

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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M/V *CONTI PERIDOT* COLLISION WITH

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THE M/T *CARLA MAERSK* IN THE

*

HOUSTON SHIP CHANNEL

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MARCH 9, 2015

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Docket No.: DCA-15-MM-017

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Group Interview of: PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY
FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

Houston, Texas

Monday,
March 16, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI
Hazardous Materials Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI, Hazardous Materials Accident
Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MIKE USHER
Board of Pilot Commissioners for Harris County Ports

ERIK ERIKSSON, General Counsel
Port of Houston Authority

THOMAS SCHROETER, Associate General Counsel
Port of Houston Authority

Interviewees:

WILLIAM BUCK, Fire Chief
JEREMY KIMICH, Assistant Fire Chief
JASON ROBERTS, Assistant Fire Chief
Port of Houston Authority Fire Department

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Today is Monday, March 16, 2015. This is Muhamed El-Zoghbi, Hazardous Materials Accident Investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. I'm here at the Port Authority, the Port of Houston Authority -- this is executive offices and the board room -- to conduct interviews related to the emergency response and hazardous materials spill that occurred on March 9, 2015.

And if everybody can go around the room and introduce themselves?

MR. KIMICH: Jeremy Kimich, Assistant Fire Chief for the Port of Houston Authority.

MR. ROBERTS: Jason Roberts, Assistant Fire Chief for the Port of Houston Authority.

MR. BUCK: William Buck, Fire Chief, Port of Houston Authority.

MR. SCHROETER: Thomas Schroeter, Associate General Counsel, Port of Houston Authority.

MR. USHER: Mike Usher on behalf of the Board of Pilot Commissioners for Harris County Ports.

MR. ERIKSSON: And Erik Eriksson, General Counsel, Port of Houston Authority.

MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. One thing I do want to make sure is that there are no objections from the people who are being interviewed for anyone else -- you know, the presence of counsel

1 of anyone else.

2 MR. BUCK: No, not at all.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

4 MR. KIMICH: No objections.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Excellent.

6 GROUP INTERVIEW OF PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY

7 FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: As I mentioned, the purpose of our
9 investigation is to sort of collect the factual information
10 related the events that occurred from the incident onward. And so
11 what I'll ask is for each of you to describe in your own words in
12 narrative format sort of what your involvement was and what you
13 observed and how you, you know, were involved in the emergency
14 response. So, I'll leave it to whoever wants to start off.

15 MR. BUCK: I'll start out. And at any point --

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Is it Chief Buck?

17 MR. BUCK: Yes, sir. Chief Buck.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

19 MR. BUCK: And at any point in between any of my times
20 if these guys have anything to add, they can jump in and add
21 information to that.

22 The call first came in -- and these numbers that I have
23 are out of our dispatch center off of our Spillman system.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hmm.

25 MR. BUCK: The call initially came in to our units.

1 They were paged at 1243. Station 2 and Station 3 were paged to
2 the incident. Now, Station 2 is the Barbours Cut Fire Station.
3 Station 3 is the Bayport Fire Station.

4 And the first call that came in was initially a odor, an
5 unknown odor at Gate 12 at Barbours Cut. Gate 12 is in front of
6 the administrative building at Barbours Cut. We had not had any
7 information of a ship collision up to that point. In a normal
8 HAZMAT, Barbours Cut facility will respond and one unit from
9 Bayport Fire Station will respond as well for mutual aid.

10 Engine 2 was on scene, arrived on scene at 1248. And
11 typical response times running emergency traffic from Bayport is
12 about 17 to 20 minutes. So 1248, Engine 2 is on scene. At 1251,
13 HAZMAT 2 arrived on scene. Now, at some point in between there,
14 they've got another phone call or toned out from dispatch
15 regarding a ship collision. Still unrelated -- still didn't know
16 they were related to the two. They're still investigating an
17 unknown odor.

18 Station 2, being that there's a ship collision right
19 there at Barbours Cut facility, their initial readings, there was
20 an odor in the air but they weren't getting anything on the
21 detectors. I believe that was correct.

22 MR. ROBERTS: Yes.

23 MR. BUCK: They responded shipside or waterside to the
24 ship collision. So they returned to the station. Station 3 went
25 ahead en route to investigate odors. At that time more odors were

1 starting to come in that area, which is kind of typical when you
2 have an unknown odor in the area, they would get several calls.
3 Still at that time we hadn't put two together because it's not
4 uncommon to have two incidents occurring at the same time.

5 At 1259, Fireboat 2 was en route and on scene, and the
6 ship collision occurred relatively close to our fireboat dock so
7 it didn't take long for them to get back to the station and be on
8 scene. Now, when they arrived on scene they observed a hole,
9 gaping hole in the side of the ship. They observed -- they took
10 readings and they were picking up readings on their detectors from
11 the ship.

12 It's at this point -- okay, these two incidents are
13 related. And Assistant Chief Roberts, I had contacted him.
14 Assistant Chief Kimich was on the boat, by the way, with the
15 initial boat crew. Assistant Chief Roberts was on terminal that
16 day doing some testing and he assumed landside operations, and at
17 1307 he was on scene and assumed command of the incident.

18 I was at the PCC at Turning Basin up here. Through this
19 process, we were communicating back and forth, us three -- Chief
20 Kimich on the boat, Chief Roberts as the incident commander of the
21 scene, and he was running both landside operations with Station 3
22 and coordinating water operations with Chief Kimich.

23 About 1308, HAZMAT 3 arrived on location and shortly
24 thereafter Engine 3 arrived on location. And that was -- I think
25 Engine 3 arrived somewhere right after 1400. When they arrived on

1 scene, they were --

2 MR. ROBERTS: 1404.

3 MR. BUCK: What was it?

4 MR. ROBERTS: 1404.

5 MR. BUCK: 1404. When they arrived on scene, they
6 continued doing air monitoring. Of course, now you're getting
7 numerous complaints. We know that this odor is spreading. Still
8 wasn't sure to the extent yet. At 1407 -- or 1427, I'm sorry --
9 Somewhere between 1404 and I don't have the specific times, but
10 between 1404 and 1427, the shelter in place was issued. The
11 initial shelter in place was issued because we're on scene, we're
12 getting multiple calls, not sure the extent of what we're dealing
13 with yet but we're going to shelter in place as a safety
14 precaution.

15 Shortly thereafter, with communications between Chief
16 Roberts and Chief Kimich, Chief Roberts consulted with me and we
17 agreed that an evacuation needed to be issued. The reason we did
18 the evacuation was because the odor was getting stronger.
19 Concentrations were starting to go up. With a hole in the side of
20 the ship, we didn't know to what extent, how big it was going to
21 get, so that was the time to get people out of there before it got
22 any worse.

23 And at 1446 the command post had been moved out of
24 Barbours Cut Terminal, as that was our hot zone, and had been
25 evacuated and it was moved to Morgan's Point City Hall. When I

1 arrived at 1446, Chief Roberts had already had a triage set up for
2 medical. He had his command post set up in the city hall. And
3 mutual aid resources had just started showing up, Harris County
4 HAZMAT, the Coast Guard.

5 We had called in another assistant chief to help stand
6 up operations and shortly thereafter that, the Captain of Port
7 arrived on location and he established the unified command. Now,
8 in between that period, Chief Roberts coordinated with the mayor
9 of Morgan's Point, and the mayor of Morgan's Point issued a
10 shelter in place for part of his community as a precaution.

11 MR. ROBERTS: Which included all the schools at that
12 time in Morgan's Point.

13 MR. BUCK: And then once the unified command was
14 established it quickly outgrew the Morgan's Point and we
15 transferred to La Porte.

16 MR. ROBERTS: La Porte EOC.

17 MR. BUCK: La Porte EOC. Also a private contractor came
18 in and he started taking -- what is the name of that private
19 contractor that took the air readings?

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: CTEH. Is that the --

21 MR. ROBERTS: I think that's it. Yes, sir.

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Center for Toxicology and
23 Environmental --

24 MR. ROBERTS: Right. That's it.

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah.

1 MR. BUCK: They started a system with air readings as
2 well as Harris County HAZMAT shortly after we arrived at 1446.
3 And that's the -- I didn't know how far you want to go, but that's
4 the initial response before it moves to La Porte. And then from
5 there it was just kind of a shipboard operations, scene
6 stabilizing --

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Well, if you can actually, you know,
8 continue to elaborate on probably the first 24 hours or so.

9 MR. BUCK: Okay. I left after -- once that incident --
10 once the unified command had been established, probably about 3
11 hours later, I left. The scene was stabilized. The area was
12 secure. So I'll pass it on to Chief Roberts. He can go into
13 detail from there.

14 MR. ROBERTS: Prior to leaving the Morgan's Point, we
15 had that outside contract set up air monitoring within Morgan's
16 Point all the way continuing to Baytown. I had Harris County
17 HAZMAT go over Fred Hartman Bridge and state that they had an odor
18 at Fred Hartman Bridge. So I extended my air monitoring,
19 estimated 2 miles, going into Fred Hartman Bridge all the way into
20 Baytown.

