



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

October 1, 2014

Attachment 3 – Crew Statements

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

DCA14MA081

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A. CREW STATEMENTS

1.0 Flight Crew Statements

1.1 Captain

To Whom It May Concern:

I was the Captain and Pilot Flying on US Airways flight 1702 from PHL to FLL on March 13, 2014.

We were issued an EDCT of 1829 on our flight release and PDC. We pushed back and taxied single-engine to runway 27L. Awaiting release, our departure time was moved up. We started the number 2 engine and accomplished the taxi checklist.

When we were cleared to taxi to the hold short line of runway 27L I called for the line items. At this time I noticed runway 27R was displayed in the MCDU and on the PFD. The First Officer changed the entry to runway 27L and we completed the checklist line items. We were cleared to line up and wait on runway 27L; as we taxied onto the runway, we were cleared for takeoff.

As I advanced the thrust, I heard a chime and asked the First Officer what it was. She responded "thrust not set." I moved the thrust levers slightly forward out of the FLEX detent towards TOGA to make sure they were not out of the detent and returned them to FLEX. During takeoff roll I noticed no V speeds were displayed. Since we had just verbally stated these speeds, I elected to use those speeds and continue the takeoff. Shortly after that, an aural "retard, retard, retard" was announced at between 120 knots and 140 knots. We continued the takeoff and I started rotation at 159 knots.

Once the wheels were off the ground, I had the perception the aircraft was unsafe to fly and I decided the safest action was to not continue. I slowly reduced the thrust to idle, reduced the pitch and the aircraft contacted the runway. After touchdown, the aircraft bounced and seemed to have a nose-high attitude. I reduced the pitch and the aircraft contacted the runway the second time. During the rollout, the nose gear collapsed.

After the aircraft came to a stop on the runway, I made a PA announcing "This is the Captain, remain seated." I smelled smoke, looked on the overhead panel and saw the number 1 engine fire switch illuminated. I called the tower and asked if they saw smoke. They replied yes they did see smoke. I then pushed the number 1 engine fire switch, fired the agent and initiated the evacuation. When the flight attendant stated that all passengers were off the aircraft, I exited the flight deck and visually checked the cabin, then exited the aircraft on the 1L slide.

Respectfully submitted,

Capt. Dave Powell

1.2 First Officer

To Whom It May Concern:

I was the First Officer and Pilot Monitoring on US Airways flight 1702 from PHL to FLL on March 13, 2014.

We were issued an EDCT of 1829 local time. Push back and engine start were normal at approximately 1750 local time. The TPS performance data indicated we should expect flaps 2 for takeoff, so I positioned the flap lever to 2. (I later positioned the flap lever to 1 after receiving the weight and balance data). We taxied single-engine for a runway 27L departure, and then stopped with the parking brake set at approximately 1810, waiting for our release time. The Captain then stated that "We will go ahead and start the engine at 1820."

At some point, tower issued our sequence, which I believe was number 6 for departure. Shortly after that, tower changed our sequence to be number 2 for departure behind the aircraft going into position on runway 27L. I started the number 2 engine, completed my flows and started the taxi checklist. During the taxi checklist we received a call on the interphone from a flight attendant saying we had a passenger in the lavatory. Before I got off the interphone the flight attendant said that the passenger was taking his seat. We completed the taxi check list "to the line" and were cleared to line up and wait on runway 27L. We accomplished the "line items" and as we taxied onto runway 27L we realized the wrong runway was in the MCDU. I changed the runway to 27L and completed the check list.

We were cleared for takeoff and assigned a heading of 230 degrees. The Captain brought the power up and we started the takeoff roll. We received a chime and message "power not set." I read the message out loud and saw the Captain push the thrust levers forward and he stated, "the power IS set." I looked at the engine indications and saw that both engines were matched to the TLA and that the TLA was up near the red line. I looked at the ECAM and the "power not set" message was gone.

I then turned my attention to the speed tape, which was at approximately 120 knots. We both then realized and verbalized that we did not have any V speeds on our PFD displays. At approximately the same time, we started receiving a loud repeated audio "RETARD, RETARD, RETARD" which increased in frequency and continued until rotation. The Captain asked whether we had any ECAM messages and I told him "no." The Captain continued the takeoff. I had never heard the "RETARD" message during takeoff before, and I was thinking this was just a spurious audio, since all engine indications were normal.

