



## **NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD**

Office of Aviation Safety  
Washington, D.C. 20594

November 18, 2016

### **Attachment 1 – Flight Crew Interview Summaries**

# **OPERATIONAL/ HUMAN FACTORS**

**DCA17IA020**

**Interviewee: Diego Fernando Restrepo**

**Date: October 29, 2016**

**Location: Fairfield Inn, Flushing NY Conference room 102**

**Time: 0928 EDT<sup>1</sup>**

**Present: Shawn Etcher, Sathya Silva – NTSB, and Robert Hendrickson – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)**

**First Officer. Restrepo was represented by Mark A Emanuele, attorney with Lydecker Diaz Attorneys at Law**

During the interview First Officer Restrepo said the following:

He was 49 years old.

He held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with ratings for Airplane Multiengine Land and Commercial privileges for Airplane Single-Engine Land. He also held the following type ratings: B737<sup>2</sup>, CE-500<sup>3</sup>, ERJ-170 and ERJ-190<sup>4</sup>. He had the following limitations on his certificate: ATP Circling Approach VMC<sup>5</sup> Only and CE-500 SIC<sup>6</sup> privileges only. He had approximately 6,400 hours of total flight experience and has flown approximately 70 hours in the preceding 90 days, 30 to 40 hours within the preceding 30 days, and 13 hours in the preceding 7 days.

He began his employment with Eastern Air Lines on December 1, 2015. He has been flying as a First Officer the entire time.

Prior to Eastern Air Lines he flew with Republic Airlines for approximately 4 years flying the ERJ170-175.

He started flying in about 2002. After he finished commercial multiengine certificate, he was unable to find a flying job for 3 years and did other things. He went back to flight school and received his certificated flight instructor rating and flight instructed for about 5 years, beginning in 2007. He was employed at Republic Airlines beginning in February 2012. He does not fly outside of work.

The flight departed from Fort Dodge and he classified it as a “normal” flight with nothing out of ordinary. The last 15 minutes of the flight, they encountered heavy rain. On the approach he classified the rain intensity as moderate to heavy rain. He stated that everything was a

---

<sup>1</sup> Eastern Daylight Time

<sup>2</sup> The Boeing Company B-737-100, B-737-200, B-737-300, B-737-400, B-737-500, B-737-600, B-737-700C, B-737-800, B-737-900. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-88.

<sup>3</sup> Textron Aviation Inc. 500, 501, 550, S550, 551, 560. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-88

<sup>4</sup> Embraer S.A. ERJ-100 STD, ERJ 170-100 LR, ERJ 170-100 SU, ERJ 170-100 SE, ERJ 170-200 STD, ERJ 170-200 LR, ERJ 170-200 SU, ERJ 190-100 STD, ERJ 190-100 LR, ERJ 190-100 SU, ERJ 190-100 IGM, ERJ 190-100 ECJ, ERJ 190-200 STD, ERJ 190-200 LR, ERJ 190-200 IGM. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-88

<sup>5</sup> Visual meteorological conditions

<sup>6</sup> Second-in-Command

“completely normal” flight until after touchdown. He reported a “very stabilized” approach for the ILS<sup>7</sup> 22. He further classified the flight as a “normal flight.”

He was the pilot flying for the incident flight. He described that Eastern Air Lines has a procedure to transfer control to the captain on landing roll out. After touchdown the captain was to do call outs but he could not remember hearing any of the callouts. He stated he never heard “I have the controls” from the captain. He further stated that the airplane was pulling to right, “really hard.” He said that during landing there was a 9 knot crosswind from the left so he expected to have to input right rudder, but he felt he kept having to put in left rudder. He said he attempted to maintain centerline with left rudder and brakes. Subsequently, they went off the end of the runway. After the aircraft came to a stop, he said that the captain stated that he was “trying to get off on the last exit.” He felt they both were manipulating the controls at the same time during roll out. He stated that normally, he’d expect to hear call outs for “speedbrakes,” “reversers,” “60 knots,” “my flight controls.” He further stated that there was no positive transfer of controls. He described that some captains will make the 60 knot callout to transfer controls; some captains will do it a little later and other captains will make that call out at various speeds.

After they stopped, they looked for any fire indications. The captain told passengers to remain seated, and then called the flight attendants. There was no evacuation, as they determined there was no danger. The captain then had him start the APU<sup>8</sup> and shut down the engines. Once rescue personnel responded then they deplaned.

The crew conducted the drug testing with urine and blood testing about 0230 EDT at a local hospital and were provided the results. He stated they did not conduct a breathalyzer test.

He reported that the only maintenance items for the flight were for the auto speedbrakes which were deferred. It had been inoperative for about 2 to 3 days prior to the incident flight. During the approach brief, they briefed that the pilot monitoring (PM) was to deploy the speedbrakes upon landing. He said that the PM did deploy speed brakes on landing although he could not recall when that occurred.

When he was employed by Republic Airlines, he said he used to be based in Philadelphia and came to LaGuardia “a lot.” They broke out about 700 feet above ground level (agl). He said no abnormalities or warnings during rollout were annunciated from the airplane during the landing rollout. He remembered the ATIS<sup>9</sup> reporting winds at 9 knots. There was turbulence during the last 15 minutes of the flight that he classified as “moderate” turbulence. When they broke out he said he remembered seeing the lights and remembered the captain say during, the flare, to “put it down, put it down.” He said that they were on speed during the approach and it was night time when they landed. He said that they were vectored for the approach and reported “a lot of vectors for the weather.”

He did not have a sense of how far down the runway they touched down. He said he did not feel that it was abnormal otherwise he said he would have done something different such as a go-

---

<sup>7</sup> Instrument landing system

<sup>8</sup> Auxiliary Power Unit

<sup>9</sup> Automated Terminal Information System

around. He said the last time he was at LaGuardia was a “long time ago,” about 2 years or so but he was not sure.

He said they do the approach checklist when they go through 18,000 feet and conduct the landing checklist after they are fully configured usually at the final approach fix. He said that the last call is “flaps 30 landing checklist.” He said the procedures were completed as normal. He stated that the person doing the checklist varies depending on the checklist. For some the pilot flying asks for the checklists the pilot monitoring does them. He described some checklists are “challenge and response.”

He stated that he could not recall Vref<sup>10</sup> but said it could have been “about 120 something.” He was not sure and stated that it could have been 130 knots since the weight was similar during the past week for the flights. He said that he utilized the autopilot beginning at 2,500 feet after takeoff until about 300 feet agl during the approach. He said that they saw the runway lights between 600 and 700 feet agl after they broke out. He said that after the autopilot was disengaged he utilized the flight director.

He said that the airplane was equipped with autothrottles. He said that after they disengage the autopilot, they also disengage the autothrottle per Eastern Air Lines standard operating procedure.

