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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

FAA'S FACILITY EVALUATIONS OF
THE GUAM CERAP - 1995 & 1997

(16 pages)



U. S. Department
of Transportation

**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Memorandum

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Subject: INFORMATION: Full-Facility Evaluation,
Guam CERAP (ZUA), Marianas Islands;
April 29-May 2, 1997

Date: MAY 9 1997

From: Manager, Air Traffic Evaluations and
Investigations Staff, AAT-20

Reply to
Attn. of:

To: Manager, Air Traffic Division, AWP-500

A full-facility evaluation was conducted at Guam CERAP by members of the Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations Staff, AAT-20. The evaluation was conducted April 29-May 2, 1997. The team was assisted by a facility quality assurance specialist and an FPL specialist who served as the NATCA representative. The evaluation was conducted through observation, position monitoring, personnel interviews, data review, and a review of in-flight evaluation reports. Operational positions were monitored for 30 hours and the team conducted 10 interviews. The ATM and staff were briefed on the findings of the evaluation team on May 2, 1997.

ZUA, a CERAP within the Pacific Hub, had a traffic count for CY 1996 of 174,306 compared to 163,444 for CY 1995, a 9.3 percent increase.

Five problems identified in this report were also identified as problems during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1995.

A total of 134 checklist items was assessed during the evaluation. The conformity index (CI) was 88. ZUA reported no operational errors in the 12-month period preceding the evaluation. Conformity index computations are depicted in attachment 1.

1. OPERATIONS. (60 percent) (Rating Index 95.5)

A total of 68 checklist items was assessed in this section. Of these, 65 items were rated as satisfactory and 3 items were rated as problems.

a Problem. Three items were identified.

(1) (97-S-ZUA-001) ATIS INFORMATION. Controllers did not ensure that pilots received the most current information when pilots omitted the ATIS code on initial contact.

Additionally, ATIS code changes were not broadcast on all appropriate frequencies (7110.65, par. 2-9-2c and d).

(2) (97-S-ZUA-002) PHRASEOLOGY. Controllers did not use the proper phraseology; e.g., numbers were inappropriately issued in group form, pilots were not informed when radar contact was lost, and appropriate phraseologies were not used when speed restrictions were issued (7110.65J).

NOTE: Phraseology was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1995.

(3) (97-S-ZUA-003) COMMUNICATIONS. Facility identification was omitted on initial calls and aircraft call signs were omitted from control instructions (7110.65, par. 2-4-8).

2. TRAINING. (15 percent) (Rating Index 69.5)

A total of 23 checklist items was assessed in this section. Of these, 15 items were rated as satisfactory, 7 items were rated as problems, and 1 item was rated as informational.

a. Problem. Seven items were identified.

(1) (97-S-ZUA-004) OJT REPORTS/CERTIFICATIONS. A review of FAA Forms 3120-25 revealed that when deficiencies were noted in block 11, references to applicable procedures, LOA's, and directives were omitted in block 12 (3120.4H, par. 2-17 and app. B).

NOTE: OJT reports was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1995.

(2) (97-S-ZUA-005) PERFORMANCE SKILL CHECK. A review of FAA Forms 3120-25 revealed that performance skill checks were not conducted monthly (3120.4H, par. 3-7).

(3) (97-S-ZUA-006) CERTIFICATION SKILL CHECKS. A review of FAA Forms 3120-25 revealed that certification skills checks were not completed as required (3120.4H, par. 3-8).

(4) (97-S-ZUA-007) OJT RESPONSIBILITIES. A review of FAA Forms 3120-1 revealed that supervisors did not conduct OJT instructor evaluations (3120.4H, par. 3-13 through 3-18).

(5) (97-S-ZUA-008) RECORD ENTRIES. A review of FAA Forms 3120-1 revealed the following discrepancies: Section III did not contain recertification entries, inappropriate training was logged in section V, and the plan for training was not logged in section III (7210.3M, par. 2-2-4 and 3120.4H, pars. 2-15 through 2-18, and app. A).

