

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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IN RE: :
   
:
   
THE FIRE THAT OCCURRED ON : NTSB Accident No.
   
THE CARIBBEAN FANTASY THAT : DCA16FM052
   
OCCURRED ON AUGUST 17, 2016 :
   
:
   
-----:

INTERVIEW OF: RICARDO CAMPBELL

Sunday, 12:12 p.m.
   
August 21, 2016

Conference Room
   
USCG Sector San Juan
   
Puerto Rico

BEFORE

MICHAEL KARR, NTSB
   
CARRIE BELL, NTSB
   
[REDACTED] USCG
   
LT [REDACTED] USCG

## APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of American Cruise:

CARLOS BAYRON, ESQ.  
Bayron Offices

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

4:12 p.m.

1  
2  
3 MR. KARR: This is Mike Karr. I'm with the  
4 National Transportation Safety Board. It's 16:12 on  
5 August 21 and we are in the Sector San Juan Conference  
6 Room to conduct interviews of the -- for the Caribbean  
7 Fantasy fire. And what we're going to do is we're  
8 going to have everyone at the table introduce  
9 themselves, and we'll start to my right, by just saying  
10 -- stating your name.

11 MR. [REDACTED] United States Coast  
12 Guard.

13 MR. CAMPBELL: Ricardo Campbell, Second  
14 Officer of Carribbean Fantasy.

15 LT. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] U.S, Coast  
16 Guard.

17 MR. KARR: All right, thanks. And Mr.  
18 Campbell, is it okay if we record the interview?  
19

20 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, of course sir.

21 MR. KARR: Thank you very much. [REDACTED]

22 MR. [REDACTED] So Ricardo, I would just like you  
23 to go ahead and start off, like I said, and just tell  
24 me your story. Tell me what happened on the day in  
25 question, beginning with when you arrived at lifeboat

1 number three?

2 MR. CAMPBELL: From the beginning?

3 LT. [REDACTED] Start earlier.

4 MR. [REDACTED] Well start --

5 LT. [REDACTED] Because he was on the bridge  
6 before.

7 MR. KARR: He was on the bridge.

8 MR. [REDACTED] Oh, you were on the bridge  
9 before? Okay, I apologize.

10 LT. [REDACTED] Just tell us about your day.

11 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

12 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, it was like 4:00, yes.

13 LT. [REDACTED] From when you woke up.

14 MR. CAMPBELL: Okay, I'm 4:00 to 8:00 watch.

15 So we were arriving in San Juan harbor something like  
16 7:20, then we call pilot -- the usual stuff. And just  
17 at the end of the sea passage, when we start  
18 maneuvering with it, we receive from engine room that  
19 we have some leakage in the main engine. And we asked  
20 if this leakage means that we need to call in tug boats  
21 for maneuvering or if they will stop the engine for  
22 awhile and repair the engine or what then. So the  
23 Chief Engineer informed us that he will call back with  
24 information about this. Well, soon -- I don't know,  
25 suddenly.

1           Maybe one, maybe two, maximum three minutes  
2 after, he called and informed us they catch fire in the  
3 engine room and I informed Captain. He was on the  
4 bridge with me and we started the procedures, and I  
5 called Mr. Skylight on the PA, you know, this is our  
6 code for fire and general emergencies. We informed the  
7 Safety Officer and Staff Captain to go on the scene to  
8 see what is happening.

9           And we remain in command center, me and  
10 Captain and the -- and the AB. Of course, we avoid the  
11 approach to the harbor, we go hard to port and go out.  
12 We stop boats and then we start the fire fighting.  
13 When we receive information about the -- how is the  
14 situation down, because it's becoming bigger and bigger  
15 very fast.

16           And I start calling emergency closer, like  
17 the here in San Juan Coast Guard, and we spoke with the  
18 pilot that we have an issue on board. So we don't have  
19 -- we will avoid the maneuver to go in. And I make  
20 security call because we have traffic inbound, we have  
21 a vessel behind -- I think it was Dolatia (phonetic) or  
22 something like that -- and we started the fire  
23 fighting.

24           After that, we received information from the  
25 Staff Captain that the fire was not under their

1 control. So Captain decided not to put the squads  
2 inside in the effected area, to pull back everybody out  
3 from the machinery spaces and try to fight it with CO2.  
4 So we start with this evacuation of the machinery  
5 spaces, and I call on-scene Commander to be sure that  
6 everybody is out of the effected area before releasing  
7 CO2.

8 We wait for this, when she report got an  
9 order to release CO2, we release. And at this time  
10 also we were evacuating passengers to our muster  
11 stations to have them, like, muster. Not to go  
12 abandon, but only to muster.

13 Then Captain decided to start the procedure  
14 of abandon. We started with lifeboats and life -- and  
15 MES. I remain in command center until they pulled  
16 Lifeboat No. 3, filled with people and they called for  
17 Commanders. So I informed Captain that I need to go  
18 then and he said okay, go in lifeboat three. And then  
19 I went there, I was the last one to go abroad, and they  
20 start lowering the boat. And when they start lowering  
21 the boat -- Lifeboat 3 is on the starboard side, so was  
22 the weather side of the vessel -- and when we were  
23 going down the wind against the ship's side was banging  
24 the -- smashing boat against the ship's side.

25 So we have very strong -- how do you say --

1 smash, hits against the ship's side. So we open one  
2 hole in front of the -- on the boat, so when we touch  
3 the water we start getting water from this. But we  
4 also [REDACTED] but there was too much  
5 swell, like.

6 When we released from inside, when I saw the  
7 [REDACTED] I tried to put the  
8 -- but it was, like, stuck. So I tried to make it  
9 manually, like, going to the hook and unhooking, but  
10 the movement of the lifeboat was not coordinated with  
11 the ship, of course. So it was very dangerous, to the  
12 seamen and for me, to out be out, like, [REDACTED]

14 So I decided to come back in the lifeboat  
15 and make [REDACTED], but the wires  
16 would not get in the hook. So, and at the same time we  
17 were smashing and the movement and screaming. So I  
18 informed this to the Captain, that we have serious  
19 problem with the hooks. So my idea, because people  
20 were starting to, asking me if they can jump into the  
21 water. Because from the boat, they can see the life  
22 raft they very close behind the boat. But I said, no  
23 we have life jacket.

24 We can't jump, we won't die here because of  
25 this. And this one is enclosed lifeboat, it's not the

1 1 and 2 that they are open. So they can -- when you  
2 are enclosed, you know, it's different, the feelings  
3 when you're out here smashing against the ship's side.

4 So I tell them no, no, no you cannot jump  
5 into the water because this will be completely  
6 (inaudible) after. So I asked to the Bosun, I said no,  
7 no, no. I will put the pins back, because the hooks  
8 are in, and let's heave the boat again. Because down  
9 was terrible, the situation.

10 So Bosun followed my order and he brought --  
11 he tried to heave back in the boat, but in the middle -  
12 - I don't know, [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED]. And I asked what, what happened, we  
14 cannot be hanging here. And he said no, we have  
15 problem or something like that. And that's it, it  
16 never came, the power to pull the boat up.

17 So I tried to remain calm, the passengers,  
18 it was a little difficult because still smashing  
19 against. And they were asking no, if the hooks are  
20 released now we will fall down. I'm like, oh yes, no,  
21 but this will not happen.

22 And after, I don't know how much time passed  
23 between the Coast Guard boat came, because the height  
24 of the lifeboat was, like, three meters or four. So  
25 it's not like the small craft can pick up the people



1 from the side. They have to bring like a high free bar  
2 boat to catch them from the side.

