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EXHIBIT NO. 16D

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Emergency Response
Interview Notes
(18 pages)

Flight 1420 / 1JUN99

Response Interviews Conducted by the Airport and Emergency Response Group

June 4-7, 1999

Captain Lewis Hawley
Redball One Captain
With Ernhart (driver)

First On Scene
Narrative from time of alarm:
Just laid down, Thunderstorm hit and hail hitting skylights and had a power failure
Emergency generator kicked on.
Perry told him they had an alarm; apparently speaker alert didn't happen (power failure)
I did turn-out (put on gear) and went to truck.

The wind was blowing so hard surprised the wind was blowing in the station so hard.

Clearance to go on ROMEO. He heard the tower had lost an airplane on the runway.
I had to turn off QUARTZ lights because of rain...barely could see the centerline.
Unit was sliding on water.

I asked for clearance on runway, rain abated, saw aircraft. smoke then plane and flames.
I backed up, followed Redball Two, helped open gate.

Saw people walking near bales of hail to get out of the rain and hail.

Made attack into open end of fuselage. REDBALL1 and 3 applied agent for 30 seconds; REDBALL2 applied agent for approximately 90 seconds.

Couldn't go to front because of people.

Fire from fuselage and under wings; had to use hand lines from REDBALL1 under wings because bumper turret was not low enough.

I walked around the plane, people asked him what to do and offered help. I moved people from the spill are to continue fire operations. I found fuel in front of plane had REDBALL3 position to this area.

When we found the First Officer he was alive and victims were still in their seats.

ARFF couldn't get involved in rescue due to lack of manpower. ARFF trucks had three trucks and four people.

TIMES:
One minute knocked down main body of fire; handlines for an hour. Under wings and plane to keep small flames from spreading again.

QUESTION:
When I arrived were all passengers out. I could see bodies in the back part. In the front part, one man brought his wife out. There were four or five victims still strapped in their seats. First Officer had to be extricated. Most people who died were in burning area and already deceased on arrival. I helped some people get around wires. Rescue One arrived 2-3 minutes and began rescue.

QUESTION: How do you get along with tower?
Depends on the operator but okay.

QUESTION: (discussion about radio communication)
Heard initial call then not much talk. We have two radio systems. Sometimes we have problems switching between city and tower; we get walked on.

QUESTION: Where were you directed?
Heard aircraft landing 4R and assumed the approach end. We went in the direction it should have been.

QUESTION: Position of switches?
Rescue One asked him about batteries. Captain Coney and FF George then went through and turned switches that were on to off. Strip lighting was still on; didn't notice about cockpit of exterior lights.

QUESTION: Could you see tower when you came out...what could you see?
I could not see the tower building but could see the beacon light.
We navigated by centerline and taxi stripes. We had difficulty judging curves on ROMEO.

Doesn't remember seeing blue lights on side.
Saw lightning.
Rain had lightened up at aircraft and smoke was going straight up.
Remembers rain but no wind.

QUESTION: Category of fire?
Used water and foam.

QUESTION: Are you familiar with a locator grid system?
We don't use grid charts.

QUESTION: On 4R do you remember lights?
Near mid point it cleared up and we could see lights, but at the beginning I don't recall seeing lights. Could have been because QUARTZ lights on.

QUESTION: What is the protocol for communicaitons?
First we call the tower, second we call dispatch to coordinate off airport response. I asked for a full response. We monitor two channels in earphones; calls from all over town; both in headset. REDBALL2 calls on dispatch channel. On city channel you have to monitor several dispatch channels that have to be manually changed. Headsets are wired one-side tower, other side dispatch.

QUESTION: How are you directed on the airport?
Ground directions are not grid charts, we uses aeronautical terms.

QUESTION: Would grid chart be desirable?
If tower knew it would be good...also for other companies.

Last two FAA inspections the airport was asked to get a grid chart. I don't know why there isn't one.
I think a gridchart would have been good.

QUESTION: Tell us about going the wrong direction?
Using the word wrong is inaccurate. We to the runway based on the best information we had.
(When asked to point to runway 18, he pointed to the runway number "18". Captain Hawley indicated the difference between "alert" where the crews would respond to a preposition midfield and a "search" where the crews would normally respond to the approach of the runway given.)

Standby positions: There are 11 standby prepositions that firefighters know by heart.

QUESTION: Was there any delay in leaving quarters?
No.

QUESTION: Was there any further directions from tower after initial movement?
No.