He said that they did not declare an emergency, and had heard that tower had closed the airport and were sending rescuing personnel. When asked how often he’s operated in heavy rain, he said that he has operated in heavy rain before, being based in Miami, he said he is “used to the storms and all that stuff.”

He said that no one occupied the jumpseat at the time of the incident.

For him, the trip started with a commercial flight from Miami, Florida to Las Vegas, Nevada on the 20<sup>th</sup> of October, 2016. He arrived in Las Vegas at 1800 local. He had a 0400 local report time, on October 21<sup>st</sup>, which provided him with exactly 10 hours’ minimum rest. On October 21<sup>st</sup>, he departed Las Vegas to Indianapolis, Indiana and the door closed 1125 UTC<sup>11</sup> (0400 local) and landed in Indianapolis at 1457 UTC. That was the only flight they operated on the 21<sup>st</sup>. On October 22<sup>nd</sup>, he reported that at 1200 UTC they flew from Indianapolis to Rickenbacker Airport (KLCK) in Columbus, Ohio. They departed Indianapolis at 1323 UTC and arrived in Columbus at 1417 UTC. They departed Columbus at 2041 UTC and flew to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (KCLE) and arrived at 2136 UTC. He said that the company had sent another crew to fly the aircraft and he and his captain flew in the back of the aircraft as “deadhead” to Indianapolis which departed from Cleveland at 0004 UTC and arrived at Indianapolis at 0109 UTC.

He said that they were given a 31-hour rest period in Indianapolis. With a report time of 1530 UTC on October 24<sup>th</sup>, they flew from Indianapolis to Charlotte Douglas International Airport (KCLT), Charlotte, North Carolina. The flight departed at 1706 UTC and arrived in Charlotte at

---

<sup>10</sup> Reference Landing Speed

<sup>11</sup> Universal Time Coordinate

1849 UTC. They operated the flight from Charlotte to Greensboro, North Carolina, which departed at 2115 UTC and arrived at 2200 UTC. They then operated a flight from Greensboro, which departed at 0044 UTC, to Indianapolis and arrived at 0219 UTC.

On October 25<sup>th</sup>, the crew flew from Indianapolis to Salt Lake International Airport (KSLC), Salt Lake City, Utah on a Delta flight, as passengers. The flight departed from Indianapolis at 1629 UTC and arrived Salt Lake City at 2241 UTC, with a connection in Minneapolis, Minnesota. On October 26<sup>th</sup>, they had a report time of 2140 UTC and flew from Salt Lake City, departing at 2340 UTC, to Colorado Springs Airport (KCOS), Colorado Springs, Colorado arriving at 0106 UTC. They departed from Colorado Springs at 0300 UTC for Omaha Eppley Airfield (KOMA), Omaha, Nebraska and arrived at 0426 UTC. On the day of the incident, October 27<sup>th</sup>, they had a report time of 1530 UTC and departed Omaha at 1752 UTC. They operated the flight to Fort Dodge Regional Airport (KFOD), Fort Dodge, Iowa and arrived at 1834 UTC. The incident flight was from Fort Dodge to LaGuardia departing at 2110 UTC, and the doors were opened at LaGuardia at 0005 UTC and they landed about 2345 UTC.

He said he normally stays in the hotel when he is on the road and does not go out. He felt he slept “good” on Monday night. He usually goes to bed around 2200 -2300 local if he does not have to get up early. He does not consider himself a morning person as he does not like to wake up early. He normally feels rested after he gets 7 to 8 hours of rest. He feels that the quality of sleep is “not the best” and that he usually wakes up 2 to 3 times per night and he classified that as occurring all the time. He reported that when he has to get up at 0400 local or when he has the 10 hours of minimum rest he does not sleep well during the night and has trouble falling asleep. He said he does have to wake up early sometimes and he did have an early wake up earlier in the week.

He could not recall when his last vacation was; however, said it could have been 3 to 4 years ago. He ate normally during the trip but he “usually ate good.” He also stated that he does not always eat at the same time when he is on the road as it is not always possible.

Tuesday night there was no reservation at the hotel they were staying at and he said he went to bed late. He estimated he went to bed between 0130 and 0200 local time. All the other crewmembers had a room reservation but he did not. He woke up at 0815 to 0830 local that morning. He does not take naps during the day and he reported that he never does.

Wednesday night they landed at 2330 local and he said that it took a while to get to the hotel. The reason for the delay to get to the hotel is that it took the fixed base operator van about an hour to get to where they were located on the airport as Secret Service would not allow the van access to the ramp area. He went to bed around 0100 local. Thought he got up around 0815 to 0830 local, and he went and ate breakfast. He could not recall the quality of his rest the night prior. He remained in the hotel all day, after breakfast, he went to the gym, worked out and also did some laundry at the hotel laundry room. After that he took a shower and then departed for the airport. He stated that was similar to his normal schedule at home. When at home, he normally would wake up and go to the gym to work out; he also plays tennis. During the day he will also pick up his son from school.

He stated he does not have any medical issues or sleep disorders. He does require reading glasses and he is required to have them for his FAA medical certificate, which was first put on his medical during his medical exam prior to the most recent medical examination. He received his last medical certificate in October 2016. He reported having no color vision issues. He stated he does not take prescription medication and drinks alcohol “once in a while.” He recalled that he had a beer with his dinner one evening but could not remember which night that was. He does not use illicit drugs nor does he smoke.

He reported having no other incidents or performance issues in the past.

The only emergency or abnormal situation he has had was going from Miami to Atlanta, when he was employed at Republic Airways. He described that they had lost radio communication while in flight. He said that this occurred in February 2015. He thought it may have occurred on February 24<sup>th</sup> but could not recall for certain. He stated that the airplane at the time was only a month old.

He has had some life changes in his personal life, as he is getting a divorce. He moved out of his house earlier in the year and he is living by himself. He stated he wanted the divorce to happen for a while.

He classified his workload on the day of the incident as “normal” before touchdown. After touchdown it was not normal but prior to touchdown it was “normal.” After touchdown he remembered the captain saying “put it down, put it down.” The weather was night time and rain; however, he did not feel that the weather conditions increased his workload. He said that they were given a lot of vectors and lots of time to accomplish checklists. He said he did not feel rushed.

He said he likes working for Eastern Air Lines and he loves being based in Miami, which was one of the reasons he came to work for Eastern, as he was tired of commuting. He was based in Miami with a previous employer but there was rumor of the base closing, and that was when he applied to Eastern. He said the employees at Eastern Air Lines “are great.” He said there was no pressure from the company nor any external pressure to complete flights. He specified that he is a first year pilot so he would “always like to make more money.”

He had flown with the incident captain in March. This was the only other time he flew with him. When asked how he enjoyed flying with the captain he declined to provide an answer. He said that the captain’s mood was “normal” before and during the flight and also stated that the captain had “normal” behavior. He considered the captain as a “normal” person.

