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**NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

NTSB FDR Recommendation Letters

CONTENTS OF EXHIBIT

1. Safety Reccomendation A-95-25 through A-95-27, page 2
2. Safety Recommendation A-95-28, page 20
3. Safety Recommendation A-95-29, page 38



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Safety Recommendation

Date: February 22, 1995

In reply refer to: A-95-25 through A-95-27

Honorable David R. Hinson
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D.C. 20591

On September 8, 1994, a USAir Boeing 737-300, flight 427, was on a scheduled passenger flight from Chicago, Illinois, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During the approach to landing, the airplane suddenly rolled to the left and pitched nose down until it reached a nearly vertical attitude and struck the ground near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. The airplane was destroyed; the 5 crewmembers and 127 passengers were fatally injured. The Safety Board's investigation of this accident is continuing, and the probable causes have not been determined.

On March 3, 1991, a United Airlines Boeing 737-291, flight 585, was on a scheduled passenger flight from Denver to Colorado Springs, Colorado. As the airplane was completing the turn to final approach, it rolled rapidly to the right and pitched nose down, reaching a nearly vertical attitude before it struck the ground. The airplane was destroyed; the five crewmembers and 20 passengers were fatally injured. In its report on this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board did not reach a determination of the probable cause.¹

Both airplanes were equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR). In each case, however, the FDR did not provide needed information about airplane motion and flight control surface positions during the accident sequence.

In the Colorado Springs accident, five parameters--altitude, airspeed, heading, vertical acceleration, and microphone keying--were recorded by the FDR. Currently, regulations contained in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 121.343 require these five parameters to be recorded by FDRs on airplanes that, like

¹ National Transportation Safety Board. 1992. United Airlines flight 585, Boeing 737-291, N999UA, Uncontrolled collision with terrain for undetermined reasons 4 miles south of Colorado Springs, Colorado, March 3, 1991. Accident Report NTSB/AAR-92/06. Washington, DC.

the airplane involved in the Colorado Springs accident, were type certificated prior to October 1, 1969, and were manufactured (received an individual certificate of airworthiness) prior to May 26, 1989.² The FDR of the airplane involved in the Colorado Springs accident did not record (nor was it required to record) other parameters critical to this accident investigation: airplane pitch and roll attitude; engine thrust values; lateral and longitudinal acceleration; control wheel position; rudder pedal position; and control surface positions, such as rudder, aileron, and spoiler.

In the Aliquippa accident, the accident airplane was the same type, a Boeing 737, but the airplane's FDR system had been retrofitted with six additional parameters, in anticipation of the 1995 deadline for these enhancements. However, the additional parameters did not include information on cockpit control position, flight control surface position, lateral acceleration, or autopilot status parameters, which has hampered the Board's continuing accident investigation. In a public hearing on the accident, conducted by the Safety Board in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on January 23-27, 1995, witnesses from the FAA, aircraft manufacturers, and airlines agreed that additional FDR parameters would have assisted the Board in determining the probable cause of this accident.

Had the airplanes involved in the Colorado Springs and Aliquippa accidents been equipped with enhanced FDRs, information from the additional parameters would have allowed the Safety Board to quickly identify any abnormal control surface movements, configuration changes, or autopilot status changes that may have been involved in the loss of airplane control. Just as important, information from the additional parameters would have allowed the Board to rule out certain factors, if warranted, and to focus its investigations on other areas.

Information from FDRs with additional parameters substantially aided the Safety Board's investigations of two regional airline accidents that occurred during 1994. The first accident occurred on October 31, 1994, while an American Eagle ATR-72-210, flight 4184, was on a scheduled flight from Indianapolis, Indiana, to Chicago, Illinois. The flight had been placed in a holding pattern over Roselawn, Indiana, because of weather delays at O'Hare Airport. The flight was cleared to remain in the holding pattern and to descend from 10,000 to 8,000 feet. The airplane rolled to the right, entered a steep descent, and struck the ground; all 64 passengers

² Part 121.343 requires that by May 26, 1995, large airplanes type certificated prior to October 1, 1969, (which would have included the airplanes involved in the Colorado Springs and Aliquippa accidents) must be equipped with FDRs that record 11 parameters. The additional parameters are longitudinal acceleration, pitch attitude, roll attitude, control column or pitch control surface position, and thrust of each engine (two thrust values for the Boeing 737). Part 121.343 also requires that airplanes type certificated after October 1, 1969 (regardless of the date of manufacture) and airplanes manufactured after May 26, 1989 (regardless of the date of type certification) must be equipped with FDRs that record 17 parameters. Airplanes manufactured after October 11, 1991 (regardless of the date of type certification) must be equipped with FDRs that record 31 parameters.

and 4 crewmembers were fatally injured. The Safety Board's continuing investigation has not yet determined the probable cause of the accident; however, information from the enhanced FDR enabled the Safety Board to identify, within hours after receiving the recorder in its laboratories, the key events leading to the airplane's departure from controlled flight and the events during its final descent.

