork that didn't affect safety

In other airline news, Kiwi reported We day that it will begin furloughs and volu leaves of absence in an effort to conserve since the FAA action, which forced Kiwi to r its fleet by 27 percent. Kiwi, which has abo Atlanta-based employees out of a 1,200-me work force, said 20 employees are being loughed and 70 have taken voluntary leav absence, reducing payroll costs about 20 per

ValuJet files initial plar

The B767 after the misfortune: The destroyed right wing along wi . the engine lay on the ground, after the aircraft landing gear collapsed during takeoff. Although the tanks held up.

AIRCRAFT DUG ITSELF INTO THE RUNWAY

Hamburg - At the Airport on Sat. 212 passengers on a B767 just barely escaped a catastrophe. On takeoff the landing gear broke off and pierced the wing of the DAL jet. The captain brought the machine, which was on its way to Atlanta, to an immediate standstill on the edge of the runway.

Passengers and crew were able to leave the plane off gangways(?) rather than having to use the emergency escapes. 50 liters. of hydr. fluid leaked from the plane, but the full fuel tanks were not damaged.

Delta explained that the incident was very unusual. "All the experts I have been able to talk with have said they have never seen such a thing", said speaker Dean Breese. The crew, 3 pilots and 9 flightatt., handled the situation very calmly and efficiently. The jet is a relatively new aircraft from Boeing.

DELTA AIR LINES

# Of Pages → 2	
To ED DUNLAP	From N. MADJO
Co.	Dept. / Sta.
Dept. / Sta.	Phone #
Fax # 604 414 5691	Fax # 690 7162

Die Boeing 767 nach dem Unglück: Die zerstörte rechte Tragfläche mitsamt der Turbine liegt auf dem Boden, nachdem das Fahrwerk beim Start abgeknickt war. Doch die Tanks hielten. Foto: dpa

Fahrwerk bohrte sich in Tragfläche

Hamburg (dpa). – Auf dem Hamburger Flughafen Fuhlsbüttel sind am Samstag 212 Passagiere in einer Boeing 767 ganz knapp einer Katastrophe entronnen: Beim Start knickte ein Fahrwerk ab und durchbohrte die Tragfläche des Delta-Air-Lines-Jets. Der Kapitän brachte die Maschine, die auf dem Weg nach Atlanta/USA war, gerade noch am Rande der Startbahn zum Stehen.

Passagiere und Crew konnten die Boeing über Gangways verlassen und mußten nicht die Notrutschen benutzen. Aus dem Flugzeug liefen 50 Liter Hydrauliköl aus, doch die Tanks der vollgetankten Boeing wurden nicht beschädigt. Delta Air Lines erklärte, der Vorfall sei sehr ungewöhnlich. „Alle Experten, mit denen ich sprechen konnten, haben so etwas noch nicht gesehen", sagte Sprecher Dean Breese. Die Crew, drei Piloten und neun Flugbegleiter, hätten die Situation sehr ruhig und mit Routine bewältigt. Bei dem Jet handle es sich um eine relativ neue Maschine vom Typ Boeing 767 ER.

D-2

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Delta Hit With $2-Million Fine

From Associated Press

WASHINGTON—The Federal Aviation Administration slapped Delta Air Lines with a $2-million fine Wednesday, saying it had violated a long list of maintenance and safety rules.

The FAA said it will suspend $500,000 of the fine until it determines whether the airline complies with new safety orders.

FAA Administrator Thomas C. Richards said Delta had taken "aggressive actions to correct deficiencies."

"The airline is now operating in accordance with the FAA's safety standards," Richards said.

Russ Heil, a Delta vice president, said that after a special FAA inspection last year, the airline "made changes or implemented programs that will cure all of the deficiencies."

"Delta is dedicated to the highest level of safety and to full compliance with FAA procedures," he said.

Neil Monroe, a Delta spokesman at corporate headquarters in Atlanta, said the primary problem was not one of quality maintenance but of record-keeping.

"We didn't have the paperwork in the right place to be able to say to a mechanic, 'This is the work that needs to be done,' " he said.

Monroe asserted that Delta's procedures are now in "A-1 shape."

