

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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IN RE: :
 :
THE AMTRAK TRAIN ACCIDENT : NTSB Accident No.
THAT OCCURRED IN : DCA15MR010
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA :
ON MAY 12, 2015 :
 :
----- :

INTERVIEW OF: BRANDON BOSTIAN

Tuesday,
November 10, 2015

NTSB Headquarters
Washington, D.C.

BEFORE

DAVID BUCHER, NTSB
STEPHEN JENNER, NTSB
MARY PAT MCKAY, NTSB

This transcript was produced from audio
provided by the National Transportation Safety Board.

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Interviewee:

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(10:30 a.m.)

MR. JENNER: Good morning. My name is Stephen Jenner and I'm an Investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. Today is November 10, 2015. It is 10:30 a.m. We are on the fourth floor conference room at the NTSB headquarters in Washington, D.C.

We are to talk with Mr. Bostian, a Locomotive Engineer, about the Amtrak accident in Philadelphia on May 12, 2015. The accident number is DCA15MR010. This is the second time we're talking to Mr. Bostian.

The purpose of the interview is to see if he has any additional information he can provide us today that may help with our investigation of this accident. And perhaps, offer some thoughts about making the industry safer.

Let me go around the room and have everyone introduce themselves. Please spell your last name and state who you are with. Again, my name is Stephen Jenner, S-T-E-P-H-E-N J-E-N-N-E-R. I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB. And continuing on my left.

MS. MCKAY: This is Mary Pat McKay, M-C-K-A-

1 Y, and I'm the Chief Medical Officer for the NTSB.

2 MR. BUCHER: Dave Bucher, B-U-C-H-E-R and
3 I'm Rail Accident Investigator for the National
4 Transportation Safety Board Operations Specialist.

5 MR. BOSTIAN: I should say my name?

6 MR. JENNER: Sure.

7 MR. BOSTIAN: I am Brandon Bostian, B-O-S-T-
8 I-A-N.

9 MR. GOGGIN: I'm Robert Goggin, G-O-G-G-I-N,
10 Counsel for Mr. Bostian.

11 MR. JENNER: Great, thank you. Again, we
12 really appreciate you being here and giving us an
13 opportunity to talk to you a second time. So if you
14 don't have any questions for us, we'll just jump right
15 into it. What we learned, you know, since talking to
16 you is that this incident occurred about eight miles
17 from the Amtrak 30th Street Station and it took about
18 11, 12 minutes before the train reached the accident
19 curve.

20 During the first interview, you indicated
21 that you didn't have memory of many details after
22 passing the North Philadelphia Station. So I'll just
23 open it up. If you want to talk about anything you may
24 have remembered before passing the North Philly Station
25 and if you have any memories after passing North Philly

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1 Station.

2 MR. BOSTIAN: I'm not sure that I remember
3 anything significant before passing North Philadelphia
4 Station. I guess what happened before then was, I
5 passed the, set the train on the adjacent track that
6 had gone -- the engineer had placed that train into
7 emergency.

8 He had reported that rocks had hit his
9 windshield. He had had a radio conversation with the
10 dispatcher. The dispatcher asked him a couple of times
11 if he needed medical attention. He didn't answer the
12 question directly and so, they went back and forth a
13 few times.

14 I radioed that SEPTA train to alert them
15 that I was passing on an adjacent track. And then I
16 blew my train's whistle quite a bit. And I think that
17 I was concerned, with all the confusion on the radio,
18 that they may have personnel on the ground inspecting
19 their train and that they may not be completely
20 situationally aware at that time.

21 So I blew my whistle probably more than I
22 would have had they acknowledged my radio transmission
23 that I was approaching on an adjacent track. And that
24 was before passing North Philadelphia.

25 After I passed North Philadelphia, my memory

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1 isn't completely clear. There's several gaps in my
2 memory as I approached the accident curve. And I
3 couldn't say with certainty that my memory is accurate.
4 There are a couple of prominent scenes in my head that
5 have come back to me since we last spoke.

6 The first one, after North Philadelphia,
7 there are a few speed changes. One of the significant
8 speed changes is there's a 65 mile an hour curve that
9 leads into an 80 mile an hour straightaway that leads
10 into a 50 mile an hour curve, I think, at Frankford
11 Junction or around Frankford Junction area.