3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]

8 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, that's quite the  
9 experience. Can you explain the procedures on the  
10 bridge that you initiated when you got the report of  
11 the fire?

12 MR. CAMPBELL: Well, first I called Skylight  
13 to most of the fire squads. I remember the calling and  
14 all this in the staging area that we choose. [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]

17 And after that, we put on the command  
18 lights, [REDACTED]  
19 around, [REDACTED] -- what is the normal.  
20 We didn't call for general emergency alarm yet because  
21 it was in the engine room. But when the fumes starting  
22 getting -- with a lot of smoke, of course the  
23 passengers will know that we have some emergency on  
24 board.

25 So we proceed faster, we send each other one

1 alarm to a general alarm to start mustering them. Then  
2 we called by section to start evacuation of passengers.  
3 They start, [REDACTED],

4 [REDACTED]

5 MR. [REDACTED] Is the GMDSS part of your job  
6 description as Third Officer --

7 LT. [REDACTED] Second.

8 MR. [REDACTED] Oh, Second Officer, thank you.  
9 Or were the GMDSS responsibilities being performed as  
10 your emergency duty in accordance with your safety  
11 card, your safety number on the muster list in the  
12 station building?

13 MR. CAMPBELL: We just came from dry dock.  
14 We were there, we had, like, minimum manning because we  
15 were at dry dock. So that and there were only two  
16 officers, me and the Third Officer. So during this  
17 time, I am officially and by most at least the  
18 Navigation Officer and the stability -- in case of  
19 this, I'm the Stability Officer, but -- and he's the  
20 fire fighter.

21 So for life saving, like, maintenance and  
22 all this, we were sharing this. I was helping him  
23 because sometimes he didn't do it by himself. [REDACTED]  
24 we -- [REDACTED] -  
25 - worked, like, for three or two days, I don't remember

1 when -- and [REDACTED]. But he was  
2 also giving him, like, fire fighting stuff, like,  
3 familiarization with equipment and all this.

4 And [REDACTED], then I still  
5 keep [REDACTED], like, to me. I  
6 didn't pass yet to the Third Officer, but in -- by --  
7 mostly I am the Stability Officer.

8 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So by job description,  
9 you're a GMDSS Officer. [REDACTED]

10 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

11 MR. [REDACTED] Stability Officer, thank you very  
12 much. What did you mean by we started fire fighting  
13 from the bridge?

14 MR. CAMPBELL: Safety Officer when she was  
15 in command, the on-scene commander, she informed when  
16 the squads were ready to start fighting the fire. They  
17 never go inside affected area because Chief Engineer  
18 and the Staff Captain, like, they saw the flames and  
19 all this, and they took the action that not to put the  
20 squads inside, to go immediately with the CO2.

21 So we started CO2, we start the [REDACTED]  
22 [REDACTED]. I think at they said all garage  
23 and -- because this, they were asking, which zones were  
24 affected to cooling. But with this smoke in the car  
25 wing garage, Safety Officer whatnot -- was not able. I

1 mean, I'm talking about I heard in the bridge, she was  
2 not able to give to Staff Captain in the engine room  
3 the set zones for drenching.

4 MR. [REDACTED] Say that again?

5 MR. CAMPBELL: Staff Captain was in drencher  
6 engine room. He was asking Safety Officer which zone  
7 you want me to activate? And she -- he asked her,  
8 like, several times, which zone do you want me to  
9 activate?

10 But she, I think, she was not able to see  
11 the zones in the bulkheads because of the smog in the  
12 (inaudible). And they decided to activate all the  
13 zones. I don't know if they just started all zones in  
14 Garage B only, or if they start all zones in all  
15 garage.

16 MR. [REDACTED] And when you're saying start all  
17 zones, for the record you're referring to the drencher  
18 system in the car deck?

19 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

20 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, thank you. When the  
21 Captain ordered the release of the CO2 --

22 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

23 MR. [REDACTED] -- and you released the CO2, do  
24 you -- where do you release the CO2 from? Is it  
25 released from the bridge?

1 MR. CAMPBELL: No.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Is it release from -- ?

3 MR. CAMPBELL: From local CO2 station in  
4 Garage BF.

5 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, so when the --

6 MR. CAMPBELL: CO2 room.

7 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So the Captain gave the  
8 orders for release, how did you guys go about  
9 initiating the release of the CO2? Tell me about the  
10 communications that you had to make in order to get  
11 that CO2 activated.

12 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes. As I told you, first we  
13 tried to be sure that we are not going to kill anybody  
14 inside engine room, so [REDACTED]  
15 s [REDACTED] And after, the readiness was given by the  
16 Safety Officer, she say no, there is nobody inside  
17 engine room.

18 And Captain ordered to activate -- to  
19 release the CO2. I think it was -- I'm not sure. It  
20 was supposed to be Chief Engineer in CO2 room, but I  
21 don't know if he release or it was released by Staff  
22 Captain. One of these two.

23 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, and the Safety Officer was  
24 the person who confirmed to the bridge and the ECR or  
25 one? Or just let me know who the Safety Officer

1 confirmed to that there was no one left in the engine  
2 room.

3 MR. CAMPBELL: I mean, as for procedures  
4 she's down in the -- she's like the on-scene commander.  
5 And we receive information from her, from Safety  
6 Officer. Maybe she get this information by Chief  
7 Engineer or by herself, but she is the one who gives  
8 this information to the bridge.

9 MR. [REDACTED] To the bridge, and do you know  
10 who on the bridge received that information from her?  
11 Who she told that the engine room was clear?

12 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

13 MR. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

14 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

15 MR. [REDACTED] All right, and once -- so once it  
16 was decided okay, the engine room is clear?

17 MR. CAMPBELL: I spoke to the Captain,  
18 Captain the engine room is ready.

19 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

20 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED] okay, order  
21 [REDACTED]

22 MR. [REDACTED] And who did you travel that  
23 information down to?

24 MR. CAMPBELL: I say it in the radio for the  
25 person inside there, that they can release it -- it

1 was Staff Captain, yes.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Do you, kind of, remember how you  
3 said it? Like, what your order over the radio was? It  
4 doesn't have to be verbatim, but something close to.  
5 Like, were you speaking to a specific person? Like,  
6 did you call a specific person on the radio?

7 MR. CAMPBELL: No. No, I -- I think I say  
8 safety we're ready to release CO2, release CO2. And  
9 Staff Captain, like, asked me again, like, I release  
10 CO2? And I say, yes release the CO2.

11 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

12 MR. CAMPBELL: We can release.

13 MR. [REDACTED] So the Staff Captain responded  
14 back. So you said to the Safety Officer, release CO2.  
15 The Staff Captain came back on that same radio channel  
16 and said, you know, confirm we can release CO2. You  
17 said, yes release CO2, and then do you know who  
18 physically released the CO2 in the CO2 room?

19 MR. CAMPBELL: No.

20 MR. [REDACTED] No?

21 MR. CAMPBELL: Ask Staff Captain.

22 MR. [REDACTED] Are you aware of any checklists  
23 within your Safety Management System for the company  
24 that have to be followed prior to CO2 being released?

25 MR. CAMPBELL: We have the safety -- the

1 checklists, like, for fire emergency, and there is  
2 these points about releasing CO2 that we --

3 MR. [REDACTED] Do you remember any of those  
4 points on that piece of paper? Perhaps, like, what  
5 some of those bullet points said? Like, was it -- did  
6 it give you, kind of, step-by-step instructions on,  
7 like, you know, do this and then do this --

8 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

9 MR. [REDACTED] -- and then do this, and then do  
10 this. Could you speak to that?

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Pull people out, stop all  
12 ventilation, stop power, close dampers. What was  
13 supposed to be the water tight was closed. Power down,  
14 the fuel valve should be shut off.