21 There was just a few initial times that we had a few
22 readings on the monitor but that didn't last very long. But
23 continuous, and it's still continuous, air monitoring throughout
24 Baytown and Morgan's Point. And we have air monitoring going on
25 still at Barbours Cut during the laddering operations.

1 And basically I was there for 24 hours, and the first
2 night we formed a IAEP plan at the EOC. And at 0600 the following
3 day, the Captain of the Port approved it and we continued the
4 action plan.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So if I can have you go back to sort of
6 when you first arrived and you got the reports of the odor, could
7 you sort of elaborate on what resources --

8 MR. ROBERTS: Sure.

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- and who you were tasking.

10 MR. ROBERTS: I was actually at the old cruise terminal
11 at C7.

12 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

13 MR. ROBERTS: We were doing hose and ladder testing, our
14 annual testing. And when we received the call -- received the
15 call from Chief Buck that they had a ship collision, I already had
16 odor of some chemical down at C7 at the old cruise terminal. I
17 had those gentlemen that were doing the testing go inside the
18 cruise terminal, shut down the HVAC.

19 Another truck showed up and that's actually when I got
20 into the radio and got up to speed. The incident's going on
21 approximately 15 to 20 minutes prior to my knowledge of what's
22 going on. I got the radio. I assumed command. I immediately
23 talked with Chief Buck and we issued a -- I issued a shelter in
24 place over the radio to our dispatch for them to notify the -- we
25 have a tree that they follow of personnel that they need to

1 contact -- i.e., managers of the terminal, of every terminal, APM,
2 our terminal, our administration building down there, and then, of
3 course, down here at the administration building.

4 Well, as soon as we had the evacuation, I had those
5 personnel from the cruise terminal get in their truck and leave
6 also. I then moved to Morgan's Point and asked the police chief
7 if we could basically take over her facility.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

9 MR. ROBERTS: She was more than welcome to accept
10 anything that we needed. I then moved the incident command post
11 to Morgan's Point police station. As soon as I got there I now
12 received a call that a gentleman in the RTG had chest pains. I
13 had Engine 3 go over to that RTG and assist that gentleman down
14 and into the fire truck and to -- brought everybody to the command
15 post outside of the hot zone.

16 In the mean -- in the time of that frame, a personnel
17 called in for chronic asthmatic. So I had La Porte Medic 1186
18 arrived on scene. They actually transported both stable patients
19 to Bayshore Hospital. I then called for a second ambulance and a
20 EMS supervisor from La Porte, who is our mutual aid companies, to
21 come in and standby at the command post. And I had the EMS
22 supervisor, she assumed EMS sector.

23 From there on we received multiple calls throughout the
24 time of the odor, of irritation of the eyes, maybe a little bit of
25 dizziness, but nobody requested and wanted medical attention. So

1 those were our only two patients that were treated and
2 transported. From there on it was basically monitoring. Chief
3 Kimich took care of all the boat operations on the water and
4 monitoring on the water.

5 And then as soon as the Captain of the Port came in, it
6 -- then it became a unified command and basically I was there for
7 things that he needed from the port. He basically called the
8 shots from there. Actually we were at -- we called the unified
9 command at the police station and then quickly outgrew that and
10 then went to the EOC at La Porte and set up command over there.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Can you tell me who was at the
12 unified command when you guys were initially setting up? I mean,
13 Captain --

14 MR. ROBERTS: Myself, Deputy Chief -- can you tell me
15 his name again?

16 MR. BUCK: Kinchen.

17 MR. ROBERTS: Kinchen.

18 MR. BUCK: Anthony Kinchen.

19 MR. ROBERTS: Anthony Kinchen from our police
20 department. He was in charge of the operations of the police, of
21 the evacuation. I moved them to another channel and he took care
22 of all the evacuation and all the contacts with the police.

23 La Porte EMS, Harris County HAZMAT, and then the
24 monitoring company that came in -- that was called in by the
25 agent, I assumed -- our MCC mobile command unit, U.S. Coast Guard,

1 multiple cleanup crew. We had TITAN, IEC was the firefighting
2 group --

3 MR. BUCK: The mayor of Morgan's Point.

4 MR. ROBERTS: Mayor, police chief. We did utilize
5 several of their officers throughout and we're still utilizing
6 their officers throughout assisting in Morgan's Point. They have
7 released a complete shelter in place and no evacuation of Morgan's
8 Point at this time. There is nothing --

9 MR. BUCK: Jeff Suggs, Emergency Manager for La Porte.

10 MR. ROBERTS: And Jeff Suggs. Well, he was -- he showed
11 up at the EOC, Harris County Sherriff's Department. We did
12 actually have, I believe, a couple of La Porte Police Department,
13 a couple units. Of course, Captain of the Port and Coast Guard.

14 MR. BUCK: I think that's about it.

15 MR. ROBERTS: I think so.

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Can you tell me roughly when the shelter
17 in place was actually lifted, the order, or did it remain in
18 effect for -- or how long did it remain in effect?

19 MR. ROBERTS: It remained in effect for 24 hours.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: 24 hours.

21 MR. ROBERTS: Well, for Morgan's Point, they were lifted
22 at 1559. And that's when we released the school district to allow
23 the kids to come home. Now, there were parents that did pick up
24 their children at the school on their own. I didn't stop any of
25 that. But as far as the school buses, we didn't have them pick up

1 the kids until -- and release until 1559.

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And this was -- my understanding it was
3 a modified shelter in place. It was just -- you guys weren't -- I
4 mean, I guess, you were telling people to stay indoors, but --

5 MR. ROBERTS: Correct.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- people were prevented from --

7 MR. ROBERTS: If they left -- they could leave but they
8 weren't able to re-enter, residents and business owners. And they
9 were not issued a evacuation through Morgan's Point. Again, this
10 was pretty much done by the mayor of Morgan's Point.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah. Okay.

12 MR. ROBERTS: We weren't getting any readings within
13 their city, so -- but on the safe side, we did both agree to do it
14 but he's the one that issued it.

15 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Now, there was discussion of, you know,
16 air monitoring and readings. Could you elaborate a little more
17 on, you know, what type of readings you were getting and maybe
18 some information on the instrumentation that you guys --

19 MR. ROBERTS: A lot of it -- a lot of it wasn't relayed
20 back to the incident command. But we have a couple of them on --
21 let's see here. At 1500, we got 7,000 VOC at Gate 12. I'm sorry.
22 That was at the ship.

23 MR. KIMICH: That was not at Gate 12.

24 MR. ROBERTS: That was at the ship. I'm sorry. That
25 was --

1 MR. KIMICH: That was -- yeah, I'm like, oh, my,
2 that's --

3 MR. ROBERTS: That was him. That was his.

4 MR. KIMICH: That was me at the ship. I have a list on
5 that.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Good.

7 MR. ROBERTS: Northwest of it and 1,000 feet away,
8 northwest corner of the ship. But, yeah, I apologize. That was
9 at the ship itself.

10 I believe you got a lot of readings that were from the
11 incident.

12 MR. KIMICH: Yeah. I have a list of the readings --

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

14 MR. KIMICH: -- when it --

15 MR. ROBERTS: As far as readings, the air monitoring
16 group, the outside agency that was contracted in, I don't have --
17 they did not report back to me with -- they did state that they
18 were getting readings but they weren't all relayed back to me. By
19 then we were already in a unified command. And I believe that was
20 actually going to the Captain of the Port.

21 MR. KIMICH: I believe the highest reading that we got
22 on actually port property was 22 --

23 MR. ROBERTS: 22.

24 MR. KIMICH: -- parts per million. The reports that we
25 got from our fire department, and that was taken with an AreaRAE

1 system -- Area-R-A-E. And that was at Gate 14.

2 MR. BUCK: Gate 12.

3 MR. ROBERTS: 12.

4 MR. KIMICH: Gate 12.

5 MR. ROBERTS: 12.

6 MR. KIMICH: Gate 12 we had the AreaRAEs set up there.

7 Then we had a remote monitoring spot, which was C5 Amenities

8 Building. That's where our crew was monitoring the AreaRAE and

9 they had zero parts per million at C5 Amenities Building.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. I guess, yeah, if you're ready?

11 MR. KIMICH: Okay. I was tasked with getting on the
12 boat with the guys and going to check out the -- or responding to
13 the boat crash. And like I said, when we first got underway we
14 had no idea that the strange odor was any way related to the boat
15 crash.

16 And we got underway. We headed southbound on the ship
17 channel. It was very foggy. Visibility was maybe a quarter mile.
18 Once we got to Light 89, I could see the *Carla Maersk* on the red
19 side of the channel. She had a gash on the side of it and you
20 could visibly see fluid pouring from it, and the fluid that was
21 pouring from it was off-gassing. At that time I set up my meter,
22 the AreaRAE meter. I put one on the inside of the boat to monitor
23 our air and one on the outside of the boat to monitor the
24 atmosphere. Initially we picked up 7,000 parts per million VOC.
25 And inside with our air we had zero parts per million.

1 We picked that up when we were initially beside -- when
2 we were due west of the boat because the wind was out of the west.
3 Once we got farther south, we started picking up lighter readings.
4 And when we were 1,000 feet downwind, which would be about
5 southeast of the vessel, we picked up zero on our meters.

