

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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COAST GUARD VESSEL CG 29113 AND
SAILING VESSEL VANGUARD TOWING
ACCIDENT MAY 3, 2017

Accident No.: DCA17PM012

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Interview of:



U.S. Coast Guard Facilities
New Orleans, Louisiana

Thursday,
May 11, 2017

APPEARANCES:

LUKE WISNIEWSKI, Marine Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Sector New Orleans
United States Coast Guard

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
District 8
United States Coast Guard

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] District 8 Legal
United States Coast Guard

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:39 p.m.)

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2
3 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. Good afternoon. My name is Luke
4 Wisniewski from the National Transportation Safety Board. Today
5 is May the 11th. The time is 1:39 p.m. We are at Sector New
6 Orleans. Today we are interviewing -- and can you state your name
7 and spell it for the transcription, please?

8 MR. [REDACTED] Yes, [REDACTED] E. [REDACTED] [REDACTED], first name [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] as in [REDACTED], [REDACTED] is P [REDACTED] R, [REDACTED], Search and
10 Rescue Controller for Operational Unit.

11 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Great, thank you for that. We're here today
12 to interview you regarding the CG 29113 small boat and sailing
13 vessel *Vanguard* that occurred on May 3rd. Could we go --

14 I'm going to first start off and just say that we're an
15 independent federal agency charged with determining the probable
16 cause of the transportation accident and promoting transportation
17 safety. We're not part of DOT or the U.S. Coast Guard, as you
18 know. And NTSB has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

19 Before I continue, can we go around the room and identify
20 everyone that's here?

21 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Good afternoon. This is [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Sector New Orleans.

23 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Good afternoon, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] D-8 Legal.

24 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Good afternoon. This is [REDACTED] 4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
25 District 8.

1 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Thank you. So the purpose of this
2 investigation is to increase safety. It's not to assign fault,
3 blame or liability. However, NTSB cannot offer a guarantee of any
4 confidentiality or immunity from legal or license action.

5 We would like to record this interview to ensure it for its
6 accuracy. Do you have any objection to recording this?

7 Mr. [REDACTED] are you okay with us recording this
8 conversation?

9 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. I am.

10 MR. WISNIEWSKI: The recording will then be transcribed and
11 you will have the opportunity to review the transcript before it
12 goes on the public docket. And it will have an errata sheet. And
13 just for technical and accuracy we ask that you review it and
14 provide us any changes needed.

15 Are you aware that you are allowed to have a representative
16 of your choice during this interview?

17 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. I've been made aware of that.

18 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. Do you need someone or is anyone
19 there with you?

20 MR. [REDACTED] No one is with me and I do not need any
21 assistance.

22 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay, thank you very much.

23 INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

24 BY MR. WISNIEWSKI:

25 Q. So let's go through then with your background, maritime

1 experience. So can you tell us when you joined the Coast Guard?

2 A. I joined the Coast Guard in 1983 -- excuse me, 1984 -- got
3 married in 1983. I served until -- active duty until 2009, was a
4 quartermaster as the rated position as an E-7 when I retired.
5 I've worked in four command centers and had numerous boats, SAR
6 experience. And I've been a civilian SAR controller, operational
7 until since 2009.

8 My experience as a civilian, I was at Coast Guard Sector
9 Northern New England for 6 years, and I have been at operational
10 unit or SAR controller at New Orleans for a little over 2 years.

11 Q. Okay, thank you. Can you share with us your educational
12 background?

13 A. Yes. I've got an Associate Degree in Criminal Justice from
14 the Prime Junior College, additional two semesters from the City
15 College. And I've been to SAR school in terms of Coast Guard Sea
16 School. I've been to SAR school for four times. I was an
17 instructor at the SAR school for 5 years. And I've been to law
18 enforcement school, law enforcement boarding officer school. And
19 I've had aids to navigation school, and that's about it. There's
20 some 1-week schools, but I have numerous one of those. I don't
21 know if you want me to go into those?

22 Q. No. I think we're good there. That's a great background.
23 Thank you. That's a good description.

24 Let's go into what your job title and position was and
25 responsibilities the night of May 2nd, your first involvement with

1 the sailing vessel *Vanguard*.

2 A. I came on the watch at 0500 in the morning. I'm responsible
3 for coordinating search and rescue missions, for pollution
4 response. Basically the operational unit is anything doing with
5 operations. NRC reports, contacting and getting information to
6 our pollution responder, also law enforcement to our law
7 enforcement duty officer and to any investigators involved in
8 that, and also keep a chain of command, keeping our chain of
9 command including the response officer, the command duty officer
10 informed of all operational missions that were transpired and
11 assist as needed with the other missions.

12 Q. Thank you for that. Let's go right into now your -- May 2nd
13 you've come on board. You've relieved the watch. Can you --
14 interactions with the *Vanguard* as it came into you?

15 A. The *Vanguard*, I got the initial call from a friend that said
16 that their friends were -- had some issues and were disabled in
17 their small sailing vessel; they couldn't go anywhere. They said
18 they were at the entrance -- she told me originally the eastern
19 entrance to the Rigolets. We found out later it was more into the
20 Rigolets. After I made contact with her friends, talked to her,
21 and we were able to determine a position and find out that they
22 were aground, their original report was that they were aground and
23 they were requesting assistance.

24 We told them -- I stated the marine assistance policy,
25 maritime SAR assistance policy to them and told them that we would

1 need to issue a broadcast to see if any commercial responders or
2 any Good Samaritan would be able to respond. We didn't get any
3 response to that. At the same time, we briefed Station New
4 Orleans and basically told them to get prepared to get underway.
5 And they pretty much launched at the completion of the 10 minutes.
6 Didn't really delay initiating any initial MARBs or marine
7 assistance request broadcasts.

8 They arrived on scene before I was relieved, but the coxon
9 made a decision at that point that they could not assist and they
10 could not go in there and salvage the vessel. So we told the
11 owner/operator and his wife that we could take them off. At that
12 point, from what I understand, it's kind of right there at the
13 relief time when they got on scene, and basically they declined to
14 come off the boat.

15 I learned later on the next day when I came in that we had
16 gone out a second time to take them off the boat. They decided
17 they needed to come off the boat and that the vessel was left at
18 anchor aground.

19 Do you want me to keep going here or do you want me to --

20 Q. Yes, please.

21 A. Elaborate more? When I came on watch in the morning I was
22 told that the vessel was left there and both the owner/operator
23 and his wife were taken off the previous evening on the second
24 sortie that was launched out from Station New Orleans because it
25 was too hazardous to get up there to try and do any type of

1 salvage.