The ATR-72 was equipped with an FDR that recorded 98 parameters, including vane angle of attack (VAOA), aileron bellcrank position, flap position, aileron trim position, and autopilot engagement status. The FDR data showed that as the airplane was descending through 9,400 feet, the wing flaps began to retract and the airplane's VAOA increased. As the VAOA reached 5 degrees the autopilot disengaged, and within 1/4 second the ailerons deflected to near maximum travel in the right-wing-down direction. The FDR data also showed that the rolling moment was reversed when the VAOA was reduced to below 5 degrees and the ailerons deflected in the left-wing-down direction. The right rolling moment recurred as the VAOA again increased to 5 degrees and the ailerons deflected in the right-wing-down direction. Control of the airplane was not restored in time to prevent impact with the ground.

The data available from the ATR-72 FDR indicated to investigators that the airplane rolled as expected in response to aileron control surface movements, and that the aileron movements were correlated with increases in the airplane's angle of attack. As a result, the Safety Board was able to focus its efforts on possible explanations for the aileron control surface movements and, within days of the accident, the Board issued urgent safety recommendations to minimize the likelihood of similar occurrences in the future. As part of its continuing investigation, the Safety Board is also examining readouts from FDRs with expanded parameters from seven other ATR airplanes that have reportedly encountered flight control anomalies, three of which have shown important similarities to the accident flight.

The second accident involving an FDR with expanded parameters was one in which FDR data quickly moved the focus of the investigation from airplane systems to operations and human performance. On February 1, 1994, an American Eagle Saab 340B, flight 3641, was approaching Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on a scheduled passenger flight from Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas. As the airplane descended through 9,000 feet, both engines failed. The flightcrew executed a forced landing at False River Air Park in New Roads, Louisiana, during which the airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight attendant received minor injuries during the emergency evacuation. The 2 pilots and 28 passengers aboard were not injured.

The FDR installed on the Saab 340B recorded 128 parameters. FDR data showed that as the airplane descended through 9,040 feet, there was a rapid rise of both propellers' rotational speed well above the maximum allowable revolutions per minute. Because the FDR also was equipped to capture the positions of the engine power levers, the Safety Board was able to determine that at the same time the propeller speed increased, the power levers moved from the flight idle gate position

to aft of the ground idle detents. The airplane's approved flight manual prohibits such power lever movements while in flight. This flightcrew action explained the propeller overspeed, which resulted in dual engine failure. With the expanded FDR data, the Safety Board was able to rule out alternative explanations for the propeller overspeed, including propeller systems failures that previously had affected similar propellers installed in another turboprop regional airliner.³

The importance of FDR data is not limited to investigations of catastrophic accidents. FDR data from incidents, which are less serious but occur more often, can provide to investigators and the aviation community critical information to help prevent accidents involving similar circumstances. Following the Colorado Springs and Aliquippa accidents, the Safety Board investigated 12 Boeing 737 incidents involving anomalous rudder activity or uncommanded roll oscillations. The FDRs aboard the incident airplanes, however, were not equipped to record flight control surface positions, flight control inputs, or lateral acceleration. Like 79 percent of all U.S.-registered Boeing 737s, the airplanes involved in the incidents were manufactured prior to May 26, 1989; consequently, they were required by current regulations to record only the five basic FDR parameters. As a result, critical, objective data were not available from the FDRs, and investigators had little more than the flightcrews' subjective recollections of these dynamic events.

In contrast to the investigations of these 12 Boeing 737 incidents, for which important FDR data were not available, investigations of other incidents have been greatly aided by the availability of enhanced recorded information. These incidents involved airplanes equipped with a digital data bus that transmits information from many sensors to the onboard recording devices.