6 Whenever -- when I initially got there, I raised the
7 captain of the *Carla Maersk* on the VHF radio. It was Channel 12.
8 And asked what the product name was and if they had an estimated
9 amount that was leaking. He gave me the name and said that he
10 wasn't sure if it was even leaking. And at that time I assured
11 him it was leaking. And then from there -- that was approximately
12 -- what time did we get underway? It was --

13 MR. BUCK: You were on scene around -- somewhere around
14 1259.

15 MR. KIMICH: 1259. So I think we -- I think we got
16 underway at actually -- at 1255, and it only -- I mean, it's like
17 a -- it was right there, so -- at 1259 that's whenever I gave my
18 report to command about the 7,000 parts per million VOC and the
19 product that it was and that it was unsure amount that it was
20 leaking. My next -- and also the *Carla Maersk* had an extreme port
21 list to it, that was that.

22 My next report is at 1314 -- or, I mean, 1340, and that
23 was in the same position, 1,000 feet south of the boat. I was
24 picking up 1,000 parts per minute -- or parts per million -- I
25 apologize -- and a 4 percent LEL, and that was upwind I was

1 picking that up. And zero inside the vessel.

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So that was upwind at that point? Is
3 that -- so the winds were blowing --

4 MR. ROBERTS: The winds were blowing east to west and I
5 was south of the vessel.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

7 MR. KIMICH: Then my next --

8 MR. ROBERTS: (Indiscernible) you were notified of the
9 collision.

10 MR. KIMICH: The next reading I took, whatever -- it
11 appeared to be -- the liquid appeared to be slowing down from
12 coming from. It was 1555, and I got an 1100 parts per million VOC
13 and the LEL was zero. And I got a zero percent reading inside the
14 vessel -- inside our vessel, our boat. Okay.

15 At 1655 we drifted a little to the west -- or, I'm
16 sorry, a little to -- yeah -- a little to the northwest, so we got
17 kind of where the wind was blowing so we could kind of gage what
18 was blowing to landside. And that's at 1655 we picked up a VOC of
19 7,000 again and a LEL of zero. And, again, it was zero inside our
20 fireboat.

21 At 1750 we departed our station south of the vessel and
22 headed to the fireboat station, the fireboat dock at Morgan's
23 Point. Whenever we crossed the vessel, we were due west of the
24 vessel, we picked up 22,000 VOC. And once we got to the station,
25 we picked up 1802 -- 18,002.

1 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Where was that at?

2 MR. KIMICH: That's at the fireboat dock.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So it was 18 -- could you repeat that
4 number?

5 MR. KIMICH: I'm sorry. 1800, 1-8-0-2. 1802. Yeah.

6 MR. ERIKSSON: And the first one -- and the other one
7 was 2200?

8 MR. KIMICH: 22,000.

9 MR. ERIKSSON: 22,000, but then it was 1800?

10 MR. KIMICH: Yeah. Then it went back down to 1800 --

11 MR. ERIKSSON: Okay.

12 MR. KIMICH: -- when we were -- got to the fireboat
13 dock. But when we passed the boat to come to the fireboat dock,
14 it was 22,000. That was a considerable amount in there.

15 At that time we were concerned with keeping the boat
16 there and concerned with getting off the boat, so we decided to
17 take the boat to the Baytown Marina, which is just south of the
18 Fred Hartman Bridge. We figured we would still have the boat in
19 service and we wouldn't have a problem getting off or anything
20 there. So we stationed -- we parked there just to kind of just
21 stage the boat.

22 And at 2129 we left Baytown Marina and they wanted us to
23 pick up the QI from the boat -- from the fireboat dock and take
24 him to the vessel. And once we picked him up, we approached the
25 vessel, and when we got to the vessel, we picked up 11,000 ppm and

1 turned around. I didn't deem it safe to let him get in that
2 atmosphere, so we turned around and dropped him back off at the
3 fireboat dock.

4 And at 2200 we went back to the fireboat dock and parked
5 there and that was when I got off the boat.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Were you getting any readings at the
7 fire dock at that point?

8 MR. KIMICH: At that point, no. The winds had changed
9 and we weren't getting anything. At 2200 we got nothing.

10 MR. ROBERTS: Right about 2130, 2145, the winds changed
11 to the east. So it was actually just blowing -- or
12 south/southeast. It was blowing straight into the marsh and down
13 the channel. And that's actually -- worked out really good for
14 us. It was now not going towards the land in any way. And at
15 that time they were 5 to 6 knots at 2130.

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So if you can tell me, where were the
17 winds -- okay, so at the time of the incident, they were blowing
18 from the west -- from the east?

19 MR. ROBERTS: From the west -- from the east to west.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: East to west, correct.

21 MR. BUCK: Yes.

22 MR. ERIKSSON: Pretty much --

23 MR. BUCK: Yeah.

24 MR. ROBERTS: Just straight into the facility.

25 MR. KIMICH: You could see --

1 MR. ROBERTS: Yeah. That's --

2 MR. KIMICH: The collision was approximately here and it
3 was blowing straight to here. Then once they changed and went
4 this way, when I got back to the fireboat dock at 2200, obviously
5 the ships here and it's blowing it away from us.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Can you tell me where the *Conti Peridot*
7 was during that? Was that --

8 MR. KIMICH: Yes. The --

9 MR. ERIKSSON: We could show you on that map over there
10 too.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

12 MR. KIMICH: We -- so this is Barbours Cut --

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

14 MR. KIMICH: -- right here and this is the fireboat
15 dock. It was pretty much where this little barge is here, that
16 would be actually pretty good. This would be where the *Conti*
17 *Peridot* was.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

19 MR. KIMICH: And it was actually headed that way also.
20 And that probably pretty close to that position. And the *Carla*
21 *Maersk* was this way with her nose pointing west.

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So when you describe some of the -- if
23 you could sort of point to where some of those readings were.

24 MR. KIMICH: Okay. This is Light 89, right?

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

1 MR. KIMICH: It would at Light 89. The *Conti Peridot*
2 was on the green side of the channel --

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

4 MR. KIMICH: -- with her nose facing inbound. The *Carla*
5 *Maersk* was on the opposite side just north of Light 90 with her
6 nose pointing due west.

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And your readings, you were --

8 MR. KIMICH: My readings --

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- sort of between the --

10 MR. KIMICH: -- I was south -- I was due south of the
11 *Carla Maersk* at approximately 1,000 feet when I was getting my
12 readings. And, of course, whenever the readings peaked, when it
13 was the 22,000 or whatever, that was whenever I was heading back
14 to the station.

15 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

16 MR. KIMICH: That was whenever I was due west of the
17 *Carla Maersk*.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Were any readings taken around the *Conti*
19 *Peridot*?

20 MR. KIMICH: Well, we were getting such high ones when
21 we were anywhere but south --

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah.

23 MR. KIMICH: -- we felt that it was -- it was dangerous
24 to do that. We didn't deem that safe so we just stayed south of
25 it. They were just getting too high when we would get in front of

1 the boat so we didn't want to take any chances.

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So would you say the *Conti Peridot* was
3 in the hot zone?

4 MR. KIMICH: No. I wouldn't say --

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: You wouldn't say south --

6 MR. KIMICH: -- because they were another 3,000 feet
7 south of us.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: South of you. Okay.

9 MR. KIMICH: So we were 1,000 feet south of the vessel.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah.

11 MR. KIMICH: They were a minimum of probably 5,000 -- 4-
12 to 5,000 --

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

14 MR. KIMICH: -- approximately 4- to 5,000 feet south of
15 them yet. We were getting zero at 1,000 feet, so --

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

17 MR. KIMICH: But when the winds changed, I don't know.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Were any readings taken after the winds
19 changed down south? I mean, were you -- any of you or any of your
20 vessels involved in that?

21 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

22 MR. ROBERTS: I don't believe in the water, no.

23 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

24 MR. ROBERTS: Still landside, but -- and they're still
25 currently going on, but none in the water.

1 MR. KIMICH: By that time we'd had the outside --

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Contractor.

3 MR. KIMICH: -- contract taking the readings and they
4 had small boats and they were taking them throughout the whole
5 ship channel from my understanding, up and downwind.

6 MR. ROBERTS: To rephrase that, as far as the outside
7 contractors --

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Yeah.

9 MR. ROBERTS: -- and Coast Guard had boats in the water,
10 they very well could --

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: They could've had --

12 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Okay.

14 MR. ROBERTS: Yeah. As far as our concern, no.

15 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: But you guys weren't (indiscernible)
16 there?

17 MR. KIMICH: As far as emergency response, no, sir, we
18 weren't.

19 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: All right. Okay. If you can go back to
20 the description, you said you observed the vessel, it was liquid
21 flowing out of it. Can you sort of describe exactly what you were
22 seeing?

23 MR. KIMICH: There was two holes in the vessel. There's
24 the one that was gaping up top and then there was a hole at the
25 bottom you could see. And the hole at the bottom you could see

1 the liquid was pouring out of the hole at the bottom and it was
2 off-gassing. You could see the fumes or the vapors coming off of
3 it. And there was vapor trails in the water. You could see a
4 trail maybe 2- or 300 feet long by maybe 50 feet wide. And you
5 could see that the vapors were coming off it as it was going.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And how long did that continue, when you
7 seen that? Would you say that was gushing out or -- like how
8 would you describe -- you said pouring?

