| NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOA | RD |
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| IN RE: | |
| THE FIRE THAT OCCURRED ON THE CARIBBEAN FANTASY THAT OCCURRED ON AUGUST 17, 2016 | No. |
| INTERVIEW OF: JORGE OBANDO CABRER | A |
| Sunday, August 21, 2016 | |
| Conference Room USCG Sector San Juan Puerto Rico | |
| BEFORE | |
| MICHAEL KARR, NTSB CARRIE BELL, NTSB USCG IT USCG ANDRES PICO RAMIREZ, PI Club CDR USCG | |
| NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 | (202) 2: |

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On Behalf of American Cruise:

CARLOS BAYRON, ESQ. Bayron Offices

| | 3 |
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| 1 | P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S |
| 2 | (6:05 p.m.) |
| 3 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: This is Mike Karr of the |
| 4 | National Transportation Safety Board. It's 1805 on |
| 5 | August 21st, 2016. And we're in a conference room at |
| 6 | Sector San Juan, conducting interviews with regards to |
| 7 | the Caribbean Fantasy fire. |
| 8 | I'd like everyone at the table to introduce |
| 9 | themselves. So we'll go around to my right. Just |
| 10 | introduce yourself by name and organization. |
| 11 | MR. MR. United States Coast |
| 12 | Guard. |
| 13 | CDR Commander United |
| 14 | States Coast Guard. |
| 15 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Carrie Bell, NTSB. |
| 16 | MR. CABRERA: My name is Jorge Obando. I'm |
| 17 | the chief housekeeper for the Caribbean Fantasy. |
| 18 | LT U.S. Coast |
| 19 | Guard. |
| 20 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: All right. Thanks, |
| 21 | everyone. Sir, is it okay if we record the interview? |
| 22 | MR. CABRERA: I don't have any |
| 23 | (unintelligible). |
| 24 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: Okay. Thank you very |
| 25 | much. Can you tell us what your position is onboard |
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| 1 | the Caribbean Fantasy? |
| 2 | MR. CABRERA: I'm the chief housekeeper on |
| 3 | the Caribbean Fantasy. |
| 4 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: All right. And what, |
| 5 | can you tell us what your duties are? What duties did |
| 6 | you perform the day the ship had the fire? What duties |
| 7 | did you perform when they had the emergency? |
| 8 | MR. CABRERA: Okay. The first thing when, |
| 9 | we don't know what happened there. Because usually in |
| 10 | the morning I have a meeting with my team, 7:00 a.m. to |
| 11 | 7:30 a.m. |
| 12 | So when I finish the meeting we start to |
| 13 | explain to the passenger where they have to be, where |
| 14 | they not have to be, to be ready for when the ship dock |
| 15 | to the port to disembark. |
| 16 | Maybe around 7:35 a.m. we heard the |
| 17 | announcement Mr. Skyla (phonetic), Mr. Skyla, Mr. |
| 18 | Skyla. So, we think if (unintelligible), we've come. |
| 19 | We no do nothing, because we no have to deal with Mr. |
| 20 | Skyla thing. So we continue our job, our duty, and we |
| 21 | pay attention to the following announcement, what to |
| 22 | happen. |
| 23 | So, after that, maybe five to ten minute we |
| 24 | start to hear we need to evacuate the people. So, |
| 25 | because we have a fire. Where, I don't know. Because |
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| 1 | they no make announcement where is the fire. |
| 2 | So we start to knock on the cabin doors to |
| 3 | make sure the passengers can get out in time. So, we |
| 4 | start to direct them to emergency station C, where they |
| 5 | are to be So, after that we double check if we were |
| 6 | missing any cabin, or something. |
| 7 | So, but when we start to check in the cabins |
| 8 | they called me, and they said the emergency C is full |
| 9 | of smoke. So, we have to take all the passenger |
