

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: \*

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CAPSIZE AND SINKING OF STRETCH DUCK 7 \*

ON TABLE ROCK LAKE, BRANSON, MISSOURI, \* Accident No.: DCA18MM028

JULY 19, 2018 \*

\*

\* \* \* \* \*

Interview of: ROB TEST  
TYLER NEVINS  
Taney County Ambulance

Showboat Branson Belle Facilities  
Branson, Missouri

Monday,  
July 23, 2018

## APPEARANCES:

MARCEL MUISE, Marine Accident Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

MARY PAT McKAY, M.D., Chief Medical Officer  
National Transportation Safety Board

CWO [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
U.S. Coast Guard

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I N T E R V I E W

(12:00 p.m.)

1  
2  
3 MR. MUISE: This is Marcel Muise with the National  
4 Transportation Safety Board. It's Monday, July 23rd at noon. And  
5 as part of the investigation into the stretch duck 07 incident  
6 we're interviewing witnesses to that incident.

7 So, Rob, can you tell us your name, your title, and spell  
8 your name for us.

9 MR. TEST: Rob Test, T-e-s-t, just like an exam, lieutenant  
10 with Taney County Ambulance, paramedic.

11 MR. MUISE: Tyler.

12 MR. NEVINS: Tyler Nevins, I'm an EMT with the Taney County  
13 Ambulance.

14 CWO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED], [REDACTED] U.S. Coast  
15 Guard.

16 DR. MCKAY: Mary Pat McKay, NTSB.

## INTERVIEW OF ROB TEST

17  
18 BY MR. MUISE:

19 Q. So, Lieutenant, can you just tell us in your own words what  
20 you saw, what you heard went on that night?

21 A. Not really sure where to begin. If I go from the very  
22 beginning?

23 Q. Sure. Very beginning. Dispatch to --

24 A. I was actually off duty. I was on my way back to the  
25 station, was pulling up to the fuel pumps when I heard, I believe

1 it was Taney County give out -- I don't know who they were giving  
2 it out to, if they were giving it out the deputies. I didn't hear  
3 any fire department tones. But on our scanner, and the fly car, I  
4 heard Taney just come over and say possibly 30 people in the  
5 water. And then I never heard anything else.

6 So didn't know what was going on. We hadn't set off any of  
7 our alert tones. We hadn't paged at that that point. So vehicle  
8 was short on fuel, so I put fuel in it. I drove to the station,  
9 which was literally right across the alley; our parking lots  
10 adjoin. And at that point was when we started dispatching our  
11 first rigs to, at that point, an unknown possible water rescue.

12 Few minutes later, kind of getting a little more clear, I  
13 went ahead and basically self-dispatched. Because I knew if we  
14 had, what, 30 people in the water, we were going to need more  
15 resources.

16 When I got here, I really, I went off to the *Belle* to make  
17 contact with our first unit, which was triaging, and our shift  
18 captain, Rick Lawler, who was the first officer on scene for us.  
19 And basically coordinated a radio frequency for incoming ambulance  
20 and to contact triage.

21 And then I went back out to the access away to the back of  
22 the *Belle*, the loading dock side over here, which is where we  
23 usually enter anyway, and I went to that position and that's  
24 pretty much all I did after that was just stay on communications,  
25 staging officer for incoming rigs.

1 I really didn't see -- I saw a bunch of lifejackets in the  
2 water and I saw *Belle* guests on and off, and people triaging. And  
3 that's pretty much all I saw, honestly.

4 There was no -- the duck was already sunk. Most of the  
5 people had already been removed from the water. And that's pretty  
6 much all I saw. Not helpful. I apologize. But --

7 Q. That's okay.

8 A. -- that's all I saw.

9 Q. No. Everything's helpful.

10 INTERVIEW OF TYLER NEVINS

11 BY MR. MUISE:

12 Q. Tyler, do you have anything to add?

13 A. We weren't working together at all.

14 MR. TEST: He was on a different angle. I sent him  
15 somewhere.

16 MR. NEVINS: Yeah. I was -- I just came on duty at 1830 that  
17 evening, and we were stationed across the county a ways.