The aircraft speed continued to increase at a normal rate. At approximately 159 knots, the Captain rotated the aircraft at a normal rotation rate and to a normal pitch attitude. The aircraft was wallowing and I didn't think it was going to fly. I have never experienced that feeling, but I could see the aircraft did not seem to be responding to the Captain's control inputs. At that same time the Captain said, "we need to get this thing back on the ground" and pulled the thrust back. The aircraft contacted the runway and bounced. The aircraft contacted the runway again, the nose gear collapsed and we came to a stop. During this time, my glasses came loose and fell to

the floor. I advised the tower of our rejected takeoff and the Captain told the passengers over the PA to remain seated. I could hear the flight attendants instructing the passengers to stay seated.

The Captain called for the evacuation checklist. Since I could not see after having lost my glasses, I got up to retrieve my spare glasses from my suitcase. I saw the engine fire warning light illuminated on the number 1 engine. The Captain asked the tower if they could see any smoke and they said "yes." The Captain then commanded the evacuation on the PA. We both exited the cockpit and confirmed that no passengers were still on board. Both of us exited the aircraft using the 1L slide.

Respectfully submitted,

First Officer Lynda Fleming

2.0 Cabin Crew

To whom it may concern, March 13, 2014

I understand this statement may be shared with the FAA and NTSB for investigative purposes.

I began work on March 13, 2014 at 10:35. I was working the A-F/A position on pairing 52428. B-F/A was Lise Goulet, C-F/A was Maria Cartagena. Our Captain was Dave Powell, F/O was Lynda Fleming. In CLT the A/C was brought from the hanger to gate C4. Boarding was delayed while the crew briefing was completed in the first class cabin area. The F/O, B-F/A and I had worked a 4-day trip the previous week. First leg was routine and arrived early in TPA. TPA/PHL was routine until we were approximately 1/2 hour out. The Captain called to say that there were reports of turbulence on approach to PHL. He requested that we secure the cabin and take our jump-seats early. We did as requested. Turbulence was mostly moderate with moments of sever turbulence. One passenger became ill on the approach. The landing in PHL was smooth, routine, despite the turbulence. I commented to the F/O that she had made an excellent landing in the conditions. We had an unscheduled A/C change for the PHL/FLL flight 1702. Boarding and departure from gate were both routine. We had been given a wheels-up time of 18:29. We taxied out and quickly moved to 2nd in line for take-off. Immediately preceding the F/O's announcement that take-off was immanent, the passenger in 2D went into the A-lavatory. The C-F/A knocked on the lavatory door twice, requesting he return to his seat. I immediately picked up the interphone to inform the flight deck that we had a passenger in the A-lavatory. As I was saying that I would call back when he was in his seat, he came out of the lavatory and returned to his seat. Since I was on the interphone, the C-F/A reminded him to be careful and to fasten his seatbelt. Shortly thereafter we began to take-off. Approximately 10-15 seconds into the take-off roll the C-F/A and I both noticed a hesitation of power. At that time I commented "That's not normal". We contined take-off. Shortly after we were airborne the power began to fade again and we began to drop. We then hit the ground and bounced back up. On the first impact the flight deck door opened into the cabin, some, but not all, O2 masks in first class deployed. C-F/A and I began our commands for people to "Bend over, heads down stay down... We hit the ground a second time. On the second impact O2 masks in the main cabin deployed. The plane came to a stop. The Captain gave the command to "Stay Seated". Passengers began to stand to collect their belongings, despite the command to remain seated. I reached for the P/A, which had fallen from its cradle, to also make an announcement to remain seated. Althought, I believe the P/A was not working at this time. C-F/A, B-F/A and I got out of our jump seats and began walking through the cabin telling the passengers to remain seated and to check for injuries. C-F/A was ahead of