When asked about the captain’s proficiency or for areas that could be improved, when compared to others he had flown with, he declined to answer.

He classified the captain’s communication during the flight as “normal.” When asked about the captain’s strengths, he said he felt that the captain knew the procedures required by Eastern Air Lines. Prior to the incident that captain showed he knew the procedures. He said that they did not

have any “major things” for him to be able to judge his knowledge but he would classify his knowledge as “normal.”

When asked if he had heard of any other crewmembers complain about flying with this captain he declined to answer.

When asked how other pilots would describe the captain, he stated he did not know.

When asked whether he had been provided training for an event like the incident event he stated that during training they are trained for evacuations and emergencies before landing. However, he said has not been trained for emergencies, such as runway excursion. He specified that they are trained for evacuations, but that day, the captain decided not to evacuate since they did not have any fire on board or outside the airplane.

He received his type rating, for the incident aircraft make and model, in February, when he was hired by the company. Eastern Air Lines utilizes in-house instructors. Eastern Air Lines utilized Boeing and PanAm training simulators. Eastern Air Lines now has its own simulator at Boeing, but that occurred after he was hired. He had a line check, in the airplane, in March in response to an event that occurred. He described the event as the captain he was flying with at the time had hit a pole with the left wing in Philadelphia. He specified that this is why he received a line check. He said he was not in control when the airplane impacted the light pole.

He stated that he had CRM training both in ground school and in the simulator. Ground school and simulator training occurred between December 1<sup>st</sup>, when he started ground school, and February, but he was not sure of the day.

He described his chain of command at Eastern Air Lines as he reports to the Chief Pilot, who reports to the Director of Operations, and then to the Chief Executive Officer.

He said that Eastern Air Lines had 64 to 65 pilots at the time of the incident but he was not sure of the total number of employees at Eastern.

When asked how he classified staffing for pilots, he stated that the company calls him in to work on his days off. He said that he had four scheduled days off but was working the incident trip during those days off. He said that “they call you on your days off because they need pilots.”

He stated that they are given 12 days off a month, as per the contract. He said the company calls pilots on their days off “often.” He said he can refuse the assignment if they are on his days off. but the company provides 150% pay if a pilot works on their days off. He said that since he is on first year pay, he works on his days off. He said he does it “because he needs the money.”

Eastern Air Lines has an open door policy and they can talk to them [the company] about whatever he wants. He said his contract states there is an open door policy. If after business hours, he said he can email his concerns. He stated that usually he would get a response within the day. An example he provided was when he did not have a room reservation on one night

during this trip. He said he called the company and then he had to call his Chief Pilot at midnight. He said that the Chief Pilot took care of it and called him back afterwards.

He stated that he has never had to call in sick at Eastern Air Lines. He said that if he has to call in sick, he would call crew scheduling and tell them that he is sick. At his previous company, he reported that if a pilot did not call in sick in 6 months that pilot would get more money. Further, if a pilot did not call in sick for 12 months, that pilot would get even more money; however, he described that is not how it is at Eastern.

He said he feels that there is sometimes pressure to complete a flight on time, and called it “get there-it is” but he would not classify it as personal nor Eastern Air Lines pressure. He said he has never heard of any crewmembers refusing a flight, except on when a crew is called on their days off.

Eastern Air Lines utilizes dispatchers for their flights but he was not certain how many and thought it may be 3 or 4 dispatchers. He said he thought there were about 2 to 3 dispatchers working at the same time. He hears different names when he is at work but he said he does not know if they were hired because they replaced someone else or if they were hired to increase the number of dispatchers. He did not interact with the dispatcher while in Fort Dodge as that is the captain’s duty. As a first officer he felt he was thought of as a “zero” or as a “nothing.” He noted that the phone call he received from the chief pilot prior to this interview was the second phone call from the company that he had received since the incident.

He said the captain is the one that always contacts the company, and he thought the captain may have called before their departure because of the delay going into LaGuardia. Prior to the flight out of Fort Dodge, he said that the company had sent an email to the fixed base operator to print it out for the flight crew.

He described that a dispatch release will consist of a flight plan, weather, performance for the runways including the alternate, NOTAMS<sup>12</sup>, METARS<sup>13</sup>, the entire weather package and performance. They are also provided approach charts as Eastern Air Lines still utilized paper charts. They have approach charts in the airplane; however, sometimes they go to airports that they do not have the approach charts for and they include that in the paperwork. They provide 2 copies of the charts: one for him and one for the captain.

They had an alternate for the flight into LaGuardia as they always have an alternate even if the weather is “good.” He asked why they always have an alternate and was told it was due to their type of operation. They are a Part 121 airline but operate as charters. He does not feel that always seeing an alternate on their flight provides any problems.

Their performance numbers they utilize for takeoff and landing are the numbers they are provided before takeoff by the company; they do not recalculate their performance numbers. He could not recall the landing weight into LaGuardia. He said that the dispatch packet has a lot of numbers and they have to do a “normal graph,” so he could not recall the landing weight for the

---

<sup>12</sup> Notices to Airman

<sup>13</sup> Meteorological Terminal Air Report



incident flight. He said that they do not have the ability to utilize the FMC<sup>14</sup> to calculate their weights. When asked about the center of gravity for the airplane he stated that the airplane handled like it “normally” had done.

He specified that there are no different required procedures when operating in heavy rain. All of their performance numbers were based on a wet runway and there was nothing special they had to do for rain.

He said that the FMC automatically adds 5 knots to the speed; however, if the winds are 10 knots or greater, the crews have to manually add 5 knots more. The FMC provides the numbers based on the landing weight and always adds 5 knots. On the incident flight their speed was Vref plus 5 knots as the wind was only 9 knots so they were not required to add any additional speed. He could not recall the speed but he could remember maintaining the speed as provided by the speed bug. He thought it was “all the time on speed” and recalls no verbalizations of “correcting for speed.”

He specified that the event in March, when the airplane struck a light pole, was with a different captain and not the incident captain.

He said the captain calls for the checklist and specified that when he [First Officer] was the flying pilot the captain provides him with the checklists when he [First Officer] asks for it.

He classified the training at Eastern Air Lines as “good.” He further stated that there was nothing he would improve in training. His ground school during training, complied with the FAA mandatory requirements for training. He started in December and they stopped December 22<sup>nd</sup> with training Monday through Saturday. They restarted their training on January 2<sup>nd</sup> and then stopped for 2 weeks prior to simulator training as there was no simulators available. He completed his training on February 8<sup>th</sup>. He did recall that at some point he had to wait but could not recall if he had to wait to start the simulator or if he had to wait during the simulator training.

He stated there were 8 pilots in his training class.

He stated he has never been terminated or asked to resign from any of his employers.