18 And I believe I was third, fourth ambulance in. We arrived  
19 and went into staging, just right here at the entryway. And they  
20 immediately sent us to the state park launch ramp next door for a  
21 code in progress. When we arrived on the scene, there was two  
22 firefighters from Western Taney County and then the chief of  
23 Branson Fire, and they were working him on the dock there. And it  
24 was my understanding that the state park marina employees, the  
25 crew there, they were there as well, they had picked him up

1 somewhere south of the actual *Branson Belle*, and had went to that  
2 access point because it was the closest. But they had pulled him  
3 out of the water.

4 DR. MCKAY: They picked him up on a boat?

5 MR. NEVINS: Yeah. It was a pontoon. And so they were there  
6 as well, as was the boat.

7 And my partner and I, both -- typically with an MCI, you  
8 don't work codes. We felt like that we knew there was other  
9 ambulances in staging. It seemed like we had the time and the  
10 personnel to do so. So we went ahead and worked it as a code. So  
11 we went ahead and continued everything that we normally would do.  
12 And I'm not sure on the time period. At some point we did call  
13 medical control at the hospital and we ceased that.

14 And from there, I think we gave the body over to highway  
15 patrol, believe it was Green. And he had a bag for him, and we  
16 put him on the boat and he took him that direction, up lake. And  
17 then we cleared the scene after that.

18 We came back into staging. We ended up driving back over and  
19 checking that area as well as the state park marina to make sure  
20 that there was nobody else that ended up somewhere else, randomly.  
21 And made contact with some employees there at the marina, just to  
22 confirm. And then we came back into staging. We sat for a while,  
23 and we were cleared shortly after that. So, yeah.

24 BY MR. MUISE:

25 Q. Just for the record, what's then name of your agency?

1 A. Taney County Ambulance District.

2 Q. And what is your footprints? What's your AOR?

3 A. I'm just an EMT. I'm a part-time employee of it.

4 Q. But your -- Taney County Ambulance, what are -- do you --

5 MR. TEST: Taney County. The entire --

6 MR. NEVINS: The whole county. The entire --

7 MR. TEST: Yeah.

8 MR. NEVINS: The entire county.

9 MR. MUISE: The whole county?

10 MR. TEST: Yeah.

11 MR. NEVINS: The entire county.

12 MR. TEST: We're county-based districts.

13 MR. MUISE: And where did you respond from?

14 MR. TEST: I came from the central office in Hollister.

15 MR. MUISE: Hollister. And how much time is that?

16 MR. TEST: I don't know what my response time was, but about  
17 10, 12 minutes.

18 DR. MCKAY: We'll get the CAD.

19 MR. MUISE: We will. Yes.

20 MR. TEST: We've got a running log from our dispatch and  
21 everything from all of our times, and --

22 MR. MUISE: All right. Do you know many units did you  
23 provide in total, just from your agency.

24 MR. TEST: I think we had four that responded, four or five  
25 that responded.



1 MR. NEVINS: There was four of us, and two --

2 MR. TEST: Because they had Ben, Alissa, you, Robbie. Of  
3 course they were the triage. But we had, like, I guess three  
4 transports units, and then I had two emergency units.

5 MR. NEVINS: As well as we had -- he was in a supervisory  
6 call by himself, as well as our supervisor that was on duty.

7 MR. TEST: Yeah. Two fly cars.

8 MR. MUISE: Tyler, when you said you responded to the boat  
9 ramp, you're an EMT. Did you -- who's your partner? Was he a  
10 paramedic?