QUESTION: What did David tell you at alarm?
He said tower had lost communication with an aircraft landing right. With an aircraft landing 4R .

QUESTION: Did turrets and hand lines perform adequately?
Yes.

QUESTION: Did foam work?
Yes but rain kept washing it away.

QUESTION: Relating to using the east or west side connector roads, what are our thoughts? There was no shorter way to get to site?
About the same and one was safer.

QUESTION: How much time lost unlocking gate?
20-30 seconds? Gates sometimes lock up.

QUESTION: Would you have damaged truck if you crashed the gate?
Yes, the bumper turret. The considered using bolt cutters but the time would have been the same because the lock is harden steel.

QUESTION: Would a knock down gate have affected the out come?
He thinks dead people were already dead when we got there.

QUESTION: Is this department a city department?
City, not contract.

QUESTION: When you received the alarm, what was the mode?
Red phone.

QUESTION: Any problems?
Not with phone, but yes with the speaker system. Static. They have requested a new phone line to tower. Station built in 89-90. Line are original.

QUESTION: Did you notice any problems with the doors?
Doors were up and rain blowing in. They had been down for the night. David answered the fire phone and punched the button. He wouldn't have had time to crank the doors up by hand.

Station uses same standby power as the rest of the field.

QUESTION: How many ARFF vehicles at the station?
3 vehicles.

QUESTION: How long were you on scene until others companies arrived?
3-4 minutes.

QUESTION: How fast were you driving in the heavy rain?
30-40 mph at most.

We don't have INFRARED equipment.

QUESTION: Are you familiar with DEVS low visibility systems?
No and trucks are not equipped.

QUESTION:
What improvements would you suggest?
We needed more personnel when we got there. Had to fight fire and couldn't rescue. 4 people on duty.

QUESTION: Did all 4 station personnel respond?
Yes

QUESTION: Were all four regulars?
No. One driver was first day as regular assigned driver, one fill-in (ARFF certified, but not regular).

QUESTION: Is there a training officer on the airport?
No full time. In limbo due to personnel changes. Only one active ARFF instructor.

QUESTION: Who is supposed to attend annual rectification?
ARFF program is in a state of flux right now (Cantrell).

QUESTION: Who was in units?
REDBALL1 Capt+1, REDBALL2 had 1 and REDBALL3 had 1.

QUESTION: Is there a policy on assignments?
Yes, least experienced driver goes with a Capt.

QUESTON: Describe the certification training for ARFF training?
It is a 40 hour course. Local training varies with the individual. There is no full-time training officer at the airport.

Metropolitian Emergency Medical Services
June 4, 1999
PARTICIPANTS IN GROUP INTERVIEW
Chris Marshall-Operations Supervisor. On Duty/MEMS(Metropolitan Emergency Medical Service) 954/ALS (Advanced Life Support) rescue truck (rescue equipment)/1person
National Reg. Paramedic 7 years
FEMA certified incident commander for mass casualty.

Tim Jordan-Nat. Registered Paramedic, Shift paramedic/MEMS-219/ALS/2people
Wayne Ledbetter-Nat. Reg. Paramedic, Shift paramedic/MEMS-305/ALS: (Advanced Life Support)/3people (one intern)

NARRATIVE
954/About 11:50pm a big thunderstorm came through. I went to the communication center to check on the generator. David Turner (MEMS employee) called from home to offer to come in to help with a plane crash he had heard about on the radio. I then checked with dispatch, learned of the crash and launched.

954/ After launching and five minutes into response I was told 80 souls on board. I went to the gate location I was dispatched to (gate located by UPS) and found it locked. Looked for access but didn't know where the roads were so I asked the district chief. I proceeded to the south gate, and followed a fire unit on to the airfield. I drove down the perimeter road to midfield, transitioned to runway 4R and went to the north end and parked there. I saw the aircraft fuselage, grabbed triage equipment, and went down the rocks to scene. I was in the area at 00:19; Arrived at the scene at 00:22. Within two minutes another unit arrived.

305/ I entered the accident area following the gravel road. I found dozens of passengers walking, carrying injured, and heard of other injured persons. Still thought 80 souls on board. 219 began triage with mass-casualty truck that included two EMTs and a paramedic. I set up triage at the site adjacent the perimeter road east of the aircraft (Red Cross tent location).

When there was lightning I saw black or gray smoke, blowing WNW gradually. I saw no flames. Fire personnel helped carry survivors. Transport officer (Mike Washington) and operations (Robert Darr).