2 Throughout the day we were monitoring, you know, the case,
3 and we knew that it was aground. We got a report that afternoon
4 from St. Tammany Sheriff's Department that they had a sailing
5 vessel that was adrift, unmanned and adrift, but we had requested
6 they try to get to the boat and secure it. And they said they
7 weren't allowed to do that with the weather conditions the way
8 they were.

9 So basically at that time I briefed Station New Orleans
10 again, the CDO and everybody was involved in this process, to see
11 if they could go get underway, get out there and corral it because
12 it was transiting towards the twin spans, which we were afraid if
13 it hit that it could cause some damage to the boat and to the
14 bridge. And see if they could get on scene to try to stabilize
15 the situation before it got worse.

16 During this time, I attempted to contact the owner, I would
17 say at least five or six times, and the friend. I did make
18 contact with the friend, the original friend. I can't remember
19 her name. And she attempted to get the wife of the owner/operator
20 again, but I never heard back from them, to let them know that
21 their boat was adrift and it was basically drifting into harm's
22 way and that they would be responsible for any damage that it
23 caused. She attempted several times but apparently she was never
24 able to get in touch with them.

25 This is right around relief time when I'm getting relieved.

1 The last thing that I was aware of was that the small boat, the 29
2 out of Station New Orleans, was on scene and they were evaluating
3 the situation. They had been told that when they get out there to
4 basically reassess the GAR. I think -- I tasked that, and I think
5 that the CDO office also had tasked it to reassess the GAR. I --
6 and then I was pretty much relieved from watch.

7 On the way across -- I live in Hickson (ph.) so I was
8 transiting across the twin spans, and I looked out to see if I
9 could see anything with it. I didn't see anything, you know, so I
10 called the operation center at that time talking to Petty Officer
11 Kersten, and asked him what the status of the case was, if they
12 had gotten out there. And he said that they had gotten out there
13 and they had that boat under tow. And that's pretty much where I
14 left it at. I figured everything was taken care of.

15 The next time I came in on watch I heard that the vessel had
16 gotten the prop fouled and become -- the 29 had gotten the prop
17 fouled and basically, while they were attempting to either shorten
18 the tow -- and this is all what -- hearsay that I heard, not that
19 I got directly.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. So but this was from the watch commander I relieved. I think
22 it was that Friday, the following Friday. And said that they had
23 drifted -- become a disabled boat and it drifted up against the
24 Highway 11 Bridge and hit one of the pilings and I guess crushed
25 the window bow on one side and the vessel took on water and sank.

1 The only other thing I have to add to that, I received a call
2 from the owner/operator that Friday asking me if I had an exact
3 position of where the boat sank because he was looking to get
4 somebody out there for it. I had -- the only thing I had was the
5 position that was tasked to me and that I could see in this whole
6 -- which I passed that to him. And that was about the end of the
7 conversation. He said he was going to attempt to get someone out
8 to salvage it. I know an NRC report was done on it earlier and
9 that's what I pretty much went by, I believe. I think I looked up
10 the NRC. So the -- that's pretty much it with my involvement with
11 it.

12 I know the first day that they went out -- to clarify, they
13 went out with two boats because there was two boat
14 (indiscernible). I think the 45 went out and the 29 also went
15 out, so -- and neither one of them could get up that close to the
16 boat from what I remember. But that was -- both those cases were
17 happening -- both days were right at the end of the day. So it
18 was kind of like on the transition period when we're doing a watch
19 relief, so --

20 Q. Okay. Well, thank you for that. Luke, NTSB. Just wanted to
21 dive in a little bit more on the pass-down from what you can
22 remember as a group, and really what came from the SMC, CDO down
23 to you back to the station --

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. -- on, you know, roughly the -- before you passed it over.

1 So I'm interested to know what was -- what were you told to do and
2 what was actually, you know, what was relayed to the station OOD?

3 A. No, I did not talk to the SMC. I talked to the CDO.

4 Basically want to make sure that the operational risk management
5 was reviewed and that everything was going to be done safely. And
6 that was passed, I believe, over to the station and to the -- when
7 the vessel got an opening they were supposed to -- the 29 I think
8 was supposed to re-evaluate, and as far as I know that took place.

9 Just basically we -- and I -- when I talked to Station New
10 Orleans, basically just reiterated that the maritime SAR
11 assistance policy that -- because the owner also was trying to --
12 when he's saying, well, will you refloat it? And I said we cannot
13 make that decision until we get on scene. And the coxon will make
14 the decision at that time if he thinks it's safe to refloat the
15 vessel. This is the first day, okay?

16 And basically from what I -- and that's when I got relieved,
17 so from what I understand, it was -- when he got out there they
18 declined. They were pretty much declining when I was getting
19 relieved. They didn't want to come off the boat. It was right
20 there within 5 or 10 minutes of the relief time one way or
21 another. They didn't want to come off the boat.

22 And I found out for sure the next morning that they did not
23 come off the boat when we first went out to get them, but they
24 came off later, that we went and did a second sortie to get them
25 off the boat that night. Did that answer the question?

1 Q. It did. And I guess I want to now understand as far as what
2 was passed to the -- to your reliefs regarding weather that
3 afternoon?

4 A. The -- in terms of what the weather was like, the only thing
5 I found it doing that it was the -- it was windy. And what we do
6 when we do a watch relief, we do another GAR model every time we
7 do watch relief. So I don't know what they came up with, but we
8 in the process we review the GAR, the wind, the weather and
9 everything else when it comes to risk management. Okay? So we
10 review all that stuff and they had had their own watch.

11 I tried to remember what our GAR score was for the day.
12 Right now I can't honestly remember. I can't remember what that
13 was. I know weather was an issue. I believe the wind was kicking
14 up pretty good, the seas were pretty choppy.

15 And the second day it was the wind was whipping pretty good
16 and then I guess that's why it broke free from it. I was told the
17 vessel was at anchor and they put the anchor out but -- and it was
18 aground, but it came free. So it broke or was dragging it or
19 something. So apparently the wind was coming through pretty good.

20 Q. Can you discuss a little bit, we've heard now that the
21 St. Tammany's Police Department was on the water that day and that
22 that's how it was reported to you.

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Do you know if it was relayed up to you? Can you recall any
25 of that conversation?