11 MR. NEVINS: Colby Stocksdale. He's a paramedic.

12 MR. MUISE: He was a paramedic. Okay.

13 MR. NEVINS: Yeah.

14 MR. MUISE: I have some questions about communications.  
15 Do -- are you familiar with this phone number: 334-1441?

16 MR. TEST: Yeah.

17 MR. NEVINS: Yes.

18 MR. MUISE: Where does that --

19 MR. TEST: That's our pre-911 emergency number that we kept  
20 in place after 911 went in, direct into our dispatch center.

21 MR. MUISE: Your working frequency, is it -- you share it  
22 with fire?

23 MR. TEST: No.

24 MR. MUISE: Or you have your own?

25 MR. TEST: We have a couple different frequencies that are

1 our own. We have a repeater frequency that, unfortunately, the  
2 mountain is straight in between the scene and our repeater, so we  
3 had some difficulties with communication with dispatch initially  
4 because we could not hit our repeater. And our talk-around  
5 frequencies and scene frequencies didn't have enough power to get  
6 to our dispatch center also. So we had some communication issues.

7 MR. MUISE: Did that affect your response, or you knew where  
8 to do go, or --

9 MR. TEST: Actually, the biggest thing that affected our  
10 response is we received no official notification from anybody for  
11 like 10 plus minutes after the events was started. Again, because  
12 what we discussed this morning in our -- nobody called us. We  
13 self-dispatched.

14 MR. MUISE: Just for the transcriptionist, when we start,  
15 please, just let her know your name.

16 This is Robert.

17 MR. TEST: Yeah. Okay. Sorry.

18 MR. MUISE: You, Rob, you self-dispatched, right, you said?

19 MR. TEST: Yes.

20 MR. MUISE: And did your team get dispatched, too?

21 MR. NEVINS: We were dispatched directly from our com center.

22 MR. TEST: And when he was -- this is Rob. And when he  
23 was -- by the time we got to the third ambulance being dispatched,  
24 at that point we'd actually had people on scene and knew we had a  
25 working MCI, and had confirmation of numbers of people involved,

1 so --

2 MR. MUISE: Are either of you familiar with narrow banding?

3 MR. NEVINS: I know of --

4 MR. TEST: Familiar, no.

5 MR. MUISE: All right. Does that cause problems here?

6 MR. TEST: No. Actually, honestly, we are in the process of  
7 updating our radio system. We just got approval to update our  
8 radio system, and I think that's going online next year. But I  
9 don't know what they've, I don't know what they've done. I know  
10 they, our dispatch supervisor and chiefs have all gotten together  
11 and investigated different radios and frequencies and different  
12 ways of doing it, and they've actually -- our system that we have  
13 now is going to be replaced.

14 MR. MUISE: Is that new system an 800 megahertz?

15 MR. TEST: I have no idea.

16 MR. MUISE: Is there any dead zones, radio, now that you have  
17 with your dispatch?

18 MR. TEST: Yeah.

19 MR. MUISE: Is this a dead zone here?

20 MR. TEST: I think so. Yeah. Pretty much. I know right  
21 here you'll get static. You'll get a couple of words, but mostly  
22 static on our repeated frequency for sure.

23 MR. MUISE: What's your relationship with fire here? Do you  
24 work -- are you co-located? Are you --

25 MR. TEST: No. We're -- we have several different fire

1 agencies, so --

2 MR. MUISE: Do you share a dispatch frequency? Because I  
3 heard you say you don't have -- you never heard the fire tones.

4 MR. TEST: Yeah. No. The fire department in Taney County is  
5 dispatched through the sheriff's department. They have -- the  
6 primary 911 centers are Branson PD and Taney County. So we have  
7 two primary download centers for 911. Branson takes care of  
8 Branson. And fire department, police department from Taney takes  
9 care of all the fire departments and Taney County. And when a  
10 call comes in, 911, they request fire department, they take care  
11 of it. If they request EMS, they download it to our dispatch  
12 center, which is at our central office in Hollister.