| 10 | (unintelligible). So then we, until the |
| 11 | (unintelligible) advisement to guide them to Deck 7. |
| 12 | Yes, because too much smoke in the emergency muster |
| 13 | station C. |
| 14 | So, that's what we do. We guide the |
| 15 | passengers to Deck 7. And when I finish, and I check |
| 16 | every, all the guest is out, no crew members are around |
| 17 | also in the cabins. So, I come to them. And we waited |
| 18 | for the further instruction of the master. |
| 19 | So, after that we stand by. We start to |
| 20 | provide the life jacket to the guests. Because in the |
| 21 | cabin we don't have no life jacket. All the life |
| 22 | jacket is in the muster station by the lifeboat, by the |
| 23 | life muster station B and A, and muster station C. |
| 24 | So we have to get from the lockers, and we |
| 25 | give to these passenger one by one, how we start to set |
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| 1 | it out. And we waiting for the instruction of the |
| 2 | commander to see what is the final step. |
| 3 | And after that they start to say, okay, we |
| 4 | need to start to evacuate the passengers. So, the |
| 5 | master is the one to give the order with boat, with |
| 6 | lifeboat number 1, number 2, number 3. So, in order, |
| 7 | according to the (unintelligible), we have to also to |
| 8 | use the MES. |
| 9 | But we cannot use the MES port side, because |
| 10 | the flap on the platform you cannot open properly. So, |
| 11 | then decide to use the MES starboard side. I was the |
| 12 | one to start to |
| 13 | We then lower the lifeboat number 1 and 2, |
| 14 | so (unintelligible) more passengers. So we start to, |
| 15 | we have instruction to guide the passengers to the MES |
| 16 | port side, starboard side. And that's what we do. We |
| 17 | start to guide them. |
| 18 | The staff captain is in charge, and is the |
| 19 | one to, in the small platform before the passengers |
| 20 | (unintelligible), he's there. And he's the one to |
| 21 | start to (unintelligible) the ladies, to get them out, |
| 22 | or kids, whatever. We follow all the procedure, what |
| 23 | to do. |
| 24 | And finally, everybody saved, we saved the |
| 25 | life of the guests, and our life also. And also the |
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| 1 | life of the dog. So, we missing two dog, because we |
| 2 | don't have the chance to go down to (unintelligible), |
| 3 | because too much smoke. So we save only five of them. |
| 4 | So, two, even I feel bad, because I have |
| 5 | three in my home. So, and I feel bad about it. And |
| 6 | every day I remember this too. Because two small dogs. |
| 7 | But I didn't (unintelligible). And that's the only |
| 8 | thing I could tell, I could say about this situation. |
| 9 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: Okay. When you |
| 10 | evacuated, were you in a lifeboat? Or were you in a |
| 11 | life raft? |
| 12 | MR. CABRERA: I have to be in the MES port |
| 13 | side. |
| 14 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: Okay. |
| 15 | MR. CABRERA: Yes. The MES is not working. |
| 16 | So the MES starboard side is (unintelligible), is |
| 17 | (unintelligible) we have to move to the other side. |
| 18 | So, (unintelligible) the captain is the one to give the |
| 19 | instruction, okay. Because this one working, |
| 20 | (unintelligible) the passenger accordingly to the |
| 21 | (unintelligible), and that's what we do. |
| 22 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: And when, did you use |
| 23 | the MES? |
| 24 | MR. CABRERA: On starboard side or port |
| 25 | side? |
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| 1 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: Starboard side. |
| 2 | MR. CABRERA: Starboard side, yes. I'm the |
| 3 | last person come down (unintelligible). |
| 4 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: Would you like to show |