NOTE: Record entries was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1995.

(6) (97-S-ZUA-009) PROFICIENCY TRAINING: Air Traffic (AT) BULLETIN DISCUSSION. Interviews with controllers revealed that AT bulletins were not verbally briefed (7210.3M, par. 2-2-8).

(7) (97-S-ZUA-010) PROFICIENCY TRAINING: SUPPLEMENTAL. A review of FAA Forms 3120-1 revealed that supplemental training was not conducted prior to new or revised procedures being implemented (3120.4H, par. 2-13 and 7210.3M, pars. 2-2-7 and 2-2-11).

NOTE: Supplemental training was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1995.

b. Informational. One items was identified.

TRAINING ADMINISTRATORS CATTS RESPONSIBILITIES. During the last year two controllers from level I towers were transferred to Guam CERAP under the direct placement program. These transferees created a hardship for the facility in that they were not radar qualified. In a CERAP, the controllers needed the acquired skills of the en route and terminal radar systems.

The training programs at ZUA did not have the automated capabilities to train non-radar controllers. ZUA did not have an ETG lab nor a CATTS platform. Without these automated training systems, controllers spent 2 years of their 3 year contract in training.

Since 1995, ZUA had tried to acquire a CATTS training system but had not been successful. They had been classified the same as a level I VFR tower and had been unsuccessful in their endeavors to get a CATTS system.

3. QUALITY CONTROL. (15 percent) (Rating Index 80.0)

A total of 15 checklist items was assessed in this section. Of these, 12 items were rated as satisfactory and 3 items were rated as problems.

a. Problem. Three items were identified.

(1) (97-S-ZUA-011) INTERNAL EVALUATION. An internal evaluation was conducted within 1 year of the previous full facility evaluation. However, the evaluation was not formatted in accordance with Order 7010.1H. Additionally, there were no responses to the internal evaluation (7010.1H, pars. 3-6b and c).

(2) (97-S-ZUA-012) OJT PROGRAM EVALUATION. An annual written evaluation of the OJT program was not completed (3120.4H, par. 3-13k).

(3) (97-S-ZUA-013) EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CHECKLIST. Emergency notification checklists were not established for each airport within the ZUA geographical jurisdiction (8020.11A, par. 64b2).

4. ADMINISTRATION. (10 percent) (Rating Index 85.7)

A total of 28 checklist items was assessed in this section. Of these, 23 items were rated as satisfactory, 4 items were rated as problems, and 1 item was rated as informational.

a. Problem. Four items were identified.

(1) (97-S-ZUA-014) ADMINISTRATIVE REFERENCE FILES. Facility copies of Order 7210.3M contained change 3 and 7110.65J contained change 5 both which were canceled by GENOT 7/04 (7210.3M, par. 2-1-4).

NOTE: References files was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1995.

(2) (97-S-ZUA-015) FAA FORM 7230-4 PREPARATION. FAA Form 7230-4 did not contain an "E" designator for equipment malfunctions. Additionally, corrections to the log were not made appropriately and watch checklist completed entries were missing (7210.3M, pars. 4-6-3 through 4-6-5).

(3) (97-S-ZUA-016) FAA FORM 7230-10 PREPARATION. Position logs (FAA Form 7230-10) contained inappropriate entry corrections (7210.3M, par. 4-6-6c).

(4) (97-S-ZUA-017) PREPARATION OF TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORTS. Personnel were observed signing off duty prior to the end of their shift (7210.3M, par. 4-6-8b).

c. Informational. One item was identified.

FACILITY APPEARANCE. Guam CERAP was located in a military building on Andersen Air Force Base. The quarters were old and in need of repair. The roof and doors leaked when it rained and the lavatory flooded. Water from the second floor dripped down through the manager's office and onto the furniture. The walls were in need of painting and much of the furniture was old and dilapidated.