1 A. I did have a -- it was relayed to us basically -- I'm trying
2 to remember. It came through the SU saying that St. Tammany, and
3 then I took the call and they said they were -- that they would --
4 it was floating free and that they were not allowed -- we asked
5 them to go corral the boat so before it could cause any damage.
6 And we were told by them that they could not do it because of the
7 weather conditions. They were not allowed to take anybody in tow
8 or do anything when the winds exceeded what they were.

9 Q. Okay. Is that pretty much all that you -- okay. So they
10 couldn't take it under tow?

11 A. They couldn't do it. They kept an eye on it for a little
12 while, but the way we were able, the second day, to reestablish
13 the position is we talked to the Highway 11 railroad bridge
14 tender, who gave us an approximate position. And that was passed
15 to the 29 when it was going out there, that that's what they were
16 seeing. I passed it to the station and I believe the radioman
17 passed it -- our communications unit passed it to 29. And when
18 they -- the new position, and this was probably somewhere around
19 4 -- 1630.

20 Q. Thank you for that. Now I just want to go into -- we've
21 heard from a couple other interviews we've had here today about
22 you ran a drift model for the sailing vessel?

23 A. The -- well, I put one in there where it might be, yeah.

24 Q. And what information did you use to --

25 A. That's used from environmental data systems, EDS systems that

1 are located within the SAROPS program.

2 Q. Okay. So what inputs do you put in? Current, wind?

3 What's --

4 A. Right. Well, what we do is we have a -- the way SAROPS works
5 is you put in what your search object is. At that point I put in
6 what the -- that the sailboat de-masted, being pushed. You put in
7 what your tide and currents are, and I believe I -- I'd have to
8 double check, but I think I used just regular tides and currents
9 for that insert data and then I used the NAAS (ph.) winds, which
10 is the North American (indiscernible) System, which is local one
11 that we use most of the time there. And that drifted it out in
12 between the twin spans and the Highway 11 Bridge.

13 Q. Okay. Thank you.

14 A. I don't know how it got through the twin spans without
15 touching anything else. I don't know. It could have gone right
16 through, like, a building.

17 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. I'm going to open up the floor to
18 other investigators for questions. Thank you. That's all I have
19 at this time.

20 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

21 BY [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

22 Q. Good afternoon. This is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with the Sector.

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Did you have anyone else on watch with you?

25 A. Yeah. I was breaking in with Mr. Powell.

1 Q. Okay. Do you know --

2 A. And we were --

3 Q. Go ahead.

4 A. Yeah, he made several phone calls, too.

5 Q. Okay. Do you know who made the decision to tow the sailboat?

6 A. To do what, sir?

7 Q. To tow the sailboat?

8 A. For that afternoon? No. I was getting the -- I was on watch
9 before -- they were just arriving on scene from what I understood
10 from what was passed to me. We -- I passed to my relief that the
11 29 was underway and that they were en route over there to get it.
12 The bridge keeper was keeping an eye on it and they said it was --
13 I think it was approximately half a mile to a mile away from it
14 and drifting towards the bridge. And that's the last information
15 I passed to my watch relief.

16 Q. Okay. Thank you. I'd like to ask a process question. Is it
17 common to relieve the watch in the middle of cases?

18 A. Well, yeah, we do it pretty regularly. It just depends on
19 what the case is. I mean, we make sure that everyone -- you know,
20 if we have a SAROPS running that everybody can get into the SAROPS
21 and everything. That's what I do. It's not uncommon to stay for
22 a -- you know, 30 minutes maybe at the most, to carry over just to
23 make sure.

24 And depending on what time the case comes in, you've got to
25 make sure and catch up the MISLE entries and everything else

1 because that's your responsibility before you leave. So what we
2 did was we just continued the previous MISLE case. We reopened it
3 and basically went from that point on because it was the same
4 case.

5 The initial report was we didn't know for sure. That's why
6 we were -- also we launched -- it's a good point -- that we
7 launched Station New Orleans out there. We were 99 percent sure
8 that it was the same boat, the sailboat that fit the description
9 according to the St. Tammany, but we wanted to get them out there
10 just to verify. What we were looking to get also that was not
11 gotten the previous night, was the Florida numbers for the boat to
12 help us confirm that this was the boat.

13 But when they got on scene they determined it, but I wasn't
14 there when they got on scene from what -- so but when I left we
15 were 99 percent sure that this was the same sailboat, fit the
16 description, everything matched up. We just did not confirm the
17 Florida numbers with it because they had not been recorded from
18 the previous night. Nobody had those and I don't know why those
19 weren't gotten, but we were going under the assumption that it
20 probably was the sailboat, the same sailboat, but we were still
21 getting another boat out there just to make sure it was. And
22 that's one of our other underlying conditions why we sailed out
23 there. It was to try to keep it from worsening, the situation
24 worsening.

25 Q. Great. Thank you. Well, I have one more question. Did you

1 know anything about the condition of the sailboat, material
2 condition of the sailboat?

3 A. I did not know. The only thing I heard was that it was
4 adrift and that was from St. Tammany and that they couldn't get
5 it. That's basically it. He gave me a description what it looked
6 like. I asked him if it was, I believe -- I did talk to the
7 deputy one time and I think Mr. Powell might have talked to him
8 once before that. I'm not positive. I got basically confirming
9 what the description was. And that's why we come to the
10 conclusion that it was probably the same sailboat.

11 But I did not have any -- in terms of if there was any damage
12 to the sailboat, I did -- I was not aware of what the damage was,
13 if there was any.

14 [REDACTED] Great, thank you. I don't have any further
15 questions at this time.

16 BY [REDACTED]

17 Q. This is [REDACTED] Hey, sir, how you doing?

18 A. Good, sir. How are you doing, [REDACTED]

19 Q. I'm doing good. So I want to try to get this -- you said you
20 input a local wind into -- for your drift model. Was that a -- do
21 you recall what that wind speed was, sir?

22 A. I don't. I'd have to look at the SAROPS. It would -- what
23 it does is it automatically downloads what the wind is doing at
24 that time. You basically put a box around where you're searching
25 and it brings in the environmental data from that and it plugs it.

1 Now, there should be -- in the MISLE itself it should be --
2 winds should be there for the first day of the case. The second
3 day there should be another place for the wind for when we
4 basically -- we didn't reopen the case. It was still pending, but
5 there should have been a second wind input in when the boat got on
6 scene. We usually wait until the boat gets on scene and tasks us
7 with what the environmental conditions are. And then we confirm
8 that. We confirm the environmental data that was put into the
9 SAROPS strip with the on-scene unit.

