

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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FAIRCHEM FILLY ACCIDENT * Accident No.: DCA19FM037

MAY 30, 2019 *

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Interview of: FAIK YOLUN

Captain, *Fairchem Filly*Aboard the *Fairchem Filly*

Tuesday,

June 4, 2019

APPEARANCES:

■■■■ Investigator
United States Coast Guard

BART BARNUM, Marine Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

LUKE WISNIEWSKI, Marine Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

AJIT BALWANT NATU
Fleet Management

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED] Good afternoon. This is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 U.S. Coast Guard, Sector Houston, on board the *Fairchem Filly*.
 It's June 4th, 2019, approximately 1558, interviewing the master
 of the vessel. In attendance for the interview are --

MR. YOLUN: Captain Faik Yolun, master of the vessel.

BY

Q. With -- what other companies have you worked for?

1 A. One of them the Oxide. The other one is Talesun (ph.).
2 Other one is Sculp -- not -- Skull (ph.) tanker. Also, all of
3 them the British company. One of them is the -- with the
4 international company. They divided two now, and one part is in
5 the Singapore, one part is Poland, the (indiscernible) brothers
6 company.

7 Q. Okay. And has this all been as a capacity as a master or --

8 A. Yeah, master.

9 Q. Master. How long have you been a master?

10 A. Since 2004.

11 Q. 2004? And then previous, how -- when did you start your sea
12 career?

13 A. 1993.

14 Q. 1993?

15 A. When I was 18.

16 Q. Wow. You've worked a long time.

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. So, going back to May 30th. We understand that the vessel
19 had orders to come into Houston. How long were you offshore at
20 anchorage?

21 A. So we came in 22 -- 22nd, and we come alongside 2024, or 2027
22 for the (indiscernible).

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. Then we finished the discharging, then we just ordered to go
25 to anchorage again for Vopak terminal. So 29, 2300 we give up the

1 anchor, was the pilot is 0-0-0. So then I take the pilot and
2 proceed to Vopak. Something is 3, 4 o'clock, we berthed at Vopak
3 5. Then start the discharging at 7 -- 0748 is happened, this kind
4 of thing. I was in my cabin to try to send the A&A report,
5 because next words was confirm, go and confirm, and I have to send
6 the 24 hours before. That is -- unfortunately at that time, they
7 had some issue. Their system is, something is happen. They not
8 receive the message. Normally I send the message, in 10 minutes
9 later I have to receive acknowledgement from them.

10 So when I face this one, I realize that this, I have to call
11 them. So I call them. They said, we having some issue, just call
12 us half hour later. So I called my agent. Then is -- when I just
13 working with this, I felt this shaking the vessel suddenly. So I
14 just went to do the bridge, checked around the vessel, because
15 sometimes the rope is can broke, the other vessel's
16 (indiscernible). And also alongside the bunker barge, this bunker
17 barge can be touch to the vessel. So I searched and it's nothing
18 there. So I went to my cabin, then I saw the ballast tank is
19 overflowing.

20 Q. From your cabin window?

21 A. Yeah. I can see it. So, and then the same time is third
22 officer call me come immediately to the deck. So I went to deck.
23 I saw the damage and I -- later, when I came to report to PI and
24 the company. And then I spoke with the captain also, his
25 instruction also, we inform the U.S. Coast Guard. And meantime,

1 the crew, I ordered to collect this overflowing ballast to the one
2 tank because we don't want any pollution.

3 Q. Okay. At what point did you know that the tank ruptured?

4 A. I think overpressure, because after they give the nitrogen as
5 agreement, as I know with the chief officer, after discussion,
6 they said just padding, but they didn't give the exact parameters,
7 how much they give, how they give, who is going to control. They
8 didn't give. And then later on we discuss with the other terminal
9 guys. They -- he came and he explained everything, but this -- he
10 said also that they have to give the beginning this information to
11 you in the (indiscernible).