The FAA said a special inspection of Delta—using selected FAA staff members who do not normally work with the airline—was completed in February, 1991.

The inspection team uncovered 20 violations of FAA regulations, the agency said, adding that 42 other violations were documented by other FAA offices, some as recently as last summer.

The FAA said the violations uncovered by the team of inspectors included:

•Operating an airliner on 63 flights while ignoring an FAA order to inspect the aircraft for cracks in the rudder control system.

•Operating seven airplanes on 138 flights without complying with an FAA directive intended to prevent binding of a device known as an aileron, which controls rolling movements.

...rm, there is already a trend in the pharmaceutical industry to design drugs that require a single daily dose instead of multiple daily dosages.

But the compliance issue is likely to force far more profound changes in doctor-pharmacist-patient relationships.

We may well see certain medications only prescribed in intelligent "programmable pillboxes" that beep and whistle when the time comes to take your medicine. What's more, these pillboxes could provide a record of consumption for the pharmacist when the patient returns to refill the prescription. Technology will be designed to enforce responsibility.

Similarly, we may see some medications prescribed for transdermal patches instead of pills precisely because the doctor does not trust the patient to comply with the rigors of a pill-taking prescription regimen.

Doctors may be ethically and legally required to assure that their patients actually adhere to their prescriptions.

Some FDA observers contend that many prescription drugs won't be approved for over-the-counter sales precisely because of compliance concerns. We may even see arguments—and lawsuits—between doctors and pharmacists over which method of drug dispensing is likeliest to ensure compliance.

"Pharmacists are becoming much more responsible for what happens," observes University of Rhode Island pharmacy professor Paul Larrat, who has extensively studied patient compliance, "and they are going to have to consider adopting and adapting some of those standards."

Indeed, the legal issues surrounding compliance may become one of the most important drivers of innovation in this area.

So just as doctors now practice "defensive testing" to minimize malpractice exposure, the medical Establishment may soon move to "defensive dispensing" to minimize the risks of liability associated with noncompliance.

With an aging population and a greater need for "geriatric pharmacology," Larrat and Rhinesmith point out, compliance assumes an even greater urgency.

Ultimately, the issue of compliance boils down to one of responsibility. Are doctors and pharmacists responsible for compliance? Or is it the responsibility of patients and their families?

See Medicine Ray Flood Letter / Translation

Los Angeles Times 11/26/92

P-1

Delta is fined $1.5 million for 69 maintenance violations

Airline corrects all deficiencies

By Scott Thurston
STAFF WRITER

Delta Air Lines has been fined $1.5 million for nearly 70 maintenance procedure violations uncovered by Federal Aviation Administration inspectors, the FAA said Wednesday.

FAA inspectors turned up 22 violations in early 1991 during a major review of Delta's maintenance operations, and another 47 in subsequent reviews that continued through this summer, said agency spokesman Paul Steucke.

The FAA cited three violations as the most egregious:

- Delta allowed an aircraft to make 63 flights without performing government-ordered inspections for cracks in the rudder control system.
- The airline flew seven aircraft on 138 flights without following an FAA order designed to prevent binding of aileron controls, which make a plane bank left or right.
- Delta operated a Boeing 727 auxiliary power unit 3,229 hours beyond its scheduled maintenance period.

The FAA, in a statement Wednesday, said the problems have been remedied and praised Atlanta-based Delta for a "cooperative attitude and aggressive actions to correct deficiencies."

Delta agreed to a $2 million settlement, but the FAA will suspend $500,000 of the fine provided the airline completes changes in maintenance programs.

"It's a fair settlement, and we've already taken steps necessary to correct the problems," Delta spokesman Neil Monroe said.

He said the violations were the result of human error and record-keeping breakdowns, not any intent to bypass federal guidelines.

"The plane that flew without the rudder checks, for instance, was the result of a records oversight," he said, "and when the plane was inspected, no cracks were found."

The first wave of violations was discovered during a National Air Carrier Safety Inspection Program review. Such reviews are conducted periodically at all airlines.