More units were on the way. One patient had immediate need for transportation. MEDFLIGHT landed on runway, then repositioned on perimeter road west of the aircraft. The first flight lifted one red and one yellow patient. One surface unit loaded two more people. Ten ambulances lined along perimeter road. Concern was for bottle necking so airport personnel tried to unlock gate number 33 for a circular route but needed bolt cutters.

There were 40-50 patients triaged and treated at the on-scene triage area. Total time 2 hours. There were 10 red codes and 19 yellow.

305/ By 15-20 minutes after arrival the injured passengers were off the airplane; by 35-40 minutes the injured passengers were in the triage area. We found 5-6 persons in or immediately around the plane. Of the 2 in the airplane one was a yellow, one was a red, the first officer. Of the other 4 persons on the ground on the north side of the airplane, there were 3 reds and 1 yellow.

QUESTION: Did you move any seats during rescue operations?
I didn't see any seats removed. I saw one first class seat about 30' north of fuselage.

QUESTION: Difficulties in accessing the accident site?
Road accesses were difficult, particularly the gate numbering system didn't make any sense. It went well after we were established on site. I am unfamiliar with ARFF prepositioning spot positions.

QUESTION: How many people were transported?
Buses transported reds, yellows and greens. (See accounting sheet for details)
MEDFLIGHT operated 2 flights transporting 4 people.

GENERAL COMMENTS
Lighting was good from the fire equipment.
Backboards were hard to get until the MCI (Mass Casualty Incident) truck arrived with supplies which can handle up to 100 patients. Airport trailer arrived late; at least one hour after arrival.

Identification and assessment of the non-injured was a problem because non-triaged were transported on a bus before the EMS crews could assess them. This required us to establish a separate triage area at the firehouse.

There was an area of water about 25 feet across, varying from knee deep to chest deep. There were survivors on high ground north of this area.

There were a lot of lower extremity injuries. Patients were placed on ACTIVE-AID backboards.

Airport training is once a year, a four-hour program (this is internal and not ARFF based).

QUESTION: How about communications?
There was not much in the beginning. Face to face with firefighter chief was useful.
We used MEMS2 for radio.

QUESTION: What were the weather conditions?
Stopped raining to light rain. There was standing water in the grassy areas on site. The rain was heavy at the north end of the runway north of taxiway VICTOR. The units hydroplaned as they pushed the water from the tires; speed was limited to 45 mph.

QUESTION: Did you observe any lights in the aircraft?
There were floor lights on initially, later we found them off.

QUESTION: On the runway, did you see taxiway lights.
954 didn't notice blue lights, white lights or centerline lights. Minutes later 219 saw lights.

QUESTION: Was response appropriate?
In the beginning there was not enough, then later we had too many ambulances.
Overall it was okay.

QUESTION: When was your last airport-related emergency drill?
Three years ago and MEMS participated.

QUESTION: Did you search for the Captain of AA1420?
Yes, We found him in the cockpit. It was obvious that he was deceased.

QUESTION: How was First Officer brought out?
Don't know.

QUESTION: Would a grid chart help?
The gate numbers don't make any sense. They have multiple numbers; it is hard to know where you are if you have not been there before.
MEMS has a copy of emergency plan. We expected to be escorted onto the field.

MEMs has asked for inter-agency critique. We did our own today.

Comments from MEMS internal critique:
Airport was moving people before they were triaged. Triaged at fire station. Don't know who was loading busses. We found out later it was airport management.
State Emergency Coordination Center sent unknown persons to site. Initiated a command and control center of its own. Did not coordinate with MEMS.

Chief Tyner
June 4, 1999
District Chief/Scene Operations Officer

Responded from the central forestation, went to scene as operations officer.

Storm came through, several calls from lightning. Monitoring radio-heard REDBALL2 an Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) unit. Called and said tower had lost communication with AA1420. Heard that they were at wrong end, went to other end and found aircraft.

Advised dispatch he would respond as operations officer. Directed city communication to go down notification checklist, including MEMS that they needed all the ambulances. Asked for MEMS supervisor to communicate with incident command center.

Asked to notify police to monitor all gates to control traffic. Asked for second alarm.

Upon arrival found main body of fire was out and handlines were in use. Saw multitude of people walking out of area.