10 Q. Okay. So at no time during your watch did you hear about any
11 on-scene weather conditions, either from the Coast Guard, SRU,
12 St. Tammany or even the bridge tender? Did any --

13 A. The only indication as to wind was from that -- was basically
14 St. Tammany when they said that it was -- it exceeded their
15 capabilities because of wind out there. I did not hear any -- we
16 did get -- there was a GAR model initially underway for the
17 station, but we didn't, we didn't get what their environmentals
18 were, but they did not say it was exceeding their capabilities.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Now, in the -- I'm trying to remember. They actually passed
21 the GAR to us before I left, and I don't remember a GAR --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- went down on scene and did an evaluation. But they were
24 basically asked to do that.

25 Q. Okay. So when you were headed -- you'd been relieved. You

1 were headed home. You were on the twin span and you said you
2 called your relief. I'm going to ask you what -- would you hazard
3 to guess what the actual wind was or --

4 A. It was whipping pretty good. It was whipping pretty good
5 across the twin spans.

6 Q. Okay. That --

7 A. I drive a -- I drive a Prius, so I don't know if I can -- it
8 gets blown around by a 10 or 15 -- I think probably about at least
9 15 to 20 at least, maybe seeing gusts up to 25 coming across
10 there. It's kind of hard to tell right there.

11 Q. Understood. I make that commute.

12 A. I'm low, I'm low to the ground so it could have been higher
13 than that, but it was moving me around. It was moving the car
14 around a little bit.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. So to do that it would have to be pretty, pretty big.

17 Q. Okay. Great, thank you for that. Let me ask you, were --
18 I'm still trying to get in my head how -- who actually
19 communicated to whom at the station what the tasking was? Did you
20 make that initial phone call as the qualified OU to the Station
21 New Orleans OD?

22 A. Yeah. We called them. I called them and told them that we
23 needed them underway if they could, you know. We had the boat
24 that was adrift. It was drifting and if they could go out there
25 and see if they could do something with it. And I didn't get any

1 pushback that they couldn't go.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. So nothing was told to me, you know, that they couldn't go
4 and they couldn't do it. I mean, I always -- if a coxon says they
5 can't do something or if it's too hazardous, then that's their
6 call.

7 Q. Right.

8 A. And I'm not going to --

9 Q. Right.

10 A. -- force a boat to get underway --

11 Q. Right.

12 A. -- if it's not safe. I mean it's --

13 Q. Right. But you did indicate that this would be -- that a tow
14 would -- is probably going to be what your expectation is as to
15 how that --

16 A. Well, I can't remember. I don't think I said tow. I said,
17 you know, things -- see if we could stabilize it, which the only
18 way to stabilize it would be to tow it, so --

19 Q. Okay. Okay.

20 A. So I -- the -- when I left the basic (indiscernible)
21 operations for it was, when I briefed my relief, was they're going
22 out there to take a look at it and see if they can do anything
23 with it.

24 Q. Okay. Do you recall whom that you spoke with at Station New
25 Orleans? Was it the --

1 A. I don't --

2 Q. -- OD, break in OD?

3 A. I think it was the OD. I can't remember for sure.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I'm sorry.

6 Q. Okay. Were you aware that Station New Orleans decided to
7 launch a 29 for this case? They were going to trailer to the
8 north shore and use a 29?

9 A. I know they had -- no, that's what I heard they were going to
10 do is they're going to trailer it. And so I assumed they looked
11 everything over and that was the best way to do it.

12 Q. Okay. Okay. Were you aware that the coxon that they had
13 decided to send on this sortie was a brand new coxon and was --

14 A. No, I found that, I found that out I think on the Friday --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- when I came back.

17 Q. Were you aware that the coxon that they chose to send was
18 also limited to daytime only sorties?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. But it was still light when all this went down, so --

22 Q. Understood.

23 A. I was not aware. I was not aware of that, no.

24 Q. Okay. Do --

25 A. I did not know any of the -- and I'm trying to remember if we

1 got the GAR in before -- they said what their GAR was when they
2 were leaving. I don't remember if it came before I left, to tell
3 you the truth.

4 Q. Do you recall whether or not you or your break-in when
5 communicating with Station New Orleans passed that St. Tammany
6 said that they couldn't handle this, that they couldn't tow the
7 boat because it had exceeded their agency's parameters?

8 A. Well, it was passed -- I told the -- when I first talked to
9 them from whatever number I told them that we received a report
10 from St. Tammany.

11 Q. Right.

12 A. They weren't able to do anything with it because it was
13 outside their capabilities.

14 Q. Okay. Okay.

15 A. They can't do it with the wind.

16 Q. Okay. So and that was via phone? You communicated that via
17 phone so we should have a --

18 A. Yeah. It should be in there, I think.

19 Q. Great. Okay. Okay. I'm just trying to get a feel for
20 whether the station realized the on-scene conditions, what they
21 were. So that's all I'm trying to get at, sir. I have no
22 further --

23 A. It should be in the entry that when we first got notified.
24 It should be in there with what was passed.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I think that's all --

2 Q. Okay. I have no further questions at this moment.

3 A. (Indiscernible) so I'm not sure if he entered it or I did.

4 So --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I try to let the break-in do most of the work.

7 [REDACTED] That's good. That's good.

8 BY MR. WISNIEWSKI:

9 Q. Luke with NTSB. Can you go through -- you indicated that the
10 bridge tender operator contacted. Did they contact you directly?

11 A. What's that? No, we made the -- we looked it up and we
12 contacted them so they could give us an idea of what was going on
13 with it, to see if they could see it, because we were -- when I
14 drifted it it was drifting in between the two. So we wanted to
15 know if they could see it. And at first they said no and then we
16 contacted -- they called us back and then they said, yeah, I got
17 it.

18 So at that point it was like a mile away but it was -- and we
19 asked them where it was drifting. They said it was drifting
20 towards the bridge slowly. And Mr. Powell, I believe, talked to
21 them and he's the one that took that information. So, and that's
22 what was passed over to Station New Orleans.

23 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay, thank you. That's all I have.

24 [REDACTED] That's all I have.