| 5 | us your |
| 6 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: (Unintelligible). |
| 7 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: All right. And |
| 8 | MR. CABRERA: Because we were, we take the |
| 9 | dog first, we put all the dogs safe with the helicopter |
| 10 | and (unintelligible). And after, we go down. So when |
| 11 | I was led to the, when I go to the MES, so everybody is |
| 12 | on it, three of us missing. |
| 13 | So, when I go down, and the gentleman from |
| 14 | the Coast Guard help me. Then he asked me if there was |
| 15 | somebody else missing. I tell him, yes, two of my crew |
| 16 | members. So we waited for them, and after we left. |
| 17 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: All right. So, when you |
| 18 | loaded the dogs on the helicopters, do you remember how |
| 19 | many dogs you would take at a time? |
| 20 | MR. CABRERA: We bring by the helicopter |
| 21 | area, we bring four kind of big one, four. And the |
| 22 | small one, we take it by the life raft. |
| 23 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: So, four dogs went into |
| 24 | the helicopter all at the same time? |
| 25 | MR. CABRERA: No, no, no. |
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| 1 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: No. |
| 2 | MR. CABRERA: In there one by one. |
| 3 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: One by one. All right. |
| 4 | MR. CABRERA: I saw when they take the small |
| 5 | one. Because the other one is bigger. And they said |
| 6 | it cannot fit in the (unintelligible). I |
| 7 | (unintelligible) hold him |
| 8 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: Okay. |
| 9 | MR. CABRERA: for they take it. |
| 10 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: All right. And when you |
| 11 | left the ship, did you get into a life raft? Did you |
| 12 | get into a small boat, or a lifeboat? |
| 13 | MR. CABRERA: No. I get a small boat of the |
| 14 | officers, the Coast Guard. |
| 15 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: Coast Guard. Okay. All |
| 16 | right. Is there anything you would like to share with |
| 17 | us about the accident, that you felt was significant, |
| 18 | with regard to the fire, how the crew responded, how |
| 19 | passengers responded? |
| 20 | MR. CABRERA: I really, really, I don't |
| 21 | know. I cannot say nothing. Because I don't know |
| 22 | where is the fire. I don't know who. I know, I just |
| 23 | followed the, what I have to do in case of emergency. |
| 24 | INVESTIGATOR KARR: All right. Did you |
| 25 | notice anyone get injured during the evacuation? |
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10 MR. CABRERA: When I start to bring the 1 2 passenger, I don't see nobody fall. But I hear, they say only one guest got (unintelligible). But I no see 3 4 nothing. I cannot say, okay, this would be right. 5 INVESTIGATOR KARR: Understood. Right. 6 Anybody else have any questions? 7 of the United MR. Yes. 8 States Coast Guard. Did you receive, actually, let me What is your emergency duty for abandon ship? 9 go back. 10 So, you've already explained to me what your 11 emergency duty is for the general emergency, which is 12 to evacuate the cabins, and get all the personnel to 13 muster station C. And then, when it goes to abandon 14 ship, then you do what? What is your abandon ship job? 15 MR. CABRERA: That is the MES port side 16 leader. 17 Okav. What kind of training did MR. you receive on the Marine Evacuation System, prior to 18 19 becoming the MES leader? 20 MR. CABRERA: Okay. They explained to us 21 how to operate the, how to open it, how to lower it, 22 what to quide the, tell the passengers, to take off all 23 the, any metal or key, whatever can damage the, to take 24 it away. 25 So, in order for the life raft, in my

