BOMBARDIER

AEROSPACE
Bombardier Inc.

Dorval, Québec, Canada H4S 1Y9 www.bombardier.com

July 13, 2012

Ralph Hicks Sr. Air Safety Investigator National Transportation Safety board Atlanta Regional Office

Our reference no.: CL600-2B16.5194.23-5-12

Subject: Challenger 601-3R N207JB (A/C 5194), In-Flight Main Passenger Door

Separation Accident, 23 May 2012, Hallandale, Florida

Dear Mr. Hicks,

Please find attached Bombardier's field notes in support of the NTSB investigation into this accident. The information contained in this report is factual information and supersedes any other previous information that may have been provided by Bombardier to the NTSB.

Bombardier investigators travelled to the Bombardier Fort-Lauderdale service facility on May 24, 2012 to assist the FAA in documenting the aircraft damage and condition of the main passenger door warning system. Bombardier investigators also travelled to the Westin Diplomat Resort & Spa on May 26, 2012 where the main passenger door came to rest after it separated from the aircraft. The Bombardier investigation team did not identify any pre-existing mechanical or structural failure.

I will send you and the Transportation Safety Board of Canada a DVD containing all the photos and videos Bombardier took during the onsite investigation and also a copy of the surveillance video obtained by the FAA showing the accident aircraft departing from the FBO at the OpaLocka Executive Airport.

If you have any questions regarding this document or the investigation, please feel free to contact me.

Challenger 601-3R N207JB (A/C 5194) In-Flight Main Passenger Door Separation Accident May 23, 2012 Hallandale, Florida

Yours truly,

(Signature on file)

Jimmy Avgoustis Sr. Air Safety Investigator Air Safety Investigation Office Bombardier Aerospace

Cc: John Britten, Transportation Safety Board of Canada

SECTION 1	AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION INFORMATION BOMBARDIER PERSONEL AND OTHERS ON SITE INFORMATION (FORT
3 2	BOMBARDIER PERSONEL AND OTHERS ON SITE INFORMATION (FORT-LAUDERDALE) MAIN PASSENGER DOOR IMPACT SITE INFORMATION
4	AIRFRAME (MAIN PASSENGER DOOR AREA) INFORMATION
U	MAIN PASSENGER DOOR INFORMATION
6	AIRFRAME & WING INFORMATION
7	PULL-IN-LEVER CHECK
∞	COCKPIT INFORMATION
9	MAIN PASSENGER DOOR WARNING SYSTEM INFORMATION
10	MAIN PASSENGER DOOR MAINTENANCE HISTORY INFORMATION (BOMBARDIER HARTFORD SERVICE CENTER)
11	FLIGHTAWARE FLIGHT TRACKING OF N207JB
12	OPA LOCKA (OPF) FBO SURVEILLANCE VIDEO OF N207JB
13	FLIGHT RECORDER INFORMATION

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ъ	4	ω	2	1	ITEM
Aircraft's main passenger door data plate indicates: Drawing 600-31901-1001, Manufactured 12-7-95, serial 5194, model 601-3R	Aircraft entered operational service on February 4, 1997	Aircraft certificate of airworthiness issued on January 31, 1996	Aircraft production serial number 5194	Challenger 601-3R (CL600-2B16)	1. AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION INFORMATION

2. BOMBARDIER PERSONEL AND OTHERS ON SITE INFORMATION (FORT-LAUDERDALE)

Note:	Ь	Ь	×	Ь	Н	QTY
Bombardier Air Safety and Engineeri	FAA FSDO-19	FAA FSDO-19	Bombardier Fort Lauderdale Service Center	Engineering - Montreal	Air Safety Investigation Office - Montreal	ORGANIZATION
Bombardier Air Safety and Engineering arrived in Fort Lauderdale, FL on May 24, 2012 and left on May 26, 2012	Principal Maintenance Inspector	Principal Operations Inspector	Support from multiple technical disciplines	Principal Engineering Specialist & Transport Canada Certified Design Approval Designee for doors	Air Safety Investigator	FUNCTION



3. MAIN PASSENGER DOOR IMPACT SITE INFORMATION





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
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
Note: ITEM 10 9 ∞ 7 6 G 4 ω \vdash 2 Aircraft had approximately 4,913 hrs and 2,492 landings at the time of the accident Aft upper tension button Forward upper tension button Aft roller Forward roller Forward stop Aft cam (Pull-in lever) Forward cam (Pull-in lever) Aft upper latch spigot Forward upper latch spigot Aft stop PART / AREA / CHECK 4. AIRFRAME (MAIN PASSENGER DOOR AREA) INFORMATION Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure CONDITION