15 MR. [REDACTED] Where is that checklist located?  
16 Is that something that's on the bridge? Is that  
17 something that's in the CO2 Release Room? Is that  
18 something that's in the ECR? Where is that checklist  
19 checked off?

20 MR. CAMPBELL: It should be -- check in the  
21 Emergency Contingency Plan on the bridge.

22 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, so who on the bridge  
23 physically went through the checklist and said -- now  
24 I'm just going to try to remember from memory -- you  
25 know, close dampers, isolate power, all those things



1 you just mentioned to me that were on the checklist.

2 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

3 MR. [REDACTED] Who on the bridge went through  
4 that checklist and verified each one of those items had  
5 been completed prior to CO2 being released?

6 MR. CAMPBELL: The Apprentice Officer was in  
7 the table in the checklist.

8 MR. [REDACTED] The Apprentice Officer?

9 MR. CAMPBELL: Cadet.

10 MR. [REDACTED] Oh, the cadet?

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

12 MR. [REDACTED] So the cadet did the pre-CO2  
13 release checklist?

14 MR. CAMPBELL: I mean, like, verbally.

15 Because [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED] Captain, he was in the, like, overall  
17 command of this by the wings. [REDACTED]  
18 [REDACTED], with [REDACTED], with [REDACTED], with  
19 [REDACTED] down. I have like three radios, one in 16, one  
20 in 6, one in 14. So the cadet was doing this paper, he  
21 was like, oh, remember to shut off --

22 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So as he was going through  
23 the checklist -- and I'm just going to pick one at  
24 random, close fire dampers. All right, when he went to  
25 the check box close fire dampers, is that something

1 that would be done at the bridge? To close the fire  
2 dampers?

3 MR. CAMPBELL: No. This is --

4 MR. [REDACTED] So how would that task get  
5 accomplished? So before he checks that box, that the  
6 fire dampers are closed, what is the process to make  
7 sure that that actually happened prior to the CO2 being  
8 released?

9 MR. CAMPBELL: The engineers with this order  
10 to -- the Chief Engineer, when we give him order to put  
11 everybody down, that we are going to release CO2, they  
12 supposed to have these duties. Every one of them, they  
13 have different duties about going out and closing what  
14 they have to close. And they have to give, like,  
15 readiness to the bridge that they --

16 MR. [REDACTED] So if I understand you correctly,  
17 the checklist on the bridge is more of a verification -  
18 -

19 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

20 MR. [REDACTED] -- on the command and control  
21 side than it is a list of tasks to be completed prior  
22 to?

23 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, because the Chief  
24 Electrician, he, I mean, he knows that he have to cut  
25 the power in the effected area. So he calls to the

1 bridge and he say I shut off the power there. By this  
2 I put, like, okay they already got the power. So it's  
3 like this, like the verification of actions.

4 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, so do you remember  
5 receiving or overhearing the calls come in for each of  
6 the items on that checklist before the Captain ordered  
7 release of CO2? Before you told the Safety Officer  
8 release CO2, before the Staff Captain asked you to  
9 confirm okay release CO2, and then you reconfirmed yes  
10 release CO2. How are those -- how are all those boxes  
11 checked on the bridge before all those orders were  
12 given down to release CO2?

13 MR. CAMPBELL: Well, when the captain give  
14 me the order that we need to, I mean, [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]. I didn't  
16 take the -- the action to release the CO2. When he  
17 told me that, the Captain, no, no tell them that we are  
18 going to release CO2, stop and put everybody down, I  
19 pass this information.

20 And he was asking me, like, continuously all  
21 the people is out, all the people is out? And just  
22 when I told him everybody is out, like, he ordered this  
23 to release. It was more, like, to put people out than  
24 to go by dampers and -- yes, I understand your point.

25 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So what you're saying is

1 then is that the bridge never received any  
2 confirmations -- and we'll just use the same example I  
3 used last time -- the bridge never received a  
4 confirmation that the fire dampers were closed prior to  
5 the order being given down to release CO2? It was such  
6 an urgent issue that it was just passed down?

7 MR. CAMPBELL: We closed dampers be -- [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED] I remember I stopped from the  
9 bridge the ventilations I could stopped. We had two  
10 shut down -- not two -- [REDACTED] but this is for  
11 accommodations and garage. We have outside a Chief  
12 Engineer, two orders that we sent out to stop these  
13 ventilations too.

14 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

15 MR. CAMPBELL: And from our side this what  
16 we shut down, from engine room, like, the main dampers  
17 down.

18 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, so you -- [REDACTED]  
19 [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED]

22 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

23 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. I don't have anymore  
24 questions about the fire, but I do have some more going  
25 back to the lifeboat. So I'm going to go ahead and

1 pass off to Mike, if you have any questions about the  
2 fire, or Lieutenant [REDACTED]

3 MR. KARR: Okay.

4 MR. [REDACTED] Thank you very much, you did a  
5 very good job.

6 MR. KARR: This is Mike Karr. How well do -  
7 - how often have you sailed with the Captain on board  
8 this ship?

9 MR. CAMPBELL: How long I have been with  
10 him?

11 MR. KARR: Correct.

12 MR. CAMPBELL: He was already two weeks on  
13 board, two and half weeks.

14 MR. KARR: Have you ever sailed with him  
15 before?

16 MR. CAMPBELL: Sailed, no because we were in  
17 dry dock. I met him during dry dock, he come over with  
18 the other Captain, the previous one, for two weeks  
19 during dry dock and I met him there. We never sailed,  
20 and I met him again when he came back to replace the  
21 Captain.

22 MR. KARR: All right, so how many weeks have  
23 you worked with him, you know, even in dry dock and  
24 sail?

25 What I'm -- how many weeks had you worked with him?

1 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

2 MR. KARR: One month? Okay.

3 MR. CAMPBELL: Two during dry dock and now  
4 two here.

5 MR. KARR: All right, when you're on the  
6 bridge and the fire is going on, describe the comments  
7 the Captain made while he was up on the bridge.  
8 Specifically, you and the AB were the only people on  
9 the bridge.

10 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

11 MR. KARR: Did the Captain --

12 MR. CAMPBELL: And the Apprentice Officer.

13 MR. KARR: Okay, did the Captain converse  
14 with you? Did he talk to you about what was going on  
15 with regard to the fire? Did he ask for your advice?

16 MR. CAMPBELL: No, when we received the call  
17 that we have fire is what, like, immediately I start  
18 asking him, Captain can I go through missteps  
19 guideline? And Captain I will call safety to go down,  
20 so like, yes he spoke to me, [REDACTED]

21 MR. KARR: Who decided that the passengers  
22 should be ordered to the muster station?

23 MR. CAMPBELL: Captain.

24 MR. KARR: The Captain? And did he do that?

25 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

1

2 MR. KARR: Okay. All right, tell me more  
3 details. From that point on, tell me more of what the  
4 Captain said and what you said to the Captain on the  
5 bridge, while you guys were on the bridge together.

6 MR. CAMPBELL: During the evacuation? Most  
7 of the time, he was asking how is the situation because  
8 I was, like, speaking with everybody down, like I said  
9 to [REDACTED] outside.