12 The memory I think I may have from that
13 night was that I came out of the 65 mile an hour curve.
14 I pushed the throttle forward to accelerate my train.
15 And as I approached 70 miles an hour, I have a memory
16 that I backed off the throttle by mistake because I was
17 targeting 70 miles an hour instead of 80 miles an hour.

18 And as I approached 70 miles an hour, I have
19 a memory that I took action to bring the train up to 70
20 miles an hour. And I have a memory that I realized my
21 mistake, that I should have been operating at 80 miles
22 an hour. And that I pushed the throttle forward in
23 order to accelerate from 70 to 80.

24 And I don't remember anything from that
25 point until after the train was already in the curve.

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1 And again, with that memory of bringing the train to
2 70, realizing a mistake and then making an attempt to
3 bring the train from 70 to 80. There's a very good
4 possibility that could have occurred on a previous trip
5 because that sort of mistake is something that could
6 have happened on any trip.

7 So I don't know. I can't tell you with
8 accuracy, with certainty that that was on the night of
9 the accident. But in my mind, that's what I believe.
10 That's when I believe that memory was from.

11 As I said, once I pushed the throttle
12 forward in an attempt to bring the train up to 80 miles
13 an hour, I don't have any other memories until after
14 the train was already in the curve.

15 And the memory that happened from that point
16 was, the memory from there is very vague. The only
17 word, and I hesitate to use the word dream-like because
18 it sounds like I was asleep and I don't believe that I
19 was asleep at all. But kind of a very foggy memory as
20 in I don't have, the memory doesn't includes much
21 visual memory. I don't remember hearing much.

22 It was more of a feeling. I remember
23 feeling my body lurch to the right, towards the right
24 side of the engine. I remember feeling as though I was
25 going too fast around a curve. In response to that

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1 feeling, I put the train brake on, made about a ten
2 pound application of the brake.

3 On a normal operating day, that would be my
4 normal response to slowing down the train for a normal
5 speed reduction. Would be to put a ten pound
6 application of the brake on, give it about maybe five
7 or ten seconds for the brakes to apply. And then apply
8 the brakes further to make a smooth brake application
9 for comfortable train handling.

10 Very soon -- this again, I don't know if
11 this memory is accurate. But my memory is, very
12 quickly after I made that ten pound reduction, I
13 realized from the force on my body, I realized that
14 this is something that's very serious and I need to
15 bring down the train speed quickly.

16 And so, almost immediately after I made that
17 ten pound reduction, I went to full service on the
18 brakes which would be, you know, I need to slow down
19 this train quickly, right now. At some point after I
20 made that reduction of the brake, from my memory, I
21 felt a sensation of the fireman's side of the
22 locomotive lifting up.

23 In other words, the train felt, the engine
24 felt as though it were tilting over. But I remember
25 taking a few seconds -- I say seconds, I don't mean

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1 that literally. I don't know how long it physically
2 took me to realize. But it felt like it took some
3 amount of time for me to realize the sensation, put
4 together that the sensation of the fireman's side of
5 the engine tilting up really meant that the train
6 engine was tilting over.

7 And that's when I realized that it wasn't
8 that the train was going somewhat fast around the
9 curve. The train was going significantly fast around
10 the curve. And that's when I put the train into
11 emergency. And so the memory I have that may or may
12 not be accurate -- like I said, I can't vouch for how
13 accurate the memory is.

14 But my memory was, my memory is of making
15 three manipulations of the brake control. That first
16 one of going to a ten pound reduction. And then
17 realizing almost immediately that it was a more serious
18 situation and going directly to full service. And then
19 when I realized that the train engine was tipping over,
20 I put the train into emergency.

21 About the same time I put the train into
22 emergency, I recall hoping that the train would not tip
23 completely over. And at the same time, I remember
24 being fearful that even if the train didn't tip over,
25 if it remained somewhat on the track -- I was hoping

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1 that the train would fall back down onto the track
2 because it lost speed.

3 And my concern was that there was the next
4 curve coming up, the right hand curve. My concern was
5 even if it fell down onto the track, I didn't know if
6 it was going to fall completely onto the track or if it
7 was going to come back onto the rail and derail
8 somewhat. And I didn't know if it was going to make it
9 around the next curve.