25 BY MR. WISNIEWSKI:

1 Q. Okay. Before we conclude this interview, we thank you for
2 your time, especially on your holiday time off.

3 A. No problem.

4 Q. So before we stop here, though, can I ask you is there
5 anything you'd like to add or change?

6 A. No, but I would like to review my initial entries, just make
7 sure everything -- because I'm trying to remember this all from
8 memory today. You know, I didn't review the MISLE. And like I
9 said, if it's not documented then it wasn't done. So to kind of
10 refresh my memory on some of these things, because I'm kind of
11 doing this all from memory. So, but I -- to the best of my
12 knowledge it's correct.

13 So the -- it started out as like a pretty benign case type of
14 thing. On the second, in my opinion, it was like one of the ones
15 that we get pretty typical, boat ran aground, sailboat ran
16 aground. We couldn't do anything with it. And we were -- I
17 thought -- the people didn't want to come off of it from what I
18 heard later on and then they were taken off. Then the next day
19 basically, you know, we got the report, we didn't -- we wanted to
20 try to limit the damage and just confirm that this was the same
21 boat. I mean, we were not 100 percent sure that this was the same
22 boat, but we were confident enough to where we were prosecuting as
23 such, but we wanted to get somebody out there, eyes on it to
24 confirm that and verify the information. So that was playing into
25 it.

1 Q. Okay, thank you for that. Yes, and understood you're
2 grabbing all of this from your memory.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. You're doing the best you can as far as recalling the events
5 as they unfolded. We really appreciate it.

6 A. So Mr. Powell --

7 Q. This helps us as an --

8 A. -- you know, was briefing anything, he was talking on the
9 phone. So I -- you know, between the two of us, the MISLE entries
10 were being done. So that should be a pretty good record of
11 exactly what was transpiring to that. I know you want an input
12 what we were thinking at the time, but -- so hopefully I've been
13 able to give you that, what my logic and my process was in order
14 to accomplish this and bring resolution to the case. So basically
15 I hope you've got a good picture from that. If not, you know, can
16 I clarify anything?

17 Q. No, that -- understood. And we thank you for that.

18 I guess I have one just final question as far as, you know,
19 you've had some time now to think about it. There's not been
20 really a hotwash or lessons learned yet developed, but is there
21 anything that you'd like to suggest to us today about -- for
22 preventing this type of reoccurrence?

23 A. Oh, well, the, you know, hindsight's 20/20. I rely on my
24 station and their knowledge of their own personnel to basically,
25 you know, come up with their GAR model of the -- I wish I would

1 have known that it was, you know, a less experienced person there,
2 but the -- everything -- the first -- and I don't know if the
3 coxon for the first day was the same the second day. But
4 everything the first day seemed like it went according to Coast
5 Guard policy. We went out there. We couldn't do anything with it
6 so we offered to take them off. They didn't come off, so then
7 they called back later, and we took them off.

8 The second day this was, like I said, trying to keep the
9 situation to get worse and hit the bridge, do some damage to the
10 bridge and then also just positively identify the boat. So I
11 mean, I think everybody was trying to do the right thing in it,
12 but -- so I hate that it happened.

13 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Well, okay. We'd like to just go around the
14 table one more time. Any questions?

15 BY [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

16 Q. Hey, so this is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I just wanted to
17 remind you that the mishap, Commandant's Mishap Board, and I think
18 that Mr. Lall (ph.), let you know as well, they would like to
19 interview you also.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. I'm not sure whether they're going to do it telephonically or
22 not. Mr. [REDACTED] should pass that information to you, but just
23 wanted to remind you that they're looking to interview you as
24 well.

25 A. Okay.

1 Q. So and appreciate, really appreciate you making yourself
2 available on leave.

3 A. Okay. And you said that was going to be sent to me for me to
4 review? And now I do have a question for you. Do you want me, if
5 there was anything that I remember in the -- refresh my memory
6 with the MISLE or anything like that and make corrections to that
7 or just -- are you just going to compare the two? I don't know if
8 you want -- you said for my review and for my signature and
9 everything. And then do you want me to change it or you just want
10 me to make notations to it? How do you want me to do that?

11 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Oh, so let me clarify. That's for the
12 transcript from this recording.

13 MR. [REDACTED] Oh, okay.

14 MR. WISNIEWSKI: You'll have the opportunity to review it
15 and --

16 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

17 MR. WISNIEWSKI: -- check for its accuracy. So if there's
18 any words, anything that transcribed, misheard, we want you just
19 to correct that. That's all.

20 MR. [REDACTED] Oh, okay. That sounds good. I
21 (indiscernible).

22 MR. WISNIEWSKI: It should be a very benign task, but you'll
23 have exactly what you said. You'll have your own record of it.

24 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

25 MR. WISNIEWSKI: And we just ask, you know, for its accuracy

1 to let us know --

2 MR. [REDACTED] When you -- when they send that to me, do I
3 need to sign that it's accurate?

4 MR. WISNIEWSKI: There is. There will be an errata sheet
5 attached to it, correct. And it's --

6 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

7 MR. WISNIEWSKI: -- pretty much spelled out what you need to
8 do on that transcript form.

9 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. I should be back in town by next Tuesday
10 or Wednesday.

11 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. It's not --

12 MR. [REDACTED] I go on duty -- I don't have duty until that
13 following Friday.

14 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. It's not that quick. It's going to
15 take about a month.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. All right.

17 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Appreciate your time. This concludes the
18 interview. The time is 2:19.

19 (Whereupon, at 2:19 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: COAST GUARD VESSEL CG 29113 AND
SAILING VESSEL VANGUARD TOWING
ACCIDENT MAY 3, 2017
Interview of [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA17PM012

PLACE: New Orleans, Louisiana

DATE: May 11, 2017

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

[REDACTED]

Teresa Holevas
Transcriber



National Transportation Safety Board
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Subj: USCGC NOLA RB-S 9113 and S/V Vanguard towing accident on May 3rd, 2017

Accident No.: DCA17PM012

To: [REDACTED] USCG GS-Civilian

Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

Enclosed with this email is a copy of the transcript of interview for the towing accident that occurred on the evening of May 3rd, 2017 with United States Coast Guard Station New Orleans CG NOLA RB-S 291113 and S/V Vanguard in Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana. Kindly review this transcript for accuracy and provide corrections, if any, in the attached table. Please print, sign, and return it to me via email by September 15th, 2017.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter. If you have any question regarding the process please feel free to contact me.

I look forward to your response.