13 MR. MUISE: This 1441 number, is that just EMS?

14 MR. TEST: Yes. That's ours.

15 MR. MUISE: So if I call that number, I don't get fire,  
16 or --

17 MR. TEST: No. It goes straight into our dispatch center.

18 MR. MUISE: Training wise, what kind of -- how much incident  
19 command system training have you had?

20 MR. TEST: Well, I know, all of the officer staff has gone  
21 through the NIMS -- let's see, 1, 3 -- I don't know all the  
22 numbers -- 1, 3, 7, 4. I'm not sure exactly to what level we went  
23 through.

24 MR. MUISE: And the people on rigs?

25 MR. TEST: I think it's 1, 2 and --

1 MR. NEVINS: 1 and 3 is that -- what you have to have.

2 MR. TEST: Yeah. We have a minimum. I think it's 1, 2 and 3  
3 and or 1, 3 and 4, 1, 3 and 7.

4 MR. NEVINS: Something like that.

5 MR. TEST: I think. I don't know --

6 MR. MUISE: There was a staging manager assigned, though?

7 MR. TEST: I became the EMS --

8 MR. MUISE: You became the staging manager?

9 MR. TEST: -- staging manager. Yeah.

10 MR. MUISE: And in that role, who did you report to?

11 MR. TEST: My captain, Rick, and the unified command post as  
12 it got established. When I first got here, there wasn't a real  
13 clear cut command area at that point. It was getting there. But  
14 it wasn't quite there yet.

15 MR. MUISE: An incident like this, does fire take command?  
16 Or does EMS?

17 MR. TEST: Usually we allow fire to -- they have a lot more  
18 experience in the incident command system. So we usually do the  
19 unified command system and let the fire set up the initial command  
20 and then we have the liaison and the medical branch.

21 MR. MUISE: Just one more question. Triage? Is that a state  
22 protocol or do you have your own agency protocol?

23 MR. TEST: We have our own agency protocol. We do a start  
24 triage.

25 MR. MUISE: Star triage. And, I'm sorry, just one more.

1 Weather, what kind of weather did you see when you arrived?

2 MR. TEST: Absolutely horrible until we pulled up on scene.  
3 To be straight out. It was, we, it was a very sudden, it was  
4 relatively calm, relatively nice, and then it was just a wall of  
5 wind. It was rather unexpected. Usually we get gusts, and we get  
6 blows, and it, you know, comes and goes. This was just a solid  
7 wall of wind that hit us, rather -- all of us were taken off  
8 guard. I was actually with another ambulance when it hit us  
9 initially. And it really, kind of, got our attention really fast.  
10 On the way down here it was windy, rainy, had branches blown out  
11 across the road, as I was responding, and I was third unit in.  
12 And about the time I pulled in here, just kind of all had blown  
13 itself through. And at that point, became calm, had a little bit  
14 of sprinkle, little wind. But nothing, you know, to the best of  
15 my memory, I was a little side tracked. But, there wasn't  
16 anything really dramatic going on. It was raining still, but not  
17 down pouring. Little bit of wind, but not overly dramatic at that  
18 point.

19 MR. MUISE: That's all I have to offer.

20 DR. McKAY: Yeah. So, a couple things. The training in  
21 terms of -- two things. You guys use the same triage as Mercy?

22 MR. TEST: I don't know what their -- I don't know what they  
23 use.

24 DR. McKAY: And last MTI drill that you guys participated in,  
25 maybe individually.

1 MR. TEST: We usually run them annually as a district. We  
2 work with the airport, too, also. We just had one, I'm not sure  
3 how long ago --

4 Do you remember airport drill?

5 MR. NEVINS: I don't (indiscernible).

6 MR. TEST: We usually, we do something annually. If nothing  
7 else, we do a, about once a year, we do an in-house, blow up the  
8 dummies and put them out in the yard, and catch them as they blow  
9 away in the breeze.

10 DR. McKAY: Yeah. Right.

11 MR. TEST: But, yeah, we try and keep on it annually, at  
12 least once a year, do at least a refresher on Star triage.