Set up triage, sent crews into aircraft and into hayfield looking for people. The hay had been recently cut, and people were sheltering themselves from the storm with the bales. Asked for busses to pick up walking wounded and transport. Asked for medical support vehicles from the ARFF station with supplies and people to man them. Chief Tyner sent fire crews through the aircraft cabin to look for any survivors and was confident that all were accounted for in all areas except the tail that was inaccessible.

Chief Tyner stated that enroute it was raining so hard that he couldn't see the hood of his car in a real heavy thunderstorm; he couldn't drive very fast, the car was rocking. The storm came from the northwest of field. Upon arrival it wasn't raining as hard but there was lots of lightning and the hail had stopped.

Chief Tyner did not recall his time on scene but noted that times are on the tape.

QUESTION: Do you know of anyone left onboard.
Did two walk-down line-abreast searches with multiple personnel, arms-width apart. The search pattern included from the perimeter road north to the river and an area 100 feet east and west of the aircraft. Checked as well as possible and was confident all living persons were accounted for.

QUESTION: To your knowledge did any of your crews move any aircraft debris, particularly first class seats, during the course of their rescue operations?
Some crews had to pull two or three people out of the first class cabin. Other personnel cut quite a lot of metal to get to the FO. He didn't think his people moved any of the first class seats in the debris field.

QUESTION: Were there any visible lights on the aircraft?
No. He verified the engines were off and was unaware of any cockpit switch movement.

Had to keep spot fires down for a couple of hours.

QUESTION: Access?
Not many of off-airport people knew what to do or where to go. EMS followed him.

QUESTION: Can you describe the scene conditions?
I didn't notice any standing water.

QUESTION: What was the ground condition around the aircraft?
Not in water, but next to the swampy area to the north.

QUESTION: How did you know where to go?
REDBALL2 had notified aircraft was off north end of 4R . Keypad access is easier than keyed locked gates.

QUESTION: Who got ambulatory passengers?
Maintenance picked some of them up in the busses.

QUESTION: Who was incident commander?
Sam Snowden set up command in fire station.
Captain Hawley had site command until Chief Tyner arrived.

QUESTION: How can location be identified?
He pointed to the numbers 4R on the airport diagram and said that is the best place when told "4R" to go to scan the runway.

David Perry
June 4, 1999
Driver of REDBALL2

NARRATIVE

Tim Bengston was in REDBALL3

Outside watching the weather, came in, never heard plane land or reverse thrust; the normal things that you would hear after a plane landing. As he came in the door, the tower direct line crash telephone rang once. His initial thought was that it was an inadvertent alarm since he had not heard any aircraft land. The person on the phone said, "I have an AA plane down on 4R , I've lost them, I don't know where they are." I responded, "You don't know where they are?" The tower repeated, "I don't where they are." He pushed the door-operating button and the doors opened. He beat on the dorm door to alert the other firefighters. He was met by firefighters already responding.

As they left the station they couldn't get city communication to respond due to large volume of radio traffic. Crossing "T" bridge city communications responded and asked if he wanted full response (See 911 tape transcript for actual conversation). Called Captain Hawley in REDBALL1 and asked if he heard it. Captain said yes and Perry relayed this on FIREGROUND1. At south end of 4R REDBALL2 called the tower and reported he couldn't find the aircraft, and asked if they should sweep the runway. Tower replied yes.

Encountered 2-3" of water, and was limited to 30 mph because the vehicle was rocked by wind and vehicle was hydroplaning on the runway.

At the north end of 4R he saw fire in the aircraft in the low area adjacent to the river below the riprap. He observed survivors jumping out of the aircraft through fire. He turned around on the runway, proceeded back to the connector road on the east side of 4R. He proceeded to gate 34 where he had trouble with the lock. Captain Hawley came from REDBALL1 and provided assistance in opening the gate, relieving pressure by lifting the gate.

Proceeding along the gravel perimeter road, he encountered 30-40 survivors beginning at the low-water bridge. He had to slow his movement for fear of running over survivors. The rain was slowing.

He still couldn't see aircraft around the riprap embankment. People were hiding under hay bales trying to get out of weather. People were on the riprap.

He positioned his unit 30 feet south of the aircraft to apply foam agent on the main fire. He initiated bumper turret application on the fire, knocked down the fire in 60 seconds. The bumper turret would not depress adequately to attack the fire under the left wing. He couldn't apply foam under the left wing while people were jumping out of forward section of the aircraft through the break just ahead of the wing in a rearward direction. He got out and used the 1-inch booster line to get under the left wing.