Staff office spaces were small or non-existent. Many modifications were being made to the operational spaces at the time of this evaluation to accommodate new equipment. The new equipment was larger than the old and installation was delayed until modifications could be made to accommodate the new displays. Space between equipment racks was narrow and crowded with test equipment, parts, and supplies. Additionally, the air conditioning system was inadequate to maintain a cool and dry atmosphere appropriate for the equipment and/or personnel.

J. David Canoles

Attachments

AAT-24:Douglas:bhb:(206)768-2925:5/8/97
cc: AAT-20/Facility Manager/Site File

GUAM CERAP (ZUA)**FULL-FACILITY EVALUATION CONFORMITY INDEX****April 28-May 2, 1997**

To determine the facility CI, subtract the number of problems from the number of checklist items evaluated for each functional area. Divide the result by the number of items evaluated for that area. This result is the rating index for that area. Multiply the rating index for each area by the percentage assigned to arrive at the adjusted index. The sum of adjusted indices for all areas shall be the conformity index. The rating and adjusted index numbers shall be rounded to the nearest tenth. The total shall be rounded to the nearest whole number.

FUNCTIONAL AREA	RATING INDEX	PERCENT			ADJUSTED INDEX
Operations	95.5	X	60	=	57.3
Training	69.5	X	15	=	10.4
Quality Control	80.0	X	15	=	12.0
Administration	85.7	X	10	=	8.6
CONFORMITY INDEX					88



U. S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Memorandum

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Full-Facility Evaluation,
Guam CERAP (ZUA), Mariana Islands;
July 18-21, 1995

Date: July 31, 1995

From: Manager, Evaluations Division, ATH-100

Reply to
Attn. of:

To: Manager, Air Traffic Division, AWP-500

A full-facility evaluation was conducted at Guam CERAP by members of the of Air Traffic System Effectiveness organization, ATH. The evaluation was conducted July 18-21, 1995. The team was assisted by an automation specialist and an FPL specialist from the facility who served as the NATCA representative. The evaluation was conducted through observation, position monitoring, personnel interviews, and a review of data review. Operational positions were monitored for 14 hours and 11 interviews were conducted. The ATM and facility personnel were briefed on the findings of the evaluation team on July 21, 1995.

ZUA, a Level I combined center/radar approach control facility within the Pacific Hub, had a traffic count for CY 1994 of 115,630 (en route) and 40,766 (approach) compared to 104,665 (en route) and 35,202 (approach) for CY 1993, this represented a 1 percent increase for en route operations and a 15.8 percent increase for terminal operations.

Eleven problems identified in this report were also identified as problems during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

A total of 165 checklist items was assessed during the evaluation. The conformity index (CI) was 90. Guam CERAP did not report any operational errors in the 12-month period preceding the evaluation. Conformity index computations are depicted in attachment 1.

1. OPERATIONS. (50 percent) (Rating Index 89.4)

A total of 77 items (63 checklist and 14 off-checklist) was assessed in this section. Of these, 1 off-checklist item was rated as commendable; 66 items (58 checklist and 8 off-checklist) were rated as satisfactory; 4 checklist and 4 off-checklist items were rated as problems; and 2 items (1 checklist and 1 off-checklist) were rated as informational.

a. Commendable. One item was identified.

SAIPAN NON-FEDERAL CONTROL TOWER (GSN) TRAINING SUPPORT. The Commonwealth Port Authority of Saipan, Marianas Islands, contracted for air traffic control services at the Saipan International Airport. In support of the associated non-federal control tower services, personnel from ZUA were tasked with the responsibility for training and providing control tower operator (CTO) certifications for the 10 tower operators at GSN. The ATM and three specialists developed a specific training program for GSN and provided on-site classroom training and OJT sessions. The ZUA ATM, the designated CTO examiner, provided exceptional oversight of all aspects of the certification process. Potential problems such as language difficulties between ZUA personnel and GSN specialists, who were local Saipan residents, and extensive use of overtime by ZUA specialists during the certification process, were handled professionally by all facility personnel.