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11 1 station we start with the life raft number 2. When 2 it's ready, when they finish, when it full, the commander will (unintelligible) away. And after we 3 start with the next one. So, in order, two, four, six, 4 5 the (unintelligible). 6 MR. Right. 7 MR. CABRERA: Yes. 8 MR. So, can you just briefly explain to me, with the MES in the stowed position, how do you 9 10 launch the MES? Like, MES is in the stowed position. 11 You guys are sailing here. You get this emergency. 12 You get the order from, you know, the hotel director 13 says, launch the MES. How do you do that? 14 MR. CABRERA: Okay. We have the MES team 15 operators. So, if he didn't say okay, they call me. 16 And so, I go to the teams, the operators. And if they 17 want to start to open it or release the hook. MR. That's what I'm referring to, the 18 19 physical action that's required to activate the MES. 20 Can you explain that? 21 MR. CABRERA: Okay. The first thing you 22 have to do, you open the small box there. 23 The small door? MR. 24 MR. CABRERA: You pull on the hook. And the 25 MES is going to be open. So, the only problem there,

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we don't have alternative. If that not work, you 1 2 cannot open it, we don't have any alternative to get 3 off. 4 MR. Okay. So --5 MR. CABRERA: Not like on the Carnival or 6 Royal Caribbean. They have two ways. If this one 7 won't work, you can use step number two, or three. So, 8 this one is only one. If it does not open you have to 9 report it to the command center. 10 MR. Okay. MR. CABRERA: And they going to let you know 11 12 what you going to do, where you going to guide the 13 passenger, or the crew members. Okay. That's the only question I 14 MR. 15 have. Thank you. 16 Good evening. Commander CDR with the U.S. Coast Guard. Did you activate 17 the port side MES? Or did somebody else do it? 18 19 MR. CABRERA: No, sir, not me. When I 20 (unintelligible) it's already, that (unintelligible) is 21 already down. The flap is not open totally, because 22 it's bend at one side. So, I really don't know who 23 pulled it. And who made the decision not 24 CDR 25 to use that?

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13 1 MR. CABRERA: I cannot say. Because I don't 2 know who is (unintelligible) tell to open it. I don't 3 know who opened it. But, nobody went down the port 4 CDR 5 side? In port side, nobody use it. 6 MR. CABRERA: 7 CDR Okay. 8 MR. CABRERA: Yes. 9 How did you know to go to the CDR starboard side? 10 MR. CABRERA: Because the, on the 11 12 instruction of the master. 13 He --CDR And the instruction from --14 MR. CABRERA: 15 CDR The public address system? 16 MR. CABRERA: And, yes, direct to the sub 17 captain, the second commander of the ship. Because 18 he's the one to be in the --19 So, it was a verbal --CDR 20 MR. CABRERA: No. He --21 -- instruction? You were over CDR 22 23 MR. CABRERA: I have a walkie talkie. You had a walkie talkie? 24 CDR Oh. 25 MR. CABRERA: Yes, sir.