13 DR. McKAY: And the integration of the law enforcement and  
14 fire in those MCI drills?

15 MR. TEST: The drills themselves, the full-scale drills,  
16 yeah, everybody's there. I think one of the things that got us on  
17 this round, too, was this was a particularly weird little segment  
18 right here, because this is Stone County, but we cover it, because  
19 we're a lot closer than the Stone County EMS. And then we had  
20 Stone County fire, which I'm not sure if Stone County Fire covers  
21 this first or if Western covers this first, because it's --  
22 Western's got stations, like, three miles up the road way.  
23 Southern Stone station is about 12 miles away. So, we had some  
24 inner-agency working together that wasn't necessarily agency  
25 working together on a regular basis. Let's put it that way. It

1 wasn't necessarily that it was a bad thing, or, it's just  
2 something that we don't necessarily work together all the time.  
3 So, I think there was a little bit of -- it took a few minutes,  
4 maybe longer, to get coordinate. But not anything really  
5 dramatic. It's just that this is, we have a few places around  
6 where we share with, like, Arkansas, because you can't get to it,  
7 and --

8 DR. McKAY: Right. Right. So, the extent of the EMS  
9 coverage may not exactly mirror the county line.

10 MR. TEST: Correct.

11 DR. McKAY: Understood.

12 MR. TEST: Correct.

13 DR. McKAY: The other question I have really has to do with  
14 the recovery operations and the fatalities. Have you had training  
15 in a mass fatality incident?

16 MR. TEST: Not with --

17 DR. McKAY: No?

18 MR. TEST: No.

19 DR. McKAY: And so who covers --

20 MR. TEST: Not like that.

21 DR. McKAY: Right. And so, who covers that here in the  
22 county? Who would you say would be the people who would deal with  
23 managing the deceased?

24 MR. TEST: We turn that over to law enforcement. The way  
25 that it's, that I remember it always being taught was we show up,



1 we triage, if they're black tag, we leave, we don't disturb the  
2 bodies. And we turn the scene over to law enforcement.

3 We make sure that the integrity of the scene is maintained  
4 until law enforcement can take it over. We don't leave them  
5 alone. We don't leave them unsupervised. We make sure that the  
6 continuity of the scene, what is that -- chain of evidence.

7 DR. McKAY: Right.

8 MR. TEST: I guess that would be the way, you know -- so, we  
9 always try to make sure that we keep the scene controlled.

10 DR. McKAY: We know in this case that quite a few of the  
11 deceased were no longer being assisted by the time you all got  
12 there. We've talked to some of the other folks.

13 MR. TEST: Yeah.

14 DR. McKAY: So, I don't know if you know the answer to this  
15 question, but in terms of the declaration of death, it sounds like  
16 you did that for one gentleman over the radio with medical  
17 control. But, how does that happen for someone who is found  
18 deceased?

19 MR. TEST: As far as just the, as an example, because I don't  
20 know exactly --

21 DR. McKAY: So, as an example --

22 MR. TEST: As an example, if I walked up to the scene, we had  
23 30 patients, and we had 5, had 2 or 3 CPR in progress, and we had  
24 4 or 5 over here that somebody had said they were no longer  
25 breathing, or were dead, we would go and assess them to make sure.

1 DR. McKAY: Sure.

2 MR. TEST: Or, if it was a reliable -- because we have other  
3 paramedics and stuff that we work with, and there's actually  
4 another medic or two on the *Belle* at that time, that we knew. And  
5 we -- but we do double check. We don't -- yeah, we do go back and  
6 check to make sure that they are deceased.

7 DR. McKAY: And then you just leave them.

8 MR. TEST: We don't leave anybody behind.

9 DR. McKAY: Right.

10 MR. TEST: And then we try and leave where they're at, just  
11 to maintain scene integrity as best we can.

12 DR. McKAY: Were there any issues that, I mean, it sounds  
13 like there was some issues with communication related to the  
14 location more than anything else.