Best Regards,

Luke Wisniewski

Investigator-in-Charge (IIC)
Office of Marine Safety
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, DC 20594
Office: [REDACTED]
Fax: (2 [REDACTED])
[REDACTED]



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TABLE OF CORRECTIONS FOR TRANSCRIPT INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED]
RECORDED ON May 11, 2017

PAGE NUMBER	LINE NUMBER	CURRENT WORDING	CORRECTED WORDING
6	13-14	Yes. I've got an Associate Degree in Criminal Justice from the Prime Junior College, additional two semesters from the City College. prime	Yes. I've got an Associate Degree in Criminal Justice from the Hinds Junior College, additional two semesters from the Mississippi College.
6	15-16	And I've been to SAR school in terms of Coast Guard Sea School.	And I've been to SAR school 4 times.
7	4-5	Basically the operational unit is anything doing with operations.	Basically the operational unit is responsible for anything dealing with operations.
7	5-11	NRC reports, contacting and getting information to our pollution responder, also law enforcement 0 enforcement duty officer and to any investigators involved in that, and also keep a chain of command, keeping our chain of command including the response officer, the command duty officer informed of all operational missions that were transpired and assist as needed with the other missions.	The OU deals with NRC reports, contacting and getting information to our pollution responder, also law enforcement , and notify investigators of cases they need to be aware off. Also I am required to keep a chain of command briefed. This includes the response officer, the command duty officer, SMC, and Commanding Officer of all operational aspect of missions that have transpired.
7	15-19	The Vanguard, I got the initial call from a friend that said that their friends were -- had some issues and were disabled in their small sailing vessel; they couldn't go anywhere. They said they were at the entrance -- she told me originally the eastern entrance to the Rigolets.	The Vanguard, I got the initial call from a friend that said that their friends were at the entrance to the Rigolets had some issues and were disabled in their small sailing vessel; they couldn't go anywhere. She told me originally the S/V was at the Eastern entrance to the Rigolets.
7	20-23	After I made contact with her friends, talked to her, and we were able to determine a positon and find out that they were	After I made contact with the owners of the S/V, and we were able to determine that their position and find out that they were aground, their original report was that they



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		aground, their original report was that they was aground and they were requesting assistance.	was disabled was incorrect at the Eastern entrance to the Rigolets and they were actual further inside and they were requesting assistance .
7	24-25	We told them -- I stated the marine assistance policy, maritime SAR assistance policy to them and told them that we would any Good Samaritan would be able to respond. We didn't get any	I stated the Maritime SAR assistance policy to them to see if any Good Samaritans be able to respond. We issued MARB , but didn't get any response.
8	2		
8	5	And they pretty much launched at the completion of the 10 minutes	Sta New Orleans pretty much launched at the completion of the 10 minutes
8	6-7	Didn't really delay initiating any initial MARBs or marine assistance request broadcasts.	We Didn't really delay initiating any initial MARBs or marine assistance request broadcasts.
8	8-10	They arrived on scene before I was relieved, but the coxon made a decision at that point that they could not assist and they could not go in there and salvage the vessel. So we told the	They arrived on scene before I was relieved, but the coxswain made a decision at that point that they could not assist. They could not go in there and salvage the vessel. So we told the
8	16	gone out a second time to take them off the boat. They decided	gone out a second time and taken them off the boat. They decided
8	19	Do you want me to keep going here or do you want me to --	Do you want me to keep going here or do you want me to stop
9	3	and we knew that it was aground. We got a report that afternoon	and we knew that it was aground. We then got a report that afternoon
9	5	vessel that was adrift, unmanned and adrift, but we had requested	vessel that was adrift, unmanned and adrift, but we requested
9	8	they were.	It was and size of S/V.
9	10	again, the CDO and everybody was involved in this process, to see	again, the CDO and everybody else that was involved in this process, to see
9	11	if they could go get underway, get out there and corral it because	I asked Sta New Orleans if they could go get underway, get out there and stabilize or corral it because,
9	14-15	bridge. And see if they could get	bridge. I wanted to see if they could get on



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		on scene to try to stabilize the situation before it got worse.	scene to try to stabilize the situation before it got worse.
9	17	say at least five or six times, and the friend. I did make	say at least five or six times, and the friend. I did make with negres.
10	2	out of Station New Orleans, was on scene and they were evaluating	out of Station New Orleans, were getting on scene and they were evaluating
10	4	basically reassess the GAR. I think -- I tasked that, and I think	basically reassess the GAR. I believe I tasked that, and I think
10	5-6	that the CDO office also had tasked it to reassess the GAR. I -- and then I was pretty much relieved from watch.	that the CDO office also had tasked it to reassess the GAR. I was then pretty much relieved of watch
10	7	On the way across -- I live in Hickson (ph.) so I was	On the way across -- I live in Picayune, Ms) so I was
10	16	gotten the prop fouled and become -- the 29 had gotten the	gotten the prop fouled and become disabled. The 29 had gotten the prop
10	18	the tow -- and this is all what - - hearsay that I heard, not that	The tow -- and this is all what heard from another watch stander it's- hearsay that I heard, not that
10	21	So but this was from the watch commander I relieved. I think	So but this was from the watch operation duty Officer I relieved. I think
10	23	drifted -- become a disabled boat and it drifted up against the	Drifted against the bridge after becoming disabled. The boat then t drifted up against the bridge
11	4-5	somebody out there for it. I had -- the only thing I had was the position that was tasked to me and that I could see in this whole	somebody out there for it. I had the last posn from the case so I passed the only thing I had was the position that was passed to me and that I could see in MISLE.
11	10-11	the NRC. So the -- that's pretty much it with my involvement with it.	the NRC. So the that's pretty much it with my involvement with it.
11	12-14	know the first day that they went out -- to clarify, they went out with two boats because there was two boat	know the first day that they went out to clarify, they went out with two boats because there was two boat training
11	14-17	I think the 45 went out and the 29 also went out, so -- and neither one of them could get up that close to the boat from what	I think the 45 went out with the 29 because they were out training. Neither one of them could get up that close to the boat from what I remember. But that was on at the



