

I was the aircraft commander of CG6589 on a training flight from Air Station Atlantic City, NJ on 07 FEB 05. We filed an IFR flight plan to Robert J. Miller Air Park (KMJX), were airborne at approx. 1250L, and completed 3 instrument approaches before canceling our IFR flight plan. From there we proceeded to Hammonton Muni (KN81) before being diverted for ice operations from Tuckerton, NJ to Absecon Inlet, NJ. Upon conclusion of the ice patrol we conducted pattern work at Atlantic City Bader Airport (KATY) and Ocean City Airport (K26N). We then departed for more pattern work at Woodbine Municipal (K1N4).

At Woodbine, I completed one turn in the pattern using runway 1, then decided to transition to runway 12 which was more suitable to the on-scene conditions. While we were completing the take-off checks at the base of r/w 1, we saw what appeared to be an ultra light plane taxi onto runway 12 for departure. I pulled into a hover and slowly hovered taxied to r/w 12 for departure. All 3 of us watched the ultra-light plane take off without incident. I waited approx. 1 minute to allow for spacing and then took off, and turned right to set up for a right downwind at 700 ft AGL. The ultra light was on a left downwind for the same runway. We slowed down to give them room to go in front of us. The pattern altitude of the ultra light was approx. 500-600 ft AGL. Shortly before abeam of the numbers on downwind the ultra light appeared to be flying very erratically (turning and diving- at times it seemed to be in turns of up to 80-90 degrees AOB). I even commented on ICS that the plane was being flown extremely aggressively. At one point it appeared to regain slight control then abruptly lost control again and turn a full 360 degrees reaching probably 90-100 degrees AOB. The aircraft spiraled out of control and impacted the earth in a near vertical flight profile. I would guess the "erratic flying" to ground impact lasted approx. 25 seconds. It impacted the ground about ¼ mile to the northwest of the airfield in a wooded section of flat terrain.

I immediately called for Rescue Check-List part one and started to orbit the crash site. We were on-scene within 1.5 minutes. I quickly determined that there was no possibility to hoist anyone from the crash site. There was no movement from the area and the woods were too thick to hoist through. There was no sign of fuel or smoke coming from the crash site. I thought that we might be able to render first aid if we could get a crewmember on scene. I conducted a visual approach to a farmer's field, which was approx. 50 yards from the ultra light's location. I hovered at 1-2 ft off the ground and my Flight Mechanic (AMT 1 Allan Morgan) ran to the scene. He was there within 3-4 minutes of the crash. I then orbited overhead and called the USCG operations center to arrange for 911 assistance. We circled overhead for about 10 minutes until EMS personnel began to arrive. Once they were on-scene and had it secured, I completed another visual approach to the field and picked up my crewman. At this point we were very low on fuel so we returned to station in case the EMS personnel recommended a medevac. We landed and shutdown without further incident. Following the debrief my Operations Officer CDR Joe Kelly informed me that both pilots were pronounced DOA.

Winds 010 at 5-10kts

Visibility 7sm

The above is true to the best of my knowledge.