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| 1 | CDR Okay. That's all the |
| 2 | questions I have. Thank you. |
| 3 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Carrie Bell, NTSB. Just |
| 4 | a couple of clarifications. When you were evacuating |
| 5 | the passengers from the cabin, at first you didn't know |
| 6 | that you couldn't go to muster station C, correct? |
| 7 | MR. CABRERA: Yes. |
| 8 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: So, did you start taking |
| 9 | people up there? |
| 10 | MR. CABRERA: The first time, when they said |
| 11 | to evacuate the people, the passenger. So we start to |
| 12 | guide them to the muster station, yes. So, after that, |
| 13 | the, in that time when we start, the smoke is not in |
| 14 | there. No smoke. |
| 15 | After that I don't know if the fire getting |
| 16 | bigger, or what happen. They call me and say, too much |
| 17 | smoke here. So, and the hotel director advise us, |
| 18 | because he's the commander of the muster, the |
| 19 | operations center. So, he told me to put everybody to |
| 20 | Deck 7. |
| 21 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Who was that? |
| 22 | MR. CABRERA: The hotel director. |
| 23 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Hotel director. Okay. |
| 24 | MR. CABRERA: Yes, the hotel director. He's |
| 25 | the, he's in the command center, the (unintelligible) |
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| 1 | center. |
| 2 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Okay. |
| 3 | MR. CABRERA: Yes. So, he's the one to |
| 4 | advise us to bring everybody to Deck 7. |
| 5 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: So, when you took |
| 6 | everyone to Deck 7, did you have plenty of life jackets |
| 7 | up there? Or did you have to go back to muster station |
| 8 | C to get life jackets? |
| 9 | MR. CABRERA: We have life jackets on |
| 10 | starboard side and port side. We have for children |
| 11 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: And you had plenty? You |
| 12 | didn't have to go back and get |
| 13 | MR. CABRERA: We have for children and for |
| 14 | adult there. |
| 15 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Okay. And was there any |
| 16 | smoke in the areas where you were evacuating from the |
| 17 | cabins? |
| 18 | MR. CABRERA: In the moment when we do it, |
| 19 | only Deck 5 aft. |
| 20 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Deck 5 aft? |
| 21 | MR. CABRERA: Aft is all the way to the |
| 22 | back. In that time we stacked, we moved the passenger |
| 23 | very quickly. So when the, all the smoke, the |
| 24 | passengers is already upstairs. |
| 25 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: So, was it hard to see |
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| 1 | back in that area, when you went back to check to make |
| 2 | sure there were no passengers? |
| 3 | MR. CABRERA: When I do my double check, the |
| 4 | smoke, you still can't go out of For that is okay, |
| 5 | because we don't get panic. |
| 6 | If we get any panic with the guests, with |
| 7 | the kids. And so we try to, that's what we try to be |
| 8 | in time to create the most, the more faster we can do |
| 9 | it. So, when I double check with one of the guy |
| 10 | everything is clear. So, I tell the, my leader |
| 11 | everything is clear. You can advise the captain. |
| 12 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Okay. And how long have |
| 13 | you worked on this ship? |
| 14 | MR. CABRERA: I'm going to almost three |
| 15 | years. |
| 16 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Three years? |
| 17 | MR. CABRERA: Three to four years. |
| 18 | INVESTIGATOR BELL: Thank you. |
| 19 | LT This is with |
| 20 | the Coast Guard. So, when you were redirected to Deck |
| 21 | 7, from muster station C, did, are there, there's two |
| 22 | separate muster stations on Deck 7, A and B. Did you |
| 23 | direct passengers to one particular muster station, |
| 24 | like one side or the other side of the vessel? Or just |
| 25 | go up to Deck 7? |
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| 1 | MR. CABRERA: So the, first, why we put the |
| 2 | lifeboat number 2, the people, sorry, the old people, |
| 3 | handicapped, we put in the side. And the B we put the |
| 4 | regular guests, (unintelligible) for the lifeboat. |
| 5 | We have a procedure, first if you have any |
| 6 | sick person, pregnant, or kids. And so, that's what, |
| 7 | before actually embarking the lifeboat. And after, |
| 8 | when they call me, so I go to Deck 7 aft to start to |
| 9 | lead more passenger for the (unintelligible) port side, |
| 10 | starboard side. |
| 11 | LT Okay. |
| 12 | MR. CABRERA: But already everybody have the |
| 13 | life jacket. Everybody is ready just to go down. |
| 14 | LT Did you take accountability of |
| 15 | passengers at the muster station? |
| 16 | MR. CABRERA: Sorry. |
| 17 | LT Did you take accountability, |
| 18 | counting numbers of passengers at the muster station? |
| 19 | Or did someone else take accountability of who was |
| 20 | present at the muster stations? |
| 21 | MR. CABRERA: So, no. <mark>I not check any</mark> |
| 22 | passenger. I just make sure the cabin is empty. And |
| 23 | then I start to guide them to the (unintelligible). |
| 24 | LT Okay. And when you got to |
| 25 | starboard MES, did you see crew members at the platform |
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1 trying to bring life rafts alongside the slide? 2 MR. CABRERA: No. Because I no have the, 3 because I see over the top why it cannot seek (phonetic) downstairs. 4 5 LTOkay. MR. CABRERA: 6 I cannot tell you if it, 7 somebody (unintelligible). 8 LTOkay. 9 INVESTIGATOR KARR: Any more questions? 10 Last word, if you'd like to offer us, offer anything 11 else? 12 MR. CABRERA: No. That's, I just want to 13 know what is the final (unintelligible), you know. So, 14 we'd like to help all of you to clear everything, and 15 make sure everything is (unintelligible) 16 INVESTIGATOR KARR: All right. Well, thank 17 you for coming in. So, it's 16, excuse me. It's 1824, 18 and we will stop the recording of this interview. 19 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 20 off the record at 6:24 p.m.) 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE

MATTER: Fire Aboard Caribbean Fantasy August 17, 2016 Accident No. DCA16FM052 Interview of Jorge Cabrera

DATE: 08-21-16

I hereby certify that the attached transcription of page 1 to 19 inclusive are to the best of my professional ability a true, accurate, and complete record of the above referenced proceedings as contained on the provided audio recording; further that I am neither counsel for, nor related to, nor employed by any of the parties to this action in which this proceeding has taken place; and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.



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