Found 5 burned bodies at forward edge of aft section, piled on each other. Expended water and half a tank of foam. Didn't see any other units activities at fire but saw survivors on south side going toward other units. Took water from two structural pumpers and reengaged with a hand-line and keep applying to aft portion to prevent reflashing. Repositioned cautiously because people were everywhere; approach was slow but rain had slackened and visibility improved.

Was pleased to see survivors but disappointed to see pile of bodies in aft fuselage.

QUESTION: Please the describe the alert sequence of events?

The alert phone is a straight ring-down phone with tap to airport manager's office. Picked up phone after one ring. Thought it was a tower phone accidentally knocked off because he didn't hear an aircraft. Tower said in an excited voice "I have lost it and I don't know where they are." Perry said "You don't know where they are?" Tower said, "I don't know where they are." Perry said, "We are on the way."

QUESTION: What was the time from alert to exit of the fire station?
It couldn't have been a minute. Looked around and hit dorm door to alert others, people were coming out. Alarm in dorm is a small bell that sounds like a telephone. It is hard to hear with rain or hail is falling on skylights.

QUESTION: On-sight, how long did it take you to knock down the fire.
I was surprised, less than 30 seconds. Fire had dissipated while they were going back to road from the first sighting up on the runway end.

QUESTION: Did you notice any loss of electrical power?
He was outside because he was on partial power. Power had been on emergency for some time before alert. Emergency power is supplied to the radio, crash alarm, partial station power, and bay doors. Perry stated that he remarked to himself as he hung the phone up that he hoped the doors would open since they were on emergency power. Perry stated that the alarm came only over the crash phone but not over the speakers.

QUESTION: Did the alarm coming in only on the telephone affect the response?
No there was no delay. Trucks were rolling in less than a minute.

QUESTION: What was the weather condition?
Visibility was so bad as they exited the station that he had a difficult time seeing the other ARFF units 10' apart. He stated he could not remember seeing the tower but could see the beacon. On taxiway ROMEO south of TANGO intersection, visibility was 30-40 feet. The Quartz floodlights on the front and sides of the ARFF unit produced a "white wall" affect, reducing visibility further so he turned them off. He stated he could only see forward one taxiway light at a time heading south.

At the approach end of 4R visibility was about 100 feet. He couldn't say whether the runway lights were on or off as they were traveling north on 4R. Passing mid-field on 4R, visibility improved as he headed north. He remembered seeing a red obstruction light on a structure and wondered if it was a wing light.

This was an intense storm of short duration. Lots of lightening from SW-S.

QUESTION: Describe the handling of the truck as the unit was driving up the runway?
Truck hydroplanes easily since CG is aft and high. The ARFF truck drive-ability is "Squirrelly."
Low pressure tire design and large side area to the wind contribute to the handling qualities.

QUESTION: Please describe the reloading process?
Two off-airport trucks nursed REDBALL2.

QUESTION: Runway condition
REDBALL2 traveled the whole length of 4R, on left side of runway. Through his rear-view mirror he saw the lights of another truck swing indicating to him that the other truck was hydroplaning. He stated that the water depth was the same the full length of the runway, except he estimated the depth at 3-5 inches on the left side of the runway due to runoff. His speed never got over 40mph because of visibility and drivability. He noticed a reduction in rain intensity as he moved north on the runway. Just before passing taxiway WHISKEY, he noted aircraft tire tracks leaving the runway surface and that a runway light was missing. At that point he knew he had an aircraft incident. When he got to the painted numbers (north end of runway) he saw a glow. At this point he notified ATCT of ALERT3 status, calling it in three times to assure it was on the tower tape.

QUESTION: What is normal method for prepositioning units responding to alerts from the tower?
Preposition system using specific numbered location is normal system.

QUESTION: Would an ELT in the aircraft and a receiver in truck have helped.
If you had someone that is trained to use them.

QUESTION: Please characterize the off-airport response?
Off airport response was bad because of delay in off-airport notification due to heavy radio traffic.

QUESTION: Describe the wind conditions on-scene?
Smoke from the aircraft fire was blowing diagonally to the NE. The wind was strong enough that he did not feel any heat from the fire even though his ARFF vehicle was positioned only 30 feet away.

QUESTION: Did you have a SCBA on?
We don't have another person in the cab to put on an SCBA. To put one on after exiting the vehicle is time consuming. The Captain had his on and walked up beside REDBALL2 after he got out to use the hose underwing. Captain was using the hose off of REDBALL1.