12 Q. And that's that form?

13 A. Yeah, ship/shore checklist report.

14 Q. Yeah, yeah. And then this -- are you talking about this form
15 they're talking about earlier?

16 A. Yeah, yeah.

17 Q. So there is not a copy for the 30th? Or the 31st? There's
18 no --

19 A. Yes. As I know, no.

20 Q. There's no copy? Okay. In your experience on board these
21 type of vessels, who normally controls the flow or the pressure of
22 the nitrogen when you're receiving it from shore?

23 A. We should agree with the shore that this is the main things.
24 The shore has to give to clear the information to us.

25 Q. Um-hum.

1 A. They not open the valve and then leave. Because we have
2 something to do; they have something to do. We are cooperating.
3 That's why we doing to this ship/shore checklist. This is
4 agreement between us. So it's not just leaving to the vessel or
5 not leaving to the terminal things this. We have to be cooperate
6 and for the safe operation.

7 Q. Okay. So for this incident, you believe there was a
8 breakdown in that communication between the shore terminal and the
9 vessel?

10 A. I can say some information is missing from the terminal, not
11 clear information is coming from the terminal. And also, may --
12 we do something is also not to take a action, sudden action to
13 avoid this. But it's -- I can see from my cabin is it's not so
14 long time. It's very, very quick happen. I saw the ballast was
15 overflowing. I just go then to check the PV is, was lifted.
16 Because after this pressure, PV is not enough to release it, so
17 that's why is the tank is (indiscernible).

18 Q. Is there anything the vessel personnel could have done to
19 prevent the tank from rupturing?

20 A. I was just on my cabin, but I know from the -- after the
21 talking with the chief officer, so they talk with the terminal,
22 but they didn't get to who information.

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. So when the tank is commence the discharging, because this
25 cargo is, according to our instruction, because we receiving the

1 (indiscernible) instruction, should be discharged all time with a
2 positive pressure. So if the tank is, became in a vacuum means
3 that's going to suck the oxygen. So we have to avoid this. So
4 they open the -- this nitrogen valve. So that time, I think
5 nitrogen is not coming, but they suddenly give the nitrogen with
6 the 7 bar, is very big things for the vessel. So it's
7 (indiscernible) everything.

8 Q. Okay. That makes sense.

9 BY MR. WISNIEWSKI:

10 Q. Luke with NTSB. Captain, when you said -- you indicated 7
11 bar was coming from ashore, from the nitrogen?

12 A. Yeah, 7 bar.

13 Q. And where did you, where did you see -- where was that
14 recorded, the 7 bar?

15 A. It's later that we talk, the terminal that is --

16 Q. So you're --

17 A. -- their system, their system is here.

18 Q. Right. So that's the max pressure from the terminal?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. But is there any way for you to record that on board the
21 ship, or no?

22 A. Yeah. We have the gauging, also we have the controlling with
23 the gauging.

24 Q. This gauge?

25 A. Yeah. In the manifold we have the fixed gauging. When we

1 are gauging, we reading the gauging.

2 Q. So you have the local gauge?

3 A. Yeah, in the manifold.

4 Q. In the manifold?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. And that was removed because it was tanked at --

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. -- 2- -- roughly 280 kPa?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. So is there any other indication on board the ship for the

11 pressure?

12 A. We have line pressure on the CCR room, and also we have tank

13 pressures also there.

14 Q. On each tank you have --

15 A. Yeah, each tank have one.

16 Q. And do you know what that was set at, the kPa?

17 A. Normal kPa is 20 and minus 3.5., is normal operation. But

18 this -- regarding of this cargo sensitivity, the chief officer set

19 with the positive. Because we supposed to carry during the voyage

20 also keep 14 kPa and 18 kPa, and oxygen content less than 50 ppm,

21 according to instruction. So chief officer also, during the

22 discharging, he tried to manage to keep same range.

23 Q. And how are you -- how is the vessel ensuring that it's kept

24 below 50 ppm? Is that local monitors, or how is that --

25 A. So they just give us some equipment, special equipment. Then

1 we, during the voyage, we just keep the discharging, they keep on
2 board, and daily, twice we sent the report to the charter.