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16	15	14	13	12	11	ITEM	
Door electrical harness interface	Door mechanical interface	Aft lower tension button	Forward lower tension button	Aft center latch spigot and proximity switch	Forward center latch spigot and proximity switch	PART / AREA / CHECK	4. AIRFRA
 Found severed and approximately two (2) feet of electrical wiring was dangling from connector P2MB The severed wires contained four (4) power wires and were free to make contact with the airframe in flight Any one of the four (4) power wires in the bundle could create a short circuit if it were to come into contact with the airframe and can potentially trip circuit breakers CB-D17 and CB-B160 	Found severed	Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure	Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure	Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure	Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure	CONDITION	4. AIRFRAME (MAIN PASSENGER DOOR AREA) INFORMATION

TE Z	4. AIRFRAME (MAIN PASSE	4. AIRFRAME (MAIN PASSENGER DOOR AREA) INFORMATION
	PART / AREA / CHECK	CONDITIO
17	1. Found a pur a) Simil b) Sama 2. Found a hor 2. Found a hor 3 Simil Airframe skin below door area between F/S 310 & F/S 335 and left stringer 19 & 20 deep d) The appr	 Found a puncture on skin: a) Similar in size to the tip of the pull out handle, and b) Same fuselage station as the tip of the pull out handle Found a horizontal impression on skin: a) Similar in size as the external handle, and b) Same fuselage station as the external handle c) The forward end of the impression has a gouge approximately 0.016" deep and is approximately 0.700" high d) The aft end of the impression has a gouge 0.005" deep, 1.950" long and 0.350" high e) There are some other minor gouges in the middle of the impression of approximately 0.003" and 0.004" deep




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
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


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


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


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


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







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		5. MAIN PASSENGER DOOR INFORMATION
ITEM	PART / AREA / CHECK	CONDITION
Ъ	Forward upper latch cam and proximity switch	 Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure The green alignment marks were present and visible When manipulating its associated linkage, the latch cam rotated
2	Aft upper latch cam and proximity switch	 Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure The green alignment marks were present and visible When manipulating its associated linkage, the latch cam rotated
ω	Support leg	Found severed
4	Forward pull-in lever	Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure
О	Aft pull-in lever	Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure
6	Forward tension fitting	Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure
7	Aft tension fitting	Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure
∞	Forward center latch cam	 Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure The green alignment marks were present and visible
9	Aft center latch cam	 Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure The green alignment marks were present and visible

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


16	15	14	13	12	11	10	ITEM	
Pushrod between upper latch cams and center latch cams	Aft handrail	Forward handrail	Door upper half	External handle	Pull out handle	Internal handle	PART / AREA / CHECK	
Found severed at lower rod end with evidence of compression load failure	Found severed	Found severed	Found crushed with evidence of compression load failure	 Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure When operated by hand, the forward and aft center latch cams, the internal handle and their associated linkages operated normal When centered horizontal, the handle would retract in its stowed position 	 Found handle bend approximately 20 degrees opposite from its contour Found handle in its stowed position with the bend portion standing proud and was difficult to extend Found its linkage to the internal and external handles severed from tension loads 	 Found no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure When operated by hand, the forward and aft center latch cams, external handle and their associated linkages operated normal 	CONDITION	5. MAIN PASSENGER DOOR INFORMATION



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
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MAINTENANCE MANUAL PSP 601-2



Challenger 601-3R N207JB (A/C 5194) In-Flight Main Passenger Door Separation Accident

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
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Challenger 601-3R N207JB (A/C 5194) In-Flight Main Passenger Door Separation Accident 15:47 EST **B** 2012 Florida May 23, Hallandale Beach,




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





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Upper fuselage	Vertical stabilizer	Left airframe side aft of door area	Belly just aft of door	Right wing	Right airframe F/S 379 to F/S 394 and forward of belly fairing	PART / AREA / CHECK	
Bombardier inspected the upper fuselage and found no evidence of damage	Found several scuff marks on the vertical stabilizer	Found several scuff marks aft and above the door area	Found the no. 1 VHF antenna severed and approximately 80% missing	Found a minor nick on the inboard leading edge	Found a round depression similar in size to the main door support leg	CONDITION	6. AIRFRAME & WING INFORMATION



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2	Ь	ITEM	
Door closed properly with the use of the internal handle	Door pushed by hand		
When the internal handle was used to properly close the door, the pull-in levers engaged 100%.	The engagement of the pull-in-levers was checked on another Challenger type aircraft by pushing the door to the closed position with a normal hand force. The pull-in-levers engaged approximately 40%.	CONDITION	7. PULL-IN-LEVER CHECK