He stated that the pilot monitoring has required call outs. After landing the first call out he expected was “speed brakes up.” He said the speed brakes are normally automatic. He said he would then expect to hear “reversers normal,” followed by “60 knots.” He said that when the First Officer is the pilot flying (PF), the captain would also state around 60 knots, “my controls,” in order to have a positive transfer of controls. When manual deployment of the speed brakes is required, he said that they briefed that the captain for the incident flight was to manually deploy them. However, he could not recall if there was a formal procedure for who was to manually deploy the speed brakes. During a rejected takeoff, he said the PF is to manually deploy the speed brakes; however, he could not recall who was to do it for the landing.

---

<sup>14</sup> Flight Management Computer

As the PF, he said he expects the PM to tell him that the captain wants the controls. If he does not hear that then he stated that he will continue to control the airplane as the PF. He felt that there was a “lack of communication” as he did not hear the captain say “I have control.” He said that after they had stopped, the captain had said he was trying to get off on the last taxiway. Then, he realized that the captain was also on the controls when he was.

When asked, he could not remember if this was the first time flying the B737 into LaGuardia. However, he said he had been to LaGuardia in the Embraer 170. He stated he had never flown the B737 prior to Eastern Air Lines.

He stated that Eastern Air Lines has dispatchers and that the dispatcher must sign the release also. He said that the flight crew also has to sign that they are fit for duty.

He said he was asked to fill out a report for the company and that was all the information he could recall. He further stated it was the same thing that he had stated during this interview.

He said he felt he was losing control of the airplane, during landing rollout, as it was pulling hard to the right. He said he was trying to keep the airplane on the centerline. He had been applying left brake and rudder. He thought the captain was trying to the right with the tiller, but was not certain. He clarified had his feet on the both brakes. He said that he was feeling muscle pain the night before which he thinks was attributed to how hard he was pressing on the brakes and rudder.

He said he was familiar with the EMAS<sup>15</sup> system and that he knows how it works and what it is there for. He said his goal was always to maintain centerline on the runway always, until the captain takes the controls as the First Officer does not have a tiller on the right side. While the airplane was decelerating, he said he was trying to maintain control on the centerline.

He does not remember if there were any communications or call outs during the rollout. He remembers hearing “the lady in the tower call ‘eastern stop stop.’”

The director of training called him while they were in the Port Authority building. They were put on speaker for about 5 minutes and then later a call from the Chief Pilot. They told him to cooperate with the investigation.

He felt that on the approach to the runway they had some increase in the airspeed but he was not certain. The airplane was on the autopilot and that they were still in IMC<sup>16</sup> at the time. He could not remember when or what altitude that occurred but he thought it was when they were established on the approach.

At Eastern Air Lines, the captain decides who flies the leg but the captain usually flies the first leg of the trip and then they would alternate legs. That was what they did for this trip.

---

<sup>15</sup> Engineered Material Arresting System

<sup>16</sup> Instrument Meteorological Conditions

He did not consider going around for the incident flight. He did not think they needed to as no one stated “go around.” If you hear go around you have to go around.

The incident flight was operating under Part 121 as a charter flight.

He has approximately 220 hours of flight experience in the B737.

There were no other issues with the airplane other than the deferral for the auto speedbrake system.

The airplane is equipped with autobrakes and were set to autobrakes 3. There were no other deferrals or mechanical issues with the airplane. When he applies brake pressure the autobrakes disengage, which will override the autobrake system. Autobrake is not mandatory, according to the FOM or the company, but it is recommended. He made the decision to override the autobrakes when the red lights “were close.” Prior to that he did not think he was on the brakes but had his feet on the rudders.

He would advise other crews, involved in similar events, to follow the procedures the company provides, especially when it came to callouts. He further stated that had he known the incident was going to happen he would have gone around.

Interview concluded at 1128 EDT

**Interviewee: Robert Eric Galloway**

**Date: October 29, 2016**

**Location: Fairfield Inn, Flushing NY Conference room 102**

**Time: 1141 EDT**

**Present: Shawn Etcher, Sathya Silva – NTSB; Robert Hendrickson – FAA; Terry Austin – Eastern Air Lines**

**Mr. Galloway was represented by Mark A. Emanuele, attorney with Lydecker Diaz Attorneys at Law**

During the interview Captain Galloway stated the following:

He was 58 years old.

He holds an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and multiengine land with type ratings in the B737<sup>17</sup>, CL65<sup>18</sup>, DC8<sup>19</sup>, DC10<sup>20</sup>, HS114<sup>21</sup>, L-188<sup>22</sup>, and MD11<sup>23</sup>. Limitations: DC10 SIC privileges only, DC10 MD11 Circling approach VMC Only.

He reported having approximately 21,000 plus hours of total flight experience but he said he does not really keep track of his flight hours any more. Within the last 90 days he flew approximately 150 hours and the last 30 days he flew approximately 30-35 hours since the 14<sup>th</sup> of October, as he did not fly at the beginning of the month. During the past 7 days he had flown approximately 15 hours. He had flown the incident airplane make and model for about 2,500 to 3,000, some of which was flown when he flew at US Airways. From 1999 to 2001, he flew a B737-200 for US Airways. He stated he had been flying the B737-NG model for 16 months since he was hired by Eastern Air Lines.

He was hired by Eastern Air Lines in June 2015 and became captain in February 2016. He was hired as a captain but worked as a First Officer (FO) until his upgrade. He stated he was in the third class of pilots hired and completed his line check in the left seat.

He learned to fly at North Perry airport in Florida beginning in 1977. He had flown about 4,000 hours' as a flight instructor. Beginning in 1981 or 1982, for about 2 years, he flew part 135 out of Fort Lauderdale flying a Piper Seneca, Piper Navajo, De Havilland, Cessna 402 and 404, etc. He said he flew to the Bahamas on the Part 135 operation. He was hired at Galaxy Airlines as a first officer on L-188 in 1985, at which time he was made a captain right away. He flew there for 1.5 to 2 years. In the late 80's he flew with TPI Airlines flying freight in a Lockheed L-1011 for about 2 years. He stated he was out of aviation for 2 years. He flew the DC-8 for Fine Air from 1994 to 1999. He then joined US Airways flying the B737-200 up through September 11, 2001 and was furloughed in December 2001. He did not fly for 6 months, then began flying at Fine Air/Arrow Air again in June of 2002 until May 2003. A few months following, he joined Mesa Airlines in their "jets for jobs" program flying the CL65 out of Philadelphia for 2 years. He flew for 1 year as a first officer then 1-year as a captain. In July of 2005, he was hired by Centurion Cargo flying the DC-10 as a first officer in Miami. He then flew the MD11 for Centurion Cargo and upgraded to captain for the last 5 years. Then sent his resume to Eastern and was hired in their third class of pilots.