10 Those are the thoughts I remember having and
11 the moment where I felt the sensation of the train
12 tipping over. Immediately after having those thoughts,
13 I remember feeling the train tip over even further.
14 And I remember realizing that the train was going to go
15 off the track.

16 I remember holding onto the controls tightly
17 and feeling like, okay well this is it, I'm going over.
18 And so I tried to brace myself. The only visual memory
19 I have from that sequence of events is I remember
20 seeing objects fly in front of me, kind of a bluish
21 tint to them. I thought it was paperwork or some sort
22 of thing, objects in the cab. I wasn't sure what it
23 was.

24 When I try to remember what the visual of
25 the memory is, it just looks like small objects. And

1 that's pretty much all I remember. The next memory I
2 have is, like I said before I think, of coming to after
3 the event was over in the cab.

4 I don't have a clear memory of what position
5 I was in when I came to after the event was over. I
6 have a memory of standing up in the cab. And by that,
7 I mean I have a memory of me standing. I don't have a
8 memory of getting up or the action of standing up. I
9 have a memory of me standing up in the cab.

10 I have a memory of looking out. I have a
11 memory of opening the fireman's side door I think. I
12 have a memory of looking, of standing in the doorway
13 and looking back at where the train was. Hearing
14 screams from passengers and otherwise kind of quiet.

15 And then I have a memory of walking through
16 brush from the engine towards where I heard passengers
17 and turning on my phone. I pushed the power button on
18 my phone at some point. It was powering on while I was
19 walking through brush. And then, I think at some point
20 between the engine and the passenger car that was close
21 by -- the passenger car I walked towards is the one
22 that had the roof that was buckled and open to sky.

23 At some point between the engine and that
24 car, the phone completely powered on. I stopped and I
25 turned off airplane mode. I've always been paranoid

1 about getting caught with my cell phone on.

2 So my habit has always been to, it's part of
3 my checklist before I move an engine. At the initial
4 terminal, I put my ringtone volume on silent and I put
5 my airplane mode in airplane mode. And then I
6 completely power off the phone and I put it in my
7 (inaudible).

8 And so, halfway between the engine and the
9 passenger car, once the phone booted up, I turned off
10 airplane mode and then I kept walking. And then I
11 called 911 as I got close to the car. A passenger saw
12 me using my phone to call 911 -- and I'll back up.

13 When I was on 911, I didn't know what my
14 location was. I do have a memory of not knowing. Once
15 I had dialed 911 and hit send on the phone, I remember
16 thinking, oh my gosh I have no idea where I am, this is
17 going to be, I'm not going to be able to tell them
18 where I am. The most I'm going to be able to tell them
19 is that maybe my train number and the fact that a train
20 had derailed. But I guess that's better than nothing.

21 But it was a relief when I called 911 and
22 they said that they had already gotten the report. I
23 remember looking up and I saw an overhead bridge of
24 like industrial, I don't know if you'd call it piping
25 or something. It wasn't a public roadway or a public

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1 walkway I don't think.

2 But I saw that and that looked familiar but
3 I couldn't for the life of me tell you. I had seen
4 that before. I knew that I had seen that but I
5 couldn't tell you where I was. And it took me several
6 minutes to remember that it was somewhere near
7 Philadelphia. And then it took me along time after
8 that to remember exactly where that curve was.

9 And ready to go back, after I got off the
10 phone with 911, a passenger that I had reached -- there
11 was a group of three passengers. One of the passengers
12 asked to borrow my phone to call somebody and I let her
13 borrow my phone. I thought she made a quick
14 conversation, or made a quick call to somebody.

15 A month or so later at my house, I looked
16 over, I got a copy of my cell phone bill. It turned
17 out that that phone call she made, I guess was about
18 seven minutes long. In my mind, I thought it was 30
19 seconds. Soon after that, soon after her call, I saw
20 first responders come over the track.

