NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

ERRATA 1

February 28, 2017

Group Chairman's Factual Report

Meteorology

El Faro
DCA16MM001

Page	Original	Correction
throughout	US Coast Guard Marine Board of Inquiry	US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation
Page 41	The NHC issues two Offshore Waters Forecast products, one for the Caribbean Sea and one for parts of the Atlantic Ocean south of 31°N and west of 55°W.	The NHC issues two Offshore Waters Forecast products, one for the Gulf of Mexico, and one for the southwest and tropical North Atlantic and Caribbean Sea.
Page 84 footnote 50	Although the HDOB data show a maximum wind of 129 kt at 1142:00 EDT, the aircraft crew deemed this report unreliable, and instead reported the 1142:30 observation of 117 kt as the maximum inbound wind in a VORTEX message transmitted at 0816 EDT. NHC also disregarded the 129-kt observation in its post-storm analysis of Joaquin.	Although the HDOB data show a maximum wind of 129 kt at 0742:00 EDT, the aircraft crew deemed this report unreliable, and instead reported the 0742:30 EDT observation of 117 kt as the maximum inbound wind in a VORTEX message transmitted at 0816 EDT. NHC also disregarded the 129-kt observation in its post-storm analysis of Joaquin.
Pages 139-140	The following table details the actual times of broadcast for weather products (previously identified as applicable to the accident region) being disseminated via VOBRA from Chesapeake according to the server logs provided by COMMCOM (advisory numbers, where applicable, are not included). Records for broadcast times after the accident are included. Note that the records for the Chesapeake VOBRA	The following table details the actual times of broadcast for weather products (previously identified as applicable to the accident region) being disseminated via VOBRA from Chesapeake according to the server logs provided by COMMCOM (advisory numbers, where applicable, are not included). Records for broadcast times after the accident are included. Note that the records for the Chesapeake VOBRA

	broadcast of the OPC-issued High Seas Forecast expected soon after the regularly scheduled daily nominal dissemination time of 1915 EDT on both September 30, 2015, and October 1, 2015, indicated (in part) "MSG MISSED BCST." According to the Coast Guard, this means that the OPC-issued High Seas Forecast was not broadcast for that nominal time on those days; however, the NTSB is unable to confirm this. Further, the server logs do not provide records that indicate the Chesapeake VOBRA broadcasts of (1) the Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisory associated with the regularly scheduled daily nominal dissemination times of 2330 EDT on September 29, 2015, 0530 EDT, 1130 EDT, 1730 EDT, and 2330 EDT on September 30, 2015, and 0530 EDT, 1130 EDT, and 1730 EDT on October 1, 2015; and (2) the NHC VOBRA text product (AWIPS header OFFN20) associated with the regularly scheduled daily nominal dissemination time of 1130 EDT on September 30, 2015.	broadcast of the OPC-issued High Seas Forecast expected soon after the regularly scheduled daily nominal dissemination time of 1915 EDT on both September 30, 2015, and October 1, 2015, indicated (in part) "MSG MISSED BCST." According to initial correspondence with the Coast Guard, this meant that the OPC-issued High Seas Forecast was not broadcast for that nominal time on those days; however, the NTSB was unable to confirm this. Further, the server logs do not provide records that indicate the Chesapeake VOBRA broadcasts of (1) the Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisory associated with the regularly scheduled daily nominal dissemination times of 2330 EDT on September 29, 2015, 0530 EDT, 1130 EDT, 1730 EDT, and 2330 EDT on September 30, 2015, and 0530 EDT, 1130 EDT, and 1730 EDT on October 1, 2015; and (2) the NHC VOBRA text product (AWIPS header OFFN20) associated with the regularly scheduled daily nominal dissemination time of 1130 EDT on September 30, 2015. Following his February 2017 testimony at the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation hearing on the *El Faro* accident, the commanding officer of COMMCOM provided the NTSB with further information on issues and procedures for Coast Guard radio dissemination of weather products (see Addendum 1 to this report). This new information indicates that the initial Coast Guard assessment that certain weather products were not broadcast as scheduled may have been incorrect.

Submitted by: Mike Richards
NTSB, AS-30