10 And I give him, like, periodically what is  
11 happening. Like, when [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED], [REDACTED]n. And he  
14 say, okay [REDACTED]. When the lifeboat preparation  
15 called to the bridge to give readiness, [REDACTED]  
16 C [REDACTED] Captain, the lifeboat preparation team is  
17 ready, and he say okay start preparing Lifeboat 2. And  
18 I just transfer this to the lifeboat preparation team,  
19 prepare Lifeboat 2, and like this.

20 MR. KARR: Was anything said on the bridge  
21 that painted a picture of why the Captain decided to  
22 abandon the ship?

23 MR. CAMPBELL: I mean, you are asking me why  
24 I think he --

25 MR. KARR: No. Did he say anything, did he

1 talk about the condition of the ship? Such that he  
2 thought it was better to put people in life rafts  
3 because he thought if they stayed onboard the ship,  
4 they'd be in trouble.

5 MR. CAMPBELL: I mean, he didn't tell me why  
6 he thought this, he only told me that it's better to go  
7 this way.

8 MR. KARR: Can you recall some of the things  
9 that were reported to you? Prior to the Captain  
10 telling you that, what were some of the things that you  
11 told him. That you, you know, you would have been  
12 receiving calls on the radio.

13 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

14 MR. KARR: What did you tell the Captain  
15 prior to him saying, you know, I think it would be  
16 better if we left the ship?

17 MR. CAMPBELL: That the fire in the engine  
18 was not under control, then he release CO2. [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED] (phonetic).

24 MR. KARR: What was that last item, smoke  
25 coming from where?



1 MR. CAMPBELL: Because we were in maneuver -  
2 -

3 MR. KARR: Oh, but I -- I didn't hear you.

4 MR. CAMPBELL: Because we were in maneuver,  
5 the people in forward mooring deck were mustered to  
6 start maneuvering with the anchors and ropes. So they  
7 have the door coming from Garage C to the forward  
8 mooring deck open, and from this door the smoke was  
9 coming up to the bow. So actually we have smoke in the  
10 bow, in the stern, in the fuel room.

11 MR. KARR: Who told you that there was an  
12 explosion in the garage?

13 MR. CAMPBELL: This was report by the Safety  
14 Officer about tires exploding in garage, tires for the  
15 trucks.

16 MR. KARR: Did the Captain say, ever mention  
17 anything to you about his concern for all the fuel and  
18 the vehicles in the garage?

19 MR. CAMPBELL: Not to me, no.

20 MR. KARR: Okay. All right. Did you  
21 recommend any action to the Captain?

22 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED]. Because from port side  
24 we had, like, there was more smoke in port side. And [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]. And I reported to the Captain,  
3 Captain in port side it is dangerous for the  
4 passengers. And he say, okay, let's go on the  
5 starboard side.

6 MR. KARR: What had you heard was -- [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]

8 MR. CAMPBELL: No, I didn't hear [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED], like,  
11 completely rigged. So it was dangerous also for this,  
12 to put people down from -- [REDACTED],  
13 [REDACTED] I saw it from it bridge, it was  
14 not like somebody called me.

15 MR. KARR: I'm going to push pause for a  
16 second at 16:49.

17 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went  
18 off the record at 16:49 and resumed at 16:54)

19 MR. KARR: It's now 16:54, we're back on the  
20 record. Mr. Campbell, I'm showing you a picture from  
21 my computer, IMG 1852, that I took several -- two days  
22 after the accident. [REDACTED] on the  
23 port side during the fire response and the evacuation,  
24 [REDACTED]?

25 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

1 MR. KARR: Yes, all right.

2 LT. [REDACTED] What's the photo number?

3 MR. KARR: Sorry?

4 LT. [REDACTED] What photo number is that?

5 Sorry.

6 MR. KARR: IMG 1852. Earlier you told us --  
7 I'll wait until you're done there. Earlier you made a  
8 comment that you said -- either you or the Captain said  
9 -- the [REDACTED]?

10 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

11 MR. KARR: Was that your comment or the  
12 Captain's?

13 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]. They were down, mostly in  
15 Garage A, and they say that it's spreading very fast  
16 through the engine compartments and was -- the smoke  
17 was coming quite fast out with the heat. And they have  
18 fire in the pilot door, so.

19 MR. KARR: Did they -- in making those  
20 reports did they indicate how the smoke was coming out  
21 of the engine room?

22 MR. CAMPBELL: Well, the people that went  
23 inside engine room from the staircase in the control  
24 room, they report that the smoke covered all the  
25 staircase up to the end. The staircase connect the

1 engine room with all garage, Garage B, C, and  
2 accommodations. So the staircase was full with smoke.

3 MR. KARR: Did anyone say if the doors to  
4 the staircases from the garage were open?

5 MR. CAMPBELL: The guy who was there was  
6 Chief Engineer. He supposed to leave engine room from  
7 the staircase and close these doors behind him.

8 MR. KARR: Okay. I was wondering if anybody  
9 said, oh the smoke is coming into the garage because a  
10 certain door was open?

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

12 MR. KARR: But did you hear anything like  
13 that?

14 MR. CAMPBELL: No.

15 MR. KARR: Okay. All right. [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

19 MR. KARR: Do you remember, was that one or  
20 two passengers? Three or four?

21 MR. CAMPBELL: No, this was more. [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 MR. KARR: And how many people did you have  
24 in your life raft or in your lifeboat?

25 MR. CAMPBELL: I don't remember the number

1 now. It was something like 50.

2 MR. KARR: Fifty?

3 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

4 MR. KARR: Had you counted the number that  
5 were in your life raft?

6 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, we count them for  
7 evacuation, but I don't remember now.

8 MR. KARR: All right.

9 MR. CAMPBELL: I count them one by one  
10 before we started getting out to be sure that when we  
11 arrive ashore, we will have everybody.

12 MR. KARR: All right. When you were on the  
13 bridge during the launching and, you know, of the --  
14 when you were on the bridge as Lifeboat Number 1 was  
15 being prepared and Lifeboat Number 2 was prepared.

16 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

17 MR. KARR: Did you notice anything unusual  
18 about the launching and the preparation?


19 MR. CAMPBELL: When they went water level,  
20 .

21 MR. KARR: Which boat was that?

22 MR. CAMPBELL: In both boats.

23 MR. KARR: Both boats?

24 MR. CAMPBELL: 

25  Because I remember first boat we put was -- it

1 was when they put [REDACTED]. I was in the bridge  
2 wing speaking with the Commander, with the Officer,  
3 because he's a younger one. [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED],

5 [REDACTED]

6 So when they went down, they released this,

7 [REDACTED]. But

8 they didn't manage to, also, to put the hooks out. So  
9 -- but they have advantage that this is not completely  
10 enclosed boats. So they can go out from outside the  
11 boat, not between the boat and the ship's side. That  
12 is dangerous because of the movement. So they went  
13 from outside, and [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]. It's quite dangerous also, but  
15 they -- at least they managed to disconnect.

16 MR. KARR: And when they disconnect those,  
17 when they release the hooks --

18 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED],

19 [REDACTED] They get detached by the bow, but  
20 the stern of the boat went immediately like this. So  
21 they were -- the -- all the people aft, were coming  
22 forward and they disconnect forward. And after, he  
23 pulled hard to port and leave.

24 MR. [REDACTED] All right. Just for the record,  
25 the hand movement that you showed -- obviously we can't

1 see this on the recorder. So for the record, Ricardo  
2 was explaining that when they released the aft hook  
3 that the stern of the lifeboat swung out. Do you think  
4 it swung out -- this is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] United States Coast  
5 Guard by the way -- did it swing out 45 degrees, 90  
6 degrees? Did it swing all the way around, 180? How  
7 far out did it swing out before they finally got the  
8 second, forward hook released?