15 MR. TEST: Yeah. Classic.

16 DR. McKAY: Yeah. Well --

17 MR. TEST: For here.

18 DR. McKAY: We've seen that before. It's not unique to this  
19 location.

20 MR. TEST: I can talk to you here, but I can't talk to you  
21 there.

22 DR. McKAY: So, what did you do to overcome that?

23 MR. TEST: On scene communications became the State mutual  
24 aid VTAC 11 as far as the staging and the triage communications.  
25 My communication with the dispatch was through the Zello app (ph.)

1 on my cell phone.

2 DR. McKAY: And what was the communication like between you  
3 guys and Mercy? Or was there any?

4 MR. TEST: When they originally arrived, from what I  
5 understand, when they arrived, they were on a Stone County  
6 tactical frequency. And it took us a few minutes to get them  
7 switched over to the staging. When we finally -- we got them  
8 switched over rather quickly, so --

9 DR. McKAY: So, it sounds like overall you guys were doing  
10 incident -- participating in unified command, doing triage, and  
11 you were doing staging, and they arrived, and mostly did what?

12 MR. TEST: The Mercy?

13 DR. McKAY: Yeah.

14 MR. TEST: They were, I know they had a couple supervisors.  
15 I don't know what their status was. I wasn't worried about them.

16 DR. McKAY: Fair enough.

17 MR. TEST: When the units came in, as we were able to make --  
18 as they came in, we got communications with them. They were  
19 brought in. And when we -- because we had an initial, we had a  
20 lot of intermingling of *Belle* guests. We had a lot of -- the  
21 *Belle* was emptying, and we had -- we didn't have an accurate  
22 headcount. It took us a while before we got an accurate  
23 headcount. We had the, you know, 150 plus, 200 people from the  
24 *Belle* that were emptying, and everybody was all looking at you to  
25 help. So, it took the triage crew a while to get sorted who we

1 had, and then try and get them, you know, over to an organized  
2 area. But once we got them into an organized spot, we were, you  
3 know, ambulance comes in, hey, here you go. Hey, I've got two  
4 that need to go out, I've got a Mercy rig, here you go. The two,  
5 I think (indiscernible) two criticals, or red and a yellow status.  
6 Everybody else was in a green status, if you're familiar with the  
7 triage.

8 DR. MCKAY: Sure. Yeah. Absolutely.

9 MR. TEST: The one that was triaged as red was picked up by  
10 the second arriving unit, or third unit. Yeah. But they got  
11 here. We had, the initial unit came in as triage. Then we had  
12 two ambulances arrive about the same time as I did. So, there was  
13 no formal staging set up at that point. They were here within,  
14 like, a minute of each other.

15 The second one loaded the red, and got out, because the first  
16 one got sent to the wrong location where the patient was at. So,  
17 when they figured out where they were at, they came back, they  
18 took the yellow classification, and then they left. So, they were  
19 off the scene pretty quickly.

20 DR. MCKAY: And am I correct that there was no CPR in  
21 progress to the hospital?

22 MR. TEST: No. To the best of my knowledge, nothing that  
23 left the scene was in active cardiac arrest. And I believe that -  
24 - because Jared (ph.) took the red, that there was notice of  
25 appeal rest in route that I'm aware of, either.

1 DR. McKAY: That was my understanding. I just wanted to  
2 verify that was that you --

3 MR. TEST: I think we had two active counting the one out at  
4 the boat launch, we had three active CPRs.

5 DR. McKAY: And all of them got called here?

6 MR. TEST: All of them were terminated. Yeah. They started  
7 to work them, and then when we realized we actually had 30  
8 patients, it changed the -- we went from having 5 to having 30.  
9 And that, you know, it just, it changed the triage.

10 MR. MUISE: This is Marcel. Can I --

11 DR. McKAY: Sure.

12 MR. MUISE: Does that three include the one that you were  
13 working?

14 MR. NEVINS: Yeah.

15 MR. TEST: Yes.

16 MR. MUISE: It does okay. That's what I was counting.

17 MR. NEVINS: There was two initial by the first ambulance,  
18 and that was when they thought they had 5 patients, not 30. When  
19 they found out they 30, they stopped, and then we took the third  
20 one.