The accomplishment of the above actions was commendable and clearly demonstrated a commitment to excellence in achieving Agency goals and supporting aviation activities throughout the Mariana Islands.

b. Problem. Eight items were identified.

(1) (95-S-ZUA-001) TAPE TALKS. A review of training records indicated that tape talk reviews were not conducted every 6 months (ATH GENOT 5/49).

NOTE: Tape talks was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

(2) (95-S-ZUA-002) TAPE RECORDER CHECKS. Copies of FAA Forms 6000-8, used to record routine recorder checks, indicated that multichannel voice recorders were not checked every 26 hours (7210.3K, par. 3-42d).

NOTE: This item was identified as an off-checklist problem and was not used in the computation of the CI.

(3) (95-S-ZUA-003) TAPE REEL RETENTION. Multichannel voice recorder tapes were retained beyond 15 days (7210.3K, par. 3-43b).

NOTE: This item was identified as an off-checklist problem and was not used in the computation of the CI.

(4) (95-S-ZUA-004) RECORDER LETTER OF AGREEMENT (LOA) WITH THE AIRWAY FACILITIES SECTOR (AFS). The AFS changed the multichannel voice recorder tape reels. However, procedures for changing the multichannel voice recorder tape reels were not outlined in an LOA (7210.3K, par. 3-42b).

NOTE: This item was identified as an off-checklist problem and was not used in the computation of the CI.

(5) (95-S-ZUA-005) PHRASEOLOGY. Monitoring of operational positions revealed the use of incorrect phraseology; e.g., controllers grouped mileage numbers in position reports, omitted the words "localizer" and "runway" when issuing approach clearances, substituted the word "oh" for "zero", and omitted the phrase "rest of route unchanged" when route amendments were issued (7110.65J).

NOTE: The above list should not be considered all inclusive. It is, however, representative of the types of phraseology errors found. Additionally, phraseology was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

(6) (95-S-ZUA-006) CLEARANCE DELIVERY FORMAT. Monitoring of operational positions revealed the use of incorrect clearance delivery format. Specifically, the word "airport" was omitted from clearance limits; e.g., "cleared to Narita, maintain (altitude)." An LOA was developed with local aircraft operators that contained abbreviated departure clearances between airports within ZUA's airspace. The LOA prescribed clearances contained direct routings beyond NAVAID use limitations and did not include appropriate airways and/or route structures. In addition, controllers issued route amendments direct to the destination airport, rather than via established routes or navigation fixes associated with the destination airport; e.g., "proceed direct Agana (airport)" (7110.65J, pars. 4-1-1, 4-2-1, and 4-4-1).

(7) (95-S-ZUA-007) RADAR IDENTIFICATION. Incorrect procedures were used to establish radar identification of aircraft departing GSN. Departing aircraft assigned beacon codes on initial radio contact were generally at altitudes below radar coverage preventing controllers from observing a change in beacon codes. Whereas other radar identification methods were not used, positive radar identification was suspect. In addition, controller assigned beacon codes were not recorded on flight progress strips making it difficult to correlate beacon code assignments with aircraft identification (7110.65J, pars. 5-3-1 through 5-3-3).

NOTE: Radar identification was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

(8) (95-S-ZUA-008) DIRECT ROUTINGS BELOW THE MINIMUM VECTORING ALTITUDE (MVA). Aircraft departing from GSN on instrument flight rule clearances were instructed to proceed direct to the destination airport when aircraft were at altitudes below the published MVA (7110.65J, pars. 4-5-6 and 5-6-1).

NOTE: This item was identified as an off-checklist problem and was not used in the computation of the CI

c. Informational. Three items were identified.