He stated he was a check airman at a Part 135 operator flying Piper Seneca. He stated that he typically worked on the union side.

---

<sup>17</sup> The Boeing Company B-737-100, B-737-200, B-737-300, B-737-400, B-737-500, B-737-600, B-737-700C, B-737-800, B-737-900. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-88.

<sup>18</sup> Bombardier Inc. CL-600-2B19, CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D24, CL-600-2D15. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-88.

<sup>19</sup> The Boeing Company DC-8-11, DC-8-12, DC-8-21, DC-8-31, DC-8-32, DC-8-33, DC-8-41, DC-8-42, DC-8-43, DC-8-51, DC-8-52, DC-8-53, DC-8F-54, DC-8-61, DC-8-61F, DC-8-62, DC-8-62F, DC-8-63, DC-8-63F, DC-8-71, DC-8-71F, DC-8-72, DC-8-72F, DC-8-73, DC-8-73F. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-58.

<sup>20</sup> The Boeing Company DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F, DC-10-40, DC-10-40F. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-58.

<sup>21</sup> Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd., UK DH-114 Heron. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-58.

<sup>22</sup> Lockheed Aircraft Corp., USA Electra 188, P-3, EA. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-58.

<sup>23</sup> The Boeing Company MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, MD-11F. Source FAA Order 8900.1 Figure 5-58.

He stated he does not fly outside of work.

The day of the event, in Iowa he was expecting to receive a wheels up time from air traffic control (ATC) due to weather in LaGuardia (KLGa). He stated the forecast for LaGuardia included a 700 foot overcast layer of clouds with rain. They were scheduled for a 2000 UTC departure and called Minneapolis Center since the airport at Fort Dodge (KFOD) was uncontrolled, and was given an estimated departure time of 2122 UTC. He stated he called Minneapolis Center at 2100 UTC to verify that 2122 UTC would be the correct time. He then stated he had to request that the passengers load back up into the aircraft. He stated he recorded a “doors closed” time of 2110 UTC and had been parked on a runway to accommodate secret service requests for a VIP on board. He stated that he did a 180 degree turn, on the runway where they were parked in order to taxi to the runway for takeoff, and had a clearance void off time of 2124 UTC and they were airborne at 2122 UTC.

He stated that he had flown the leg into Fort Dodge and it was the first officer’s leg to fly to LaGuardia and he would be pilot monitoring (PM). He said they discussed that he, as captain, would manually operate the speed brakes, since the automatic extension feature of the speed brakes was inoperative and the corresponding maintenance was deferred. He stated that the first officer’s flying had been superb on every other leg and he said that the first officer said he was comfortable flying into LaGuardia and had flown into the airport “plenty” of times with Republic airlines.

They took off on Runway 24 at Fort Dodge and made a left turn out. The route of flight was direct to the Waterloo VOR<sup>24</sup>, then the route was “as filed.” He said that they flew the Milton 4 arrival and were told to expect to hold at an intersection prior to Keating, PA (ETG); however, 2 minutes prior to the fix, the hold clearance was cancelled. They got the ATIS which was Bravo then became Charlie as the time was near the top of the hour. The ATIS was calling for 700 foot broken ceilings with rain, wind from 130 degrees at 9 knots, an altimeter setting of 30.14 in Hg, ILS 22 in use, and runway 22 centerline lights were out of service. He said that they were given a step down on the arrival and then radar vectors to a right downwind to runway 22. He said that ATC issued a speed of 170 knots, so they slowed to 170 knots and deployed flaps 5. About 20 minutes from landing, which he expected to be at 7:35 local time, he made a passenger announcement (PA) to the passengers, provided them with the weather, and asked the flight attendants to prepare for arrival. He said that they were cleared to descend from 4,000 feet to 3,000 feet or 2,000 feet just outside of the final approach fix and cleared for the approach. Once they intercepted the approach, they deployed the landing gear, selected flaps 15, and then selected flaps 30 and performed the landing checklist. The landing weight was about 53,000 kg and their Vref was 129 knots plus 5 knots, as allowed. He said there was moderate rain, the approach was stable, and they were on speed. He said that autopilot ‘B’ was in command of the aircraft. He said that they did their descent checklist at top of descent and approach checklist at 18,000 feet. He stated that they reviewed that he (captain) was going to pull the speed brakes on landing. After the pilot flying called flaps 30 they did the landing checklist.

---

<sup>24</sup> Very-high Omni-direction Range

He said that there was traffic ahead of them on the approach. They slowed to approach speed. He said that the final approach was stable. He said that he made a call at 1000 feet. At 700 feet, he said he called approach lights in sight. He said shortly thereafter he saw the runway and called "runway in sight." About 500 feet he said that the first officer disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle and said that the descent was normal to the touchdown zone until the flare.

He stated that the first officer floated initially in the flare and he (captain) told him to "put it down." He said he felt he as the captain should have called for a go around. He estimated the touchdown to be about 3,000 feet down the runway. He said he activated the speed brakes and called "speed brakes" and "reversers normal." He said he then looked up and saw the end of the runway coming up and he "got on max manual brakes." He said he felt it would better to veer to the right instead of going straight to the road which was why he put in right rudder and they ended up in the grass.

After coming to a stop and bringing the throttles to idle, he said that there was "3 green" on the landing gear, the aircraft was upright, and there was no visual or audible indication of a fire so he thought there was no need for an immediate evacuation. He said he made a PA for everyone to remain seated and then called the purser who stated that everything was "fine." He said he knew from training that the flight attendants would make their own assessment and report if they saw a need for immediate evacuation. He said that there was no report from the back of any problems. He then started the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), transferred the electrics, and shutdown the engines. He did recall hearing the controller say "eastern stop stop" during the rollout prior to leaving the runway; but could not recall if he responded to controller. After they had stopped, he said someone came up to the window and asked if everything was ok. He also stated that the purser said that Secret Service needed to verify that everything was ok. They opened the cockpit door and the Secret Service entered the cockpit. One of the first responders asked how many passengers and he relayed the passenger information and requested a set of stairs to evacuate everyone from the L2 door. He said that the passengers deplaned using the L2 door once the stairs arrived. After everyone exited he stated that a fireman told him that he needed to exit the aircraft. He said he called the chief pilot who told him to pull the CVR<sup>25</sup> circuit breaker. He said he ran the shutdown checklist but could not recall where the CVR circuit breaker was. He said he made sure to turn off the battery. He said he and the fire fighter were the last two people to exit the airplane. From there they went to a bus with the 9 crew members, 2 ladies from Private Guest Services (PGS), an FBI agent, and police. He stated that PGS was a company that provided catering and scheduling services. The police asked if they would like to make statements which he declined. The FBI and port authority took names, addresses, and phone numbers of those on bus. They sat on the ramp for 15-20 minutes then went to the LaGuardia police station. They went to a conference room in the station where he asked if it was a recorded room, which he was told it was not. Everyone began to make phone calls. Three flight attendants were complaining of back pain and were transported to Forrest Hills hospital. He waited, talked to chief pilot, provided him with a synopsis, and was told to remain at the scene. They were brought their baggage and were loaded into a van and brought to the emergency room at Forrest Hills Hospital for drug testing. He had taken a few phone calls from the operator.

