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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Security Factors Group Chairman's Factual Report
(13 pages)

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

SECURITY FACTORS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S
FACTUAL REPORT

A. ACCIDENT: DCA-96-MA-079

LOCATION: Moriches, Long Island New York

DATE: July 17, 1996

TIME: 2045 Eastern Standard Time

AIRCRAFT: Trans World Airlines Inc.
Boeing 747-100, N93119

B. SECURITY FACTORS GROUP

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C. SUMMARY

On July 17, 1996, at 2045, a Trans World Airlines 747-100, N93119, operating as flight 800, under 14 CFR Part 121 as Flight 800 crashed into the sea about 10 miles south of Moriches Inlet, Long Island, New York, after taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York.. The 209 passengers, and 21 crew members sustained fatal injuries.

D. DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION

The field phase of the security factors investigation was conducted at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) from which TWA Flight 800 had departed. Much of the information that was reviewed by the Security Factors Group is restricted information. The information is sensitive, and therefore not releasable to the public in accordance with requirements of 14 CFR Part 191, "Protection of Sensitive Security Information", and is therefore excluded from this report.

The security factors investigation centered on potential vulnerabilities for placing an explosive or incendiary device on board a scheduled air carrier airplane, at JFK, system-wide. The Group reviewed Department of Transportation (DOT), FAA, PANYNJ, and TWA security plans, documentation, reports, terminal facilities, equipment and passenger, freight and mail processing procedures (See attached document list).

1. Airport Information

John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), elevation 13 feet msl, encompasses approximately 5000 acres in Jamaica, New York, approximately 15 miles east of Manhattan. JFK is owned by the City of New York and operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ). The airport is certificated by the FAA in accordance with Title 14 CFR Part 139, and is also required to conform to 14 CFR Part 107, "Airport Security". and it has a current FAA approved Airport Security Plan (ASP).

JFK airport is classified as a Category X₁ airport. The ASP is required under 14 CFR 107; appropriate parts of the ASP were prepared by the PANYNJ/airlines and were submitted to the FAA for approval. The ASP was last approved in total, on July 14, 1994 by the FAA. Key elements covered under the plan are Port Authority for New York and New Jersey responsibilities under FAR 107 for air operations area (AOA) security, security control procedures, law enforcement officer checkpoint response requirements, emergency preparedness and personnel identification procedures. Additionally, the ASP contains Exclusive Area Agreements, covering Airport Operator Controlled Exclusive Use Operations and has specific procedures covering separation of screened and unscreened passengers and security plans for threat Levels I through IV2.

1 Category X is based upon international traffic, must have at least 25 million screened passengers... CRITERIA DELETED DUE TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN 14 CFR 191.

2 Threat Levels are assigned.. CRITERIA DELETED DUE TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN 14 CFR 191.

2. Air Carrier Security Information

Trans World Airlines (TWA) operates at JFK as a 14 CFR 121 international and domestic air carrier. TWA has a FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Plan (ACSSP) in accordance with 14 CFR Part 108, "Airplane Operator Security."

TWA is among 5 carriers at JFK operating terminals under exclusive area agreements with the PANYNJ. The International Arrival Building (IAB) is operated by the PANYNJ. Terminal 5, which is operated by TWA, was the departure terminal for TWA Flight 800.

The Security Factors Group conducted a survey of Terminal 5 on July 20, 1996. The following observations were made by group members. The group was escorted by the TWA Station and Ramp Managers.

Terminal 5 has been operated as a sterile³ building for more than 3 years.

As of July 18, non-passengers were not allowed in the sterile area.

A guard was posted at the entrance door from the street to the baggage claim area.

As of July 21, 1996, a TWA Security Agent was posted at an access door which connected the sterile terminal area and the baggage claim area.

3 A sterile area is one in which all passengers/visitors must complete screening before admittance.

TWA had been using Positive Bag Match⁴ for the past 8 1/2 years, prior to the TWA 800 accident. The TWA Station Manager stated that TWA was the originator of Positive Bag Match.

Authorized personnel have access to AOA with any sort of large or small unchecked personal bags.

Mail and freight - CRITERIA DELETED DUE TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AS CONTAINED IN 14 CFR 191.

TWA employees provided passenger security screening. (This is noteworthy, in that at JFK, and most other airports, passenger security is most often provided by contract personnel.)

2.1 Flight 800 Information

On July 17, 1996 activities at terminal 5 was described as "uneventful" and there were no profile⁵ bags were handled for Flight 800 prior to departure.

As estimated 24 TWA service employees were in immediate contact with Flight 800 prior to departure.

Additional observations were made, however, they were not included in this report to comply with 14 CFR Part 191.

2.2 Baggage Check

⁴ Positive Bag Match is a procedure(s) which requires that all bags loaded on to an airplane, must have been identified as belonging to a passenger who has been confirmed as having boarded the airplane, prior to that airplane being permitted to depart.

⁵ Profile bags are bags which meet certain predesignated criteria

DELETED DUE TO REQUIREMENTS AS CONTAINED IN 14 CFR 191.

DELETED DUE TO REQUIREMENTS AS CONTAINED IN 14 CFR 191.

2.3 Terminal Surveys

The following observations were made by group members during a survey on July 21, 1996 of TWA's Domestic Terminal 6 at JFK airport.

The TWA Domestic terminal complex included 2 buildings connected by 2 tunnels/bridges at the second story level. The security checkpoints in the bridges are used to separate screened and unscreened passengers in the terminal.

Two revolving one way doors were located at baggage claim. A guard was in proximity to the revolving doors.

All passengers in both terminals exited through the baggage claim area.