(1) FLIGHT DATA PROCESSING. Guam CERAP had no flight data processing capabilities. Flight data strips were hand-written from flight information received verbally from either pilots or other controllers and from teletype messages. All fix estimates were manually calculated and updated with pilots' estimates. Flight plan information was hand-written on flight progress strips first then relayed verbally to tower personnel at GSN and Agana FCT. Interviews with AWP-510 personnel revealed that action was being taken to provide ZUA with automated flight data processing equipment.

(2) SIGMET DISSEMINATION. Controllers routinely relayed SIGMET information to pilots that applied to operations conducted well beyond the normal 150-mile range. Controllers believed that pilots could receive this information more effectively by using direct VHF radio communication rather than using the HF band communication link through ARINC.

(3) FACILITY DESCRIPTION. The facility is located on Andersen Air Force Base at the northern tip of the Island of Guam and controls approximately 196,350 square miles of airspace. The delegated airspace, that is nearly all oceanic, was a circle with a 250-nautical mile radius from the long range radar antenna situated on the island. The facility is responsible for en route control through their delegated airspace as well as approach and departure control services for aircraft arriving and departing Guam, Tinian, Saipan, and Rota Islands. All adjacent airspace is controlled by the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center.

A portion of the airspace is designated as special use airspace (SUA) for joint use with the military, and includes a warning area, a restricted area, a controlled firing area, and four air traffic control assigned airspace areas. Both routine and special military exercises are conducted within these SUA's. Other air traffic control facilities within ZUA's boundaries include the military control tower at Andersen Air Force Base, Agana FCT, and recently opened Saipan NFCT. Although Honolulu ATCT (HNL) is the designated hub for Agana FCT, ZUA provides most of the administrative and operational support as outlined in a memo from the HNL ATM.

The operations area of ZUA is divided into two areas of operation. One area is dedicated to en route control and the other area performs full-time approach and departure control functions at the four airports listed above.

2. TRAINING.

(20 percent)

(Rating Index 85.3)

A total of 34 checklist items was assessed in this section. Of these, 29 items were rated as satisfactory and 5 items were rated as problems.

a. Problem. Five items were identified.

(1) (95-S-ZUA-009) CAMI REPORTS. Tracking reports for the completion of each course of qualification training were not submitted to CAMI (3120.4H, par. 2-11a6 and 3120.22, pars. 9f and 10b).

(2) (95-S-ZUA-010) OJT REPORTS. A review of FAA Forms 3120-25 for OJT and certification skill checks revealed discrepancies; e.g., block 9 was not always completed; proficiency checks were annotated as "other;" checkmarks were not placed in all spaces in block 11; comments in block 12 did not make reference to orders or directives when deficiencies were noted; and "N/O" was entered in block 11 without a corresponding explanation of the developmental's skills in block 12 (3120.4H, app. B).

NOTE: The above list should not be considered all inclusive. It is, however, representative of the types of errors found throughout OJT reports.

(3) (95-S-ZUA-011) TRAINING AND PROFICIENCY RECORDS: RECORD ENTRIES. A review of FAA Forms 3120-1 revealed discrepancies. For example, extraneous materials were retained in training folders (correspondence training certificates and training reports) and employee initials were missing. Corrected entries were not annotated with the initials of the person making the corrections and corrections were made with writeovers and/or whiteout. Sections I and IIB did not include the facility three-letter identifier and section IIB did not reflect OJT instructor (OJTI) certifications. Entries were not made in section III to annotate facility OJTI certification. Entries in section V were not made within 30 days of training being received and/or the entries did not reflect the actual date that training was completed. Entries in section V, which annotated the type of training received (refresher or supplemental), were transposed, and entries for briefings on air traffic bulletins and changes to national orders were not included. Additionally, entries for over-the-shoulder evaluations for OJTI's did not always reflect the position where the evaluation was conducted (3120.4H, pars. 2-15 and 2-18 and app. A).