---

<sup>25</sup> Cockpit Voice Recorder

He stated that the crew provided blood and urine and were not released until results were provided. He stated that the results were negative. He said that by that time, the 3 flight attendants were released also. He said that they checked in to their hotel about 0400 EDT. He was informed to write a report and got to sleep about 0500 EDT.

He reported that there were no abnormalities with the airplane other than the minimum equipment list (MEL) item for the automatic deployment of the speed brakes. He said that everything was normal until the rotation of the flare. They had done the ILS 22, and he said he had no concerns about flying into LaGuardia. He said that he felt the first officer's landings had been "superb" previously during the trip.

He said that they were utilizing "autobrakes 3" due to weather and the standard for Eastern is "autobrakes 2." He said that he would use "autobrakes max" if there was snow or sleet. He stated that the wind was less than expected felt no windshear, only moderate rain during the approach.

He reported that the last time he flew into LaGuardia was around the 30<sup>th</sup> of September, 2016, in the same airplane and they came into LaGuardia twice during that trip. He said that there were two bid lines flying the customer and he bid that trip for the days off that he needed because his son was coming into town.

During the approach, he said that there was turbulence at higher altitudes and they went through rain showers. He reported having engine anti-ice on for a short period with continuous ignition. He said they turned off the anti-ice when above 10 degrees Celsius but left the continuous ignition on. The landing occurred at night with a touchdown at 1942 EDT. He reported that the indicated airspeed was about 135 knots down to the runway as Vref plus 5 would have been 134 knots.

He began the trip on October 14<sup>th</sup>, 2016. This was a day off for him, but he said he preferred to "pick up" the flight in Miami instead of being flown on commercial airlines. On Wednesday, October 19, 2016, they flew into Las Vegas, Nevada which was the 6<sup>th</sup> day of his trip. The first officer that he had been flying with went home and the replacement first officer was flown in via commercial airline to Las Vegas. On Thursday, October 20, they flew from Las Vegas to Indianapolis, they (the flight crew) went to the hotel in Indianapolis. He stated that another crew flew with the flight attendants to New Hampshire and back that day.

He flew the first leg of the trip beginning on Thursday, October 20. They had a 0410 local time departure scheduled. Because the first officer had flown in late the night before and had minimum amount of scheduled rest prior to this flight, he (the captain) was required to prepare the aircraft for flight alone. He reported a doors closed "block time" of 0425 local. He said that they only had a 9-hour duty day due to the report time. He stated that they had flown somewhere on Friday, October 21, but could not recall. On Saturday, October 22, they flew to Rickenbacker Airport (KLCK) in Columbus, Ohio and then to Cleveland. He said that a replacement crew flew into Cleveland and he and his first officer then "deadheaded" in the back of the airplane to Indianapolis. He said they then had a required day off in Indianapolis on Sunday, October 23 and that they would have been legal on the 24<sup>th</sup> at 0400 for the day off in seven days. On Monday, October 24<sup>th</sup>, he said that they had a 1130 local time show time for a flight from Indianapolis to

Charlotte and that it departed at 1706 UTC and arrived in Charlotte at 1849 UTC. He said they sat in Charlotte until they were able to depart for Greensboro at 2115 UTC (“Block out” time). They arrived in Greensboro, reporting a “block in” time of 2200 UTC. They departed Greensboro at 0044 UTC and arrived Indianapolis at 0219 UTC. On Tuesday, October 25, he and the first officer flew commercially to Salt Lake City on Delta via Minneapolis. They departed at 1629 UTC and arrived at 2120 UTC in Salt Lake City. He said he went to dinner with his son when he arrived that night around 5pm and met him briefly in the morning as well. On October 26<sup>th</sup>, they had arranged for a 2130 UTC pick up at the hotel and were on duty at 2145 UTC for a scheduled 2315 UTC departure. They departed at 2331 UTC (“block out” time) and flew to Colorado Springs. Then left Colorado Springs at 0300 UTC and flew to Omaha, arriving at 0420 UTC. He reported that they were off duty at 0456 UTC.

On October 27<sup>th</sup>, they reported at 1530 UTC for a 1700 UTC scheduled departure. At 1715 UTC, they found out that the lavatory system was nearly full, so they took a 35-minute delay while the lavatory was serviced. They departed at 1752 UTC (“block out” time) and landed Fort Dodge at 1834 UTC. The following leg was the incident flight.

The night prior to the incident (October 26- October 27), he stated that they went off duty at 11:56pm local and were checked into the hotel about 0030 local. He said he went to sleep within an hour of getting to the room after he “watched a little television to unwind and readied for the next day.” He stated he set an alarm for 0915, but awoke before the alarm on the 27<sup>th</sup> at 0830 local. He stated that they officially had a 1030 local time show time and that he took a shuttle to the airport at 1000 local on his own. He stated that once he got to the airport, he arranged with the FBO for the crew to be transported from the hotel directly to the airplane. At 1025 local he received a message from the pursuer stating that they were on the way. He said he waited for the flight release to be printed in Omaha as the dispatch is not as efficient as he would prefer. He then stated once he received the paperwork, he went to the airplane and was on the airplane about 1100 local and sat ready until the delay for the lavatory.

He said that there was no cell service and no internet in the fixed base operator, during the layover in Fort Dodge. He recalled that the weather was clear skies after the cold front had come through. He said that Fort Dodge had a 6500-foot-long runway. He said the Omaha to Fort Dodge leg happened to be his leg, but he stated he would have flown it even if it was supposed to be the first officer’s leg due to the short runway. He said that he had planned to land it firmly as he wanted plenty of runway to land on and they had a crosswind.

He said that he normally gets 5.5 hours to 9 hours of sleep depending on what he was doing. He said his sleep habit is a function of what he did during the day and between 6 and 8.5 hours would be considered standard. He stated that when he woke up the day of the incident, he felt as rested that could be expected with “normal flying” as he was out for 14 days on the road. In regard to quality of sleep during that night, he said he is normally either dead asleep or awake so he has no problems sleeping when he goes to bed.

Two nights prior to the incident (October 25 - October 26), he had taken a commercial flight into SLC, went to dinner with his son at a Mexican restaurant and had a margarita. He watched



television for an hour and then went to sleep about 2230 local. He said he slept in until 0730 or 0800 local and went to breakfast around 1000 local.

He said that when he's not working, his sleep is varied and can sometimes follow his wife's schedule. He said he considers himself more of an evening person.