LT Kyle S. Armstrong



~~61 South South~~

7 Feb 05-

I was the copilot of CG helicopter 6589 on a routine pilot training mission. We departed KACY on an IFR flight plan to KMJX (Robert Miller Airpark) at 1750Z and flew 3 practice approaches. We canceled our flight plan and proceed southwesterly toward KN81 (Hammondon Airport). We were asked by CG Group Atlantic City to fly the intracoastal waterway south for an ice report. We did some practice landings at KAIY (Bader Airport) and then more at K26N (Ocean City Airport). We then entered the traffic pattern for K1N4 (Woodbine Airport). We entered a right base for runway 1 and while on short final, saw what appeared to be a vehicle near the far end of the runway. We landed short on the southern end of runway 1 and determined that the "vehicle" was an ultralight and we watched it take off into the prevailing wind of 100 at 8 knots from runway 12. The ultralight climbed rapidly to an altitude of approximately 600 feet and entered a left downwind. We carefully hover-taxied to runway 12 and took off behind the ultralight and entered right traffic. Because we were unsure of the other aircraft's intentions, we kept our eyes on it and began to prepare to land on runway 12. We witnessed the ultralight make an aggressive turn from a lower altitude (approximately 4-500 feet). It appeared to begin to lose a significant amount of altitude and make erratic movements to what looked like almost 80 or 90 degrees angle of bank. The ultralight descended into the trees in a near vertical profile. We immediately overflew the crash site and looked for movement on the ground. Seeing the wreckage in the trees, we passed the position of the crash to CG Group Atlantic City and requested EMS assistance and decided to hover in a near field to check for survivors as hoisting was not a viable solution. We made an approach to a hover in a farmer's field, south of the crash site by about 50 yards. Our flight mechanic, Petty Officer Alan Morgan, jumped out and ran to the wreckage. We took off from the field and began to orbit over head for communicating with CG Group and minimizing fuel consumption. I called to inquire the status of the EMS personnel. We confirmed the geographical position with the Group Duty Officer, Mr. Tom Peck and the Communication Watchstander, Petty Officer Kate Condon. The crash occurred at about 1950Z and EMS personnel began arriving at about 2010Z. In the meantime, our flight mechanic ran to the wreckage and tried to determine the status of the crew. He had difficulty getting to the victim's because of the wreckage on their bodies. He said the aircraft had broken a 3-4 inch tree in the crash. He was unable to find a pulse on either person but had a difficult time trying to get his hand near because of the position of the victim's helmet. One of the men's head was into the ground and didn't appear to be breathing. The other's helmet chin strap was up near his nose and his face was quite disfigured.

About 20 minutes after the crash, 3 ambulances, a fire truck and additional rescue personnel were on scene and we were low on fuel. We approached to hover in the field to regain our flight mechanic and he jumped in to inform us what the situation was. We departed scene at 2020Z and landed at KACY at 2034Z.

Specifics:

Time: 1950Z

Wind: 100 at 8 knots

Sky condition: Clear, visibility 10 SM, no obstructions to visibility.

Crash was approximately 1/4 NM to the NW of Woodbine Airport and about 1/4 NM from the center of town.

Crew: 2, both reported to be DOA by EMS personnel after we landed at KACY.

Monday, February 07, 2005

On approach into Woodbine Airport we noticed an ultra-light aircraft taking off. After the ultra-light aircraft was airborne, it entered a left down-wind. We proceeded to complete our "touch and go" and entered a right down-wind.

At the end of the ultra-light's down-wind we observed the aircraft initiate a left bank turn. The aircraft completed approximately a complete circle when we observed the angle of bank to increase substantially. Then the aircraft made a couple erratic spiral like maneuvers and fell quickly nose down into a body of woods between Woodbine Airport and the water treatment plant. This incident occurred at approximately 2:30 - 2:45 pm, at an altitude of approximately 400 feet.

We proceeded to complete rescue check Part I, made contact with USCG Air Station Atlantic City, flew to the scene to do a low recon to look for any movement at the wreckage. After approximately two orbits around the scene observed no movement around the downed aircraft.

The pilot, co-pilot and I discussed the situation and decided the best course of action was to drop myself off in a field next to the woods. I proceeded through the field and through the woods to the downed aircraft, which was 40 to 50 yards into the wooded area.

Upon arrival to the aircraft I found the aircraft lying on its right side with pieces scattered over the area. There was no smoke or smell of fuel present. There were limbs and branches entangled in the wreckage. The aircraft was partially laid over on the pilot and passenger.

I checked pilot and passenger for breathing and pulse. None found. Two civilians stopped to assist. I instructed one of the civilians to call "911". I re-checked the pilot and passenger for breathing and pulse. None found.

I exchanged information with the "911" operator regarding the victims on the aircraft and location of the crash site. I informed the "911" operator to direct the rescue workers to the circling USCG helicopter due to insufficient location information at that time.

The "911" operator asked me to go back to the dirt road in order to direct EMS personnel to the site. Upon reaching the road I was able to get a road name from another civilian who arrived on the scene. I stayed on line with the "911" operator until EMS personnel and NJ. State Police arrived on scene.

AMT1 ALAN D. MORGAN