On October 7, 1993, a British Airways Boeing 747-436 experienced a nose-down pitching moment immediately after departure from London Heathrow Airport. The captain avoided ground contact by exerting substantial back pressure on his control column. The incident was investigated by the United Kingdom's Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB). Of the many parameters that were available on the airplane's digital data bus, recorded by a Quick Access Recorder (QAR)⁴ and available to the FDR, several were useful in the AAIB's investigation. These parameters included the position of each of the four elevator control surfaces, control column position, radar altitude, landing gear position, and hydraulic system pressure. By analyzing the information from the QAR, the AAIB established that "the upset was caused by the uncommanded pitch-down movement of both right-side elevators,

³ National Transportation Safety Board. 1992. Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc., Flight 2311, Uncontrolled collision with terrain, an Embraer EMB-120, N270AS, Brunswick, Georgia, April 5, 1991. Aircraft Accident Report NTSE/AAR/92/03. Washington, DC.

⁴ QARs and FDRs have similar data storage capabilities, but QARs, primarily intended for air carrier maintenance fault analysis, are not hardened to survive crash impact and fire conditions.

coincident with landing gear retraction."⁵ As a result of its investigation, the AAIB recommended that the FAA require modifications of Boeing 747 hydraulic systems and elevator power control units.

Between June and August 1993, Air France Boeing 737-300 airplanes experienced three rudder deflection anomalies. For each incident, about 206 flight data parameters were available to the French accident investigation authority, Bureau Enquetes Accidents (BEA). The data were recorded on QARs, and available parameters included control surface positions, flight path data, acceleration in three axes, yaw damper, and autopilot modes. The Safety Board is evaluating the data from these incidents for possible applicability to the Aliquippa or Colorado Springs accidents.

The data required to be recorded on FDRs have been based on the Safety Board's accident investigation experience and the capacity of the recording devices. Over the course of decades, many accidents investigated by the Board focused on wind shear, takeoff overruns, and instances of controlled flight into terrain; fewer accidents involved the inflight loss of lateral or directional control. In response, FDR parameter requirements focused on airplane performance (such as airspeed, altitude, and longitudinal acceleration) rather than on flight control (such as rudder position and trim settings). However, the recent accidents and incidents, discussed above, have demonstrated that more information about flight control parameters should be recorded by FDRs.

Among the additional flight control parameters that are needed are parameters that pertain to the positions of flight control inputs and control surface positions. Under current rules, airplanes fitted with conventional flight controls are permitted to record either the cockpit control input (such as control wheel position) or the control surface position (such as the direction and amount of aileron deflection), if one can be derived from the other. But in its investigations of the recent Boeing 737 accidents, the Safety Board found that in some failure modes, flight control surface positions could move independently of cockpit flight control inputs. Also, under some conditions, additional information is needed by investigators to determine whether the controls on the flight deck caused the control surfaces to move, or vice versa. Consequently, FDRs should record both the control inputs and control surface positions.

Flight control trim information, including the positions of trim controls for roll and yaw, also has been essential during recent accident investigations. For example, the aileron and rudder trim parameters provided answers to critical questions early

⁵ U.K. Department of Transport, Air Accidents Investigation Branch. 1995. Report on the incident to Boeing 747-436, G-BNLY at London Heathrow Airport on 7 October 1993. Aircraft Accident Report 1/95. London, England.

in the investigation of the Roselawn accident. The airplane involved had previously experienced trim anomalies; the FDR revealed none on the accident flight.

Recent technological changes have made feasible the acquisition and storage of large amounts of data on FDRs. Today, even for older airplanes, many FDR systems can record additional parameters because of unused capacity in the flight recording system. In terms of flight recording systems, there are two general categories of airplanes in the current air carrier fleet: analog airplanes, and airplanes equipped with a digital data bus.

On an analog airplane, information from remotely located data sensors (for example, a rudder position sensor located in the tail section) is transmitted to the FDR via dedicated wires in an analog format. The information is then converted to digital format in the FDR or the flight data acquisition unit (FDAU).

On an airplane equipped with a digital data bus, information is transmitted in digital format from a multitude of sensors, along a single, high capacity communications pathway (data bus). Information transmitted on the bus is provided to a number of systems, including flight management computers, cockpit displays, QARs, and FDRs. Additional data can readily be fed from the bus to the FDR, based on information that is already on the bus for other purposes or added to the bus by new sensors.

Upgrading FDRs with additional parameters would result in improved aviation safety. The Safety Board acknowledges, however, that retrofitting airplanes that are currently operating in air carrier service would necessitate a significant monetary investment, especially for analog airplanes.