9 MR. CAMPBELL: For me, [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 MR. KARR: Ninety degrees, all right thanks.  
12 And did -- I heard that the Coast Guard dropped a large  
13 raft from an aircraft -- from a helicopter? Did you  
14 see --

15 MR. CAMPBELL: They leave -- they -- life  
16 raft?

17 MR. KARR: Yes. Well, did they -- did the  
18 Coast Guard helicopter drop a large life raft?

19 MR. CAMPBELL: No, I never saw that.

20 MR. KARR: I'm going to push the pause  
21 button.

22 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went  
23 off the record and resumed at 16:02)

24 MR. KARR: So it's 16:02, we're back on the  
25 record, and I'm Mike Karr and I'm done with my

1 questions for now. Oh, before you begin -- in San  
2 Juan, what's your final destination? What pier were  
3 you going to?

4 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

5 MR. KARR: Thanks.

6 LT. [REDACTED] I can't remember if my  
7 question's related to this, should I ask? Can I ask  
8 any other questions? Okay. Ricardo, are you  
9 responsible for the maintenance? For your normal job  
10 description duties as a second mate, are you  
11 responsible for maintenance of electronic equipment on  
12 the bridge including the voyage data recorder? This is  
13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with the U.S. Coast Guard.

14 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, I [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED], but not for VDR. For  
16 VDR, we have, like, a company that make this  
17 maintenance periodically.

18 LT. [REDACTED] Do you know which company that  
19 is?

20 MR. CAMPBELL: Consilium.

21 LT. [REDACTED] Sorry?

22 MR. CAMPBELL: Consilium.

23 LT. PROCOTR: Consilium? And were you aware  
24 of any previous deficiencies noted with the voyage data  
25 recorder?



1 MR. CAMPBELL: No, actually everything is  
2 working properly.

3 LT. [REDACTED] Do you maintain records of the  
4 servicing from this Consilium company?

5 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, it's a record. It's in  
6 Captain's files.

7 LT. [REDACTED] Captain's files?

8 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

9 LT. [REDACTED] Okay, and -- let's put it  
10 away, please. I'll come back to the questioning.

11 MS. BELL: I'm going to pass.

12 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] United States  
13 Coast Guard. Do you -- did Lifeboat Number 3 have --  
14 do you know what skates are on a lifeboat?

15 MR. CAMPBELL: Skates?

16 MR. [REDACTED] Skates.

17 MR. CAMPBELL: They're the --

18 MR. [REDACTED] On the side of the lifeboat?  
19 They prevent damage between the lifeboat and the hull  
20 in case it has to go down on a hard list? Did lifeboat  
21 number three have skates?

22 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, it had skates.

23 MR. [REDACTED] It did have skates. It had it's  
24 fore and it's aft skates?

25 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

1 MR. [REDACTED] And those didn't do any good at  
2 all in protecting the boat once it hit the water level?

3 MR. CAMPBELL: No because -- yes.

4 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

5 MR. CAMPBELL: Because our ship -- in the  
6 ship side, she have, like, like this stuff but bigger.  
7 So when she hit, the lifeboat against the ship's side,  
8 this immediately make a hole to the fiberglass.

9 MR. [REDACTED] All right.

10 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED]. It's outside, in the  
13 weather, in the weather side.

14 MR. [REDACTED] So it was real rough out?

15 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

16 MR. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
17 Three to five, six to eight?

18 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, [REDACTED]. I  
19 know this fo sure because I was taking the swell into  
20 consideration to make the turn inside San Juan Harbor  
21 to go close to the side because this is, like, now. So  
22 this same swell catch the lifeboat.

23 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, so the hydrostatic release  
24 on the lifeboat. Explain to me -- and let's just  
25 pretend for the sake of this conversation that we are

1 in perfectly calm waters, no swell, zero swell, all  
2 right?

3 And you're going to lower your lifeboat into  
4 the water for a training or a drill, all right? Walk  
5 me through exactly what you would do once the boat was  
6 in the water, in order to release the hooks using the  
7 hydrostatic release.

8 MR. CAMPBELL: When we are in the water?

9 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

10 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] erating

14 [REDACTED]

15 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Same scenario, boat is in  
16 the water, but the indicator is not in the red, okay?  
17 So you pick up the handle, you're trying to pull it but  
18 it's still in the red. What is now, at that point,

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]? You're in the water, your indicator is in the  
21 red, but the handle's not working. How would you  
22 release the locks?

23 MR. CAMPBELL: We're supposed to break the  
24 glass where this indicator is and to make it go the red  
25 by hand. Or by the pin, you pull the pin and pull the

1 -- .

2 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So with that process that  
3 you just explained to me about breaking the glass,  
4 manually moving the pin over. Did you attempt to do  
5 that in Lifeboat Number 3 on the day of this incident,  
6 when the boat was in the water and you couldn't get the  
7 hydrostatic release to operate?

8 MR. CAMPBELL: Okay.

9 MR. [REDACTED] Because -- and the only reason  
10 I'm asking is because you said that --

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Now, if you managed to go --

12 MR. [REDACTED] Hold on, let me finish sentence  
13 and you can answer it.

14 MR. CAMPBELL: Oh.

15 MR. [REDACTED] So what you had said was that the  
16 boat was in the water, you tried the hydrostatic  
17 release. And when that didn't work, then you went and  
18 you manually unhooked the hooks fore and aft. [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 MR. CAMPBELL: No, I broke it. Yes, I first  
21 attempt this, but if you manage to go inside this  
22 lifeboat you will see that the [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED] So you don't have angle to  
24 break this. You need to find, like, I don't know  
25 something like an axe, and there is no angle to break

1 this from there.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

3 MR. CAMPBELL: So I tried everything, I  
4 tried with the hand, but this is not like the -- this  
5 easy glass to break with the fingers like this.

6 MR. [REDACTED] Right.

7 MR. CAMPBELL: So we were trying to hit this  
8 and I say no, no, no forget it, we will not manage.

9 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

10 MR. CAMPBELL: It is better to go by the  
11 hooks.

12 MR. [REDACTED] So on Lifeboat Number 3, you made  
13 an attempt to do a manual override of the hydrostatic  
14 release, but due to its installation that emergency  
15 release could not be activated. And you then had to  
16 move out to the outside of the boat to manually release  
17 the hooks, or attempt to manually release the hooks.  
18 Is that right?

19 MR. CAMPBELL: [REDACTED] because I know how to  
20 release from all the three ways.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

22 MR. CAMPBELL: And this way, remember that  
23 we have the timing, that we are banging against the  
24 ship and the people are screaming. So I can't -- I  
25 don't have, like, okay I will spend here an half an

1 hour trying to break this glass.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

3 MR. CAMPBELL: So I override this procedure  
4 and tried to -- went outside.

5 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

6 MR. CAMPBELL: So we went outside. Also, we  
7 have te problem that this door -- we have a fiberglass  
8 door behind. This door is not made -- you don't have  
9 anything to secure this door in open position. So the  
10 door is against you, hitting you in the back, and also  
11 you have to be careful with the cables because the ship  
12 is moving, not in same phase of the lifeboat.

13 So sometimes the ship is up and you are  
14 down, and the cables will be -- will have tension. So  
15 if you put your hands like this, in the hooks, and  
16 after it changed you could cut your hand on something  
17 like this or fall into the water.