9 MR. KIMICH: Pouring. Is pouring the same as gushing?
10 I don't know.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: But I'm wondering, was it -- I mean,
12 clearly -- how -- well, first of all, how high up would you say --

13 MR. KIMICH: It was just above the waterline.

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

15 MR. KIMICH: That's where I observed the fluid coming
16 from the vessel was maybe approximately 2 feet above the water
17 line. You could see it almost as a, you know, a bubbling. I
18 don't want to say bubbling up, but you could just see it coming
19 out of the boat basically.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Not spraying out or anything?

21 MR. KIMICH: Not spraying out. Flowing.

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: No. Just flowing.

23 MR. KIMICH: It was a flow.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

25 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir.

1 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Can you take me back to that discussion
2 you had with the captain? So you spoke directly to the captain --

3 MR. KIMICH: I spoke to the pilot.

4 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: To the pilot. Okay.

5 MR. KIMICH: Yes. But I just called the *Carla Maersk* on
6 Channel 12 and the Houston pilot is who responded to us. He did
7 not give his name.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

9 MR. KIMICH: So I don't know what his name was.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And he's the one who provided you with
11 the name MTBE and --

12 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir. And he said he wasn't sure if it
13 was actually leaking out or not. I let him know it was.

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Were any of you provided, let's say,
15 shipping papers or cargo volumes or anything like that to know --

16 MR. KIMICH: I'm on a boat. There's no way I'm provided
17 anything. But we do have computers and Internet access on our
18 boat, and we looked it up and got a MSDS sheet. We looked it up
19 in the response book. We got all our information from there.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

21 MR. KIMICH: I can't speak for the land side.

22 MR. ROBERTS: That's correct. That's what we got.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Did you -- what were you guys basing
24 your sort of, I guess, scenario based on in terms of volumes? Did
25 you guys have an estimate that we were using? Did you do any

1 modeling or any issues like (indiscernible)?

2 MR. ROBERTS: No. Actually that was discussed in the
3 unified command at EOC. They were doing -- because they -- to fix
4 their list, which was very quick, they've already transferred some
5 of the product. So from my understanding, when they transferred
6 the product they didn't calculate the amount of product that was
7 transferred into the amount that was still there and possibly
8 leaking. So I don't know if they actually came up with an exact
9 number. They may have, but that wasn't relayed to me in the
10 unified command.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So given that the readings were pretty
12 high on the water --

13 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir.

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- were you -- am I understanding, is
15 you guys weren't getting any significant detectable concentrations
16 on the land? Is that --

17 MR. ROBERTS: Periodically when the winds. But it would
18 -- it wouldn't last long.

19 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

20 MR. ROBERTS: No high significant amount of numbers.
21 Nothing like water side. But periodically we would get, you know,
22 22 and we had an LEL at 4 percent. Those are pretty much the
23 highest ratings that we had. Now all -- as far as fire
24 department-wise,

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

1 MR. ROBERTS: Outside contractors they had their own
2 monitoring. I don't know those levels. Now, they also set up
3 through our facility, Morgan's Point and then all the way to
4 Baytown. So they had quite a few out, so I don't know those
5 numbers on there.

6 MR. BUCK: And our thoughts were with the numbers that
7 we did have and the hole in the side the ship, to get the people
8 out before those concentrations got higher.

9 MR. ROBERTS: That's correct.

10 MR. BUCK: Truly is precautionary.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Now, given that you had such high
12 readings, were there any concerns for the crew or how -- were you
13 guys coordinating at all with the crew of the *Carla Maersk* in
14 terms of (indiscernible) --

15 MR. KIMICH: Yes. I did on Channel 12, again, talking
16 with the pilot --

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

18 MR. KIMICH: -- did let them know the concentrations we
19 were getting and that they should shelter in place as well on the
20 vessel. And I'm sure all that's recorded on Channel 12, so --

21 MR. ROBERTS: On VTS.

22 MR. KIMICH: On the the VTS.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Did you observe any other crew out on
24 deck or doing anything like that? Were they wearing -- I mean,
25 just --

1 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- any observations on what their
3 activity was?

4 MR. KIMICH: No.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: No? Okay. I guess I'll give Mike here
6 an opportunity. Do you have any --

7 MR. USHER: Yes.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- questions?

9 MR. USHER: If you don't mind. Yeah. Please. Thank
10 you. Mike Usher, Houston Pilot Commission.

11 Gentlemen, in case you're not familiar, the pilot --
12 Board of Pilot Commissioners -- the Pilot Board had been named a
13 party to the NTSB/Coast Guard's -- or NTSB investigation. The
14 NTSB and the Coast Guard are conducting a joint investigation, but
15 the NTSB is the lead investigator. So as being a party to the
16 investigations, I'm allowed to ask witnesses questions and so
17 forth through the interview process. So if you don't mind, bear
18 with me here.

19 Jeremy, you arrived on scene -- or when you left the
20 fireboat dock, do you recall passing any traffic en route to
21 scene? Any barge traffic or any other ship traffic?

22 MR. KIMICH: Not that I recall. No, sir.

23 MR. USHER: Okay. Did you happen to identify any spill
24 coming from the *Conti Peridot*?

25 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

1 MR. USHER: Did you make contact with the pilot on the
2 *Conti*?

3 MR. KIMICH: Not that I recall.

4 MR. USHER: Okay. And you said you -- when you arrived
5 on scene you -- it was quite noticeable that the *Carla* had an
6 extreme port list?

7 MR. KIMICH: Yes. Let me make sure -- check my notes
8 and make sure. But, yeah, I think so, I think it was port list.

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: While you're doing that, did you guys
10 take any photographs while you were out there on the boat of the
11 list or --

12 MR. KIMICH: Port list. Yes, sir.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Did you guys document -- take any
14 photographs of --

15 MR. KIMICH: I took a few photographs. Yes, sir.

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Are they available to us?

17 MR. KIMICH: Yes, they are.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. I would like to --

19 MR. KIMICH: Okay.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- officially request if we can get
21 those photographs.

22 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir. I will email them to -- just
23 give me a -- I guess it's on your card.

24 MR. ERIKSSON: Do you want to send them to me and I'll
25 send them on?

1 MR. KIMICH: Okay. Sure.

2 MR. ERIKSSON: Yeah. I'll do it that way.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: All right. Were they of the vessel
4 itself in the water or just the --

5 MR. USHER: You think you got one of that port list?

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: That's what I was -- one of the reasons
7 I was asking.

8 MR. ERIKSSON: And you could just send it to --

9 MR. KIMICH: Yeah. I'll just send --

10 MR. ERIKSSON: -- and then just copy me. That's all.
11 Yeah, I just want a record as well. I'm not trying to screen it
12 or anything. I just wanted to have a record.

13 MR. KIMICH: Yeah. I have one of the port list.

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Take your time. We're --

15 MR. KIMICH: Okay.

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: I don't know if you have -- if you could
17 actually find it, it'd be great.

18 And then did you take any photographs of, you know, the
19 gushing or anything like that? Did you see -- or the pouring out
20 of the vessel or just where you guys --

21 MR. KIMICH: Well, when we first got there, it was so
22 foggy, the pictures weren't really going to come out that good.
23 You could see that -- you could see the damage and you could see
24 that there was off-gassing a little bit around it.

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

1 MR. KIMICH: But the picture really doesn't do -- you
2 may be able to see --

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So for the record, we're looking at a
4 photograph of the *Carla Maersk* and the damage to the port side.
5 And point roughly --

6 MR. KIMICH: This was where it was coming --

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Roughly right around there?

8 MR. KIMICH: Um-hum.

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

10 MR. KIMICH: You kind of see it coming out there a
11 little bit, huh? It's really cluttered. It's going to be hard to
12 tell, there.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: That right -- that whitish area right
14 there?

15 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir.

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay

17 MR. USHER: That's the only area it was coming out of?

18 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir.

19 MR. USHER: It wasn't coming out of this --

20 MR. KIMICH: Not at the top end. I didn't see anything
21 coming out of the top.

22 MR. USHER: Nothing out of the top. Okay.

23 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

24 MR. USHER: Do you have a picture facing the ship
25 towards the bow showing that list or aft showing that list?

1 MR. KIMICH: I have several pictures that I emailed to
2 Marcus Woodring previously, and I could go back and look at those.

3 MR. USHER: Well, as long as you can get them to Muhamed
4 or Eric.

5 MR. KIMICH: Yeah.

6 MR. USHER: Just make sure we get a copy of them.

7 MR. KIMICH: I'll copy them to everybody.

8 MR. USHER: Do you have any idea what degree of list it
9 might have been at or approximately?

10 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

11 MR. USHER: Okay. May I continue, Muhamed?

12 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yes. Yes.

13 MR. USHER: Okay. Thank you. How soon when you arrived
14 on scene were you made aware of shelter in place and by whom were
15 you made aware of?

16 MR. KIMICH: Obviously I was monitoring several
17 different radios and one of them I was monitoring was the ops
18 channel for the Port of Houston.