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
TEM	PART / AREA / CHECK Circuit Breaker B-160 "DOOR	8. COCKPIT INFORMATION
1	Circuit Breaker B-160 "DOOR WARN"	Found in the open position
2	Circuit Breaker D-17 "DOOR WARN"	Found in the open position
ω	Pressurization system	Found selected in the "AUTO" mode and Emergency Depressurization not selected
4	Checklist	Found a Bombardier / SimuFlite Quick Reference Handbook PSP 601A-15 Revision 12 — October 2010, which it includes: • CHALLENGER 601-3A/3R PILOT CHECKLIST, Page N-6, BEFORE TAKEOFF, item 8: Annunciator
И	Checklist	Found a checklist "Benair / Bahrain executive Air Services Co. WLL" Revision 00 23-Jan-07, page 2, TAKE OFF CHECKS does not contain: "Annunciator






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
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


4	ω	2	Н	ITEM	
8-CHANNEL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL	CABIN & DOOR SIGNS PANEL ASSEMBLY light illumination check	CABIN & DOOR SIGNS PANEL ASSEMBLY	Master caution system	PART / AREA / CHECK	9. MAIN P
 a) The DOORS caution light on the 8-CHANNEL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL illuminated when the cockpit was electrically powered up and extinguished normally when pressing the master caution button b) The DOORS caution light on the 8-CHANNEL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL was successfully recalled when the RECALL switch, located on the 10-CHANNEL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL, was selected 	The following was found during the illumination check of the door warning lights: a) The PASS DR UNLKD light, on the cockpit CABIN & DOOR SIGNS PANEL ASSEMBLY, was not illuminated when the cockpit was electrically powered up due to the severed door interface circuitry Note: The PASS DR NOT RDY, PASS DR READY lights do not illuminate if the door is opened normally on the ground b) The PASS DR NOT RDY, PASS DR UNLKD and PASS DR READY lights on the CABIN & DOOR SIGNS PANEL ASSEMBLY illuminated when tested with the cockpit pushto-test switch located on the pilot's side console	Found the CABIN & DOOR SIGNS PANEL ASSEMBLY, on the cockpit center pedestal , not in the factory certified location Note: The factory certified location is in the center lower portion of the cockpit center pedestal	Found no anomalies with the master caution warning system	CONDITION	9. MAIN PASSENGER DOOR WARNING SYSTEM INFORMATION

9. MAIN PASSENGER DOOR WARNING SYSTEM INFORMATION


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
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
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10. MAIN PASSENGER DOOR MAINTENANCE HISTORY INFORMATION (BOMBARDIER HARTFORD SERVICE CENTER)

И	4	ω	2	Ъ	ITEM
Main entry door cable guide attached to fuselage at FS 348 WL 97 is broken	Floor board support extrusion at pax door entry is corroded along the attached point of the top	Lower portion of guard for cabin entry door lever handle is broken, attached to upper fwd railing	Main door closed green light (ready for flight) does not illuminate	Passenger door upper corners leak when cabin is pressurized	SNAG
Removed passenger entry door motor cable plastic guard assembly. Riveted new nutplates onto guard assemblyand installed guard assembly at aft side of fuselage door frame.	Replaced floorboard support angle at pax door entry with new angle	Removed old handle guard and installed new handle guard	Re secured PBA (push button assembly) performed ops test of pax / crew entrance door switch operational test good performed in accordance with PSP 601-2 AMM Chapter 52-70-00 page 205	Repaired upper and aft passenger door seal striker surface area	WORK ACCOMPLISHED
8 August 2011	28 September 2011	29 September 2011	12 December 2011	4 February 2012	DATE

Note: Aircraft arrived at the Bombardier Hartford facility for maintenance on June 20, 2008 and departed on January 5, 2012



2	Ъ	ITEM	
FlightAware flight tracking services show the aircraft on May 23, 2012 @ 3:48 PM was at 2,700 feet and descending	FlightAware flight tracking services show the aircraft on May 23, 2012 @ 3:47 PM was at 3,000 feet and climbing	FACTUAL INFORMATION	11. FLIGHTAWARE FLIGHT TRACKING OF N207JB

Н	ITEM	
Airport surveillance video obtained by the FAA from the Opa Locka (OPF) FBO, shows the Operator closing the main door then reopening and then closing the door again	FACTUAL INFORMATION	12. OPA LOCKA (OPF) FBO SURVEILLANCE VIDEO OF N207JB

Challenger 601-3R N207JB (A/C 5194) In-Flight Main Passenger Door Separation Accident

Hallandale Beach, Florida May 23, 2012 @ 15:47 EST

ω	2	Ь	ITEM	
CVR L3 Communications Model FA2100 P/N 2100-1020-00 S/N 000244915 Mfg 09 2003	FDR Fairchild Model F1000 P/N S603-1000-00 S/N 00633 Mfg 05/97	Both the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were recovered by the FAA and sent to the NTSB labs in Washington D.C on May 25, 2012	FACTUAL INFORMATION	13. FLIGHT RECORDER INFORMATION