21 It looked like the track, they came over a
22 hill, it looked like the track was on a hill. I waved
23 my flashlight at him. I had my flashlight in my
24 pocket, I used it to walk from the engine to the car.
25 I remember seeing my flashlight along the brush as I

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1 walked over. I used my flashlight to wave at the first
2 responders and a few of them came over to help the
3 three passengers that I was standing next to.

4 I asked them, you know, what I could do to
5 help. I said that I didn't feel like I was hurt or
6 anything. And they just told me to sit down where I
7 was and I sat down. And eventually, someone else told
8 me to get up and walk over there to the, walk across
9 the tracks to the triage area. And I walked across the
10 tracks to the triage area.

11 I think those are pretty much the details
12 that I didn't have a good memory of last time we
13 talked. Maybe the only other stuff that's come up is I
14 remember hearing, while I was in triage area, I
15 remember hearing some of the first responders shouting
16 to each other watch out, the electricity hasn't been
17 turned off yet.

18 I remember feeling terrible that that's
19 something that I didn't warn them about either. That I
20 should have known that myself, that I didn't do
21 anything to try to protect the response crews or radio
22 for help or do anything.

23 I know that, looking back on it, it's kind
24 of ridiculous. I was in a bad situation myself but at
25 the time, I remember feeling just beside myself that I

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1 didn't do any of the normal radio calls or anything. I
2 don't remember getting on the radio after the accident
3 or anything, making an emergency call or anything.

4 After that, you know, I went to the ER, all
5 that. I think we pretty well, probably covered that
6 last time. So yes, I think that's what I remember.

7 MR. JENNER: Great. I appreciate that.
8 There are two areas that I heard that you gave a
9 wonderful description. I just want to go back --

10 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes, sure.

11 MR. JENNER: -- and explore some more
12 details. One thing that you just mentioned and I don't
13 think you talked in as much detail the first time, was
14 you blowing your whistle as you were passing the SEPTA
15 train. And you had, there was some confusion about
16 what was going on out there at that time.

17 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes.

18 MR. JENNER: I don't think you commented
19 that on the --

20 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes.

21 MR. JENNER: -- on the first interview. So
22 if I understood what you just said, the confusion, you
23 know, or uncertainty was what is going on with the
24 SEPTA train at that moment.

25 MR. BOSTIAN: Well the confusion that I

1 remember having when I was passing by them was, we have
2 the standard procedure that you're supposed to follow
3 when your train goes into emergency. Is that you're
4 supposed to, immediately the train crew is supposed to
5 get out and provide protection for trains on adjacent
6 tracks until you're relieved of that duty by the
7 dispatcher.

8 And also, before you start moving again,
9 your train crew is supposed to inspect the train to
10 make sure all wheels are on the track. And so, when I
11 heard the confusion going on between the dispatcher and
12 the engineer of that train, I was concerned that there
13 was a possibility that there may have been some sort of
14 communication breakdown onboard the train itself
15 between the engineer and the conductor and the
16 assistant train men, or the assistant conductor, the
17 various train men.

18 And maybe there was a possibility that some
19 of the train men may have decided on their own to get
20 off the equipment to either provide protection or to
21 start inspecting the train without the knowledge of the
22 engineer or the conductor or the dispatcher. And so
23 that's why I wanted to make sure that there was some
24 sort of whistling, that I was providing whistle.

25 And then also, I think that there was a

1 train coming the opposite direction, if I remember
2 right. I remember seeing headlights coming the other
3 way. So I wanted to make sure -- and it probably
4 wasn't the appropriate response. But I wanted to make
5 sure that I whistled as well so that, if the other
6 train was whistling, so they knew that there were two
7 trains coming from opposite directions.

8 Because it seemed like that was a scenario
9 where it would be really easy for someone to get struck
10 by a train, out in the middle of the night with a lot
11 of radio confusion going on. So that's why I made as
12 much noise as I possibly could. But there's a
13 possibility that, in that situation, the extra
14 whistling could have added to the confusion.

15 MR. JENNER: Okay. If you recall, and I
16 think you may have mentioned --

17 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes.

18 MR. JENNER: -- moments ago. Before you
19 passed the SEPTA train, you got on the radio and said
20 you're hot on two.

21 MR. BOSTIAN: Right.

22 MR. JENNER: But you did not get a reply
23 from SEPTA.

24 MR. BOSTIAN: That's right.

25 MR. JENNER: Would you have expected to have

1 gotten a reply?