18 MR. [REDACTED] Thank you for clarifying that for  
19 me, I really appreciate that. When you were in  
20 Lifeboat Number 3 -- so when you -- when you there,  
21 everybody was already in the boat waiting for you?

22 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

23 MR. [REDACTED] You got in the boat. Do you have  
24 the ability to lower the boat from within the boat?  
25 Like, if there wasn't someone on deck to lower the boat

1 for you, do you have the ability to lower your lifeboat  
2 from within the boat?

3 MR. CAMPBELL: We're supposed to -- I didn't  
4 try this time. We lower, someone outside lower, the  
5 Bosun lowered.

6 MR. [REDACTED] But does the --

7 MR. CAMPBELL: There is a --

8 MR. [REDACTED] Does that system have the ability  
9 to lower the boat from within the boat?

10 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

11 MR. [REDACTED] All right. Was that attempted to  
12 be used?

13 MR. CAMPBELL: No.

14 MR. [REDACTED] So you never tried to lower the  
15 boat from within the boat? The Bosun conducted the  
16 entire lowering of the lifeboats.

17 MR. CAMPBELL: No, they -- you mean in my  
18 boat or in other boats?

19 MR. [REDACTED] Your boat.

20 MR. CAMPBELL: No, I didn't.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Lifeboat Number 3.

22 MR. CAMPBELL: No, we were lowered by  
23 lifeboat preparation team.

24 MR. [REDACTED] The fire coming from the pilot  
25 doors, did anybody actually see flames and fire coming

1 from the pilot doors?

2 MR. CAMPBELL: The fire had just started  
3 when we were approaching to San Juan harbor, and the  
4 pilot boat was coming alongside. So I have people  
5 there in pilot boat, pilot, port side, and we have  
6 security in 1-AB preparing the ladder.

7 So when the fire start, they remain there.  
8 Because at some point we try, okay it's not that big  
9 fire so we can take the pilot in. But the pilot, I  
10 don't know, managed to go somewhere. But soon after  
11 the securities report that they have smoke coming  
12 there, because our pilot boat -- our pilot door is the  
13 same door for bunking stations.

14 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

15 MR. CAMPBELL: So they report that they have  
16 fire there, so they have to go from there. They  
17 actually tried to extinguish this fire with  
18 extinguishers there by the pilot door.

19 MR. [REDACTED] So there was an actual, open-  
20 flame fire in the bunker station.

21 MR. CAMPBELL: I never saw it, but I  
22 received the -- from the -- in the bridge, I received  
23 this information.

24 MR. [REDACTED] And they said there was open  
25 flames in the bunker station?



1 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, in the --

2 MR. [REDACTED] In the port side bunker station?

3 And they made an attempt to extinguish by the fire  
4 extinguisher.

5 MR. CAMPBELL: With fire extinguisher, yes.  
6 So at this point, I remember, I called the pilot and I  
7 say no, no, no forget it. You cannot come on board  
8 because it's not safe, and he say okay.

9 MR. [REDACTED] The Car Deck C forward door that  
10 was left open, which then led to the smoke egress onto  
11 the forward mooring deck. Why was that door left open?  
12 In your opinion, or if you know the answer obviously  
13 that would what I'm looking for, but --

14 MR. CAMPBELL: The answer is because the  
15 people waiting standby for what -- for maneuvering.

16 MR. [REDACTED] What people?

17 MR. CAMPBELL: The people preparing the  
18 ropes, the sailors. We were approaching --

19 MR. [REDACTED] Oh, on the forward mooring deck?

20 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes. We were approaching the  
21 pier, so when I activate Mr. Skylight I both people  
22 forward and aft, in both mooring decks. So when I  
23 activate Mr. Skylight, they all run.

24 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

25 MR. CAMPBELL: They didn't -- because they

1 didn't know that after the smoke would go this high.  
2 They didn't know that we have this kind of fire in the  
3 engine room, so they didn't took the time to close one  
4 door in Deck C. This wasn't done. But after when I  
5 saw this -- when we saw the smoke, we sent one guy to  
6 close this door from upside.

7 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Is that a weather-tight  
8 door or a fire screen door?

9 ME. CAMPBELL: No, it's weather-tight.

10 ME. [REDACTED] So it has the six docks?

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

12 MR. [REDACTED] Two on the left, two right, one  
13 top, one bottom.

14 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, it's weather-tight.

15 MR. [REDACTED] And then you said there's another  
16 door similar to that for the aft mooring deck?

17 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

18 MR. [REDACTED] Same type of door, weather-tight,  
19 six docks?

20 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

21 MR. [REDACTED] All right, and that door was also  
22 left open?

23 MR. CAMPBELL: From -- I was in the bridge,  
24 I can tell you from the forward because I can see the  
25 smoke right there. But in aft, I don't know, maybe it

1 was coming from this, so I don't know.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Did the MES team on the  
3 port side ever make any reports up to the bridge after  
4 the failure to inflate?

5 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, they made reports.

6 MR. [REDACTED] Do you remember any of the  
7 reports, what they said?

8 MR. CAMPBELL: They report that they were  
9 waiting to be inflate -- because what happened is this  
10 MES, as for scale and maintenance and this, maybe there  
11 is people that never see this, how to launch. So they  
12 don't know, in fact, how long it has to take to be  
13 completely inflate.

14 So they would report it in, no it's not yet  
15 completely inflate, it's not yet completely inflate.  
16 Because they can see from there that the angle to jump  
17 is completely vertical. But right after that they  
18 start to report in also for the smoke coming in this  
19 area. And they have transfer the people to the other  
20 side.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Did the MES team ever make any  
22 reports to the bridge that they had used, released, or  
23 activated the emergency air supply for the Marine  
24 Evacuation System?

25 MR. CAMPBELL: No.

1 MR. [REDACTED] No? Okay. What did you mean  
2 when you said the Chief is supposed to close the door?  
3 They were talking about a door on a car deck that led  
4 to -- or I'm sorry -- a staircase that had access to  
5 all three car decks as well as the accommodation space.

6 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

7 MR. [REDACTED] What door is that? What type of  
8 door is it first, water tight, fire screen?

9 MR. CAMPBELL: It's water-tight door.

10 MR. [REDACTED] Another weather-tight door.

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Another water-tight door  
12 inside the ship, connecting the engine spaces below  
13 Garage B with all garage and accommodations. The door  
14 is just after the engine spaces.

15 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, so what did you mean by the  
16 Chief is supposed to close the door? Is it --

17 MR. CAMPBELL: Because they supposed to be  
18 doing maneuvering in Control Room. And if they have in  
19 the main engine, they will go out from the escape. I  
20 suppose the Chief to be the last one to leave, so if  
21 he's going out from here he needs to close this door.

22 MR. [REDACTED] So in the process of escaping  
23 from the engine room, he has to go through this door?

24 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

25 MR. [REDACTED] And so when, in your opinion,

1 when the personnel, you know, what -- of course this is  
2 an opinion -- when the personnel of the ECR escaped,  
3 they escaped through that door but never closed it  
4 behind them?

5 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

6 MR. [REDACTED] And then that is perhaps how the  
7 smoke and the flame from the engine room, perhaps, got  
8 up into the car deck and then of course onto the  
9 mooring deck?

10 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

11 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. You're the Commander of  
12 Lifeboat Number 3.