NOTE: The above examples should not be considered all inclusive. They are, however, representative of the types of errors found within the training and proficiency records. Training record entries were identified as problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

(4) (95-S-ZUA-012) ASR APPROACH ENTRY. A review of FAA Forms 3120-1 revealed that section III did not include the statement "surveillance approaches not conducted at this facility" (3120.4H, par. 2-18e).

(5) (95-S-ZUA-013) PROFICIENCY TRAINING: SUPPLEMENTAL.

Documentation could not validate that supplemental training was briefed to all employees prior to the date of new and/or revised procedures; e.g., some individuals did not initial for briefings while others initialed for briefings but the date documented was after the implementation date. This problem was compounded because many publications were received by the facility after the implementation date (3120.4H, par. 2-13).

NOTE: Supplemental training was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

3. QUALITY CONTROL (20 percent) (Rating Index 91.7)

A total of 13 items (12 checklist and 1 off-checklist) was assessed in this section. Of those, 10 checklist items were rated as satisfactory, 2 items (1 checklist and 1 off-checklist hub) were rated as problem, and 1 checklist item was rated as informational.

a. Problem Two items were identified.

(1) (95-S-ZUA-014) UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION REPORT (UCR)

PROCESSING. Interviews and a review of records revealed that UCR's were not processed within required time limits (1800.6A, app. 1).

NOTE: Processing of UCR's was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

(2) (95-S-ZUA-015-H) REPEAT PROBLEMS. The following items were identified as problems during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993 and are listed as repeat problems: 95-S-ZUA-001, 005, 007, 011, 013, 014, 015, and 016. Additional administrative and managerial oversight from the hub is required to correct the identified deficiencies (7010.1H, par. 5-3).

NOTE: This item was identified as an off-checklist hub problem and was not used in the computation of the CI.

- b. Informational. One item was identified.

U.S. AIR FORCE HAZARDOUS AIR TRAFFIC REPORT (HATR). A review of records revealed that one HATR had been filed as a result of an incorrect frequency assignment by ZUA controllers. The incident occurred on February 2, 1995, the date on the HATR was April 20, 1995, and the ATM was notified of the existence of the HATR on June 30, 1995. Voice tapes had not been retained due to the late notification of the existence of the HATR. The ATM informed AWP-505 of the circumstances surrounding this incident immediately upon learning of the existence of the HATR.

4. ADMINISTRATION. (10 percent) (Rating Index 90.4)

A total of 58 (57 checklist and 1 off-checklist) items was assessed in this section. Of these, 51 checklist items were rated as satisfactory; 5 checklist items were rated as problems; and 2 items (1 checklist and 1 off-checklist) were rated as informational.

- a. Problem. Five items were identified

(1) (95-S-ZUA-016) REFERENCE FILES. A review of reference files revealed outdated and/or canceled directives; e.g., Orders 7110.10J, 7340.1M, 7350.6J, and 7110.83 and a canceled WP notice. Additionally, GENOT's were not posted to national orders; e.g., Orders 7110.65, 7110.128, and 7930.2 (7210.3K, par. 2-4).

NOTE: The above list should not be considered all inclusive. It is, however, representative of the types of errors found within the reference files. Reference files were identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

(2) (95-S-ZUA-017) DIRECTIVES CURRENT/FORMAT. A review of facility documentation revealed canceled and/or superseded directives; e.g., ZUA Orders 1100.2F, 1110.2, 7110.10, and 8260.2. Guam CERAP Order 7210.1 contained outdated procedures. Additionally, local orders did not include completed samples of local forms (7210.3K, pars. 2-4 and 4-1; 1320.1D, par. 617; and 1330.1A).