The FAA fined Eastern Airlines $9.5 million after a NASIP review in 1987, Pan American World Airways $1.9 million in 1986 and American Airlines $1.5 million in 1985, Mr. Steucke said.

Delta paid a $120,400 fine after a previous inspection in 1987.

ATL
The Airport Newspaper
HARTSFIELD ATLANTA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
ATL, THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1997 PAGE 3

Plane kills baggage handler

From staff and wire reports

A Delta Air Lines baggage handler was killed last Thursday night when he was struck by an airplane at Kennedy International Airport in New York, the Port Authority said.

Nicholas Romano apparently was hit by the Delta L-1011 jet bound for Nice, France, as a vehicle was pushing it from the gate about 6:20 p.m., said a Delta spokeswoman.

"The employee died when he fell beneath the wheels of the aircraft being pushed from the gate," she said.

He was pronounced dead at the scene.

Passengers on the jet, Flight 82, were transferred to another plane. The accident is under investigation by the airline and other inspectors.

The victim had been with the airline three and a half years, according to Delta spokesman Bill Berry. This is the first time an accident like this has happened, he said.

HOW CAN ANYONE BELIEVE ANYTHING THESE PEOPLE AT DELTA SAY??? THERE WERE THREE OTHER INCIDENTS WHERE THE AGENT WAS KILLED BETWEEN 1991-94!! ATTACHED IS AN ARTICLE ON ANOTHER IN 1978!

R-1

Delta Identifies Mishap Victim

A ramp service agent at Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport who was crushed to death by the landing gear of a departing jetliner has been identified as Bruce K. Tilly, 24, of Jonesboro.

Delta Air Lines officials said Tilly apparently fell under the landing gear of an L-1011 passenger jet Sunday as it was pushed away from a departure ramp.

Delta spokesman George Shedd said Tilly was employed by the airline in August 1976.

6/13/78

Atl. Constitution

—ATLANTA JOURNAL & CONSTITUTION.

R-2

Magazine Loses Delta Ads

Conde Nast Traveler says Delta Air Lines pulled advertising from its pages following an article in the August issue that was critical of the poor maintenance records of certain airlines.

Delta pulled ads out of Traveler's November issue following the article on spotty airline safety, which listed Delta as No. 1 in fines for maintenance violations for the period from 1986 to 1994. Traveler Publisher Richard D. Beckman said after the article appeared, Delta made several "irate" phone calls about the article to the offices of the magazine of Conde Nast Publications, a unit of Advance Publications. Soon thereafter, Delta pulled a two-page spread from the November issue and stopped a magazine-sponsored in-flight fragrance sampling program. Traveler is unsure about Delta's future ad commitments; it was expected to spend $350,000 in the magazine this year.

But Delta contends that it pulled out of Traveler not because of the article, but rather as part of the Atlanta airline's attempt to trim its marketing budget. Jack Walz, global account director at BBDO South, Delta's agency in Atlanta, said it was incorrect to connect the ad pullout with the Traveler article and that it was common for clients to shift ad spending.

Delta spokesman Todd Clay said other magazines should expect to lose advertising too, while some would gain ads. Of the shifting spending pattern, he said, "We want to place our ads where we feel we get the greatest value." Mr. Clay also called the Traveler article "accurate."

Traveler doesn't buy Delta's explanation. "We feel the editorial integrity of this magazine is being challenged and they are questioning our right to service the

S-1

WITNESS STATEMENT

Interviewed by:
Lisa A. Kearns
July 09, 1996

Mr. Michael Logsdon
[redacted]

STATEMENT:

While driving down Langley Avenue he saw Delta flight #1288 sitting on the runway ready to take off. Says one engine, the left engine, looked lower than the other. He and his son pulled over to watch the plane take off.

He said something was not symmetrical with the other side.

The plane was at the end of the runway and he said he was positioned directly behind it. Left engine seemed to be hanging lower.

Watched airplane roll, saw the fire and flames in the front and shooting out the back. Looked like a rocket engine. Fire lasted only approximately 20 seconds. Smoke lasted approximately one minute.

Son also noticed that the left engine looked lower. Asked if there is something inside the back of the engine that expands when it is ready to take off and which may have made it look lower.

T-1