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		I remember. But that was -- both those cases were happening -- both days were right at the end of the day..	same time as another case that was happening. Both days were right at the end of the day..
11	17-19	So it was kind of like on the transition period when we're doing a watch relief, so --	So it was kind of like on the transition period when we're doing a watch relief.
12	6-8	I believe, over to the station and to the -- when the vessel got an opening they were supposed to - - the 29 I think was supposed to re-evaluate, and as far as I know that took place.	I believe, over to the station and to the OOD when the vessel got an underway they were supposed to conduct GAR. The 29 was supposed to re-evaluate, and as far as I know that took place.
		Just basically we -- and I -- when I talked to Station New Orleans, basically just reiterated that the maritime SAR assistance policy	Just basically we talked to Station New Orleans, basically just reiterated that the maritime SAR assistance policy.
12	11-12	that -- because the owner also was trying to --when he's saying, well, will you refloat it?	That's because the owner also was trying to us to refloat. when he's kept saying, well, will you refloat it?
12	16	And basically from what I -- and that's when I got relieved,	And basically from what I remember, and that's when I got relieved,
12	17-18	so from what I understand, it was -- when he got out there they declined.	so from what I understand, it was when we got out there they declined.
13	4-5	The -- in terms of what the weather was like, the only thing I found it doing that it was the -- it was windy.	In terms of what the weather was like, the only thing I found it doing that it was windy.
13	16-18	I was told the vessel was at anchor and they put the anchor out but -- and it was aground, but it came free.	I was told the vessel was at anchor and that they put the anchor out but broke free. it was aground, but it came free.
14	1-2	I did have a -- it was relayed to us basically -- I'm trying to remember.	I did have a conversation it was relayed to us basically from St. Tammany 911. I'm trying to remember.
14	2-5	It came through the SU saying that St. Tammany, and then I took the call and they said they were -- that they would --it was floating free and that they were	It came through the SU saying that St. Tammany, and then I took the call and they said they were o/s and that it was floating free and that they were not allowed to tow we asked them to go corral the boat so



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		not allowed -- we asked them to go corral the boat so before it could cause any damage.	before it could cause any damage.
14	6-7	And we were told by them that they could not do it because of the weather conditions.	And we were told by them that they could not do it because of the weather conditions And size of vessel.
14	11-14	They couldn't do it. They kept an eye on it for a little while, but the way we were able, the second day, to reestablish the position is we talked to the Highway 11 railroad bridge tender, who gave us an approximate position.	They couldn't do it. They kept an eye on it for a little while. The way we were able to relocate it the second day was through talking to the Highway 11 railroad bridge tender, who gave us an approximate position.
14	16-17	I passed it to the station and I believe the radioman passed it -- our communications unit passed it to 29.	I passed it to the station and I believe the radioman passed it to the 29. Our communications unit passed it to 29.
14	17-19	And when they -- the new position, and this was probably somewhere around 4 -- 1630.	And when they got the new position, it was probably somewhere around 4:30 or 1630.
14	23	The -- well, I put one in there where it might be, yeah.	The drift well, I drifted it to see where it might be, yeah.
15	4-6	Right. Well, what we do is we have a -- the way SAROPS works is you put in what your search object is. At that point I put in what the -- that the sailboat de-masted, being pushed.	Right. Well, what we do is we have a object. The way SAROPS works is you put in what your search object is. At that point I put in the search object as a sailboat de-masted, being pushed.
15	6-11	You put in what your tide and currents are, and I believe I -- I'd have to double check, but I think I used just regular tides and currents for that insert data and then I used the NAAS (ph.) winds, which is the North American (indiscernible) System, which is local one that we use most of the time there.	You put in what your tide and currents are, -- I'd have to double check, but I think I used just regular tides and currents for that insert data and then I used the NAM_CONUS_12km_W) winds, which is the North American mesoscale) System, which is local one that we use most of the time there. AGG_ADCIRC_GHycom_C*4 FOR CURRENTS
16	8-11	For that afternoon? No. I was getting the -- I was on watch before -- they were just	For that afternoon? No. I was getting relieved I was on watch before they got there. They were just arriving on scene from



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		arriving on scene from what I understood from what was passed to me. We -- I passed to my relief that the 29 was underway and that they were en route over there to get it.	what I understood from what was passed to me. We -- I passed to my relief that the 29 was underway and that they were en route over there to stabilize it.
16	12-14	The bridge keeper was keeping an eye on it and they said it was - -I think it was approximately half a mile to a mile away from it and drifting towards the bridge.	The bridge keeper was keeping an eye on it and they said it was drifting toward bridge. I think it was approximately half a mile to a mile away from it and drifting towards the bridge.
16	19-21	I mean, we make sure that everyone -- you know, if we have a SAROPS running that everybody can get into the SAROPS and everything.	I mean, we make sure that everyone is comfortable with cases, you know, if we have a SAROPS running we make sure that everybody can get into the SAROPS
16	22-23	a -- you know, 30 minutes maybe at the most, to carry over just to make sure.	a few minutes you know, 30 minutes maybe at the most, to carry over just to make sure.
17	5-7	The initial report was we didn't know for sure. That's why we were -- also we launched -- it's a good point -- that we launched Station New Orleans out there.	When we received the report the 2 nd day we didn't know for sure if it was the same S/V. That's why we were in the uncertainty phase and why we launched. it's a good point to ere on the side of caution. That's why we launched Station New Orleans out there.
17	13-16	But when they got on scene they determined it, but I wasn't there when they got on scene from what -- so but when I left we were 99 percent sure that this was the same sailboat, fit the description, everything matched up.	But when they got on scene they determined it was same, but I wasn't there when they got on scene. But when I left we were 99 percent sure that this was the same sailboat, fit the description, everything matched up.
17	16-19	We just did not confirm the Florida numbers with it because they had not been recorded from the previous night.	We had the numbers from St Tammany , but we just did not confirm the Florida numbers with it because they had not been recorded from the previous night.
17	21-24	And that's one of our other underlying conditions why	And that's one of our other underlying conditions why we sailed out there. The



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		we sailed out there. It was to try to keep it from worsening, the situation worsening.	other reason was to try to keep the situation worsening.
18	6-8	I asked him if it was, I believe -- I did talk to the deputy one time and I think Mr. Powell might have talked to him once before that.	I asked him if it was damaged I believe I talk to the deputy one time and I think Mr. Powell might have talked to him once before that.
18	11-13	But I did not have any -- in terms of if there was any damage to the sailboat, I did -- I was not aware of what the damage was, if there was any.	But I did not have idea if there was any damage to the sailboat, I was not aware of what the damage was, if there was any.
18	22-24	It would -- what it does is it automatically downloads what the wind is doing at that time.	What it does is it automatically downloads what the wind/current is doing at that time.
19	2-4	The second day there should be another place for the wind for when we basically -- we didn't reopen the case.	The second day there should be another place for the weather in MISLE for when we reopen the case.
19	13-15	The only indication as to wind was from that -- was basically St. Tammany when they said that it was -- it exceeded their capabilities because of wind out there.	The only indication as to wind was the weather we basically got from St. Tammany when they said that it was windy and it exceeded their capabilities because of wind out there.
19	15-18	I did not hear any -- we did get -- there was a GAR model initially underway for the station, but we didn't, we didn't get what their environmentals were, but they did not say it was exceeding their capabilities.	I did not hear any weather conditions. We did get the 29ft GAR model initially underway from the station, we didn't get what their environmental conditions were, but they did not say it was exceeding their capabilities.
19	20-21	Now, in the -- I'm trying to remember. They actually passed the GAR to us before I left, and I don't remember a GAR --	Now, in the green I'm trying to remember. They actually passed the GAR to us before I left, and I don't remember a GAR number.
19	23-24	-- went down on scene and did an evaluation. But they were	When on scene the 29ft should have re-evaluated their GAR. They were basically