The Safety Board obtained information about the cost of upgrading FDRs on analog airplanes from an air carrier trade group and an FDR equipment manufacturer. In a petition submitted to the FAA, the Air Transport Association (ATA) reported that to upgrade an FDR with six additional parameters would require a one-time expenditure of about \$250,000 per airplane type for engineering specifications and the development of retrofit kits.⁶ These one-time costs would be spread over all of the individual airplanes of each type that are retrofitted; that is, if there are 500 airplanes in service, the cost for basic engineering would be \$500 per airplane. Additional expenditures would be required for labor and equipment to upgrade each individual airplane; an ATA member survey stated that the installed equipment cost for a six-parameter upgrade would total between \$20,000 and \$40,000 per individual airplane.

⁶ Letter of June 5, 1992, to the FAA Office of General Counsel Rules Docket, from Joseph D. Vreeman, Vice President of Engineering, Maintenance, and Materiel, Air Transport Association.

⁷ Summarized by the FAA in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on extension of the compliance date for installation of digital FDRs on Stage 2 airplanes, Federal Register (Vol. 59, No. 36), p. 8573.

The Safety Board also obtained estimates of installed equipment cost to upgrade an FDR to record the parameters listed in "Proposed Minimum FDR Parameter Requirements for Airplanes in Service" (attachment A to this letter). The information was provided by an FDAU manufacturer and an FDR manufacturer.

The FDAU manufacturer estimates that retrofitting an analog airplane could cost about \$20,000 to \$30,000. This estimate includes about \$1,000 per additional parameter (\$200 to \$400 of which is for sensors; the remainder is for associated wiring and labor). The FDR manufacturer estimates that to record the parameters listed in attachment A, many airplanes may require the use of an FDAU, which could cost an additional \$15,000 to \$20,000 for each airplane not already so equipped. Based on the various estimates, it appears that retrofitting an analog airplane to record the parameters listed in attachment A could cost between \$25,000 and \$70,000.

Retrofitting an airplane equipped with an ARINC 429 digital data bus or equivalent (such as the Boeing 757 and 767) to record, as a minimum, the parameters listed in attachment A would be less expensive. Most wiring changes would be confined to the electronic equipment compartment, and some reprogramming of the digital FDAU would be required. All of the airplanes would require the addition of flight control surface position sensors. Some airplanes that were manufactured on or before October 11, 1991, may also require additional sensors.

During the public hearing on the Aliquippa accident, a major U.S. air carrier expressed concern about the costs of upgrading FDRs on the carrier's fleet. The Safety Board recognizes that enhanced FDR capability needs to be weighed against the costs. However, the Board also believes that the costs should be balanced against the remaining useful life and revenue-earning potential of an airplane. Using an upper-bound retrofit cost of \$70,000 per airplane and reasonable assumptions about airplane utilization,⁸ the Safety Board estimates the cost of retrofitting an airplane in current service with an enhanced FDR to be less than 7¢ per passenger.

The Safety Board believes that public safety outweighs the 7¢-per-passenger cost of equipping older airplanes to record more FDR parameters, especially if the retrofit program is limited to airplane types that remain in production (including derivative models⁹). According to information provided by the FAA to the Safety

⁸ Assumptions are as follows: average seating capacity of 150 passengers, 3 departures per day, a 65-percent passenger load factor, and a useful life of 10 years.

⁹ Derivative models are updated versions of older airplane types that continue to use the original FAA aircraft type certificate. Examples include the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 series, based on the DC-9, and the Fokker F-100, based on the F-28.

Board,¹⁰ the U.S. register currently lists about 2,000 transport category airplanes (such as DC-9s, B-737s, and F-28s) that were type certificated before October 1, 1969. These types are still in production (including derivatives, such as MD-80s, B-737-400s, and F-100s), and most of these airplanes use the analog method of data acquisition and transmission.

The Safety Board believes that transport category airplanes of a type that is still in production and operated under 14 CFR Parts 121, 125, or 135 should be retrofitted with the sensors and FDAU needed to record, as a minimum, the parameters listed in attachment A. Further, these airplanes should continue to record the FDR parameters required by current regulations applicable to each airplane (based on its dates of certification and manufacture). Although Boeing 727 and Lockheed L-1011 airplanes are not currently in production, nearly 800 airplanes of these types are expected to remain in the U.S. airline fleet by the end of the 1990s.¹¹ Accordingly, the Safety Board believes that these airplanes should also be retrofitted to record on FDRs, as a minimum, the parameters listed in attachment A.