2 MR. BOSTIAN: I would have hoped for one. I
3 think, I wasn't surprised that I didn't get a reply.
4 But I think if things had been less chaotic between the
5 potential medical emergency and everything -- I think
6 if we were out in the middle of nowhere and, you know,
7 there had been an event and things had calmed down, I
8 think it would have been standard. If they had heard
9 me say that, they would have replied probably with a
10 thank you or something. But as confusing as things
11 were, I'm not really surprised, if that makes sense.

12 MR. JENNER: Okay. And when you passed the
13 SEPTA train, did you end up seeing anyone on the
14 ground?

15 MR. BOSTIAN: I didn't but I think that
16 there was an oncoming train with headlights. And it
17 was hard to see anything with all the headlights or
18 with the glare from the headlights. So if there was
19 somebody on the ground, I wouldn't have seen them.

20 MR. JENNER: Okay. And so you traveled on
21 in the second area that you just provided more details.
22 And you opened up by saying, there's changes in, I
23 guess maximum authorized speed, 65 to 80. Now I heard
24 you saying you may have mistaken 70 for 80.

25 MR. BOSTIAN: Right.

1 MR. JENNER: I know you gave a lot of good
2 details right there.

3 MR. BOSTIAN: Sure.

4 MR. JENNER: But for a moment you thought
5 the maximum speed was 70?

6 MR. BOSTIAN: I had a, I wouldn't say I
7 thought the maximum authorized speed was 70. But you
8 know, any time you're operating a car or a vehicle,
9 sometimes in your head, you might be targeting 80. But
10 you notice the needle approaches a whole number like 70
11 --

12 MR. JENNER: Right.

13 MR. BOSTIAN: -- or whatever, you may just
14 kind of peg on that 70 and see the needle approach 70.
15 Or even the digits, I usually look at the digits. So I
16 might look at, you know, 68, 69, 70 and just kind of
17 get the wires crossed for lack of a better word, and
18 accidentally, you know, hone in on the wrong speed.

19 MR. JENNER: Right.

20 MR. BOSTIAN: Makes sense?

21 MR. JENNER: But in a sense, you erred on
22 the safer side.

23 MR. BOSTIAN: Right.

24 MR. JENNER: It was actually you could have
25 gone up to 80.

1 MR. BOSTIAN: I could have gone 80.

2 MR. JENNER: But you were targeting 70?

3 MR. BOSTIAN: And I wouldn't say it was
4 especially a conscious decision.

5 MR. JENNER: Right.

6 MR. BOSTIAN: More of a subconscious thing,
7 you know.

8 MR. JENNER: Okay.

9 MR. BOSTIAN: Where you know, you're trying
10 to go for a particular speed and you see the last digit
11 getting close to, you know, eight, nine, zero and you
12 start backing off.

13 MR. JENNER: Okay.

14 MR. BOSTIAN: Also there's, for other types
15 of trains the speed limit is 70. So there's a
16 possibility I may have gotten momentarily mixed up.
17 Not that I thought I was on that type of train but I
18 may have just, you know, thought back to a couple of
19 days prior or a couple weeks prior or something. I'm
20 not sure --

21 MR. JENNER: So is there --

22 MR. BOSTIAN: -- why that would have
23 happened.

24 MR. JENNER: I'm sorry.

25 MR. BOSTIAN: I'm not sure why that would

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1 have happened. But yes, I think that I subconsciously
2 or whatever may have just hit the wrong speed by
3 mistake, if that makes sense. It's not like I came out
4 of the 65 curve and thought I'm going to go to 70, you
5 know.

6 But as you approach 70, or as I approached
7 70, my memory is -- and it could have been from a prior
8 trip. But my memory is that I think I may have, you
9 know, by mistake, accidentally come up to 70 rather
10 than 80.

11 MR. JENNER: Okay. So you had an
12 opportunity to go faster than you actually did?

13 MR. BOSTIAN: Right. And so I sped up.

14 MR. JENNER: Okay.

15 MR. BOSTIAN: And I don't know if I
16 actually, I don't remember if I actually leveled off,
17 for lack of a better word. I don't know if I actually
18 maintained 70 for any particular amount of time or if I
19 just approached and pulled the throttle back and
20 corrected that error before I actually, you know,
21 stabilized at 70 or not.

