RECORD OF CONVERSATION

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Aviation Accident Investigator
Central Region

Date: January 14, 2011
Person Contacted: Mr. Justin Barchfeld III, First Officer (Pilot Flying)
NTSB Accident Number: CEN11FA144 – Springfield, IL (Learjet 35A ~ N800GP)

Narrative:

Mr. Barchfeld was the first officer (second-in-command) on the accident flight involving N800GP. He was also the pilot flying (PF) at the time of the accident. He was positioned in the left pilot seat during the accident flight.

Mr. Barchfeld reported holding an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with a multi-engine land airplane class rating, and a Cessna CE-510/S (single pilot) type rating. His pilot certificate also included a single engine land airplane class rating, which was limited to private pilot privileges. He was issued a First Class Airman Medical Certificate without limitations in February 2010. He reported accumulating approximately 1,800 hours total flight time, with about 700 hours in a Learjet. Of that flight time, about 15 to 20 hours were flown within the preceding 90 days.

Mr. Barchfeld was employed by Northwest Flyers located at Schaumburg Airport since 2007. He had been flying with Priester Aviation on a part-time basis since 2007, as well. His most recent training event in the Learjet was in December 2009.

Mr. Barchfeld stated that during final approach, the captain noted "ref plus five." About that time, the stick shaker went off. He noted that the airplane was in the vicinity of the airport fence line or runway threshold at the time. He was not sure of the airspeed at the time the stick shaker activated. Mr. Barchfeld applied full power and at the same time the captain stated "full power." The left wing dropped causing the airplane to veer to the left. He attempted to correct to the right. He was not sure exactly when or where the airplane touched down, but he thought that it was while he was trying to correct to the

right. After the airplane came to a stop, the captain directed him to evacuate the passengers. When Mr. Barchfeld reached the cabin, the passengers were already at the door. He opened the door and moved them to a safe distance from the airplane. He noted that the right wing was on fire at that time.

Mr. Barchfeld recalled that the approach itself was "nothing unusual." The airplane tracked the localizer and glide slope accurately. He used the autopilot for the initial part of the approach and then hand flew the remainder after breaking out of the clouds. Mr. Barchfeld could not recall if the yaw damper was turned off because of how quickly the accident occurred. (He noted that he was trained to turn the yaw damper off at approximately 50 feet. However, in crosswind conditions, the yaw damper is turned off closer to the ground. Flight crews were taught not to land with the yaw damper on.) The captain indicated that the runway was in sight about 2 miles out. Mr. Barchfeld used the VASI for glide slope information after breaking out of the clouds.

Mr. Barchfeld indicated that a "little bit" of a crab was necessary to handle the crosswind condition of approximately 15 to 20 knots. There were some gusts, but "nothing significant." He commented that he was looking mostly outside that airplane during the time he was hand flying. He recalled that the approach reference speed was 119 knots. His target speed was about 124 knots; ref plus five.

Mr. Barchfeld noted that they picked up a small amount of rime ice upon climb out from Midway. They had filed for 14,000 feet. However, they requested and were cleared to 16,000 feet in order to avoid any icing and to able to fly a little faster. They were on top of the clouds by about 200 feet during the cruise segment of the flight. They re-entered the clouds upon initiating the descent into Springfield and remained in the clouds until breaking out on the approach.

Mr. Barchfeld stated that the airplane anti-icing was on during the entire cruise portion of the flight. The airplane did not accumulate any ice during the initial portion of the approach. He recalled that he slowed the airplane earlier than usual in order to extend the wing flaps and landing gear. This allowed him to operate at a higher engine power setting to increase the effectiveness of the anti-icing system. He reported that the airframe anti-ice system (wings and tail) was turned off at the time the airplane intercepted the glide slope; shortly before breaking out of the clouds. After breaking out of the clouds, they checked for ice. He recalled seeing "barely any frost," but more like dew, on the wing tip tank and outboard portion of the wing during the remainder of the approach. The engine heat was turned on just after takeoff and remained on until after breaking out on the approach.

Mr. Barchfeld noted that about one-half to three-quarters of the left wing could be seen from the left pilot's seat. The right wing was not visible from the left pilot's seat. The airplane did not have any ice detection equipment. The wing and stabilizer temperature indicators in the cockpit were in the green area when he checked them during the flight.

Mr. Barchfeld explained that the wings and stabilizer anti-ice system is operated together; on or off. They cannot be selected independently. He noted that with the wing/stabilizer and the engine anti-ice systems on, an engine speed of approximately 65-percent is required in order to maintain cabin pressurization. Also, the airplane needs 60 to 65-percent engine power to hold a standard 3-degree glide slope with full flaps and landing gear extended.

Mr. Barchfeld stated that there were no issues with the operation of the airplane during the accident flight. The airplane performed normally without any indication of a malfunction or abnormal condition prior to the accident.

Mr. Barchfeld reported that the day before the accident he was in the office and completed a standard, 9-to-5 work day. He was briefed on the trip that afternoon (the day prior to the accident flight). Initially the destination was St. Louis, but it was changed to Springfield the afternoon prior to the flight. He went to bed about 10:00 pm and woke up about 6:00 am. He left his house about 6:30 am and reported for the flight about 7:00 am. He reported that he felt well rested for the trip. He stated that he was not using any prescription or over-the-counter medications at the time of the accident.

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