Search Request No. 7075

FFZ Airport Departure/Arrival Procedure or Class B Clearance Related Reports

May 2, 2012



Aviation Safety Reporting System

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Ames Research Center
[redacted]

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

[redacted]

Linda J. Connell, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that *at least* 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS data is the **qualitative information** contained in **report narratives**. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report/Alert

6/19/2009 **FOR YOUR INFORMATION** 2009-105/8-10

833526

To: FAA (ATM P50 TRACON)

Info: FAA (ATM FFZ ATCT, DIRECTOR OF WESTERN TERMINAL OPERATIONS, AFS-230, AFS-200, ASA-100), AOPA, EAA, NATCA, NAFI, NBAA,

From: Linda J. Connell, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Re: FFZ RUNWAY 4L/R OBSTACLE DEPARTURE PROCEDURE

We recently received an ASRS report describing a safety concern which may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the enclosed deidentified report.

To properly assess the usefulness of our alert message service, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your feedback on the value of the information that we have provided. Please contact Gary Brauch at [redacted] or email at [redacted].

ACN: 833526

Time

Date: 200904
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: FFZ.Airport
State Reference: AZ

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft 1

ATC / Advisory.Tower: FZZ
Make Model Code: Light Transport

Person 1

ASRS Report Number: 833526

Person 2

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Excursion from Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Narrative 1

A corporate jet departed FFZ on the Falcon Field Runway 4R obstacle departure procedure. P50 later reported to us that the aircraft got in position where it was below the MVA. As a controller here at FFZ I've seen several problems resulting from this departure procedure. It is confusing, and outdated. Here are some of the problems with the departure procedure published on page C5 of U.S. Terminal Procedures (S\W) Vol 4. 1. The procedure utilizes the FFZ NDB, many aircraft are no longer NDB equipped. 2. The procedure as published is a climbing left turn to 5000', however by LOA we stop all departures at 3000'. 3. The second sentence in the procedure states "For climb in visual conditions cross FFZ NDB at or above 2300 then proceed via 220 bearing to PXR VORTAC R-143 southeast bound." This does not specify a left or right turn back to the NDB. 4. Again, reference the second sentence in the procedure. In March 2009 the traffic pattern altitude was raised to 2400. Crossing the FFZ NDB at or above 2300 creates a conflict with pattern traffic. 5. This procedure sends all A/C southeast bound regardless of what direction they filed. Many pilots do not want to comply with the procedure. Proposed solution: Write a new procedure that's more user friendly.

Synopsis

FFZ Tower Controller is informed by P50 that a corporate jet that departed FFZ got below MVA while attempting to comply with Runway 4L/R obstacle departure procedure. Controller believes the NDB departure procedure is confusing and outdated.