21 MR. TEST: Kind of applied the Star triage, adjust the  
22 airway, check for pulse, give a couple breaths, check for  
23 everything, and there was no change in their status, so we --

24 DR. McKAY: Right. Right. And --

25 MR. TEST: Get the black tag and move on.

1 DR. McKAY: Particularly given that this was drowning.

2 MR. TEST: Yeah. I mean, it's just -- if the airway --

3 DR. McKAY: Yeah. No, I think that's the end of my  
4 questions.

5 Jessie?

6 CWO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I go by [REDACTED] I just got a  
7 couple of questions. I'm not -- full transparency, I'm not  
8 familiar with dispatch and how those calls come in. But you said  
9 that you self-dispatched. What does that mean?

10 MR. TEST: I wasn't sent by my dispatch center. My  
11 dispatcher didn't say hey, you need to go there. I walked into  
12 dispatch,  
13 and -- me personally, I walked into dispatch, and things were  
14 becoming more developed on the scanner traffic, and I just looked  
15 at the dispatchers and the dispatch supervisor, and I said I'm  
16 going to go ahead and go.

17 We did self-initiate our initial response, because we had not  
18 been notified by anybody off of scanner traffic and radio traffic  
19 from other agencies. We initiated our dispatch of one ambulance  
20 and a supervisor rig.

21 CWO [REDACTED] Have you guys determined how that call came in?

22 MR. TEST: They --

23 MR. NEVINS: There was discussions that our 911 system had  
24 went down.

25 MR. TEST: Yeah.

1 MR. NEVINS: And that first 911 caller actually got, like,  
2 Lawrence County.

3 MR. TEST: Yeah. Apparently --

4 MR. NEVINS: And then they patched it over to Stone County.  
5 And so what ended up happening was is that was the delay of the  
6 911 responses.

7 DR. McKAY: So, we'll dig into the 911 issues with other  
8 people than these guy. Because they're at the receiving end.  
9 They're not in control of --

10 MR. TEST: Yeah. Can't answer (indiscernible) on that one.

11 DR. McKAY: Yeah.

12 CWO [REDACTED] I'm just curious. I'd heard how a call came in,  
13 or not so much that a call came in, but a report was made, and I  
14 was just wondering if you guys had any information on that.

15 Another question. You mentioned that the storm was rather  
16 unexpected. Can you elaborate on that, or what you mean by that?

17 MR. TEST: Well, we knew we had weather coming. We knew we  
18 had weather alerts. We'd had a watch established earlier in the  
19 day. We'd had a warning at one point. I don't remember what the  
20 time frames were. I was actually working other calls, so I  
21 don't -- you know, as far as time frames coming in, I can't vouch  
22 for anything. But the cloud front that came in was very, was a  
23 higher-up cloud (indiscernible) it seemed like. It wasn't low  
24 level. And I know me, personally, I -- the severity and the  
25 quickness of the way it came in was rather startling. I mean, it

1 was, like, all the sudden, it's here. And trees were laying over  
2 sideways, and trashcans were across the street, and, you know,  
3 usually around here, when we have something come in, we get --  
4 there's a little bit of warning. We get some gusts. We get some,  
5 you know, you get the trees over here kind of fly, but not every  
6 tree, you know, down the street leans over at the same time. So,  
7 the severity of the say it came in, to me, was an unusual  
8 presentation. We don't, we don't usually get like that. The  
9 hills usually seem to break it up a little bit. So, like, gets a  
10 little bit over here, and then it kind of comes over the hill over  
11 here, and, but not as one unified big front like that one hit.

12 CWO [REDACTED] And then lastly, Tyler, when you were kind of  
13 describing your work, when you arrived, did you bounce around from  
14 ramp to ramp?