22 MR. JENNER: Okay.

23 MR. BOSTIAN: I don't know how long I was
24 there.

25 MR. JENNER: But sometimes, you just alluded

1 to, if you're operating on a different track or
2 different equipment --

3 MR. BOSTIAN: Right.

4 MR. JENNER: -- then 70 would have applied?

5 MR. BOSTIAN: That's right.

6 MR. JENNER: Okay.

7 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes.

8 MR. JENNER: Have you operated other
9 equipment on other tracks where you did have to abide
10 by the 70?

11 MR. BOSTIAN: Sure.

12 MR. JENNER: Okay.

13 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes. I don't know how
14 recently before this trip. But yes, certainly.

15 MR. JENNER: But is it fair to say more
16 often than not, you would have been allowed to go 80
17 based on the track and equipment that you're accustomed
18 to operating?

19 MR. BOSTIAN: I'm not sure what percentage
20 I'd be allowed to go 80 or 70. I certainly often times
21 operated C trains that would be a maximum of 70. And
22 there were several times they had me operate on Track 1
23 going that direction which would be a maximum of 70 for
24 all trains. Or at least all trains that I regularly
25 operated. But I wouldn't be able to tell you if it was

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1 51 percent of the time.

2 MR. JENNER: Right.

3 MR. BOSTIAN: Often would be fair I think.

4 MR. JENNER: Okay. This incident occurred
5 at night time. Are there any particular challenges
6 working at night in that area of Philadelphia? In
7 terms of visibility, in terms of signals or other
8 queues that you would use to help you operate?

9 MR. BOSTIAN: I think for the 50 mile an
10 hour curve, it's difficult to see where the curve
11 starts. If you are, or when you do slow down for the
12 50 mile an hour curve, it's difficult to see where the
13 track physically starts curving.

14 That being said though, it's clear when you
15 approach it that there is a curve there. Because as
16 you approach that curve, you know there is the SEPTA
17 marker at Frankford El, I think the elevated subway
18 track bridge structure, that gives you a cue that's
19 pretty visible at night.

20 There's the signals for the interlocking
21 (phonetic). I think it's shore interlocking. It's
22 been almost six months now, I'm a little bit out of
23 the, a little bit rusty on the territory now. But as
24 that track curves to the left, it kind of, you're
25 looking into somewhat of a black abyss.

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1 I mean, it's hard to see where the curve
2 specifically starts but you can tell that there is a
3 curve, if that makes sense.

4 MR. JENNER: Right.

5 MR. BOSTIAN: You wouldn't be fooled into
6 thinking the track continued going straight. But as
7 far as trying to peg exactly where the curve starts, it
8 would be easy to hit the curve a little bit hot by five
9 or ten miles an hour if you weren't being careful and
10 looking very carefully at the cues because it can sneak
11 up on you.

12 But like I said, I mean, you would know
13 there was a curve there if you were looking out the
14 windshield because it's just a black abyss on the other
15 side of the curve.

16 MR. JENNER: Okay. That's all the questions
17 I have for right now.

18 MR. BOSTIAN: Okay.

19 MR. JENNER: Dave, you have some follow up?

20 MR. BUCHER: Just a couple and they're sort
21 of -- this is Dave Bucher. Have you heard or have you
22 had any memories additionally of how the equipment
23 handled? Any issues with the locomotive or the cars?
24 Initially you told us there was no problems and the
25 train handled as it should.

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1 MR. BOSTIAN: Right.

2 MR. BUCHER: I guess what I'm looking for,
3 is there anything that you remembered in that
4 department?

5 MR. BOSTIAN: I don't remember having, I
6 haven't had any memories of any particular mechanical
7 issues. Like I said, other than the window that you
8 guys telling about, with the wind noise from the
9 window.

10 MR. BUCHER: Okay. And could you go through
11 that a little bit again? You initially told us that
12 there was vibration.