13 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

14 MR. [REDACTED] How many other crew do you have  
15 in the lifeboat with you? As like --

16 MR. CAMPBELL: Only two guys.

17 MR. [REDACTED] Two guys. And what are their  
18 jobs?

19 MR. CAMPBELL: Carpenter and one OS.

20 MR. [REDACTED] And what is their job in the boat?

21 MR. CAMPBELL: The hooks.

22 MR. [REDACTED] The hook men, okay. Did you have  
23 like an assistant, or like a Second Commander? Like a  
24 Vice Commander or a Second Commander that, like, takes  
25 over for you if you're not able to be present?

1 MR. CAMPBELL: The muster leads the full? I  
2 don't remember when.

3 MR. [REDACTED] Not on musters, I'm saying in  
4 reality. The way you drill, the way you practice, and  
5 the way it goes do you have a second?

6 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

7 MR. [REDACTED] You do?

8 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

9 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, because I just asked you  
10 and you said you only had two people and they were the  
11 fore and aft hook men?

12 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, I have only two.

13 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

14 MR. CAMPBELL: I supposed to have the Second  
15 Commander and, of course, one engineer if I have  
16 problem with the engines.

17 MR. [REDACTED] And how come you don't have those  
18 personnel? How come you didn't have them, do you know?

19 MR. CAMPBELL: No, I can't -- I don't know.

20 MR. [REDACTED] They just weren't assigned?

21 MR. CAMPBELL: I don't know if they didn't  
22 show there or what happened to them. Because I told  
23 you, I just left the bridge when they informed me that  
24 the Lifeboat Number 3 was ready to go out, to go down,  
25 full with people. So I will not cancel the launch

1 because I don't have one engineer there.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Right. So at the drill that you  
3 had previous to the day in question -- just think of  
4 the last drill that you conducted.

5 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

6 MR. [REDACTED] When you conducted that drill,  
7 how many crew were in your boat with you?

8 MR. CAMPBELL: Five, I believe. Because  
9 always we have people not attending -- but they have  
10 permission because they are on watch, something like  
11 this -- but I have five.

12 MR. [REDACTED] All right, and what are their  
13 jobs on the boat? Yourself?

14 MR. CAMPBELL: Myself, two hooks, one  
15 engineer, and the Second Commander.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

17 MR. KARR: Can you recall, did the vessel  
18 lose propulsion?

19 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, we went under the  
20 command.

21 MR. KARR: And when did that occur?

22 MR. CAMPBELL: A while after the fire they  
23 stopped the engines.

24 MR. KARR: Did you -- did the engines stop  
25 on their own or did you shut down -- did someone on the

1 bridge shut down the engines?

2 MR. CAMPBELL: No, from the bridge we cannot  
3 switch off the engine. We can put the -- because we  
4 have manual pitch propellers, we can put the pitch in  
5 zero. But from down, they have to stop the engines to  
6 -- or the LP has to go down in to really stop the  
7 engine.

8 MR. KARR: Okay.

9 MR. CAMPBELL: If we put the -- our  
10 telegraphing in stop, the engine is not stopped it's  
11 the pitch in zero. The engine is still running.

12 MR. KARR: So did the ship's crew put the  
13 vessel not under command?

14 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

15 MR. KARR: So if you wanted to have  
16 propulsion you could have had it?

17 MR. CAMPBELL: No, no, no. When we received  
18 the -- we had two calls from the engine room. The  
19 first one, they have leakage in the port engine room.

20 MR. KARR: They have what?

21 MR. CAMPBELL: Leakage.

22 MR. KARR: Okay.

23 MR. CAMPBELL: With this one, Captain asked  
24 the Chief Engineer if this means that we will make the  
25 maneuver with one engine, so we need to call tug boats.



1 Or he can fix this engine before going in in the port  
2 and we will have two engines for the maneuvering.

3 And Chief Engineer say I will call you back  
4 with this answer. He call back like two, three minutes  
5 after and in this call he reports the fire. So when he  
6 reports the fire, we put boat's engine in pitch zero.  
7 We order him to stop the engines, but we have speed at  
8 this time in order to make the turn outside the harbor.  
9 At this time, maybe we have 15 knots, 14 knots, when we  
10 stopped.

11 MR. KARR: Oh, when you put everything -- so  
12 when you put everything in pitch zero --

13 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

14 MR. KARR: You were still going 15 knots?

15 MR. CAMPBELL: Of course decreasing fast.

16 MR. KARR: Yes, but you were able to make a  
17 turn?

18 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, we were able to make a  
19 turn.

20 MR. KARR: All right, thanks. And did --  
21 during these -- during this event, did you ever lose  
22 electrical power?

23 MR. CAMPBELL: No, we still have -- we  
24 didn't have blackouts.

25 MR. KARR: You still had lights?

1 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

2 MR. KARR: And you never lost power, all  
3 right.

4 LT. [REDACTED] I just had one quick  
5 clarification question. So when you were in the  
6 lifeboat being lowered, did you have any issues -- did  
7 you start the engine yourself? Or did you start the  
8 engine -- did you try to the start the engine on your  
9 way, being lowered? Or did you not even attempt to  
10 start it at that time?

11 MR. CAMPBELL: No, I didn't start attempting  
12 to start the engine. Because I was waiting to release  
13 hooks, and after start the engine. I have -- because  
14 we, we started the engine manually.

15 LT. [REDACTED] Yes.

16 MR. CAMPBELL: So I was -- I had the handle  
17 ready to start the engine, and I supposed to release  
18 the hook and after start the engine.

19 LT. [REDACTED] So it's procedure to start the  
20 engine after the boat is already in the water separated  
21 from the hooks, or still attached to the hooks?

22 MR. CAMPBELL: No, that's why we supposed to  
23 have more people there, to have, like, a team. They  
24 can start engine -- the guys can release if they need  
25 to release, and I can drive. But I was alone, so my

1 concern -- because of the smashing of the lifeboat  
2 against the ship's side -- was first release the hooks  
3 to not be banging.

4 And after, I don't care if I don't have  
5 engine because they can tow me. But at least I'm not  
6 attached to the ship, that's why I prefer to go first  
7 with the hooks and after with the engine.

8 LT. [REDACTED] Okay. So normal protocol is  
9 where your engine --

10 MR. CAMPBELL: When we touch, yes.

11 LT. [REDACTED] -- and while -- while being  
12 lowered is to start it? Or is normal protocol with --  
13 when you do have a full complement of crew -- is your  
14 normal --

15 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, when we are, like, one  
16 meter above of the water, we start with the batteries  
17 and the starters so when we touch the water we have  
18 engines. And so when we touch, we can remove by the  
19 remote and go fast.

20 LT. [REDACTED] Okay, and then when you --  
21 when you say you were going to manually start the  
22 engine, do you not just turn the key?

23 MR. CAMPBELL: No, because this Lifeboat  
24 Number 3 is not working with batteries, it's working  
25 with the system that you turn, turn, turn. And after

1 you, you have like a -- I don't know how you call --  
2 like, a starter in the engine room -- manual -- and you  
3 start like this. It's not like the other two, that  
4 first you start the batteries and then you start by  
5 electrical start.

6 LT. [REDACTED] Okay.

7 MR. CAMPBELL: This is manual boat.

8 LT. [REDACTED] Okay, and then -- so I'm --  
9 after you got to the water and you had troubles with  
10 releasing the hooks.

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

12 LT. [REDACTED] And you, you know, you told  
13 them -- you put the pins back in to raise the lifeboat  
14 up?

15 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, because in my mind --  
16 it's almost we afraid to, if they try to heave without  
17 these pins maybe we lose -- because we don't have  
18 experience, yes.