3 Q. So that's to charter party that's providing that equipment?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. To ensure the quality of the --

6 A. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

7 Q. -- cargo? Okay.

8 A. Everything from the charter. Because we receive from the
9 charter how should deal with the cargo. So we follow to this
10 instruction; otherwise, something's happen. The cargo is our
11 (indiscernible) --

12 Q. Potentially --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. -- contaminate the cargo.

15 A. Yes. Yeah, we have to follow to this instruction.

16 Q. Okay. We're going to ask for a copy of the -- I don't think
17 we have the charter party's lawyer. We'll ask for a copy from
18 them later, after this.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. When you made -- you indicated you were in your cabin. You
21 went downstairs to the CCR to -- when did you first make your
22 notification? Were you in the CCR when you made your
23 notifications?

24 A. No.

25 Q. To the Coast Guard, to the company?

1 A. No, I just go to my cabin. Then I called the -- because we,
2 before arrival here 2, 3 days ago, we have to make the
3 (indiscernible) with the QI. So that's why I notify the numbers,
4 so I directed, after the talking with the company, I just called
5 the QI because I have to inform them, because if something is
6 happen.

7 Q. The qualified individual?

8 A. Yes, qualified individual. I called them. Then I give all
9 the information. They said it's just wait, we're going to go to
10 our head, then it's going to be -- inform you. So I wait there,
11 but I have to take care of the other things, so I left in cabin.
12 So I called and update them also, QI, if -- because the
13 preliminary information, what I had, I give it to them. Then I
14 went down, then I check again. Then I call again them, then I
15 asked them to inform also the Coast Guard. They said we already
16 informed the Coast Guard. So after that, everybody will come to
17 visit, see what's happening on the vessel.

18 Q. And you made all those notifications from your cabin?

19 A. Yes, my --

20 Q. Not on the bridge?

21 A. No, because the -- I had a satellite phone in my cabin.

22 Q. Oh, okay, you're using a satellite phone.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Was there anyone up on the bridge at this time? There's no
25 one standing up on the bridge, right?

1 A. No, because when the vessel is berthed, we just cycle the
2 bridge, put all the equipment, one watch, or something, switch
3 off, whatever. Then we just go to CCR, because all thing is going
4 there.

5 Q. That's the center, okay.

6 A. Yeah.

7 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. I'm good at this time. Thanks.

8 BY MR. BARNUM:

9 Q. Captain, just a question for the SMS. Is there anything in
10 your SMS specific to your nitrogen blanketing or purging?

11 A. Yeah, of course.

12 Q. There is?

13 A. Of course. Is there, in front of you.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Chapter 6.

16 Q. All right. Okay. I'll have to review that again. But,
17 yeah, yeah, thank you. So I have no more questions.

18 BY MR. WISNIEWSKI:

19 Q. I just have one more, but it deals with the maintenance of
20 the departure vacuum test. I'm not sure if you know it or if
21 maybe it should have been directed to the chief officer or chief
22 engineer. Who maintains the records when they test the high limit
23 for pressure --

24 A. Chief officer, we have a SMS system --

25 Q. SMS procedure?

1 A. -- and also, far as PMS system that we keep in report. And
2 it's monthly, weekly, what the SMS is ordering to us, we keeping
3 them. If some technical things chief officer need, the chief
4 engineer will accompany to him, do some technical things. Today,
5 for example, we do hull's pressure test, also the chief engineer
6 was accompany to chief officer or assisting him any need, anything
7 he need.

8 Q. Yeah. And they are PMS, PM --

9 A. Yeah, Planning Management System.

10 Q. PMS.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. I got it. All right. And -- I think that's it.

13 MR. WISNIEWSKI: I had one more, but I can't remember it
14 right now. Okay.

15 [REDACTED] Okay. Well, thank you again, Captain. We're
16 going to conclude the interview, and then we're going to do a tour
17 of the vessel. Thanks.

18 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


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 MAY 30, 2019
 Interview of Captain Faik Yolun

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA19FM037

PLACE: Aboard the *Fairchem Filly*

DATE: June 4, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Deborah Dowling Sweigart
Transcriber