GENERAL COMMENTS
He was disappointed in the time lost because they started the search at the south end of 4R. He also noted that it might not have made a difference because if the search had begun at the north end, the REDBALL units most likely would have turned south at taxiway WHISKEY and might have missed the accident scene altogether because of the low visibility.

QUESTION: How long from initial call until agent application.
It was in excess of 5 minutes because of visibility and no knowledge of position of the lost aircraft. He commented that this was a search and not a response since the tower had not given him specific information other than contact was lost with AA1420 landing on 4R. It was a search until he noted the tire tracks off runway. He had to drive slowly in a search mode. Also some additional time was lost while he had to stop and unlock a gate enroute to the accident site.

QUESTION: How would you characterize tower communication?
Tower was at a loss because his visibility was so bad plus the tower was a long way from the scene. The tower gave no direction after the initial alarm except to give permission to enter 4R.

He has 25 years in firefighting also hold an Airframe &Powerplant mechanic and pilot licenses.

Hawley helped open gate.

REDBALL2 was first in line going down the runway and in the lead going to the accident scene.

QUESTION: Characterize the operation of the bay door?
Door opened without delay with a punch of a button.

Rescue One
Steven White-Firefighter/Rescue One/station2
Steven Bell- Firefighter/Rescue One/station2
June 4, 1999

Heard unit on radio (REDBALL2) that tower had lost sight of an aircraft. Completing a run, went back out to airport. Still hadn't dispatched. Tree down in road in heavy storm. Just as they arrived on airport grounds a full response was announced. Went in gate at radar site (keypunch) and down runway, saw slight glow. One minute from enter to scene.

Got HOLMATRO rescue tool and jaws and spreader. Walked down embankment along landing gear-witness tracks to scene. They saw people moving.

A man asked for help to get someone out so Bell went with the male to the end of the aircraft facing the fire where a female with agonal respirations was found, bleeding from the throat. During the assessment of the patient her respiration stopped. At this point Bell told the male how to breathe for her but that Bell could not remain to help her because of the need to help other patients. He went to the front where he found a man on the ground and man in the first class section with left side pains, difficulty breathing. After assessing those patients he located the Captain and determined he was deceased.

During movement of a male from the First Class section, his pulse was lost and the patient was triaged out.

Extrication of First Officer began by Firefighter George and Captain Coney of the RESCUE1 unit. Bell, having a SCBA on went to assist with fire suppression and cool the debris while Firefighter White moved to assist in removal of the First Officer and loading patients for transport to medical facilities.

It took 45minutes to get the First Officer out. He was extricated out the left side of aircraft by enlarging existing rips in the fuselage side behind the Captain's seat.

They were directed to leave the fatalities where they were.

GENERAL COMMENTS
Badly storming. Constant lightning and heavy rain; there was strong wind and they heard hail.
They saw the blue lights on the taxiway operating.

Aircraft floor mounted emergency direction walkway lights were on. They don't know of anyone moving switches or controls in the cockpit. They moved debris and worked across pedestal while extricating the First Officer.

The First Officer had a fractured femur and a possible dislocated or fractured hip. The patient grasped the back of his head several times and indicated he had pain there. The First Officer had signs and symptoms of pain and compensated shock. He had no slurred speech or dilated pupils. EMS providers stated that because of pain, shock, and obvious injuries, any statements made by the First Officer that were unrelated to his treatment or condition, were not reliable.

Tim Bengston, Driver,
Firefighters Standards-Basic/March '91
EMT-Basic

ARFF trained for 6 years. Average 10-15 days per year at the airport; some lapses of 90 days between ARFF assignments. Standard practice is to take an off airport firefighter to fill in when regularly assigned ARFF personnel is sick or on vacation.

When assigned to the station he received ARFF training comprised of self-study on different subjects, 1-2 hours a day. Airport familiarization consisted of some training in-truck and some on-map training. Every morning we check all the truck equipment, including agent systems, foam, nitrogen pressure, HALON pressure, etc. During checks we would pull the truck outside, we operated the turrets including shooting water only. He felt comfortable operating the equipment.

NARRATIVE
Went to bed at 10:30pm. Heavy weather woke him up because of lightening with heavy rain and hail pounded on the skylight. He went to the back of the station; noticed hail and lightning. The roll-up steel doors were bowing from wind. He went to the front with FireFighter Perry. He noted a 737 parked at the terminal was wing-rocking in the wind. The rain was blowing almost horizontally. Then the alert phone rang. The phone is supposed to work with a speaker, he thinks he heard the tower say they had lost a plane on 4R; then the power failed. He heard some of the tower communications; it was noisy because it was raining, hail beating and the roof. He stated some times the PA crackles and is garbled; works sometimes, some times it doesn't.