19 MR. USHER: Um-hum.

20 MR. KIMICH: And I heard that through the ops channel
21 whenever Chief Roberts initiated it.

22 MR. USHER: Was that soon after you arrived on scene?

23 MR. KIMICH: It was fairly soon. Yes, sir. And we got
24 the exact time right here.

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And can I ask -- also for the record,

1 could we get a copy of any dispatch records?

2 MR. BUCK: Get copies.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And for the radio communications, do you
4 guys maintain records of those or is that something that VTS --

5 MR. KIMICH: You'd have to ask the chief on that one.

6 MR. BUCK: Yes, sir. Our dispatch center maintains
7 records of that.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Could I get --

9 MR. BUCK: Yes, sir.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- records of that? Okay. So just --

11 MR. ERIKSSON: Yeah. Would you want (indiscernible)?

12 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- that's my official request.

13 MR. BUCK: Yes, sir.

14 MR. ERIKSSON: Okay. That's --

15 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

16 MR. USHER: Chief, would that -- would the records
17 indicate the time of evacuation and when the shelter in place was
18 secured and so forth?

19 MR. BUCK: Yes, sir.

20 MR. USHER: Okay.

21 MR. ROBERTS: Shelter in place was 1317:11.

22 MR. KIMICH: So to answer your question, 22 minutes
23 after I arrived on scene.

24 MR. USHER: When you were notified of the shelter in
25 place?

1 MR. KIMICH: You said 1317?
2 MR. ROBERTS: Yeah. 1317:11.
3 MR. USHER: Okay. And you had arrived at --
4 MR. KIMICH: 1259, I arrived.
5 MR. USHER: -- 1259. Yeah.
6 MR. KIMICH: 1255, I got underway.
7 MR. USHER: Okay. Did CIMA engage in unified command at
8 all?
9 MR. KIMICH: No.
10 MR. ROBERTS: No, sir.
11 MR. USHER: No? Were you -- were they asked to or --
12 MR. ROBERTS: No.
13 MR. USHER: That you're aware of?
14 MR. BUCK: CIMA was not engaged.
15 MR. USHER: Okay.
16 MR. ROBERTS: At 1322:59, the *Carla Maersk* corrected the
17 list per the fireboat.
18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: What time was that again?
19 MR. ROBERTS: 1322:59.
20 MR. USHER: She adjusted her list?
21 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir.
22 MR. USHER: You had that transferring cargo.
23 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir.
24 MR. USHER: Perfect. Chief Kimich, were -- when you got
25 underway, you checked into VTS system on Channel 11. Is that

1 correct?

2 MR. KIMICH: Channel 12.

3 MR. USHER: Or 12.

4 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir.

5 MR. USHER: Okay. Excuse me. 12 below (indiscernible).

6 I haven't been out there in a while. You're right.

7 MR. KIMICH: Yes.

8 MR. USHER: Were you in constant communication with them
9 on 12?

10 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir. I was monitoring 12 and 13.

11 MR. USHER: Okay. Did VTS provide you with ample
12 information about the conditions of the area as you were
13 conversing back -- did you converse back and forth with VTS
14 (indiscernible)?

15 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir, regularly. Throughout the
16 evening, yes, sir.

17 MR. USHER: And they were -- they kept you well informed
18 of what was going on and as you were them as well?

19 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir. Every time I had -- every time I
20 went from one area to another I checked in with them. At one
21 point I called in to let them know what, you know, our readings
22 were and to have some of the smaller -- or to have all of the
23 Coast Guard vessels back out a little bit. There were several
24 Coast Guard vessels in the area. And, yeah, I was in constant
25 communications with VTS.

1 MR. USHER: Good. Were the -- your first responders on
2 board the boat with you, were they ever outdoors?

3 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

4 MR. USHER: Had ever had to dawn SCBAs or anything?

5 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir. Whenever we put the AreaRAE on
6 the front of the boat, I had a man put a SCBA on to go out there
7 and put it on, put the AreaRAE out.

8 MR. USHER: Okay. Perfect. Did you ever hear VTS come
9 across Channel 12 and announce a security zone in that area to
10 secure any traffic or anything of that nature?

11 MR. KIMICH: Several times.

12 MR. USHER: Several times?

13 MR. KIMICH: Several times, yes, sir.

14 MR. USHER: Security alert type of announcement?

15 MR. KIMICH: What -- yes, sir. Basically, yeah.

16 MR. USHER: Basically, okay.

17 MR. KIMICH: They just -- they announced the closure of
18 the ship channel and -- yeah.

19 MR. USHER: Okay. Were there any reports of injuries
20 aboard either ship?

21 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

22 MR. USHER: Okay.

23 MR. KIMICH: At no time.

24 MR. USHER: No request to evacuate personnel from either
25 ship?

1 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

2 MR. USHER: Okay. Okay. I believe that's all I have.
3 Thank you, Chief Kimich, Chief Roberts, Chief Buck.

4 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Sir, I have a few more questions here
5 and I was wondering how did you establish early on the hot zone,
6 like, the perimeter? Like what (indiscernible)?

7 MR. ROBERTS: By the ERG --

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

9 MR. ROBERTS: -- and the MSDS, it states a half mile.
10 So basically I estimated the half mile.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

12 MR. ROBERTS: I'm probably not the best at the half mile
13 to a mile or whatever, but basically at the end of Barbours Cut
14 all the way to Enterprise and Morgan Point -- Morgan's Point.
15 That's why I agreed upon with the mayor of Morgan's Point and the
16 police chief to go ahead and shelter in place due to the fact that
17 it is a little bit south of the point.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

19 MR. ROBERTS: And that could affect their city if the
20 winds did change. The winds did change but it wasn't to affect
21 their city, so it worked out fine.

22 MR. KIMICH: So basically this would have been close to
23 half a mile about right in here and he had doubled that, so.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So you guys use roughly like, about a
25 mile.

1 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir.

2 MR. KIMICH: It was probably closer to a mile and a
3 half.

4 MR. USHER: A mile and a half.

5 MR. BUCK: Yeah.

6 MR. USHER: Okay.

7 MR. ROBERTS: Basically --

8 MR. KIMICH: Yeah. I think so.

9 MR. ROBERTS: Basically this line is outlined of our --

10 MR. KIMICH: Yeah. So this would be roughly maybe a
11 miles and half and you're looking here, you know, close to 2 miles
12 so it was way overkill.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

14 MR. KIMICH: But it was worst case -- he was planning
15 for worst case scenario so.

16 MR. ROBERTS: And due to the fact of the further
17 distance, I was --

18 MR. KIMICH: That's a mile?

19 MR. USHER: That's a mile.

20 MR. KIMICH: Okay. There you go. You can see the mile.

21 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

22 MR. KIMICH: The boat was more or less down here so
23 we're looking at 2 --

24 MR. USHER: So that's a mile radius?

25 MR. KIMICH: -- even 3 miles away.

1 MR. ERIKSSON: That's about 3 miles, 2½, 3 miles --
2 yeah, 3 miles.

3 MR. ROBERTS: And due to the fact -- the reason why I
4 extended it that far is this is the terminal -- old cruise ship
5 terminal building and I was actually there and I was being
6 affected by it.

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

8 MR. ROBERTS: So I know if I have it here, it needs to
9 be a little bit further than --

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Were you detecting any readings at
11 your --

12 MR. ROBERTS: I didn't have anything. I was actually in
13 my own truck --

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

15 MR. ROBERTS: -- doing something completely, totally
16 different than -- so and it took me a while to get a radio and to
17 find out what's actually going on until Chief Buck called me and
18 says I need you to come in and I'm already here.

19 MR. BUCK: You're here.

20 MR. ROBERTS: So I didn't even know what was going on
21 but I noticed a smell and before we -- before I even got a phone
22 call. So that's the reason why I went at least to that distance
23 because I know that area was being affected.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Can you describe the odor? You know,
25 how would you describe what you smelled?

1 MR. ROBERTS: Maybe pungent. Kind of eyes irritating,
2 low water. I never had any difficulty breathing, nothing like
3 that. Just a noticeable smell in the air.

4 MR. KIMICH: So this area here is Gate 12 --

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

6 MR. KIMICH: -- where this X is. And the highest
7 reading that the Port Authority got on our meters was 22 parts per
8 million and that was at this location here at Gate 12, so --

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And just so I understand, you're using
10 AreaRAEs, and are these -- these aren't -- they don't have the
11 smart detect? They're not -- they don't autocorrect? Well, they
12 don't have a correction factor --

13 MR. ROBERTS: No.

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

15 MR. KIMICH: No. It takes a reading every 30 seconds
16 and reports it.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Did you guys pull up the
18 correction factors for any of your equipment or once you knew that
19 it was MTBE, was any of that done?

20 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

21 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. So these are all VOC readings?

22 MR. KIMICH: VOC specifically, sir.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. And you do isobutylene
24 calibration?

25 MR. KIMICH: Oh, yeah.

1 MR. ROBERTS: Oh, yeah.

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. I was just -- trying to make sure
3 that I'm --

4 MR. ROBERTS: Absolutely. Absolutely.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

6 MR. USHER: For the record, could you describe what the
7 acronym of that VOC is? What's the --

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Oh, volatile organic compounds.