To ensure that individual airplanes have a substantial useful life over which to recoup the cost of FDR enhancement, the Safety Board believes that the retrofit should apply only to airplanes (except for Boeing 737s, which are addressed later in this letter) that comply with Stage 3 noise requirements,¹² or that remain in service after December 31, 1999, by receiving a waiver or exemption from Stage 3 noise requirements. This criterion would apply the FDR enhancements only to individual airplanes that have the opportunity to operate well into the next decade.

The Safety Board believes that the FAA should complete its rulemaking on FDR enhancements by December 31, 1995. Further, the FAA should require all operators of transport category airplanes under 14 CFR Parts 121, 125, or 135 to complete the FDR enhancements by January 1, 1998. Airplanes that do not currently comply with Stage 3 noise requirements should be retrofitted with these FDR enhancements by January 1, 1998, or by the later date when they meet Stage 3 noise requirements but, regardless of Stage 3 compliance status, no later than December 31, 1999.

With regard to Boeing 737 airplanes, which account for about 23 percent of the U.S. air carrier fleet, the Safety Board believes that FDR enhancement is needed sooner. Data from enhanced FDRs play a vital role in helping to prevent accidents

¹⁰ Letter of December 14, 1994, from FAA Administrator David R. Hinson to Safety Board Chairman Jim Hall.

¹¹ Derived from information in the letter of December 14, 1994, from FAA Administrator Hinson.

¹² According to 14 CFR 91.853, all airplanes will be required to meet Stage 3 noise requirements by December 31, 1999.

through information they provide about incidents.¹³ During the public hearing on the Aliquippa accident, the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group indicated that it had records of 187 flight control incidents involving Boeing 737s that occurred between 1970 and 1994. Of the 187 incidents, 35 occurred in 1993 and 1994. Because the Boeing 737 will be used for years to come, it is essential that the airplanes involved in future incidents be equipped with enhanced FDRs. Consequently, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require that all Boeing 737 airplanes operated under 14 CFR Parts 121 and 125, regardless of Stage 3 compliance status, be equipped, by December 31, 1995, with FDRs that record, as a minimum, the parameters required by current regulations plus the following parameters (recorded at the sampling rates specified in attachment A): lateral acceleration; flight control inputs for pitch, roll, and yaw; and primary flight control surface positions for pitch, roll, and yaw.

According to information provided to the Safety Board by the FAA,¹⁴ as many as 1,000 Boeing 737 airplanes would be affected by the retrofit. The additional parameters could, in most cases, be accommodated by the currently installed FDR and FDAU systems. As a result, the Safety Board estimates that the cost to add these parameters would total between \$10,000 and \$20,000 per airplane.

In the ATR-72 and Saab-340B accidents, the traveling public benefited from earlier corporate decisions by Avions de Transport Regional (ATR), Saab Aircraft AB, and AMR Corporation/American Eagle to equip the airplanes with FDRs that record more parameters than are currently required by the Federal Aviation Regulations. American Eagle also has taken the initiative to retrofit its 19-seat, British Aerospace Jetstream airplanes with enhanced FDRs. In the Safety Board's opinion, the leadership role taken by these companies should be followed by others in the aircraft manufacturing and air carrier industries. Because the Board recognizes that regulatory change is not accomplished as quickly as action taken by individual companies, the Safety Board believes that the operators of transport category airplanes currently in service under 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 should voluntarily modify FDRs installed on their airplanes to record, as a minimum, the parameters listed in attachment A plus the parameters that are currently required by the regulations applicable to each airplane.

Most newly manufactured airplanes used in air carrier service are routinely equipped with digital data buses that carry information on hundreds of parameters.

¹³ In addition to the role that enhanced FDR data can play in accident and incident investigations, the data will be of great assistance to air carriers' Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs. FOQA is a proactive, accident prevention program that involves the analysis of data collected during normal flights, for the purpose of enhancing the safety of flight operations. The Safety Board joins the FAA, the Department of Transportation, and many industry representatives in supporting the development of FOQA programs.

¹⁴ Letter of December 14, 1994, from FAA Administrator Hinson.

Also, the current state of the art in solid-state memory devices has lifted the previous constraints on the number of parameters that FDRs can record. Consequently, the cost of adding FDR parameters usually will be minimal if the parameters are specified before the airplane is built.