FF Perry said they have lost a plane; it has landed but they don't know where it is. FF Earnhart came out and FF Perry got Captain Hawley. FF Perry expressed a concern about the door opening but the door worked when the button was pushed. He has never manually opened door but he knows how to do it.

He turned out (suited up), started REDBALL3, drove out of the door and got hit with blinding rain and wind. REDBALL3 always goes on right hand side of REDBALL1. They started out to taxiway TANGO. He started the generator and tuned on the QUARTZ lights. When he turned on these lights it caused a "white sheet" effect.

Water was on the ramp, later noted to be ½ inch or more. He was limited to 15-20 miles per hour maximum for visibility. He went out TANGO on the right, following REDBALL1 with REDBALL2 on the left. He tried to make the corner at ROMEO, but found it hard to find the taxiway edge. They went to approach (south) end of 4R. He noticed REDBALL1 had a hard time making turn. Had to look extremely hard just to see the edge of the taxiway ROMEO. It was hard to see the blue taxiway lights but noticed that they were on.

He tried the front QUARTZ lights but he had to turn them off again due to a complete white-out effect. REDBALL2 on left of REDBALL1, REDBALL3 was on right. REDBALL3 was looking in ditches for the aircraft.

Regarding Radio dispatch issues: When we get an alert we have to call downtown to get off airport assistance. As soon as we got out of the station REDBALL2 called city communications. Their headsets are designed to have city communications channel in one ear, tower in the other. Tower had lost an airplane and we were going out to look for it. As the trucks entered taxiway ROMEO city communications called and asked if full response was requested. REDBALL2 asked Captain Hawley if he wanted full response. Captain Hawley said yes and REDBALL2 relayed this to city communications. Half the city equipment was out on lightening calls (responses). Radio was buzzing in both ears from traffic from other city incidents, since all

city-wide responses were communicating on the common fire-ground frequency (Fire-Ground 1) even though there were multiple channels available.

At south end of 4R, one of the other units asked permission to enter 4R. The units proceeding up runway with REDBALL2 on the left side and REDBALL3 on the right side of the runway. It was raining just as hard. We accelerated to maybe 25 mph before it felt like we were hydroplaning. Tried QUARTZ lights again and encountered white out condition. I shined the turret light to right side looking for ruts.
As we got very close to the north end, an orange glow and smoke were observed. Some one told city communications they had an Alert3.

After 2-3 seconds REDBALL2 peeled off in a U-turn to the east-side connector road, to gate 34. FF Perry and Captain Hawley got out to open the gate. It took a good 20 seconds to open the gate. The lock took about 10 seconds. REDBALL lights illuminated the area well. The order of units going down the road was REDBALL2, 1, and 3. We didn't stop to secure the gate.

Coming off the low water bridge REDBALL3 saw walking wounded near the hay bales. Most of walkers were pointing back towards the wreck. Road was clear of persons and REDBALL3 was following REDBALL1. At the left-hand turn at the end of the berm, REDBALL2 in lead went in first, dispersing agent, REDBALL1 set up to the right of REDBALL2, REDBALL3 to the right of 1. REDBALL3 was up near front of fuselage.

REDBALL3 dispensed agent on fire over the fuselage to the area of the left engine using the roof turret. After 30 seconds REDBALL3 stopped dispersing agent. He saw Captain Hawley get out and FF Earnhart dragging a hand line.

No orders were given on radio regarding fire attack. Someone asked REDBALL1 what was going on and REDBALL3 believes REDBALL1 gave another Alert3. After last turret application, REDBALL3 set high idle and donned his airpack. The fire was pretty much out and REDBALL3 still had agent remaining.
FF Earnhart was on a wing without an airpack on. All personnel were using handlines at this time and there were no off-airport units on scene.

REDBALL3 attacked the fire by advancing a handline over a wing. He was surprised at the lack of fire volume based on watching training films of fuel burning in planes and this airplane still had unburned paint.

Standing on the stub of the left-hand wing, he applied agent blanket with the handine. He stuck the handline hose in to the open galley exit. The fire was all on the inside of the fuselage back by the engine. It seemed odd that all the fire was on the inside. It looked like the door was gone. Captain Coney appeared at this time.