9 MR. USHER: Okay. Just wanted it for the record.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: No problem. Okay. So you did -- you
11 said you used the ERG as your primary to establish --

12 MR. ROBERTS: That and the MSDS.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: MSDS.

14 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir. Those are the two that I went
15 by on the -- and so that's how I got my area that I was going to
16 do my hot zone.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Were there any -- I mean, do you
18 have a safety officer or were you the safety officer for the
19 scene?

20 MR. ROBERTS: I designated the one on the -- the captain
21 on the fire truck to be the safety officer.

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. And were there any PPE
23 requirements or other safety protocols that you guys -- you had
24 put in place for people entering that zone?

25 MR. ROBERTS: Not at the time because we haven't reached

1 the 50 parts per million in any spot within the facility at that
2 time --

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

4 MR. ROBERTS: -- we were just projecting and planning
5 for the worst. If we did have that, everybody would be in SCBAs,
6 which they had with them.

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay, good.

8 MR. ROBERTS: Their own personal mask. They had
9 everything with them in case they do need it -- did need to don
10 it.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

12 MR. ROBERTS: Every personnel in the fire department
13 did.

14 MR. KIMICH: Yeah. Even on our boats and everything, we
15 were all -- we had it at the standby. And you can see, this is
16 where we had the highest reading at. Well, that was just where
17 the -- where the meter was. Where we actually were staging was
18 the C5 Amenities Building, which is right there along the
19 waterside at container dock 5. So we were a pretty good distance
20 away. And I never got any readings there, so.

21 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

22 MR. USHER: Excuse me. Could we take about a 3 to 5
23 minute break, please?

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Sure. Sure. Does anybody have --

25 MR. KIMICH: Just real quick before -- and every

1 monitoring station also, they had an RAE, a multi-RAE reader with
2 them. So if they -- not only were they monitoring away but they
3 were monitoring where they were at also, and they never picked up
4 anything where they were at.

5 MR. BUCK: Personal monitor.

6 MR. KIMICH: A personnel monitor. Yes, sir.

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. All right. We'll take a short
8 break here.

9 (Off the record.)

10 (On the record.)

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: We're resuming the interview. So let's
12 see here. So with regards to the notifications, going back to
13 sort of the VTS communications with the traffic in the area, as
14 soon as you noticed and you got measurements, did you report those
15 to anybody outside of the incident command, like, through VTS,
16 were there any notifications going to anybody outside of --

17 MR. ROBERTS: No, sir.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: No? Okay. And this is just for our
19 documentation. How would that normally be handled? Is this
20 pretty traditional in terms of how the response occurred, the
21 notifications.

22 MR. ROBERTS: What do you mean, far as how --

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: In terms of -- first of all, do you
24 practice and drill with the Coast Guard or do you have any -- if
25 you elaborate, you know, explain --

1 MR. BUCK: Well, if I think -- normally during a HAZMAT
2 incident, what we'll do is we'll contact the regulatory agencies.
3 And the Coast Guard was already involved with this. I saw the NRC
4 report come out fairly quickly. I believe they initially filed
5 that. So the agencies had already been notified and I believe
6 they were notified by the Coast Guard, I believe. Because --

7 MR. ROBERTS: That's correct.

8 MR. BUCK: Yeah. But normally we'll talk to different
9 agencies. Usually it's within our facility. If it's a HAZMAT
10 call, we'll just isolate within our facility. If the impact is
11 outside our facility, then we'll get with other -- like the local
12 LEPC or the mayor of Morgan's Point, as in this case.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So how did you find out about the ship?
14 Was that notification through your dispatch or did it come through
15 NRC report or --

16 MR. BUCK: They came through dispatch.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Through dispatch. And they were
18 notified -- is that the --

19 MR. BUCK: I believe the Coast Guard notified dispatch.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Notified them. And at the time that
21 report came in there was no information related to the type of
22 products that you were dealing with? Okay.

23 MR. ROBERTS: No.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So when the response was launched, how
25 did you know what -- were you guys doing like a general profile?

1 I mean, what -- how'd you know what to look for, I guess that's --

2 MR. BUCK: I'll take this. A lot of times when they get
3 a HAZMAT call --

4 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

5 MR. BUCK: -- you don't know what you have.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

7 MR. BUCK: So you're taking readings with your meters.
8 So there's so many hazardous containers out there, you just don't
9 know what you have.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

11 MR. BUCK: A lot of time it could be just a lot of
12 unknowns. Probably most of the time it's an unknown. It's there
13 an it's gone, real quick. But we do the same thing every time we
14 take our readings and if we get anything then we'll start
15 narrowing it down. So they handled this like a typical incident.

16 They got an unknown odor. They took their meters. They
17 went and started taking readings on that to see if they could pick
18 up anything in the air and go from there. It wasn't until the
19 ship collision came in that we started putting two and two
20 together. So it's kind of like an investigation kind of --

21 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah. Yeah.

22 MR. BUCK: -- tracking down, seeing where this is coming
23 from.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: How quickly into the response did you
25 feel like you had everything adequately characterized and you guys

1 were, like, the scene was under control.

2 MR. ROBERTS: At 1301 is when I assumed command.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

4 MR. ROBERTS: And I immediately notified our dispatch if
5 they've already contracted the NRC. And they said, it's already
6 been notified. Again, I'm already approximately 15, 20 minutes
7 the scene's been going on.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

9 MR. ROBERTS: I'm just now getting involved with it.
10 And they said it's already been contacted with the NRC obviously
11 it shoots out contacting everybody as far as that's concerned.
12 After we find out -- found out that it wasn't -- we assumed
13 initially that it was possibly an internal container that was
14 leaking. After we found out with Chief Kimich going out there and
15 actually finding the collision and seeing what it is and getting
16 the product, we took our resources away from trying to find a
17 leaking container.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum. Okay.

19 MR. ROBERTS: We then put all our resources on the
20 collision. So as soon as we found that out and we're not dealing
21 with any container, we're just dealing with a ship collision. To
22 me, I think it was under control completely.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum. And that was roughly -- I know
24 you spoke -- you said you spoke with the pilot around 1:00
25 roughly.

1 MR. KIMICH: Yes.

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And so you -- by that time you knew MTBE
3 and had had observations, so you felt like, you know --

4 MR. KIMICH: Sure.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

6 MR. ROBERTS: Just another routine incident.

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

8 MR. KIMICH: Larger scale.

9 MR. ROBERTS: Larger scale.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum. Excellent. Sort of go on, I
11 want to discuss a little bit of your background on -- about your
12 fire department and what your capabilities are the and training
13 levels.

14 MR. BUCK: Sure.

15 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So if you could sort of walk me through
16 some of that.

17 MR. BUCK: Sure. All of our personnel, we hire all of
18 our personnel. They come to us certified EMTs and certified
19 firefighters through the Texas Commission on Fire Protection.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

21 MR. BUCK: And I believe the certified firefighter's 544
22 hours of fire protection training, somewhere around there. Day 1,
23 they start their Marine firefighting class. That's a 90-hour
24 class on top of their structural fire certification.

25 MR. ROBERTS: And that's a state certification.

1 MR. BUCK: And it's through the Texas Commission on Fire
2 Protection.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

4 MR. BUCK: After they finish their 90-hour marine
5 firefighting class, we put them through another -- we go a little
6 bit more than the required 90. We go 100 and something hours. We
7 do some drills afterwards for HAZMAT technician.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

9 MR. BUCK: So all of our people are HAZMAT techs.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: HAZMAT technician.

11 MR. ROBERTS: Approximately 110 hours.

12 MR. BUCK: Yeah. After that we put them through another
13 60 hours of driver operating training. So they have several --
14 well, they have a few months of training before they hit they
15 station. We require -- each month we require -- well, they have
16 annual CE hours that they have to complete, roughly about 30
17 annual CE hours but we require a whole lot more training
18 throughout the stations each month.

19 All of our officers have 100 Ton Masters licenses. And
20 it takes roughly 3 to 4 years before they accumulate enough sea
21 time to go through the class for the 100 Ton Masters license. And
22 not only that, we put them through -- annually, we put them
23 through a annual proficiency test --

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

25 MR. BUCK: -- to make sure that they can do that.

1 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Now so we're wondering with training and
2 annual training for HAZMAT, do you guys attend courses or do you
3 do recertification through online?

4 MR. ROBERTS: We do CE hours.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: CE.

6 MR. ROBERTS: We have a Level 3 instructor here --

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

8 MR. ROBERTS: -- that we do CE hours through to maintain
9 our certification every year. And that's every certification, not
10 just HAZMAT.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

12 MR. ROBERTS: And that's a minimal requirement, which we
13 meet and exceed the minimal requirement of CE hours for every one
14 of our certifications, otherwise the state -- we lose it by the
15 state.

16 MR. BUCK: We also do a lot of training with other fire
17 departments and other agencies. Each year Harris County HAZMAT
18 and the annual hot zone conference in Houston --

19 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

20 MR. BUCK: -- where it's a kind of convention for
21 HAZMAT. They'll bring class through the Port of Houston and show
22 them what we do and the different kinds -- because we have so many
23 containers and ships.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

25 MR. BUCK: It's kind of an unusual thing for most HAZMAT

1 things to see. So they'll bring them to us for us to explain --
2 we'll explain things to them, how to respond to hazardous
3 containers, the hazards associated with ships and that nature.