13 MR. BOSTIAN: I think I said wind noise.

14 MR. BUCHER: Wind noise? Okay.

15 MR. BOSTIAN: Or something like that. That
16 is something that I actually remember less well now --

17 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

18 MR. BOSTIAN: -- than I did about six months
19 ago.

20 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

21 MR. BOSTIAN: I just remember that there was
22 noise from, it felt like or it sounded like there was,
23 you know, that the window was cracked open or
24 something. Not that the glass the broken. The glass
25 seemed intact on the side window.

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1 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

2 MR. BOSTIAN: But it felt like it didn't
3 close completely or something. And I remember trying
4 to adjust it but I couldn't find a position with the
5 window that would --

6 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

7 MR. BOSTIAN: -- be quiet.

8 MR. BUCHER: Okay. And those adjustments
9 that you made, did you make those leaving early in the
10 trip or later?

11 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes. That would have been
12 early. I would have probably tried to adjust that
13 between the area of Washington --

14 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

15 MR. BOSTIAN: -- and Baltimore or something.

16 MR. BUCHER: Okay. That's all I have right
17 now.

18 MR. BOSTIAN: Okay.

19 MR. JENNER: Okay. Mary Pat?

20 MS. MCKAY: So a couple questions.

21 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes.

22 MS. MCKAY: The first one is going to --
23 I'll start at the end instead of the beginning.

24 MR. BOSTIAN: Okay.

25 MS. MCKAY: When you actually got

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1 transported to the hospital, who did that
2 transportation for you?

3 MR. BOSTIAN: To the hospital? I would
4 imagine -- it was in a police paddy wagon. So I
5 imagine it was probably the police that did the
6 driving.

7 MS. MCKAY: Okay. And there were other
8 passengers in the paddy wagon with you?

9 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes. I think there was eight
10 seats so probably seven other people.

11 MS. MCKAY: Okay. And really just out of
12 curiosity and this has very little to do with the
13 question of how the accident came to happen, but comes
14 to some of the questions about how things went after
15 the accident in terms of the emergency medical
16 response. Did they put you in a seatbelt? Do you
17 remember?

18 MR. BOSTIAN: I'm sorry? Could you --

19 MS. MCKAY: Was there a seatbelt?

20 MR. BOSTIAN: In the paddy wagon, there was
21 a strap that you'd hold onto with your hand behind,
22 right around your waist level. But there wasn't a
23 seatbelt that went around your hip.

24 MS. MCKAY: Okay.

25 MR. BOSTIAN: And there was a sign. I do

1 remember there were news media reports at the time
2 about being transported in paddy wagons because of
3 other events that had occurred. And so, I did remember
4 hearing about those. And I noticed the straps and I
5 remember pointing them out to other people in the paddy
6 wagon, that they did not notice them.

7 MS. MCKAY: Okay.

8 MR. BOSTIAN: And so, I was like, you guys
9 should hold on to these.

10 MS. MCKAY: Okay. The day sounds, up to
11 this point, from your previous interview, like it was
12 sort of run of the mill kind of a day. Any memories or
13 any symptoms that you might have had? It still sounds
14 like there's some things you don't remember. But do
15 you remember feeling unwell in any way?

16 MR. BOSTIAN: No, I don't have memories of
17 any symptoms. As far as the -- and I know this is not
18 related to your question. As far as the day being
19 normal, the only abnormal thing about the day -- and I
20 think I covered this last time we spoke, was just that
21 technical issues on the Acela train on the way down to
22 D.C.

23 MS. MCKAY: Right.

24 MR. BOSTIAN: With the speed data not
25 available. But as far as your question with the

1 medical symptoms, I don't recall having any sort of
2 abnormal medical symptoms. No cold or anything like
3 that.

4 MS. MCKAY: Okay. Well that's what I have.

5 MR. JENNER: Okay. Thank you. I don't have
6 any questions at this moment. But Dave, can you pause
7 that for a moment?

8 MR. BUCHER: We're going to pause now.

9 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
10 off the record at TIME NOT GIVEN and resumed at TIME
11 NOT GIVEN.)

12 MR. BUCHER: Okay. This is Dave Bucher and
13 we're back on the record. Brandon, if you could -- and
14 I'm just going to follow up on the visibility of the
15 locomotive a little bit.