Later Captain Hawley asked REDBALL3 to move to the front of the aircraft for illumination purposes and to put a blanket of foam because of the fuel smell. REDBALL2 peeled off to refill the water tank. REDBALL1 & 3 still had agent but fire was only in spots inside the fuselage. He didn't feel threaten at that point.

QUESTION: How large was the body of fire.
REDBALL3 shot 30 seconds of agent; the body of fire was knocked down in 15 seconds. People were coming out of front half of plane. He was surprised there wasn't much body of fire. He moved around and put foam in the cockpit. Capain. Hawley had REDBALL3 move his handline around to the right-hand side to cool down around the right engine. At this time it was mostly cool-down but there were a few spot fires. There were a few holes in the floor to apply agent. There was a hole under the left engine with fire coming out.

QUESTION: Please describe the agent streams from the 3 units.

They were converging on the open end of the fuselage. REDBALL3 was aiming for the left engine over the top of the fuselage using straight stream from the roof turret. No under-truck nozzles were used from REDBALL3.

QUESTION: Is the procedure normal to have only one person on a handline.
I don't like this. It is not how we are trained. If you are going to be on a line you should have at least two people, but we had to do it in this circumstance.

We have a booster line 1" hose, dispensing less than 100 gpm with a pump pressure of 210 psi.

QUESTION: Focus on moving around and putting out spots fires, where were people?
He didn't see any people while he was doing this. He didn't receive any direct order but assumed we should put out fires. He laid a foam blanket behind and around himself for insurance. He did run out of air finally. He used SCBA intermittently off and on to save air.

QUESTION: Regarding the initial response in the fire station; did power fail before or after the alarm call?
Having a hard time recalling that. When returning about 3:30am lights went out for 5-7 seconds. He can't hear generator in the building.

QUESTION: When pulling out of station, you could see a 737 parked at the terminal?
Yes, I was watching the Southwest 737 at the terminal.

QUESTION: You were up before alarm was called in?
Yes. I was awakened by hail on the skylights. Skylights go up in a funnel shape from the ceiling just like a megaphone. The bed I was in is right under one of them. TV weather had indicated bad weather was coming.

QUESTION: Anything else we should address?
It seemed like communication with 911 failed us. Didn't get help when we needed it.
Other units started hearing traffic and started to airport before they were dispatched.
Usually east-end companies leave dispatch speaker on. The unwritten policy is if you hear an Alert 2 or 3 you turn out and start to the airport.

QUESTION: When REDBALL2 called in leaving quarters, did dispatch put out an alert.
No, when we turned on to ROMEO I heard dispatch sending off-airport companies. (See fire transcripts for details).

QUESTION: Is it normal procedure for fill-in persons to drive apparatus.
Yes, the policy is when a person is sick, the person below fills in. Hoseman and drivers are both trained to drive.

QUESTION: What is the maximum range of a roof turret in no wind, ideal conditions.
I've never noticed how far it would reach; 200+ feet on a straight stream seems possible.

QUESTION: How deep was the water on 4R.
I didn't notice. Rain was falling fast enough that we were bumping hydroplane conditions at 20-30 mph. He had a "floating feeling".

QUESTION: Where you when the Alert 3 was called in?
On the physical end of the runway. It amazed me I couldn't see the fire until we got to the end. That was mostly due to rain and wind. We should have been able to see it from the TANGO/ROMEO intersection or from the ramp.

QUESTION: Are you familiar with FLIR? Would it have pick out the fire?

It might have been able to pick up the heat.

QUESTION: When you were driving up 4R did you notice any ponding in the turf?
I can't recall. I'll say this much about the water- REDBALL1 & REDBALL2 were pushing a lot of water from the tires.

QUESTION: Are you aware of an on-airport locating system
Taxiway intersections and standard marking are available. (When asked to point to position 10 he was able to quickly. When asked go to 18 he pointed at the runway numbers 18 at the north end of runway 18.

QUESTION: When you opened the doors, describe the visibility and wind conditions.
A lot of water was coming down before the phone rang. The ramp area was floating with ½ inch or better of water on it. When the alarm sounded visibility was about the same but harder to see from the visibility point of view. When I got in REDBALL3 I could see the 737 but I wasn't focusing on it. I could make the red lights out in the corner where ramp meets the taxiway. The blue taxiway lights were burning but hard to find. Runway lights were better and were on. When we made our turn around at the north end the center-line lights were on. Distance markers were lighted.