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		basically asked to do that.	asked to do that.
20	7-10	I drive a -- I drive a Prius, so I don't know if I can -- it gets blown around by a 10 or 15 -- I think probably about at least 15 to 20 at least, maybe seeing gusts up to 25 coming across there. It's kind of hard to tell right there.	I drive a Prius, so I don't know if I can say for sure. It gets blown around by a 10 or 15kts of wind. I think the wind was probably about at least 15 to 20 at least, maybe seeing gusts up to 25 coming across there. It's kind of hard to tell right there.
20	16	So to do that it would have to be pretty, pretty big.	So to do that it would have to be pretty, strong.
21	4-6	I mean, I always -- if a coxswain says they can't do something or if it's too hazardous, then that's their call.	I mean, I always defer to the coxswain. if a coxswain says they can't do something or if it's too hazardous, then that's their call.
21		And I'm not going to --	And I'm not going to force a coxswain to get U/W when it's not safe.
21	12	if it's not safe. I mean it's --	-- if it's not safe. I mean it's the coxswain call
21	16-18	Well, I can't remember. I don't think I said tow. I said, you know, things -- see if we could stabilize it, which the only way to stabilize it would be to tow it, so --	Well, I can't remember. I don't think I said tow. I said, you know, things like see if we could stabilize it, which the only way to stabilize it would be to tow it, so I was going to let coxswain make call once onscene
21	20-23	so I -- the -- when I left the basic (indiscernible) operations for it was, when I briefed my relief, was they're going out there to take a look at it and see if they can do anything with it.	So I was thinking when I left watch that the basic concept of operations was that they're going out there to take a look at it and see if they can do anything with it.
22	1	I don't --	I don't remember for sure
22	9-11	I know they had -- no, that's what I heard they were going to do is they're going to trailer it. And so I assumed they looked everything over and that was the best way to do it.	I knew they had . that's what I heard they were going to do is they're going to trailer it. And so I assumed they looked everything over and that was the best way to do it.
22	21	But it was still light when all this went down, so --	But it was still light when all this went down.
22	25	I did not know any of the -- and	I did not know any of this and I'm trying to



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23	1-3	I'm trying to remember if we got the GAR in before -- they said what their GAR was when they were leaving. I don't remember if it came before I left, to tell you the truth.	remember if we got the GAR in before they got U/W.-- they said what their GAR was when they were trailering . I don't remember if it came before I left, to tell you the truth.
24	15-16	And at first they said no and then we contacted -- they called us back and then they said, yeah, I got it.	And at first they said no and then they called us back and then they said, yeah, I got it.
24	22-23	So, and that's what was passed over to Station New Orleans.	So, that's what was passed over to Station New Orleans.
25	11-12	So, but I -- to the best of my knowledge it's correct.	So, to the best of my knowledge it's correct.
25	16-14	So the -- it started out as like a pretty benign case type of thing	So the case started out as like a pretty benign case type of thing
25	13-25	So the -- it started out as like a pretty benign case type of thing. On the second, in my opinion, it was like one of the ones that we get pretty typical, boat ran aground, sailboat ran aground. We couldn't do anything with it. And we were -- I thought -- the people didn't want to come off of it from what I heard later on and then they were taken off. Then the next day basically, you know, we got the report, we didn't -- we wanted to try to limit the damage and just confirm that this was the same boat. I mean, we were not 100 percent sure that this was the same boat, but we were confident enough to where we were prosecuting as such, but we wanted to get somebody out there, eyes on it to confirm that and verify the information. So that was playing	So the case started out as like a pretty benign aground case . On the second day , In my opinion, it was like one of the ones that we get pretty typical, boat ran aground, sailboat ran aground. We couldn't do anything with it. I thought the people didn't want to come off of it from what I heard later on and then they were taken off. Then the next day we got the report of the vessel adrift, I was not positive it was same vessel so I thought it was prudent to send a unit out. I figured that it probably the same vessel. And I figure that we could probably stabilize the situation. We didn't just want to try to limit the damage and stabilize the boat we were trying to confirm that this was the same boat. I mean, we were not 100 percent sure that this was the same boat, but we were confident enough to where we were prosecuting as such, but we wanted to get somebody out there, eyes on it to confirm that and verify the information. So that was playing into it.



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		into it.	
26	6	So Mr. Powell --	So Mr. Powell should be able to fill in some of the blanks.
26	8-9	- you know, was briefing anything, he was talking on the phone. So I -- you know, between the two of us, the MISLE entries were being done.	Mr. Powell was also briefing, he was talking on the phone. So between the two of us, the MISLE entries were being done.
26	11-14	I know you want an input what we were thinking at the time, but -- so hopefully I've been able to give you that, what my logic and my process was in order to accomplish this and bring resolution to the case	I know you want an input what we were thinking at the time, so hopefully I've been able to give you that, what my logic and my process was in order to accomplish this and bring resolution to the case
26	24-25	I rely on my station and their knowledge of their own personnel to basically, you know, 26come up with their GAR model of the --	I rely on my station and their knowledge of their own personnel to basically, you know, come up with their GAR model
26 27	25 1-3	I wish I would have known that it was, you know, a less experienced person there, but the -- everything -- the first -- and I don't know if the coxon for the first day was the same the second day.	I wish I would have known that it was, you know, a less experienced person there, but the OOD knew everything and I relied on him. I don't know if the coxswain for the first day was the same the second day.

If, to the best of your knowledge, no corrections are needed kindly circle the statement "no corrections needed" and initial in the space provided.

NO CORRECTIONS NEEDED. _____
Initials

Printed Name of Person providing the above information



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Signature of Person providing the above information

9/8/17
Date