me in the aisle. I got to row 8-10 when began to smell fumes. A passenger pointed to the smoke that was visible on A/C right near the engine. I immediately headed back to the flight deck. The Captain was on the radio with someone who was confirming smoke and possible fire in an engine. At that time the Captain gave the command to "Evacuate". At this time the, C-F/A and I were both in the forward galley. We began our commands again and opened the doors deploying the slides. C-F/A blocked the 1R exit, redirecting the passengers to the 1L slide. Once the 1R exit was opened there was just too much smoke to safely use the exit. B-F/A was doing the same at the 2L exit only. Passengers in the exit rows opened the windows and began an evacuation. After evacuating the A/C, B-F/A, C-F/A and I went through the cabin and checked the lavatories to ensure all passengers had evacuated. I retrieved the EEMK, AED, SEP from the aft left overhead area. C-F/A retrieved the POB's, SEP, FAK and Megaphone from the forward left overhead area. As I was returning forward with the emergency equipment, the Captain and F/O were leaving the flight deck. I assured him that the cabin was empty. C-F/A and I threw the emergency equipment down the slide and exited the A/C. I chose to use the 1L exit. The 2L exit slide was too high, steep and blowing in the wind. After exiting the A/C the C-F/A and I collected the equipment. We began getting the passengers together and looking for passengers with injuries. We had a group of Firefighters from Belgium that assisted us in this task. We also had a doctor who offered her help with a passenger complaining of neck pain. The PHL police, paramedics and firefighters began to arrive and attended to the passengers. They parked their vehicles close together to provide a wind block for the passengers. Paramedics provided blankets, sheets, towels and whatever else they had that would provide some warmth to the passengers. C-F/A, B-F/A and I distributed the blankets among the passengers. Eventually, buses arrived to take the passengers to the terminal and we were escorted to a van parked near the disabled A/C.

Unfortunately, many passengers were delayed in their response to the situation because they were using their electronic devices. They were literally plugged in and tuned out.

Also, the wait for the buses to transport the passengers to the terminal was far too long. Nearly 45 minutes passed from the time the incident occurred and passengers were transported to the terminal:



Patricia A. Isacco

To whom it may concern:

March 19, 2014

I understand this statement may be shared with the FAA and NTSB for investigative purposes.




Check in 10:35 for flt. 2053. The a/c came from the hanger cleaned a/c just needed to be catered. Checked emergency equipment needed seatbelt extenders for demo kit in the back.

Set up galley made my announcement help with bags, boarding complete, demo, did service – no issues
In TPA to PHL flt. 768 no issues we had an a/c swap in PHL flt. 1702 from a/c 119 to a/c 113 from gate C20 to B6 plane cleaned, pre flt, set up galley, made boarding announcement, help with bags, demo. We were informed by Cpt. David due to one runway in FLL we were schedule to leave at 6:29pm instead of 5:50pm. Over PA " F/A take your station that we are in line to take off". From my station I saw a first class psgrs go to the lav just minutes before announcement for takeoff. He made it back to his seat in time

Took off, very windy and unstable thought we had a go till (I thought we hit shear turbulence, a/c dropped and blew tires) and then started my commands from my jumpseat, psgrs screaming and then we hit a second time also very hard, oxygen mask deployed and notice one bin opened, psgrs screaming, Capt. came on P.A. said 'remain seated.' All three of us got up to make sure psgrs were okay. Psgrs in coach remained seated expressing concern of smoke and smelled fumes. My response was, we hit shear turbulence and when we dropped and hit hard, we blew a tire or two. The smell may have come from the tires and also from the plane's fuselage, 'cause we skidded a bit. When I looked out the exit window on the right side I did see smoke and could smell something but did not want to alarm psgrs.

On my way from exit to the back I heard the Capt. say 'evacuate evacuate' Went straight to my 2L door assessed, psgrs were right behind me and I opened exit. There were psgrs outside already from the wing and my concern was for their safety down below when the slide deployed but there was no incident. Had my two first psgrs ABA hold the slide at the bottom and asked two others to help people off. Once everyone was off-I went back to check to make sure there was no one left. I had to kick the lav door due to the debris that kept from opening at first. Went down the 2L slide then tried to get all psgrs to huddle, by the EMT vehicle in the field to keep warm. I went to the emts and retrieved blankets for psgrs. Very cold and windy. We waited nearly 45 minutes for transportation for our psgrs to get inside the terminal.

