MP 608 – Marshall, Michigan Incident
NTSB/PHMSA Information Request No. 316

316 **Reference:** NTSB email request of January 9, 2012 by Matt Nicholson [NTSB request number 321 by Kelly Emeaba for SCADA Control Center group]

Preamble:

Request: According to the phone recordings from the morning of July 25th, Tim Chubb performed a line start on 6B before handing line operations over to Dave Scott. Also, based on IR 139, valve 632.89 alarmed on July 22nd showing comm. Failure. Who was on-shift for line 6B that acknowledged the comm. Alarm on July 22nd. Did Tim Chubb make a notification to the shift leads on the morning of the 25th, during startup, that this valve had lost communication? Provide the FACMAN for valve 632.89 that would have been entered on July 22nd. Explain how the operators would have known that valve 632.89 was fully open during operations preceding the 25th shutdown by Dave Scott?

Required Jan12/2012

Response:

- In regards to valve 632.89 communication failure, our records indicate that Valve 632.89 alarmed various times during the morning of July 22nd, 2010.
- The valve alarm last cleared at 06:46:15 MST on July 22nd and did not reoccur until 19:09:27 MST, which was after shift change (17:00 MST).
- Our information shows that M.P. 632.89's communication failure did not clear until Aug. 4th at 09:05:52 MST.



- Our records show that Tim Chubb was operating line 6 during the day shift on July 22nd and passed over to either Stephanie Smith or Steve Gold for the night shift.
- We cannot confirm/verify who acknowledged the communication alarm as two qualified Operators were in on that shift and either could have acknowledged the alarm.
- Our records indicate that no FACMAN was entered by any operator when M.P. 632.89 communication failure occurred on July 22nd at 19:09:27.
- Tim Chubb did not make a notification to the Shift Leads on the morning of the 25th.
- Tim Chubb did not do a full line startup – line 6b went even at Stockbridge (SK) station. This means that he finished delivering oil to SK station and was proceeding to start up the rest of the line into Sarnia (SA) following the completion of the delivery.
- Since M.P. 632.89 is upstream of SK station, the pipeline would have been continuously flowing through that section of the line. Procedures do not require Operators to inform the shift leads of this valve communication failure as it was not in the section of the line that was shutdown.
- The line was flowing through the valve with the communication alarm.

- The operators would have known that valve 632.89 was fully open during operations preceding the 25th shutdown by Dave Scott.
- The operators would analyze pressures upstream and downstream of this valve looking for indications of valve closure such as an unexpected increase in pressure upstream accompanied by a decrease in pressure downstream and then react appropriately to maintain safe operations of the pipeline.
- The Operators are required to follow the startup procedure for a communication loss to a sectionalizing valve during startup - which states that the operator must drive the next two upstream stations to communication out limits, start the line up at minimum flow and notify the shift lead prior to startup.


LINE 6B
Commands
Help
Detail
Report
Exit
Controlled on: PCS Server 06
Griffith - West Sarnia
From Line 6A (East Superior - Griffith)
474.97
475.27
480.49
489.14
499.38
519.70
532.74
533.21
538.15
552.94
576.93
599.43
607.63
607.66
BLK
GT
Griffith
465.38
WH
Wheeler
488.45
LA
La Porte
499.35
CL
Carlisle
519.68
NL
Niles
538.13
VN
Vandalia
552.89
MD
Meadon
576.9
LR
Leroy
598.41
MR
Marshall
607.62
611.00
620.66
632.89
633.66
638.45
638.99
661.39
678.16
678.33
678.70
701.14
707.28
714.22
735.58
743.17
751.21
751.73
650.64-6-V
650.63-6/17-XV
AB
Albion
628.65
SK
Stockbridge
650.58
FR
Fowler
661.36
HW
Howell
678.2
OV
Ortonville
701.08
LN
Leonard
714.18
MV
Marysville
748.37
RW
West Sarnia
738.3
Valve at M.P. 632.89
that comm failed
section of line that was started following SK DEL
U.S.A.
CANADA