4 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah, I mean, I definitely mentioned a
5 little earlier, I know you guys deal a lot of HAZMAT.

6 MR. BUCK: Yes.

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And roughly, just so I have it on
8 record, did you say what percent calls do you guys normally --

9 MR. BUCK: It's 50 percent -- 50 to 60 percent are
10 HAZMAT.

11 MR. ROBERTS: 50 percent.

12 MR. BUCK: And when we respond to a HAZMAT call, no
13 matter what it is, we respond to it the same way. We set up our
14 incident command. We establish our hot zones. We suit out. No
15 matter what, we do it the same way every time. So that kind of
16 helps out with our training so when you get something big like
17 this you're used to doing it and it's routine just on a bigger
18 scale.

19 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And do you guys use any modeling
20 software or for plume plotting or anything like that? I was just
21 wondering, you know --

22 MR. ROBERTS: I actually just received the software that
23 we're going to be training on, and set up that evaluation that
24 Treyanne (ph.) had.

25 MR. BUCK: Um-hum.

1 MR. ROBERTS: So we're trying to implement that now.

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

3 MR. BUCK: Usually if it's something bigger like that,
4 our resources are limited to the -- to the initial response.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

6 MR. BUCK: And we rely on mutual aid resources to work
7 together.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

9 MR. BUCK: So it's better for us to have somebody come
10 in with the Coast Guard or another agency to help us with the
11 plume modeling just for manpower stuff.

12 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

13 MR. BUCK: When we're modeling, that's a very large
14 incident. And, you know, we're staffed with five people at each
15 station. So, I mean, they're engaged in the incident. They don't
16 -- they're not going to be to model. It's better to do that
17 through a unified command.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum. For the record too, how many
19 firefighters do you have in the fire department?

20 MR. BUCK: There is 47 of us.

21 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Forty-seven.

22 MR. BUCK: There's 3 shifts of 15 on each shift, 5
23 personnel at each station. We have three stations.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: So at the time of the incident, you'd
25 say roughly you had 15 people on?

1 MR. BUCK: No. We had five down here at the Turning
2 Basin at Station 1.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

4 MR. BUCK: We had a few more people because Chief
5 Roberts was there doing hose and ladder testing.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

7 MR. BUCK: So he's normally not there. So we had some
8 extra people on scene that day.

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

10 MR. BUCK: But what did we have? We had 12?

11 MR. ROBERTS: Got a list right here.

12 MR. BUCK: How many? Eleven or 12?

13 MR. ROBERTS: Twelve.

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: You had 12.

15 MR. ROBERTS: Well, you, 13. Sorry.

16 MR. BUCK: Count myself.

17 MR. ROBERTS: I got to count you too. Sorry.

18 MR. BUCK: Dang. Oh, that guy.

19 MR. ROBERTS: Right.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Do you guys get any information related
21 to the type of product -- I mean, you have familiarity just due to
22 the types of facilities here but in terms of the types of products
23 that might be going through the channel. Do you receive --

24 MR. BUCK: Everything.

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. So you do --

1 MR. BUCK: If you take the response -- Emergency
2 Response Guidebook and put it on the table, that's it.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: All right.

4 MR. BUCK: Everything moves through the Port of Houston.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. And do you -- I guess, do you
6 have specific procedures at all that you guys developed related to
7 some of those products or is it again you guys deal with -- go
8 ahead.

9 MR. KIMICH: Well, we treat every HAZMAT scene the same.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: The same.

11 MR. KIMICH: And then we -- the specifics come through,
12 the MSDS sheet or the guidebook that we have.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

14 MR. ROBERTS: Whether it's a Level A, Tyvek --

15 MR. KIMICH: You know, seeing how big a hot zone you
16 need --

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah.

18 MR. BUCK: Level of protection.

19 MR. KIMICH: -- PPE you need.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah.

21 MR. KIMICH: But those are just the specifics that we
22 use.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And do you guys interact a lot with --
24 my understanding there is an LEPC in -- is it La Porte, I believe?

25 MR. KIMICH: Um-hum.

1 MR. BUCK: There's several of them. La Porte had an
2 LEPC. Yes, sir.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And do you get information from them and
4 things like that? I'm just trying to understand the --

5 MR. KIMICH: We attend quarterly meetings.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: It's in the -- okay.

7 MR. BUCK: Emergency management attends those now.

8 MR. KIMICH: All right.

9 MR. BUCK: Yeah. Yeah.

10 MR. KIMICH: Well, we, at La Porte.

11 MR. BUCK: Yeah. Yeah.

12 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Oh, okay.

13 MR. BUCK: La Porte does. Yes.

14 MR. ERIKSSON: Could you -- LEPC. What's that?

15 MR. BUCK: Local Emergency Planning Committee.

16 MR. ERIKSSON: Got it. Sorry.

17 MR. BUCK: And basically that is an organization that if
18 there is an event that affects the community, it had a phone line
19 for information for the community to call.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

21 MR. BUCK: It's kind of an alert, make people aware of
22 what's going on in the community.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: It has representatives from the industry
24 as well, act as liaison.

25 MR. ROBERTS: Different facilities.

1 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah. So, okay. All right. I guess do
2 you guys have, like, commodity flow record? Do you generally
3 know, like, the types of volumes and things like that that might
4 be coming through the channel or that you might have to respond to
5 or --

6 MR. ROBERTS: Not the commodity. No, sir.

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Not that one, all right. Is that
8 something that, you know, you attempt or want or is it just too
9 overwhelming given the amount of --

10 MR. KIMICH: Well, with our resources, we really
11 wouldn't be able to --

12 MR. BUCK: That would be overwhelming. That would be a
13 lot.

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: That's what I -- okay.

15 MR. BUCK: There's a lot of product that goes through
16 the -- that use the ship channel.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. All right. Make sure I got -- I
18 think that covers most of the questions that I have at this point.
19 One thing I want to say before we leave is is there any addition
20 information or anything that you thought of or that you think
21 might be pertinent to our investigation or lessons learned that,
22 you know, you'd like to share that we could perhaps help with in
23 terms of improvements, or with HAZMAT, or something along those
24 lines?

25 MR. BUCK: Not at -- I don't have anything at this time

1 but I'm sure when we go through an after-action review, we will
2 discuss it.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Are you going to have your after action
4 review internally or do you guys do it with the unified command?
5 I mean, I know the unified command will have a hot wash later,
6 but --

7 MR. BUCK: I believe we'll probably do both.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Both. Can I ask, if there's anything
9 that does come out of it that you guys feel that we could help
10 with or move forward, definitely reach out to me and let me know.

11 MR. ROBERTS: Absolutely.

12 MR. BUCK: Sure.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Again, we're, you know, a safety
14 organization and anything we can do to help minimize any hiccups
15 or issues like that, it would be a good thing for us to know, so.

16 MR. BUCK: Sure.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. What else? Sorry. I was going
18 to ask -- yeah.

19 MR. USHER: Were you going to go around the table?

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: No. Yeah.

21 MR. USHER: Okay.

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: I was going to say, any --

23 MR. USHER: Yeah. Mike Usher, Houston Pilot Commission.
24 Gentlemen, I have a couple of follow-up questions with you, if you
25 don't mind.

1 Chief Kimich, were you ever asked to use your fireboat
2 foam on the *Carla*?

3 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

4 MR. USHER: Not by the master or the crew at any point?

5 MR. KIMICH: No.

6 MR. USHER: Okay. So you didn't dispatch any assets to
7 the *Carla* while you were on scene whatsoever?

8 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

9 MR. USHER: Okay. Chief Roberts, if I could ask you a
10 couple of questions about the evacuation that took place. You
11 said the shelter in place was secured first and then the
12 evacuation plan was put into effect?

13 MR. ROBERTS: That's correct.

14 MR. USHER: Okay. What time do you recall that was,
15 please?

16 MR. BUCK: 1317 for shelter in place.

17 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir. 1317.

18 MR. USHER: And what time was that secured?

19 MR. ROBERTS: The shelter in place was -- that was
20 immediate.

21 MR. BUCK: Um-hum.

22 MR. USHER: No. What time was it secured and the
23 evacuation plan taken into effect?

24 MR. ROBERTS: Oh, okay. 1415. Authorized evacuation
25 plan at Barbours Cut terminal.

1 MR. USHER: Who was in charge of that evacuation?

2 MR. ROBERTS: Deputy Chief --

3 MR. KIMICH: Kinchen.

4 MR. ROBERTS: Of Port Police.

5 MR. USHER: Okay. PHAPD then?

6 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir.

7 MR. USHER: Okay. That was Mr. Kinchen?

8 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir.

9 MR. USHER: Okay. Do you know if he -- were you

10 involved with how he organized or initiated that plan?

11 MR. ROBERTS: No. Actually, we had a lot of radio

12 traffic and I actually put him on their Ops channel for PD ops

13 channel and he dealt with the whole thing on that. And I advised

14 him if he needed anything or had any problems, let me know. He

15 took care of everything. I didn't hear a work from him other than

16 everybody is out and safe.