The Safety Board's accident investigation experience in recent years indicates that the FDR parameter requirements for newly manufactured airplanes need to be expanded further. The Board believes that the required FDR parameters for newly manufactured airplanes should include those proposed in EUROCAE Document ED-55¹⁵ plus additional parameters such as flight control input and surface positions. Accordingly, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require that all airplanes operated under 14 CFR Parts 121, 125, or 135 (10 seats or larger) for which an original airworthiness certificate is issued after December 31, 1996, should be equipped with FDRs that record the parameters listed in "Proposed FDR Enhancements for Newly Manufactured Airplanes" (attachment B to this letter). Also, the Safety Board believes that because available technology now permits all FDRs to record at least 25 hours of data, all FDRs installed on these newly manufactured airplanes should have this recording capacity after December 31, 1996.

Because aircraft manufacturers can react more quickly than regulatory requirements can be changed, the Safety Board also believes that the manufacturers should establish, for all newly manufactured airplanes that will be operated under 14 CFR Parts 121, 125, or 135 (10 seats or larger), a minimum standard for recording FDR parameters in accordance with attachment B.

Air travelers and the air carrier industry cannot afford additional unresolved accidents. The Safety Board will continue its efforts to identify the probable cause of the accidents at Colorado Springs and Aliquippa, but enhanced FDR data are essential to help prevent future accidents.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Require that each Boeing 737 airplane operated under 14 CFR Parts 121 or 125 be equipped, by December 31, 1995, with a flight data recorder system that records, as a minimum, the parameters required by current regulations applicable to that airplane plus the following parameters (recorded at the sampling rates specified in "Proposed Minimum FDR Parameter Requirements for Airplanes in Service"): lateral acceleration; flight control inputs for pitch, roll, and yaw; and primary flight control surface positions for pitch, roll, and yaw. (Class I, Urgent Action) (A-95-25)

¹⁵ European Organisation For Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE). May 1990. Minimum Operational Performance Specification For Flight Data Recorder Systems (ED-55). Paris, France.

11

Amend, by December 31, 1995, 14 CFR 121.343, 125.225, and 135.152 to require that Boeing 727 airplanes, Lockheed L-1011 airplanes, and all transport category airplanes operated under 14 CFR Parts 121, 125, or 135 whose type certificate applies to airplanes still in production, be equipped to record on a flight data recorder system, as a minimum, the parameters listed in "Proposed Minimum FDR Parameter Requirements for Airplanes in Service" plus any other parameters required by current regulations applicable to each individual airplane. Specify that the airplanes be so equipped by January 1, 1998, or by the later date when they meet Stage 3 noise requirements but, regardless of Stage 3 compliance status, no later than December 31, 1999. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-95-26)

Amend, by December 31, 1995, 14 CFR 121.343, 125.225, and 135.152 to require that all airplanes operated under 14 CFR Parts 121, 125, or 135 (10 seats or larger), for which an original airworthiness certificate is received after December 31, 1996, record the parameters listed in "Proposed FDR Enhancements for Newly Manufactured Airplanes" on a flight data recorder having at least a 25-hour recording capacity. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-95-27)

Recommendations were also issued to the operators of air carrier service under 14 CFR Part 121 and commuter air carrier service under 14 CFR Part 135, and to the manufacturers of airplanes operated under Parts 121, 125, or 135.

Chairman HALL, Vice Chairman FRANCIS, and Member HAMMERSCHMIDT concurred in these recommendations.

By 
Jim Hall
Chairman

Enclosures

Attachment A**Proposed Minimum FDR Parameter Requirements
for Airplanes in Service****Proposed Minimum Parameters:**

1. Altitude
2. Airspeed
3. Vertical acceleration
4. Heading
5. Time of each radio transmission to air traffic control
6. Pitch attitude
7. Roll attitude
8. Longitudinal acceleration
9. Pitch trim position*
10. Yaw trim position**
11. Roll trim position**
12. Control column and pitch control surface position**
13. Control wheel and lateral control surface position**
14. Rudder pedal and yaw control surface position**
15. Thrust of each engine
16. Position of each thrust reverser (or equivalent for propeller airplane)*
17. Trailing edge flap or cockpit flap control position*
18. Leading edge flap or cockpit flap control position*
19. Ground spoiler position/speed brake selection**
20. Angle of attack (when information source is available)**
21. Lateral acceleration**