Three nights prior to the incident (October 24 – October 25), he said that the hotel van did not show up when they arrived in Indianapolis that night so they did not get to the hotel until 2330 local. He said he got to bed about 0030 local and slept in until about 1100 local. He said he felt the schedule had been getting busier towards the election and said that they were all tired when they got to the hotel on the night of the 24<sup>th</sup>.

He reported no history of sleep disorders.

He described two previous incidents he was involved with. One was when he was a flight instructor when he was about age 20. He stated that during a simulated engine failure in a Piper Cherokee Archer, the student released the flaps about 50 feet above ground level and they stalled and impacted the ground. He said this was classified as an incident. The 2<sup>nd</sup> incident was on the L188 Electra at Galaxy Airlines. He was flying left seat during a V1 cut for a check ride for his first officer in Grand Rapids. He stated he had maintained control of the aircraft down the runway, however the first officer input "hard left rudder" at 120 knots. Once airborne, he stated the flight engineer was in medical distress and he was instructed to declare medical emergency. He subsequently cancelled medical emergency. The event was classified as an incident due to the medical emergency. He stated that he not been involved in any other emergency or abnormal events.

He said he got commendation from the boss for stepping in to help during a speaking event. He said he experienced a major life change as his father passed away on June 17<sup>th</sup>, 2016 due to Alzheimer's disease and stated that his father had been under Hospice care. He said he took a week off of work spending time with family following his father's death. He stated this was the only major change in his life in the past year.

When asked about his health, he said that he is overweight but he gets to the gym. He said he takes 20 mg/day of Lisinopril for blood pressure. Otherwise, he said his health is "excellent." He said he now takes a nasal spray, similar to Flonase, for allergies.

He said his vision is 20/20 and has a corrective lenses limitation on his medical certificate. He reported no issues with color vision.

He stated he drinks alcohol on occasion and the last was the margarita in Salt Lake City on Tuesday, with his son. He reported that he does not smoke nor use illicit drugs.

He said his workload during the incident flight was standard for pilot monitoring duties and was "standard IFR workload for New York City." He said that he felt no increase in workload until the flare.

He said that he thought he would get better braking veering to the right, and had forgotten about the EMAS. He said he was looking for the most drag at the end. He stated that he felt he had control of the airplane the entire time. He said he vaguely remembers reading about EMAS, but has not had any training on it.

He stated that when he was flying freight, the aircraft was too big to fly into LaGuardia.

When asked how he likes working for Eastern Air Lines, he said that “it’s a job” with a paycheck and is stable. He stated that he does wish they had more time off and that there were more scheduled flights compared to charter flights. He said that Eastern is a supplemental charter operator at this time under CFR Part 121.

He said that the company is always asking for pilots to work on days off. He said he does not volunteer to give up his days off and does not allow intimidation to be a factor. He said he has never heard of intimidation tactics being used at Eastern Air Lines.

He said he did not feel any pressure to conclude the flight. He said that if he were flying on a day off he would get 150% pay. He also said that sometimes they will offer more but that is rare.

He said that his mood was normal prior to the incident flight and said that the first officer’s mood seemed normal as well.

He said he and the first officer had flown together during “March Madness” but could not recall the specifics. He said he got a long with the first officer just fine overall and had no issues with him.

He characterized the first officer’s proficiency as a pilot as “average or standard.” He said that the first officer’s performance was good enough that he felt comfortable allowing the first officer to fly into LaGuardia. He classified the first officer’s flying skills as “excellent” when asked about the first officer’s strengths. When describing weakness, he said he was comfortable with the FO but would not recommend him for an upgrade at this point. He has not heard of any complaints from other pilots about the first officer. He stated that he had improved greatly since the last time they flew back in March, as would be expected given how new the first officer was to the B737 at that time.

When asked if he had received any training regarding this specific event, he said he has received training via standard videos, crew resource management discussions, but has not received training to this specific event.

His initial training consisted of ground training in June 2015, simulator training in July 2015, a check ride on August 1<sup>st</sup>, and Operating Experience in September 2015. He said he took a 6-month proficiency training in March 2016. He reported having had recurrent ground school either in the last week of August or first week of September. He reported having his proficiency check on September 14, 2016.

He described CRM training consisting of videos and classroom discussion. He stated he tries to implement that as trained and also tries to include the flight attendants. He said that most of CRM training was in initial training, with some in recurrent training for the requirement.

He said that the best CRM training he ever received was at US Airways. There, he did CRM with flight attendants in the room. He said that he felt part of the problem with CRM is that “if the guy is a pain he is a pain and CRM will not change that.” He said that he felt he and the FO had been working well as a crew.

Regarding overall training, he said he thought training could be a lot better than it is. When asked what could be improved upon he said that one problem is that in the simulator they don't always have the same instructor each day. He also said that he feels that during initial training, more time should be spent teaching the FMS and that they need more hands on training before putting pilots into the simulator. During his initial training Eastern instructors did the training but they used Pan Am simulators and training facilities.

When asked about his chain of command, he stated that he reported to the Chief Pilot, Juan Nunez, who is his direct boss and his direct contact. If there is a scheduling issue, he said he will talk to scheduling. If there is a dispatch issue, he said he will contact flight control. He said he was in Mexico and the temperature was too hot for a wet runway performance chart so he called his flight control and they sent him the dry runway performance charts as there was not a cloud in the sky. He said that if he could not get an issue resolved, he could go to the vice president of operations. He said he felt he could go into the office to talk with whomever he needed to. He could also go in and talk to the director of training. He also felt they could also call him if needed.

He said that Eastern has 65 pilots on the seniority list but he is not sure of how many flight attendants they have. He stated that, a year ago, they hired a human resources person.

When asked if he thought there were enough pilots employed, he said that he felt they were short of pilots because the past CEO would get the equipment prior to hiring the people. He felt they forget that it may take 3 months after they hire someone before they can fly the line. He said that they are short of check airman also and that the chief pilot and check airman fly about twice a month. He stated that they used to have 5 check airmen, but they have lost two of those. He did training on long range navigation in August and still has not done his checkout.

He said that the company is hiring a new class every couple of months because they are getting a plane within the month. He said that when he ran out of duty time in Cleveland, they had to fly the trip with 2 captains because they could not find a first officer.

When asked what his opinion was about the first officers fresh out of training, he said that he felt that skills of some of the new pilots are a function of experience. He provided an example as guys from the regionals were not as good as those coming from Qatar. He said he was aware of one pilot that did not finish the training.

He said he has not conducted a go-around at Eastern Air Lines except in training, and said he had no reason until now to do one. When asked how to do a go around in the aircraft, he said that he would “hit the TOGA<sup>26</sup> switch, push the power forward, pitch up to the flight director typically about 15 degrees to start, and select flaps 15, positive rate, gear up, and keep that configuration until the missed approach altitude.” He said that he has been trained in the simulator for a go around at an altitude just prior to touchdown. About the time of the flare and he said they would call out “‘cow on the runway’ or something.” He approximated the altitude to be 10 to 20 feet above ground level.