16 MR. BOSTIAN: Okay.

17 MR. BUCHER: If you could, tell us what your
18 view, basically describe your view coming in to the
19 accident scene. You know, what, you know, the
20 visibility out the front, visibility to the side,
21 anything that you might be able to add in that respect.

22 MR. BOSTIAN: Visibility out the front of
23 the engine? It's been a while, it's been six months
24 since I was on it. So I don't have all that clear
25 memory off the top of my head of how the visibility out

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1 of the front of the engine was. I don't remember it
2 being an especially big problem but that's not to say
3 that it isn't.

4 Like I said, I've been away from it for a
5 long time, I would consider right now. So it could
6 have been a factor and I'm not really sure.

7 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

8 MR. BOSTIAN: I do know that visibility to
9 the side can be an issue on that engine.

10 MR. BUCHER: Okay. All right, that's all I
11 have right now.

12 MR. JENNER: Just to follow up, what are the
13 issues with the side visibility that you're mentioning?

14 MR. BOSTIAN: Just that the, looking out the
15 corners, looking kind of to the side and out the corner
16 of the engine can be hard. It can be hard to spot the
17 train accurately at platforms and stuff like that. Or
18 I've never used the locomotive for doing switching
19 operations, but I imagine it might be difficult to see
20 personnel on the ground around the engine.

21 MR. JENNER: Thank you.

22 MS. MCKAY: Nothing from me.

23 MR. JENNER: Great. Just changing pace a
24 bit, if you recall in our first interview, we discussed
25 if you had any thoughts about anything that you can

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1 think of that would make the overall railroad industry
2 safer. You've had some time to reflect on this and
3 also, you've had to take care of yourself since then.

4 MR. BOSTIAN: Right.

5 MR. JENNER: So I'll make an offer again.
6 If you have any thoughts about any new procedures,
7 policy, training, equipment that you think would help
8 prevent this type of accident --

9 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes.

10 MR. JENNER: -- from happening again, we'd
11 like to give you the opportunity to say anything.

12 MR. BOSTIAN: I think that there are
13 probably things that could be done. I haven't had much
14 time. I've been focusing a lot on recovery over the
15 last few months. And also, it's been, with my
16 condition, it's been difficult to concentrate for very
17 long on things. I'd prefer to wait and go over that at
18 a later time, if that's okay.

19 MR. JENNER: That would be fine for us.

20 MR. BOSTIAN: Okay.

21 MR. JENNER: When you're ready, we'd like to
22 hear from you.

23 MR. BOSTIAN: I appreciate it.

24 MR. JENNER: Okay. And we'll go around the
25 room, any points of clarification Mr. Goggin?

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1 MR. GOGGIN: None.

2 MR. JENNER: Great. Do you have any
3 thoughts, anything you'd like to share with us Brandon,
4 that we had not discussed that you think would be
5 helpful?

6 MR. BOSTIAN: I think that about covers it.
7 I appreciate you guys having another meeting.

8 MS. MCKAY: Sure.

9 MR. BUCHER: Not a problem.

10 MR. JENNER: Well we appreciate you being
11 here and your willingness to talk to us a second time.
12 The time is 11:30 and --

13 MR. GOGGIN: Just for purposes of finishing
14 up -- this is Mr. Goggin. If it would be helpful to
15 you in any way, we'd be happy to talk to you a third, a
16 fourth, a fifth, anything you want.

17 MR. BUCHER: Great. We appreciate that.

18 MR. BOSTIAN: Yes.

19 MR. BUCHER: Thank you.

20 MR. JENNER: So with that, we'll finish up
21 this interview.

22 MR. BUCHER: Okay. That concludes the
23 interview.

24 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
25 off the record at 11:30 a.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

MATTER: Amtrak Train Accident that Occurred in
Philadelphia, PA on May 12, 2015
NTSB Accident No. DCA15MR010
Interview of Brandon Bostian

DATE: 11-10-15

I hereby certify that the attached transcription of page 1 to 33 inclusive are to the best of my professional ability a true, accurate, and complete record of the above referenced proceedings as contained on the provided audio recording; further that I am neither counsel for, nor related to, nor employed by any of the parties to this action in which this proceeding has taken place; and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

A solid black rectangular box redacting the signature of the court reporter.

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