19 LT. [REDACTED] Right.

20 MR. CAMPBELL: So I put back the pin, and  
21 the sooner we get to be safe, to the hooks now.

22 LT. [REDACTED] So it was in the process of  
23 being raised back up when it stopped?

24 MR. CAMPBELL: Stop, yes. This was the  
25 worst.

1 LT. [REDACTED] And who was controlling that  
2 from the deck?

3 MR. CAMPBELL: Bosun.

4 LT. [REDACTED] The Bosun?

5 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes. I ask him what happened  
6 bosun, don't left me here.

7 LT. [REDACTED] And -- okay, the bosun. And  
8 did he relay to you via radio what was wrong? Did he  
9 know what was wrong?

10 MR. CAMPBELL: Well, he just say no it's not  
11 coming, we lost power. That's how I found that.

12 LR. [REDACTED] Okay, thank you.

13 MR. KARR: Carrie, did you have any  
14 questions?

15 MS. BELL: I'm good.

16 MR. KARR: All right --

17 MR. [REDACTED] So --

18 MR. KARR: Well, go ahead.

19 MR. [REDACTED] Okay, so I just want to make sure  
20 I'm clear on this. So this Lifeboat Number 3, does not  
21 have the ability to start it from the cockpit like  
22 Lifeboat Number 1 and Lifeboat Number 2?

23 MR. CAMPBELL: No.

24 MR. [REDACTED] You physically have to get out of  
25 the cockpit and go to the engine locally to start it?

1 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

2 MR. [REDACTED] So it -- so -- okay.

3 MR. CAMPBELL: You cannot, no.

4 MR. [REDACTED] All right, the only question I  
5 have left is just my closing question, so.

6 MR. KARR: All right. Well, then let me go.

7 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

8 MR. KARR: On August 9th, it was the Coast  
9 Guard examination?

10 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

11 MR. KARR: And the -- we heard that the  
12 Number 2 lifeboat was lowered into the water?

13 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

14 MR. KARR; From -- do you have any knowledge  
15 as to how that boat was -- how the hooks released that  
16 day?

17 MR. CAMPBELL: Manually.

18 MR. KARR: Manually, all right. And -- was  
19 it supposed to -- was that a problem? Since they  
20 should have released with -- what's the system called?

21 MR. [REDACTED] The hydrostatic release.

22 MR. CAMPBELL: The hydrostatic interlock.

23 MR. KARR: So when it didn't release through  
24 hydrostatic interlock -- are you the LSA person?

25 MR. CAMPBELL: No, another guy is LSA.

1 MR. KARR: The other guy is LSA. All right,  
2 I won't ask that question. All right.

3 LT. [REDACTED] One more question. You know  
4 how to start the lifeboat engine in Number 3?

5 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

6 LT. [REDACTED] So does this training provide  
7 it to you? Like, I don't normally use -- you're  
8 supposed to have an engineer to operate the engine if  
9 you have any questions. But did other people know that  
10 you had training with the engine? Like, you know, in  
11 case it wouldn't start you would be able to fix it when  
12 they lowered you, or any of that knowledge?

13 MR. CAMPBELL: I mean, to fix the engine if  
14 the engine didn't start. I know how to start, but if I  
15 had problem with the first start, no. I'm not  
16 engineer.

17 LT. [REDACTED] Okay. But you know how to  
18 start it, okay.

19 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, I know how to start.

20 LT. [REDACTED] Who have you the command to  
21 launch -- to leave -- to lower the boat with yourself  
22 inside and leave? Did the Captain tell you okay, Randy  
23 you're good to go?

24 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes. I give him readiness  
25 that I was inside when I closed the doors and everybody

1 put the life jacket with the seat belts. And he say  
2 okay go, and I say to Nosun, Bosun let go.

3 LT. [REDACTED] Was it -- now, you said there  
4 was about 50 people. Now, is that a full lifeboat or  
5 were there empty seats?

6 MR. CAMPBELL: It looked full for me because  
7 this is enclosed, but we have five old ladies, we have  
8 -- oh, we have childs. So it's not like --

9 LT. [REDACTED] What is the capacity of the  
10 boat?

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Seventy-five.

12 LT. [REDACTED] Seventy-five, okay.

13 MR. KARR: Final questions?

14 MR. [REDACTED] I have one more. Was the bridge  
15 aware that you did not have your Second Commander, or  
16 your Deputy Commander, and your Engineer in the boat  
17 when they gave you the order to lower the boat? Is --  
18 and the reason I'm asking is because you said that I  
19 let them know, and I believe you said I'm good to or  
20 I'm ready to go?

21 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

22 MR. [REDACTED] And they said go ahead and lower  
23 the boat. Were they aware, at that time, when you gave  
24 them that I'm good to go that you were missing two of  
25 your essential crew?



1 MR. CAMPBELL: When they send me to the boat

2 --

3 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

4 MR. CAMPBELL: -- they say don't worry, that  
5 they have everybody there, so in the disembarcation  
6 they have no more work crew, it was only passengers  
7 outside the boat. So when I arrive there, I know I was  
8 going to be the last one to get there. And I was --  
9 and they have the order to put the boat down.

10 MR. [REDACTED] So your understanding when you  
11 were dispatched from the bridge by the Captain to  
12 Lifeboat Number 3, that the boat was full complement  
13 with pass and crew ready to go. And all you had to do  
14 was get in and do your job?

15 MR. CAMPBELL: Is get inside, yes.

16 MR. [REDACTED] All right, so here's my closing  
17 question -- if that's okay, unless you wanted to?

18 MR. KARR: No, I'm ready for closing  
19 questions.

20 MR. [REDACTED] So my closing question is, in the  
21 time that you were on the bridge you were -- I mean,  
22 you saw everything the Captain was doing. You saw the  
23 decisions he was making, all these things.

24 At any point, during your time on the  
25 bridge, did the Captain ever make any decisions that,

1 in your professional opinion -- as a professional  
2 mariner, as a licensed officer -- were grossly  
3 negligent to the safety of the vessel, passengers, or  
4 crew? Something so grossly negligent that you  
5 considered saying no, we're not doing that Captain or  
6 Captain we should really reconsider this decision?  
7 Something to that extreme of a level, in your  
8 professional opinion?

9 MR. CAMPBELL: No. No, in this professional  
10 -- in this level, no. He give some orders that --  
11 because he was not watching what I watch, what I see -  
12 - that I say to him, no, no this cannot be done. But I  
13 still not -- I tell him and he declined the order.

14 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Do you think -- let me  
15 rephrase that -- would you have done anything  
16 differently, from the bridge standpoint, in the way  
17 that the evacuation of the vessel was handled? Again,  
18 this is professional opinion.

19 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes.

20 MR. [REDACTED] I'll tell you what, think about  
21 that one, sit on it. I'll give you my business card,  
22 if anything comes to you let me know.

23 MR. CAMPBELL: Okay, that would be good.

24 MR. [REDACTED] All right, that's all I have.

25 MR. KARR: All right. It is 17:34 and this

1 ends the interview with Second Mate Campbell.

2 (Whereupon the above-entitled matter went  
3 off the record at 5:34 p.m.)

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C E R T I F I C A T E

MATTER: Fire Aboard Caribbean Fantasy  
August 17, 2016  
Accident No. DCA16FM052  
Interview of Ricardo Campbell

DATE: 08-21-16

I hereby certify that the attached transcription of page 1 to 60 inclusive are to the best of my professional ability a true, accurate, and complete record of the above referenced proceedings as contained on the provided audio recording; further that I am neither counsel for, nor related to, nor employed by any of the parties to this action in which this proceeding has taken place; and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

*Neal R Gross*  
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**NEAL R. GROSS**

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