15 MR. NEVINS: No. We just went to the ramp originally, for  
16 the code.

17 CWO [REDACTED] And to clarify, which ramp is that?

18 MR. NEVINS: State Park Marina, or the State Park launch  
19 ramp.

20 CWO [REDACTED] Okay. And that's the south ramp?

21 MR. TEST: That's on the other side of the Belle area.

22 MR. NEVINS: It's inside the campground there.

23 CWO [REDACTED] I just wanted to clarify that.

24 MR. NEVINS: So, when we came back to staging, we got sent  
25 back over there, because somebody was asking for help through law



1 enforcement. And so, we went back over there and ended up not  
2 being anything really needed at all. And so, we went ahead and  
3 went over to the marina on the other side of the campsite, which  
4 is the next point over.

5 CWO [REDACTED] So, the next one down?

6 MR. NEVINS: Yeah. We went down to the marina --

7 CWO [REDACTED] South?

8 MR. NEVINS: There's no public launch ramps over there, just  
9 a private one for the marina. But, we went over there, and I made  
10 contact with the manager, just to confirm that they didn't have  
11 anybody on their docks, or nobody had made it that far down the  
12 lake.

13 MR. TEST: Yes, I sent them over there, I was, went ahead --  
14 one of the fire guys run up and said somebody's yelling for help  
15 at the ramp. So, I sent them back over there, and then they said  
16 it was clear, so I told them to just go ahead just do a roundabout  
17 over there and make sure everything was okay. At that point, we  
18 were actively not transporting. We were just pretty much done  
19 with our patients I think at that point, so --

20 CWO [REDACTED] Thank you. That's all I have.

21 MR. MUISE: This is Marcel again, and I have just a couple  
22 follow ups, just to get this list right. Rick Law (sic) was the  
23 first on scene that did triage and comms. Is that correct?

24 MR. TEST: No. The first ambulance that was on scene out of  
25 TCA 11, which was Paramedic Bersheid (ph.) and EMT Bush (ph.)

1 MR. MUISE: And they did triage?

2 MR. TEST: They initiated triage.

3 MR. MUISE: And Mr. --

4 MR. TEST: Captain Lawler arrived a couple minutes after  
5 them.

6 Dr. McKAY: Lawler?

7 MR. TEST: Lawler.

8 MR. NEVINS: L-a-w-l-e-r.

9 MR. MUISE: He was not with a rig, though? He was a personal  
10 vehicle.

11 MR. TEST: Yes. Our shift captain, shift supervisors are in  
12 a fly car. They respond on their own.

13 MR. MUISE: And then the third unit with Jared took the red  
14 tag?

15 MR. TEST: Jared Stroebock (ph.) last name.

16 MR. MUISE: And the second arriving, what did they wind up  
17 doing?

18 MR. TEST: They transported the yellow.

19 MR. MUISE: They had a yellow tag. And then there was  
20 another yellow tag.

21 MR. TEST: I think we had one red, one yellow.

22 MR. MUISE: One red, one yellow.

23 MR. TEST: I think that's what they clarified this morning in  
24 our meeting.

25 MR. MUISE: The patient at the south ramp was an adult?

1 MR. NEVINS: Yeah. Early, mid-50s, rather large guy.

2 DR. MCKAY: Black or white?

3 MR. NEVINS: White.

4 MR. MUISE: And that's all I have. That's all.

5 You want to follow up?

6 DR. MCKAY: No. I think --

7 MR. MUISE: Okay.

8 It's 12:34, and we will conclude this interview.

9 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:           CAPSIZE AND SINKING OF STRETCH DUCK 7  
                                  ON TABLE ROCK LAKE, BRANSON, MISSOURI,  
                                  JULY 19, 2018  
                                  Interview of Rob Test and Tyler Nevins

ACCIDENT NO.:               DCA18MM028

PLACE:                        Branson, Missouri

DATE:                         July 23, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.



Karen Coen Brooks  
Transcriber