Lise Goulet

March 17, 2014

Statement

To whom it may concern:

I understand this statement may be shared with the FAA and NTSB for investigative purposes. I recall my date starting as

On March 13, 2013 I went to work at Charlotte Douglas Int. airport. Check in for paring 52428 at 1035am when to the gate and met my fellow crew members. We waited for the plane that came in from the hangar. Then Dave brief us, Patricia brief us and we went on to check the equipment and do the cabin prep for boarding. We boarded without further delayed, i brief my exit and we closed door and were ready to go and started doing the demo and cabin check for take off. First flight 2053 went on time and uneventful got to Tampa on time/ few minutes early. Deplaning was fine, clean cabin for re boarding to go to Philly. We boarded flight 768 on time and left Tampa without any problems or incidents. Flight was calm and uneventful, we landed in Philly around 1630 a few minutes early and on time, got to the gate and we had an unscheduled aircraft change. We went from terminal C to terminal B6. We got to the gate the plane was there and we proceeded to board plane and to the pre- flight check, for flight 1702 all was in place and ready to go, boarded on time no problems with passengers. I brief my exit row seating people all went well, we closed doors armed and cross check. Did safety demo and cabin check, got cabin ready light going and took jump seat , while we were waiting on the runway for take off, the pax on 2D got up to used the bathroom, i asked Patricia to call the Captain and let him know someone whats standing and using the bathroom. At the same time we are trying to reach the front the captain made the PA that we were number 1 for take off and i was knocking at the bathroom door for the passenger to come out and take his seat right away. He came out and took his seat we advise the front that he was seat and strap. when the plane started to roll me and Patricia felt a pull out of the g force and then the plane got going again and continue to roll for take off. we felt lift off in the front and saw the plane was in the air for a few seconds, then it felt like turbulence and the plane was descending again trying to catch up and go up with force. Then all of a sudden we hit the runway really hard cockpit door became open and we can hear then talking, plane bounce back up and hit the ground again a second time and it was a lot of screaming and noise by the passenger. The oxygen mask came down and The plane was sliding and grinding against the floor or runway really hard. By the time the plane came to a complete stop, we were saying our command to bend over, head down to passengers, and the captain said over the PA to remain seated, so we got up and started to say remain seated and went on the aisle to check situation and passengers. everything seems to be OK at that point we asked for injuries and all of them were OK, scare but OK. The passengers were more concerned about the smoke inside the cabin and the engine out side were on fire. At that point the captain said over the PA to Evacuate and we move to our respected positions assess outside conditions and open the doors to start evacuation. Passengers hesitated to respond to command since a lot of then were wearing headphones and they were using their gadgets watching movies and listening to music to hear the command and start moving. We got the doors open and the flow going, passenger were able to open the emergency exit windows and started to go out of them. When i saw after I open 1R door that the engine in the right side was smoking really bad and the plane was really low nose down, I block my exits and redirect passenger to only go out to the 1L door. After all passengers were out we did a cabin check and bathroom took emergency equipment out and exit the aircraft with the pilots. We redirected passenger to move away from the aircraft a lot of them were taking pictures and video of the situation and tent to get closer to the plane again. once authorities arrive and medical assistant, we were trying to keep passengers together and warm. we check and counted passengers and offer assistance. we deliver blankets the few we found and reassure passenger the help was on the way. The crew waited on premises until help arrived and took passangers awat in busses with company personnel and taken to the airport for drug test. After drug test was completed, we waited for personal belonging to be brought back to us and we then went to check in in to the hotel.

Sincerely, Maria Cartagena/FA



Event date: March 13, 2014 F1702 Time was around 1830 Position: FA/C #A/C N113US, PHL-FLL

3.0 Other Crew Statements

April 6, 2014

To Whom It May Concern:

I understand this statement will be shared with the NTSB.

I was the Captain and Pilot Monitoring on US Airways flight 742 from FLL to PHL on aircraft 113 on March 13, 2014. The PHL weather was visual conditions with winds at 20 knots or more, gusting to over 30 knots and continuous light turbulence during approach. There were no ECAM warnings, cautions or status messages that I recall and the Pilot Flying did not indicate there were any control issues.

Sincerely,

Captain Steven C. Heinz

April 6, 2014

To Whom It May Concern:

I understand this statement will be shared with the NTSB.

I was the First Officer and Pilot Flying on US Airways flight 742 from FLL to PHL on aircraft 113 on March 13, 2014. As I recall, there were fairly strong surface winds (greater than 20 knots with gusts to 30+ knots) in PHL. The approach to runway 27R was in visual conditions with constant light to occasional moderate turbulence and minor deviations in airspeed and sink rate. The aircraft responded normally to flight control inputs and the approach remained stable. I don't remember receiving any ECAMs, warnings, or alerts.

Sincerely,

First Officer Tony E. McMillan