The following observations were made by group members during a comparative walk through survey on July 21, 1996 at Delta (DAL) Airline's Terminal 3, at JFK:

There were 26 contract air carriers located inside DAL's Terminal 3.

The entire terminal was sterile and access was permitted for ticketed passengers only.

There are no substantial physical barriers at checkpoint access, there are stantions only.

DAL used contract security personnel at security checkpoints.

DAL had a full time company security manager at JFK to oversee security activities.

DAL' has containment program designed to secure terminal areas in the event of a break-in at a checkpoint.

DAL has upgraded x-ray units (E-Scan) at all passenger checkpoints. Four of the 12 checkpoints were enhanced with Ionscan DM detectors for trace chemical analysis of explosive compounds. The Ionscan units were on loan from the FAA during the Olympics.

2.4 Records Review

Summary of FAA Security Activity Log (October 1, 1995 through July 21, 1996). During this period 40 security incidents were logged at JFK. Of the 40 incidents reported 4 involved TWA. The following table summaries the Security Activity Log during the referenced reporting period: (DELETED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 14 CFR PART 191)

Members of the Security Factors Group also reviewed the FAA's Comprehensive and Supplemental Reports (FAR 107) Reports from July 1993 to March 1993 at JFK.

(DELETED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 14 CFR PART 191)

The following summary was prepared following an inspection of the IAB and interviews with PANYNJ security personnel:

A 30-second response time was required for PANYNJ security personnel to respond to IAB checkpoint. A five minute response time was required for law enforcement officers (LEO) to respond to any point in the terminal.

The Kennedy Airport Management Office (KAAMCO) acts as a clearing house for the exchange of information and is intended to provide motivation for heightened security awareness. KAAMCO members include major airline and government agencies at JFK.

Level III monthly meetings. Members include PANYNJ, Security, and PANYNJ Police. Group is chaired by the PANYNJ Police commander.

The "Bogus Bob" Program is designed by the PANYNJ to reward individuals for "challenges" to those who do not display airport ID. An issues information sheet on ID cards is regularly published and used to reinforce the PA Challenge Program.

ID Cards - DELETED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 14 CFR PART 191.

The PANYNJ intends to contract the management of IAB for security for 1996. Long term plans call for the IAB to be modernized and over the next several years the entire structure will be replaced. However, the plan is to have the new tenant take over the terminal operations and have an exclusive area agreement like the other unit terminal buildings.

There are 46 carriers operating at the IAB. The PANYNJ, as the host, currently provides access security to the AOA. Each of the carriers conduct their own passenger screening and joint baggage handling under a single contractor.

2.5 Interviews

The following observations and concerns were reported by PANYNJ and TWA Security personnel:

Needed at JFK as well as all airports are ways to improve screening at checkpoints through new technology, training of personnel and increased salary levels of x-ray screeners and limit access to AOA by all airport employees.

Check-In Technology: on the drawing board are baggage inspection equipment based on true explosive detection technology that is not based on trace explosive detection where a swipe is passed manually through a chemical detector. Present system uses x-ray scan personnel who are lowest paid salary level, leading to high turnover rates with high potential for operator deficiencies.

It was felt that a higher density of security guard presence at key locations in the terminal is a key factor in security response time and terminal security. PANYNJ has guard booths throughout terminal and ramp side access areas.


Finger printing of all airport employees should be a requirement for employment and applicant should have results of a criminal background check in a timely fashion. Presently, everyone is not finger printed, only those applicants who have an employment gap of 1 year or more are fingerprinted.

More needs to be done by the airlines in regard to airport security. Additionally, the FAA needs to move faster in developing requirements affecting air security. Finally, need exist to develop standards in regard to unattended aircraft and an inspection of aircraft following lay over and return to service. The last mock security drill at JFK was in 1994.

3. White House Commission of Aviation Safety and Security

On July 25, 1996, President Clinton directed Vice President Gore to establish the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. During the Security Factors investigation, factual information, concerns, and observations were reported to Safety Board Chairman Hall, who in turn apprised the White House Commission. On September 9, 1996, the Commission issued its Initial Report to President Clinton. The commission issued 20 security related recommendations.

Lawrence D. Roman



Senior Investigator,
Airports

ATTACHMENT # 1

Following is a list of documents reviewed by the members of the Security Factors Group:

1. Explosives Security Survey for JFK International Airport, July 19, through September 17, 1993 by FAA -Eastern Region
2. FAA/FBI Joint Airport Vulnerability Assessment Program Protocol, September, 1991
3. Security Directive: International Concern to Aviation Security Personnel. Current Security Procedures Review (SD-95-11-K). January 4, 1996
4. January 5, 1996 Letter from Paul Crispi (FAA) to Robert Kelly in reference to January 4, 1996 FAA Security Directive
5. TWA Air Carrier Standard Security Plan (ACSSP)
6. Comprehensive Airport Security Plan for JFK International Airport
7. Airport Security Assessment Guide (10/21/95)
8. FAA ACSSP Assessment Guide
9. FAA Supplement and Comprehensive Audits for JFK Airport from 1993 to 1996

10. FAA Supplement and Comprehensive Audits for TWA from 1993 to 1996
11. Enforcement Investigative Report for JFK and TWA
12. FAR's 107, 108 and 109
13. Foreign Airport Assessments (Classified)
14. TWA Athens Directives Relating to Athens Airport Assessment.
15. FAA Correspondence to TWA in regard to Athens Airport Security.
16. 1996 DOT Inspector General Report on FAA Security.
17. Last JFK Airport Security Drill with TWA (Lessons learned critiques).
- 18, Terrorism legislation including the Hatch Amendment.