NOTE: The above examples should not be considered all inclusive. They are, however, representative of the types of errors found within the facility directives. Directives were identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

(3) (95-S-ZUA-018) RECORDS RETENTION. Air traffic records were retained beyond retention dates. Specifically, FAA Forms 6000-8 were retained beyond 1 month after the last entry on the form; flight progress strips were retained beyond 15 days; OJT certifications and graded examinations were retained beyond 1 year from an individual's certification; and

copy 4 of FAA Forms 1500-7 were not retained for 1 year (1350.15B, par. 7230; 3120.4H, par. 2-19; 7210.3K, par. 3-42 and 7-22; and ATZ Interpretation, dated April 2, 1993).

NOTE: Records retention was identified as a problem during the last full-facility evaluation conducted in July 1993.

(4) (95-S-ZUA-019) TIME AND ATTENDANCE (T&A) REPORTING. A review of personnel logs revealed that supervisors and/or controllers-in-charge (CIC) did not always sign the log to account for the time periods each was in charge of the watch. Additionally, the certified hours listed did not always cover all hours of operation (7210.3K, par. 4-67 and ATZ Memos, dated May 5, 1994, and January 27, 1995).

(5) (95-S-ZUA-020) FAA FORMS 7230-10 PREPARATION. A review of documentation revealed that block 7 was not completed (7210.3K, par. 4-62).

b. Informational. Two items were identified.

(1) FAA HOUSING. All FAA personnel in Guam, by agreement with the U.S. Navy, were provided housing at moderate rental rates. The Navy developed a phased closure plan for 500 units of family housing (including the FAA housing site) and notified the FAA in writing of their plans in June 1994. To help mitigate the adverse impact the closure would have on employees, the Navy offered to relocate FAA tenants to other family housing units. The offer was made with a request that FAA fund the moves. Two specialists have moved from the original site. One moved off-base while the other specialist moved into the family housing offered by the Navy. The specialist that moved into other Navy housing did so at personal expense. An agreement with the Navy was reached whereby the Navy would pay for the moves and the FAA would pay any temporary housing costs associated with the moves. At the time of the evaluation, the relocation expenses incurred by the specialist above had not been reimbursed.

Rental costs at the "new" housing units were essentially double the current rates. The Navy agreed to subsidize the increased rental rates for specialists currently under FAA contract in Guam but would provide no subsidy for future employees. In addition, the Navy suggested that they were unable to provide housing for non-married specialists due to military constraints governing family housing.

The above issues were of great concern to ZUA employees who were eager to reach a satisfactory resolution.

(2) MINIMUM SAFE ALTITUDE WARNING (MSAW) INHIBITED. Guam CERAP was operating with MSAW inhibited. A new digital terrain map (DTM) was ordered in

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for delivery of the DTM in April, 1995. For various reasons, NOAA was unable to meet the April delivery date and installation was rescheduled for August 1995. A notice to airman was issued that alerted pilots to the condition.

5. SPECIAL EMPHASIS ITEM (SEI).

- a. National SEI. One item was identified.

OVER-THE-SHOULDERS AND TAPE TALK REVIEWS. Documentation was not available to evaluate this item.

Ronald G. Cooper

Attachments

ATH140:Diggins:bhb:(206)764-3412:07/28/95
cc: ATH-100/Facility Manager/Site File

GUAM CERAP (ZUA)

FULL-FACILITY EVALUATION CONFORMITY INDEX

July 21, 1995

To determine the facility CI, subtract the number of problems from the number of checklist items evaluated for each functional area. Divide the result by the number of items evaluated for that area. This result is the rating index for that area. Multiply the rating index for each area by the percentage assigned to arrive at the adjusted index. The sum of adjusted indices for all areas, minus the calculated deduction for operational errors, shall be the conformity index. The rating and adjusted index numbers shall be rounded to the nearest tenth. The total shall be rounded to the nearest whole number.

FUNCTIONAL AREA	RATING INDEX		PERCENT		ADJUSTED INDEX
Operations	89.4	X	50	=	44.7
Training	85.3	X	20	=	17.1
Quality Control	91.7	X	20	=	19.4
Administration	90.4	X	10	=	9.0
CONFORMITY INDEX					90