When asked what he would do if he had a concern, he said that if he sees a problem, he will try to handle it personally first. He said that if that does not work, then he will go to his direct supervisor to report the issue, and could go “up the ladder” from there. He said he has not had to do that at Eastern.

He reported that pilots get 7 hours of personal time a month and can be used however they wish. He said that some people will call in sick if they need a day off. He gave an example of one guy calling in when he has a few days off if he has a student to teach. Only once has he ever had any issues with a sick call, but he said that was an error in human resources.

Regarding Eastern’s dispatch program, he said that they are a Part 121 supplemental airline and they only have flight following, and they do not have dispatch. He said that there may be 1 or 2 flight followers with a dispatch license but they do not do the duties of a dispatcher. Theoretically, they do what a dispatch office does however the director of operations is the one responsible along with the captain instead of the dispatcher being responsible along with the captain. He said that the dispatcher may sign the release if it is coming out of Miami, but not always. He felt that 99 percent of the time the information they give him is adequate for where they are going. He said he gets the landing performance for every flight including the alternates. He said that if he needs something, he will call the Eastern main number, press 2 for flight following, and they will give him what he needs. He said he’s told it is a labor intensive system from Jeppesen so it takes them some time to get him the information in the initial packet sometimes, however if he needs certain charts, they can easily send them.

During the night of the event, Atlantic City was listed as the alternate. He said he agreed with that alternate due to the weather impacting New York. He said he usually calls the flight follower to let them know he is ready for the paperwork. He said he always feels they have to “kill 2 trees for a flight,” considering he gets two copies of the paperwork.

When asked who completes the weight and balance he responded that both he and the first officer do the weight and balance. In this case, the first officer did the long form and he did the plots. Since he was doing plots, he said he’d check the first officer’s math on the long form with a calculator. He said that the FAA just approved the Boeing onboard toll; however, training has not been completed so it is not able to be released to the line. Typically, he said that the crewmembers both take turns doing each part of the weight and balance. He also said that they have recently been flying around with the same number of passengers and baggage.

---

<sup>26</sup> Take Off/Go Around

He said that the deferred auto-spoiler, according to the Jeppesen data, would have no performance penalty. He said he looked up the information in the QRH and depending on which brake setting they use they may have to add 50 meters to the landing distance. However, he said he was ok with max landing weight to 43 degrees F with either automatic or manual spoilers. He said he felt that manually deploying the spoiler can take a little time especially when he is used to an automatic airplane. However, because they briefed that he would deploy the speed brake he said that it should be more efficient. He also said that this went into his decision to let the first officer do the landing, so that he could handle the speed brakes. He was not aware of any policy for the manual deployment of the spoilers.

He stated that after the first officer landed, he (the captain) deployed the speed brakes and called “spoilers up, reversers normal,” he looked up and noticed the runway coming to an end and then he “jumped on the brakes to do all he could to make it stop” and didn’t say anything after that. He said he noticed no abnormalities with brakes. He also said that he didn’t call a transfer of aircraft controls but in hindsight he should have. He said he also thought that it would be OK if both of them were on the brakes. He stated that there was a point when he thought it would be better to go to the right of the runway and he applied rudder. When he veered to the right, he said he did it all with the rudder and did not touch the tiller.

He said that the first officer conducted the ILS 22 approach briefing and briefing for arrival, which was done as soon as they got the ATIS in the cruise phase of flight. He (the captain) loaded the approach into the FMS. He said that the first officer determined it would be a flaps 30 landing. He stated that he would have used a flaps 40, but Eastern’s policy is flaps 30. He said that they do not train flaps 40, but he does use 40 as a carryover from his previous job. He said the airplane handles differently on flaps 40 and the pilot has to use power to the ground. He stated that they jointly discussed how he (as captain) was going to pull the speedbrake manually. When asked if they discuss exit strategy off of the runway prior to landing, he said that they do communicate an exit strategy after landing and stated that he knew they would a right turn off at the end. He said that they call the FBO, about 30 minutes out from landing, to find out where they are on the airport and determine their taxi plan.

He said that another crew had marked the auto-spoilers inoperative and he noticed the log in Salt Lake City.

When asked if a first officer had ever offered him criticism, he said that he has had a first officer on occasion ask a question about something he did. He said he will explain to the first officer if something is out of standard and why he took that action. He said he tries to be open about what others do, but does not always agree with the criticism.

He said he has never had to refuse an FO at Eastern Air Lines. However, if he needed to he would call the chief pilot directly and say he is not flying with that individual and provide a reason. He said that there is no policy at Eastern when it comes to refusing a first officer. He considers himself easy to get along with and that if he has issues with a first officer then others have already complained about them. He is not aware of any complaints in the office about him.

He said that during the event, they utilized “Autobrake 3” but normal at Eastern is “Autobrake 2.” He said he likes “Autobrake 3” at LaGuardia because it is a short runway and it was raining. He did not use max because he felt that it would be “overkill.” He said he would use max braking if the conditions warranted it. He said that there were no braking action reports given to them specifically. When asked when he would expect to receive a braking action report, he said he would expect ATC to provide braking action when the conditions were less than “good” or if the braking action was reported on the ATIS. He said that had he known braking action was fair he would have probably verbalized to the first officer to “plant it on the 1000 foot markers.”

He noted gusting in the forecast but reported no wind shift on the approach, just a steady 9 knot crosswind. He said that the aircraft was on centerline the entire time.

He stated that at Eastern the captains are required to do a single engine go around while first officers are not. He said that upgrade training now gives ground training, 25 hours of operational experience in the left seat, and a new proficiency check. He clarified that he was not aware of any captain’s authority training.

He said that they have no cockpit procedure training or procedures trainer and all of the FMS training was in the simulator. He said he wishes they would go to the Boeing training program that has everything integrated into the training.

When asked if he had considered a go around at any point during the event, he said that he had but when he did the “moment had slipped past” and it was too late. He stated that the moment he rounded out they should have gone around. He said he is now going to now require at least 8,000 feet of runway length for first officers to land. He said that that if the landing would have been firmer they would have stopped on the runway. He said he will reiterate with first officers in the future that they must land in the touchdown zone. He said again that he did consider a go around before touchdown but there was little time to verbalize it, and he said to “put it down” instead of Go around.

He was pilot monitoring and responsible for the radios. They were on every other leg basis for Pilot Flying/Pilot Monitoring assignments. He said that was the case unless there was a special situation in which case he would take the landing.

When asked if he had been terminated before, he said that he had been terminated from Arrow Air.

The interview ended at 1540 EDT.