17 MR. USHER: Everybody's out and safe from where?

18 MR. ROBERTS: As far as Barbours Cut.

19 MR. USHER: Barbours Cut facility itself.

20 MR. ROBERTS: Morgan's Point was not issued an

21 evacuation.

22 MR. USHER: So the evacuation plan was initiated for

23 Barbours Cut terminal.

24 MR. ROBERTS: That's correct.

25 MR. USHER: Okay. Do you -- do you know if Mr. Kinchen

1 or Deputy Chief Kinchen's PHAPD called out any other police
2 officers, other assets to assist him --

3 MR. ROBERTS: Morgan's Point.

4 MR. USHER: -- with that evacuation plan?

5 MR. ROBERTS: Morgan's Point.

6 MR. USHER: Do you know if there were any obstacles or
7 any problems he encountered with his evacuation plan?

8 MR. ROBERTS: The only thing that we encountered was --
9 is we closed all the gates and as an incident commander, I kept
10 one gate open and that was Gate 12. All the other gates were to
11 be secured and locked and security guards to evacuate also. A
12 couple of the truck drivers were stuck at those gates, didn't
13 realize that Gate 12 was still open. But soon after that was
14 notified on camera. Deputy Kinchen -- Deputy Chief Kinchen sent
15 an officer over there and got those people to Gate 12 and out.

16 MR. USHER: Now, would you describe geographically where
17 is Gate 12 at Barbours Cut terminal?

18 MR. BUCK: Admin Building.

19 MR. ROBERTS: Administration Building approximately
20 midway point between Barbours Cut.

21 MR. USHER: Now you said those two truck drivers were
22 identified by camera?

23 MR. ROBERTS: Unknown how many truck drivers.

24 MR. USHER: All right.

25 MR. ROBERTS: I was just notified as truck drivers.

1 MR. USHER: Any stragglers inside the terminal that
2 hadn't evacuated were later discover or notified --

3 MR. ROBERTS: Correct.

4 MR. USHER: -- by camera.

5 MR. ROBERTS: Correct. And then a officer went over
6 there and escorted them out to another gate.

7 MR. USHER: Okay. You have any kind of a timeframe as
8 to when that may have happened? Just, if you don't have a log
9 entry of it, maybe Mr. Kinchen's would.

10 MR. ROBERTS: He -- he might have that log.

11 MR. USHER: Okay. Now where were --

12 MR. ROBERTS: Their log is separate from the fire
13 department log and I only have the fire department log present.

14 MR. USHER: Right. That's understandable. Where were
15 the stragglers inside Barbours Cut terminal identified at? What
16 was their geographical location in respect to Gate 12?

17 MR. ROBERTS: Further west at APM terminal.

18 MR. USHER: At APM terminal.

19 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir.

20 MR. USHER: So further west from Gate 12. Okay.

21 MR. ROBERTS: C5.

22 MR. USHER: So the -- I mean, the Gate 12 was at the
23 Admin Building. The stragglers were identified at APM.

24 MR. ROBERTS: Correct.

25 MR. USHER: APM Building.

1 MR. ROBERTS: Correct.

2 MR. USHER: West of the PHA Admin Building.

3 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir.

4 MR. USHER: And Gate 12. Okay. Very good. Were you in
5 the company of Mr. Kinchen when he identified those stragglers and
6 dispatched officers to go (indiscernible)?

7 MR. ROBERTS: We were sitting at the same table?

8 MR. USHER: You were?

9 MR. ROBERTS: We were.

10 MR. USHER: And you don't have a log entry of that time?

11 MR. ROBERTS: Not on my log. No.

12 MR. USHER: Okay. Again, we can check with PHAPD
13 records. That'd be fine. Okay. I think that's all I have.
14 Thank you.

15 MR. ROBERTS: You welcome.

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: All right. Let's see here. One follow-
17 up question to that was what resources did you have for in terms
18 of foam resources in case there was actually a fire on this
19 vessel?

20 MR. ROBERTS: We've got six containers.

21 What is the size of those containers there?

22 MR. BUCK: They're 250 gallon totes.

23 MR. ROBERTS: 250 gallon totes of AFFF.

24 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: AFFF? Okay.

25 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir. And they were readily available

1 and told that they could use them if needed to be, from between
2 Bay -- our Bayport facility Station 3 and Barbours Cut facility at
3 Station 2.

4 MR. KIMICH: Each boat 300 gallons of foam readily
5 available. Just --

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

7 MR. USHER: Muhamed, excuse me.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Sure.

9 MR. USHER: Just one other question.

10 Chief Buck, so is this -- when this -- or when the
11 shelter in place went into -- or actually when you received the
12 call, is it safe to say, correct me if I'm wrong, that you would
13 have pulled your assets from the Bayport terminal fire department
14 station so that you -- it's safe to say you pulled a two alarm, in
15 fire department terms?

16 MR. BUCK: Yes.

17 MR. USHER: For your assets and for manpower?

18 MR. BUCK: Yes.

19 MR. USHER: All right. Thank you.

20 MR. ROBERTS: And we did also pull an officer from
21 Bayport to assist too.

22 MR. USHER: Very good. Okay. Thank you.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. One last question, do you guys --
24 have you printed out the readouts of the AreaRAEs --

25 MR. KIMICH: No, sir.

1 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- or any of that? Do you intend -- do
2 you plan on -- does it record and log those?

3 MR. KIMICH: It does. It logs them.

4 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Can I get a copy of the readout logs?

5 MR. KIMICH: Sure. We'll get them to you.

6 MR. ERIKSSON: Sure.

7 MR. KIMICH: We'll go through Mr. Eriksson or go
8 straight to him or?

9 MR. ERIKSSON: Yeah. Just copy me on it.

10 MR. KIMICH: We'll copy you.

11 MR. ERIKSSON: I think that's fine.

12 MR. KIMICH: Yes, sir.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. When can I expect -- I know I've
14 asked -- I mean, I guess I was going to say, we have pictures, I
15 know the radio dispatch communications and logs. And did you guys
16 create any ICS records or like any of that or hand it over to you?

17 MR. BUCK: A lot of the, a lot of the ICS records came
18 when --

19 MR. ROBERTS: That's going to be unified command.

20 MR. BUCK: -- when the staff -- unified staff came.

21 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Okay. So --

22 MR. BUCK: Unified command staff.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. And then we have the AreaRAE
24 readout reports. So those --

25 MR. ROBERTS: Mike's down there now. Maybe he'll work

1 on it.

2 MR. ERIKSSON: Yeah. We'll work on it as soon as
3 possible.

4 MR. KIMICH: Okay. If it's possible to get you those,
5 which, with my understanding it is --

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Um-hum.

7 MR. ROBERTS: I've never printed it out.

8 MR. KIMICH: We've never done it. You know, these are
9 fairly new.

10 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

11 MR. KIMICH: But if at all possible, we will get you
12 those.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. That would be great.

14 MR. KIMICH: It's -- to my understanding it is set up
15 where that is a capability. But I don't know that for sure.

16 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah. I know you used to be able to run
17 through there and sort of I guess it would depend on --

18 MR. BUCK: We'll work on that today.

19 MR. KIMICH: We'll work on it today.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. That'd be great.

21 MR. KIMICH: If at all possible, we'll get that to you
22 today.

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Great. I have -- there are no
24 other questions or concern -- does anybody have questions for me
25 or concerns about anything? No? All right. With that, we'll

1 terminate.

2 MR. ERIKSSON: Thank you.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Thank you.

4 MR. ROBERTS: Thank you.

5 MR. KIMICH: Thanks.

6 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: M/V *CONTI PERIDOT* COLLISION WITH
 THE M/T *CARLA MAERSK* IN THE
 HOUSTON SHIP CHANNEL
 MARCH 9, 2015
 Group Interview of Port of Houston
 Authority Fire Department Personnel

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-MM-017

PLACE: Houston, TX

DATE: March 16, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Heidi Gardner
Transcriber



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials Investigations

July 13, 2015

Port of Houston Authority Fire Department
P.O. Box 2562
Houston, TX 77252-2561

Reference: Interview Regarding the Carla Maersk and Conti Peridot Accident in the Houston Ship Channel on March 9, 2015
NTSB Accident Number: DCA15MM017

Dear Chief Buck, Assistant Chief Roberts, and Assistant Chief Kimich:

Attached is a transcript of the group interview conducted on March 16, 2015, for the on-going NTSB investigation of the above referenced accident. Please review the transcript for accuracy and make any necessary editorial changes or additions. Your changes may be emailed to me; however, please ensure that you reference the relevant page and line number of the transcript for each change.

Once you have completed your review, sign the attached acknowledgment sheet indicating that you have reviewed the transcript and whether or not you are submitting changes. The acknowledgement sheet, along with any comments, must be emailed to me no later than noon (12 p.m.) on July 31, 2015.

These transcripts must be treated as confidential at this time. They are for your use only, and not for release. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) [REDACTED]. Thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Muhammed A. El-Zoghbi
Hazardous Materials Group Chairman

Enclosures:

1. Acknowledgment Sheet
2. Interview Transcript

Date _____